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Railroads and Aspects of Social Change in Senegal, 1878-1933
Abstract
In a dissertation, or any research subject for that matter, there are generally both narrow and broader queries
that can be pursued on a given theme. The narrow theme in this case concerns the "motives for French
railroad-building in Senegal." Unfortunately, despite prolonged searches through archival sources available in
Senegal, it soon became obvious that there were simply too many missing particulars to be able to complete
this story well. Even while searching out the missing information gaps for the narrow theme, however, it also
proved possible to gather abundant material for the broader theme of the social impact of the railroad in
Senegal, on trade patterns, on labor, and on land— sufficient material at the end of a two-year sojourn in
Senegal to write a dissertation regardless of the missing gaps in the narrow theme.
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PREFACE
In a dissertation, or any research subject for that 
matter, there are generally both narrow and broader 
queries that can be pursued on a given theme. The narrow 
theme in this case concerns the "motives for French 
railroad-building in Senegal." Unfortunately, despite 
prolonged searches through archival sources available 
in Senegal, it soon became obvious that there were simply 
too many missing particulars to be able to complete this 
story well. Even vdiile searching out the missing 
information gaps for the narrow theme, however, it also 
proved possible to gather abtndant material for the broader 
theme of the social impact of the railroad in Senegal, 
on trade patterns, on labor, and on land— sufficient 
material at the end of a two-year sojourn in Senegal to 
write a dissertation regardless of the missing gaps in 
the narrow theme.
These critical gaps had, in reality, been stored all 
along in Paris, xdostly in unclassified cartons at the
- 1-
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French National Archives, Section d'Outre-Mer. Happily, 
all of this became available, just before I arrived in 
Paris, with the French government's relaxation of the 
fifty-year rule. Given the bonanza of information at 
Paris added to the riches already collected in Senegal, 
it thus became possible to write on either of the themes. 
It is hoped that the reader will welcome this attempt to 
combine some of the more promising elements of both 
narrow and broad themes within one dissertation, despite 
the consequent necessary neglect of interesting sidelights 
and omission of detail.
The narrow theme of French motives serves as the 
main chronological thread for the dissertation and 
forms the major concern within Chapters I, II, IV, and 
VII, and to some extent Chapter III. The more interesting 
and challenging problem of the role played by the rail­
road in shaping the colonial situation in Senegal is taken 
up more specifically in Chapter V on labor and Chapter VI 
on land. Chapters III and IV also grapple to some extent 
with the impact of the railroad on trade patterns and 
population movements. The complexity and abundance of 
the available material forced analysis at a more general
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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level, and the results are by no means definitive; but 
it is hoped that they may serve as a frame of reference 
for further studies.
French motives in building railroads^ it should be 
added, also have their own broader implications because 
of the ways in which the actions and attitudes of Euro­
peans toward Africa and Africans were conditioned by the 
sensed loss in mobility, and therefore a heightened sense 
of isolation, experienced by Europeans in the African 
environment— a notion that served to guide the general 
approach taken in this dissertation. Significant at 
first only because of the rigors of a foreign climate, 
this relative loss in mobility would become more per­
ceptible and more vexatious to Europeans from the mid-19th 
century as mobility and the pace of life within an 
industrializing Europe grew. The growing disparity in 
the mobilities, indeed the internal rhythms, of European 
and African societies may have been only a secondary 
factor in the general encounter of the two societies, 
with their differing norms, symbols and values. But, this 
disparity imposed, nevertheless, certain constraints on 
the nature of their contact.
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Time limitations required that the study be confined 
spatially to Senegal--to cover the Dakar-St. Louis and 
the Thies-Kayes railroads and their small branch lines-- 
to the neglect of the Kayes-Niger section of the Dakar- 
Niger rail line. The year 1878, when a definitive Dakar- 
St. Louis rail project was drawn up, was a logical start­
ing date. Choosing the terminal point at 1933 was more 
arbitrary owing largely to the difficulty of carrying 
the story to 1948 within a reasonable time. However, in 
retrospect, 1933 turns out indeed to have been a very 
suitable cut-off point, since a major break in the 
economic and social history of Senegal, if not its poli­
tical history, did take place at that time. For lack of 
space and time, the story of Lat Dior's struggle against 
the railroad--already done in some detail from documentary 
sources by Germaine Ganier and Vincent Monteil-- can only 
be touched on briefly.
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CHAPTER I
THE INCEPTION OF SENEGALESE RAILROADS
it is not alone and without arms, at the tail of a 
native caravan or under the inadequate care of camel 
drivers that we ought to penetrate there; but in a 
locomotive, with all the material power, all the 
moral prestige that our industrial and civilizing 
power permits us to have at our command; with the 
help of a railroad following us step by seep--simul­
taneously an engine of conquest, of replenishment, 
and of exploration.
-A. Duponchel, 1880^
The first question that comes to mind is, why study 
railroads of all things? The impact of railroads seems 
familiar and obvious. Railroads were faster than earlier 
modes of transportation, could carry more, and were more 
convenient--at least until the motor car came along. These 
commonplaces, however, seem obvious simply because so 
little is really understood about the workings of our 
society or other societies of the past or present. In 
reality, the railroads have had a broad range of often 
subtle, intangible impacts on the fabric of society--alter­
ing it in ways that being untraceable or unmeasurable, have 
to be labeled indirect effects, perhaps only to be briefly 
mentioned before going on to the items that can be 
analyzed.^
- 1-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
FI
GU
RE
 
1
MO
DE
RN
 
SE
NE
GA
L 
AND
 
ITS
 
RA
IL
RO
AD
S
+++*•+44*--+
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 3 -
For African society, a study of railroads seems even 
more vexing because the rail lines were, after all, 
inserted into Africa by the colonial powers for their own 
purposes, usually without much regard for the wishes of the 
Africans directly involved; moreover, these railroads 
impinged on the lives of these Africans in indirect ways 
generally--acting largely as instruments through which 
external economic forces and political control could be 
brought to bear on the local scene.
It would be immensely difficult to summarize in a 
few lines the intricately complex social and political 
developments in the West African societies of the Senegal- 
Sudan region before the advent of the railroad and the 
"scramble for Africa." But it may be said that the 
principal motifs were the distortion and decay of tradi­
tional political structures, first under the impact of the 
Atlantic slave trade, then on this trade's demise; the 
resurgence and expansion of Islam in a militantly reformist
form; and the persistence, through adaptation, of character-
3
istic African social structures and modes of thought.
Historical change in precolonial Sengambia centered 
not so much upon the strife among social classes, nor upon 
the clash of one cultural "ethnic" group with another, nor 
even on the incessant struggles for political supremacy
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among rival, but kindred aristocracies, nor on the 
promising concommittant growth of "legitimate" commerce 
with Europe-- though all these developments did occur. 
Instead, change centered on the expansion of Islam 
throughout the region, particularly in the attempts of 
puritanical "marabouts" to forge immense Islamic empires-- 
in great jihads, which could also act as vehicles for 
other aspects of social change (See Appendix 1 and 
Figure 2 for some details).
After the colonial conquest, however, the impact of 
the loss of political sovereignty to the French and the 
progressive absorption of the region's economy into a 
global trade market also became crucial processes genera­
ting change within Senegambian society, alongside the 
continuing, even more rapid Islamization of the region's
4
inhabitants. Thus, whatever the continued importance of 
Islamization in social change--and it may be argued indeed 
that Islamization was still the most important of these 
central processes--it is undeniable that Africans were 
obliged thenceforth to cope in their ordinary, everyday 
encounters and economic concerns with what Balandier has 
termed the "colonial s i t u a t i o n . T h e  railroad was, of 
course, one element helping to shape the colonial situa­
tion that was intruding into African life, and it is in 
this sense that a study of the railroad merits particular
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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attention.
In Africa, as elsewhere, railroads offered promising 
solutions to the constraints imposed by nature since, un­
like a fixed river valley, a railroad could carve out new, 
more convenient lines of communication far from the valleys, 
and it was less subject to seasonal variations. Yet, 
railroad construction and exploitation in West Africa 
differed substantially in certain senses from rail under­
takings in other climes.
For H. S. Frankel, the distinctive feature setting 
off African railroads from those of other global regions 
lay in the continent's relative underpopulation, which 
impaired the financial profitability of railroad ventures 
and thereby hamstrung their potential for generating 
economic growth (or attracting capital).^ Equal weight, 
however, should also be given to the question of political 
control and responsibility, since the African railroads 
were built in response to European needs in an African 
environment, rather than specifically for African needs.
Railroads built in Europe, for instance, took into 
account the preexisting social complex within which they 
were constructed. It was not simply that existing popula­
tion centers were pivotal foci necessarily figuring in 
the calculations of railroad planners, but also that 
European governments had taken care to ensure that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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existing social and economic geographies of their own
countries were not altered too quickly or in directions
that were unacceptable to at least some local entrenched 
7
interests. Less burdened by such considerations or by 
immoderate costs for right of way passage, "pioneering" 
rail lines in the American West could in contrast first 
be traced out with a freer hand on the basis of economic 
and geographical considerations. These lines then would 
supply the framework around which the society settling
g
the West afterwards could spread out and grow.
Colonial railroad building in West Africa offers a 
distinctive contrast to experiences in both the American 
West and Europe. In West Africa, as in Europe, the ■ 
peoples of the social communities already settled in place 
had a vital stake in the existing regional social and 
economic geographies and in the manner of their alteration. 
However, those who made the decisions regarding the 
remolding of the West African economic and social geogra­
phies with railroads were Europeans, unaccountable as a 
rule to the Africans involved. Indeed they were often 
metropolitan Europeans who had never even visited Africa.
The French, whose movements were severely hampered 
by what was for them a hard, alien climate, were not think­
ing, moreover, in terms of the "presettled" model of 
railroad building applicable in Europe. Beholding in
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West Africa an underpopulated region, unlike the densely-
settled colonial areas of Asia, the French considered
indeed that they were operating in virtually virgin
territory, which was to be "opened up" by pioneering raii-
9
roads around which a new society would grow. it was the 
dazzling success of American railroad development, not of 
European, that captured the attention of French colonial 
railroad builders as the model to be copied for African 
railroads, and the French were acutely conscious that 
they were not simply implanting lines of steel rails in 
Africa, but also infusing a complex system of European 
substructure and culture along the thin ribbons of 
territory about these rails.
Two difficult problems are encountered in trying to 
trace the social impact of the railroad in Africa. First 
of all, although the importance of the railroad economi­
cally, strategically, and politically is undeniable, its 
role as a conveyor of European innovations perhaps crucial 
in certain respects, it is often difficult to separate 
the specific impacts of the railroads, direct and indirect, 
on life in Senegal from those caused by other innovations 
carried into the region (often by the railroads them­
selves). Thus, while much of the prosperity of towns and 
ports served by rails was due to the railroad, it was 
really the European export commerce acting through the
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railroad that had made the prosperity possible; and the 
morphological growth of these centers was also more 
closely linked to the needs of commerce and the municipal 
policies of the colonial government than to any intrinsic 
effects of the railroad on local geography. It is only 
possible,therefore, to understand the social impact of 
the railroad, if other broader developments are taken 
into account.
Furthermore, some effects specifically springing from
the railroad can be so diffuse and intangible in their
manifold, indirect social and psychological results that
it becomes almost impossible to pinpoint or trace many
of them, even if they may be significant. An analysis
of the rail locomotive, or of Western machinery in
general, as value-laden symbols in African society, for
example, would be of great interest--certainly the French
thought the locomotives would make a powerful, even
terrifying impression; but this question requires special
11
research efforts not attempted here. The marabouts of
Senegal, likewise, took to the rails at an early date,
employing them as effective instruments for the wider
12
propogation of Islam; and many young men also took 
advantage of an increased accessibility of travel for 
enjoying in a new way the familiar pastimes of voyaging 
for pleasure and adventure. But how could this be measured
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Of these indirect social effects perhaps all that can 
be done for the moment is to sum them up in the catchword 
of MaccessibilityM--obviously the increased accessibility 
and exposure of Africans, particularly those previously 
isolated in the interior, to European military, economic, 
and cultural penetration and reciprocally the accessi­
bility to Africans of European goods and ideas; but also 
the increased mutual reciprocal accessibility among 
Africans for interchanges of goods, lands, or ideas.
This being said, the multitudinous, intangible aspects of 
accessibility, unfortunately, have to be left aside. It 
is in the more obvious sense of the notion of accessi­
bility- -that dominating the thought of French planners of 
colonial railroads--that the thread of the story can be 
more easily followed.
Geographical access Precolonial West Africa, and more
specifically pre-railroad West Africa, was faced with
particularly harsh transportation problems. Both the shape
of the African continent as an essentially massive block
without strongly indented coast lines and the region's
shortage of navigable waterways inhibited the growth of
13a substantial water-borne traffic.
With little dramatic relief, the key geographical 
features marking out the Senegambian region are indeed 
those of drainage, principally the Senegal and Gambia
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rivers that rise in the Futa Djallon massif well to the 
south to flow in a generally westerly direction to the sea. 
Only slightly to the east, the Niger river rises in the 
Futa Djallon and Guinea highlands, but flows contrariwise 
in a northeastern direction into the Sudanese interior; then 
bends sharply southeastward after skimming the rim of the 
Sahara to flow down to the Gulf of Guinea--managing there­
by to encompass in its path much of the expanse of the 
West African interior. The forms of these two river basins 
and their alignment with each other would suggest major 
highways for commercial traffic; but in fact there were a 
number of obstacles, physical, economic, and social, 
inhibiting the flow of commerce along them.
The prevalence of weather fronts roughly paralleling 
the southern tier of the West African coast, and their sea­
sonal movement in north to south directions, created in West 
Africa a diverse range of climatic and vegetative conditions 
that encouraged domestic interchanges of goods among the 
differing zones (such as salt from the Sahara and kolas from 
forest areas toward the Sudanese grasslands). But these 
climatic and vegetative zones running generally (with local 
variations) in east to west belts--corresponding to decreas­
ing annual rainfall and progressive dessication as one 
proceeds northward--tended to support domestic trade in 
a north-south direction rather than in the east to west
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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orientation of the Senegal-Niger axis.
To compound transportation difficulties, extensive
use of animal-borne traffic was precluded over substantial
zones infested by tse-tse flies, whereas in dry regions
free of the sleeping sickness carried by the tse-tse,
water shortages could be a serious burden or even a peril 
15to travellers. Moreover, the dramatic seasonal movement 
of weather fronts could disrupt the regularity of both 
land and water-borne traffic in Sahelian and Sudanese 
West Africa. Thus, during the rainy season, water-borne 
traffic would flourish as rising water levels swelled the 
rivers and reinvigorated dry Mmarigot"beds; but many land 
routes were also cut by the same flooding waters. During 
the dry season, on the other hand, water traffic shrank 
or ceased when falling water levels dried marigot beds 
and left river channels clogged with emerging obstacles-- 
even while some land routes also became unusable for lack 
of drinking water.^ The close relation between transpor­
tation ease and the quantity and timing of rainfall also 
made transit arrangements difficult to predict on a year- 
to-year basis.
Widespread domestic market systems did develop in 
West Africa despite the physical difficulties; but the 
currents of domestic and external commerce could have been 
stronger had there not also been economic and social
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obstacles to the growth of commerce. Particularly crip­
pling to the growth of long-distance commerce was the 
low value of most of the commodities that were likely to
be traded (gold, ivory, slaves were high valued, easily-
17transported exceptions). Low cost transportation over
waterways aligned in the right directions might have
stimulated the growth of commerce for the lower valued 
18goods. But even where such river alignments occurred,
such as on the lower Niger river, unsettled political
conditions, the interests of local trading monopolies,
and the conservative mores of some social ethos often
deterred much potential long-distance trade. Perhaps
the real importance of the rivers in precolonial Sudanese
Africa lay less in their role as highways of trade than as
magnets for population--creating, with reliably abundant
waters, populated centers within the parched Sudanese 
19
region.
European interest Despite a long history of contact with 
the coast of tropical Africa in modern times, Europeans
had displayed little relative interest in exploring the
2 ninterior of Africa until just before the 19th century. 
Already hampered by the geographic and climatic diffi­
culties of the region, Europeans encountered in tropical 
Africa endemic diseases of a virulence unequalled in any 
other quarter of the globe, and they were soon easily
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distracted by the allure of richer, more accessible lands 
elsewhere. The rigors of a foreign climate, with sudden, 
sharp fluctuations in temperature adding to the fierceness 
of sun and heat sapped the European's vigor even as deadly 
diseases took a heavy toll among his companions--a fright­
ening experience since it was believed that the diseases 
sprang from the climate and the very soil of Africa. The 
difficulties of access to West Africa seemed all the more 
formidable to an outsider since access to the interior was 
guarded on the north by desert and semi-arid zones and 
along the southern littoral by a dense rain forest.
Perhaps the apparent disinterest arose, in large 
part, out of the poisoned atmosphere born of the Atlantic 
slave trade. With violence always possible, European 
traders rarely ventured into the interior, generally 
huddling instead on ships and offshore islands, or in 
forts that hugged the coast. For Africans, on the other 
hand, the arms procured by the trade were so important for 
security that the layers of intermediate African traders 
had every reason to discourage direct contact between the 
coast and the interior. In any case, an unremunerative 
European occupation of African soil in the face of the 
physical and military odds made little sense.
By the 19th century, several developments were 
acting to erode the strength of these physical and
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psychological barriers. Successful humanitarian efforts 
to end the slave trade, for one thing, had turned popular 
European attention to the persistence of this trade in 
the African interior. Europe was industrializing, and the 
new industrial technology was disgorging a plethora of new 
devices and techniques. There were steady gains in the 
speed and capacity of modes of locomotion and communication, 
as well as enormous advances in improved weaponry of pro­
gressively increasing firepower. Thus, the power equation 
between Europe and Africa was strongly altered by a 
growing European military superiority, while a series of 
medical discoveries breaching the invisible barriers of 
tropical diseases allowed the new military technology 
to be brought to bear directly on the scene. By the 
1880*s and 1890's, Europeans had acquired so dispropor­
tionate a military edge, that relatively trivial numbers 
of Europeans leading African troops could prevail against 
well-organized African empires of military renown.
At the same time, the needs of an industrializing 
Europe for the cheap, raw materials (peanuts, palm oil, 
rubber, etc.) available in West Africa also fostered a 
growing trade with the region, drawing to its coasts new 
merchants and new attention. For European traders, the 
rivers would immediately suggest avenues for penetration 
into the interior, moving highways on which trade might
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flow easily and cheaply, and on which Europeans could 
glide quickly in relative security and comfort on their 
own vessels. But even if Europeans did use the rivers 
to establish trading posts farther inland, much, if not 
most of the trade with the interior, even along the 
rivers, was in the hands of African intermediaries. 
Occasional European visits to the interior generally had 
the character of adventures of little regularity, and 
Europeans seem to have known little of realities in the 
interior or of the active African trade networks of the 
region.
A growing trade had sparked new interest in West 
Africa and had given some Europeans a new material stake 
in the region; but it hardly follows that this impelled 
the European governments to occupy large slices of 
African soil. Perhaps it was rather that a Europe 
enriched by the surpluses of industrialism could now 
afford to indulge in such overseas enterprises with
22
little return as the difficult conquest of West Africa.
Early French expansion Durable French trading contacts 
with the Senegambian region date from 1659. Objects of 
the rivalries of the European maritime powers in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, the island port of St. Louis in the 
Senegal river's mouth and Goree, 150 kilometers to the 
south, definitely passed to the French in 1816. Farther
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down the coast lay other French posts scattered from the 
"Petite C8te" to the Saloum, the Casamance, the "Southern 
Rivers," even down to Gabon. Interspersed with these posts 
were strings of colonial trading posts of other European 
nations--such as the Portugese at Bissau and on the 
Casamance and, most importantly, the solid British posi­
tions at Sierra Leone and on the Gambia river--the posts 
on the latter virtually blocking French penetration by 
this route.^
The Senegal river, of course, afforded the French 
a major avenue for penetration into the interior. The 
French had indeed taken advantage of this opportunity in 
making a number of notable forays to the Upper Senegal, 
even in the 17th and 18th centuries. But these efforts 
were sporadic in nature, especially since the upper parts 
of the river were navigable only for a short season from 
August to mid-October, and even then with difficulty.
After the failure, from 1816, of French officials to turn 
Senegal into an agricultural plantation colony, the river 
trade largely remained in the hands of African and creole 
intermediaries based at St. Louis.^
The Senegal river, indeed, was the primary axis for 
the first major attempt at territorial conquest in the 
interior. While commercial motives were not entirely 
absent, this forward movement of French imperialism in
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the Senegambia from the 18 50's seems to have been provoked
by military officers who refused to tolerate any longer
any form (real or token) of subordination to neighboring
African powers and who resolved to end with military force
the local civil and religious wars that were disrupting
25
trade with the interior.
From 1854 on, the colony of Senegal took on a decidely
martial tone, with especial emphasis on the domination of
the Senegal river's banks by ships' artillery and well-
placed military posts. At the end of 1854, a new governor,
Louis Faidherbe, launched a program of continental ex-
26
pansion based frankly on the Algerian model. Along the
river, the neighboring arabo-berber Moors were vanquished,
chased out of Oualo, and then forced to trade gum on French
terms, even while Oualo itself was annexed by the colony
(see Figure 2). While the Tukolor nation along the middle
Senegal river was overawed with French arms, the reformist
Tukolor marabout El Hadj Umar was turned back from the
Upper Senegal, and a French post installed permanently at
27
Medine in Khasso.
French forces were soon equally active along the 
Atlantic coast, with Cape Verde, next to Goree, occupied 
and annexed in 18 57 and Rufisque taken in 18 59. Ex­
peditions were launched into the interior to overawe Cayor, 
Sine, Saloum, and the Casamance, while new posts were es-
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tablished along the African coast farther south, down to 
Gabon.
One of the most vexing strategic problems of this 
unfolding expansion was the separation of St. Louis and 
the Senegal river basin from French bases at Gor£e and 
Dakar by the powerful kingdom of Cayor lying between. A 
project submitted by one French officer in 1856 suggested 
linking the two wings of the colony with a coastal rail­
road; but finally only a connecting coastal telegraph
28
protected by military posts was actually undertaken.
Even for the telegraph, Cayor had first to be invaded in 
force in 1861, a French protege installed as "darnel" of 
Cayor, and a strip of Atlantic seaboard for the line 
annexed by the colony. When control of Cayor through a 
pro-French darnel failed, all of Cayor was conquered and 
annexed directly to the French colony.
Warriors of progress The striking prominence of military 
engineers in colonial expansion--those of the colonial 
artillery as well as the corps of engineers--was not 
accidental but indeed indicative of a cardinal aspect of 
the process of French imperialism in West Africa that was 
to emerge full-blown in the 1880’s. From a modern 
perspective, the imperialist proconsuls may appear as well- 
shod barbarians perverting a new technology for aggressive 
purposes; indeed it would be easy to assemble a compendium
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 2 0 -
29
of brutal, even grisly imperialist acts. One should 
not ignore, however, the very firm, contrary belief of 
officers spearheading the imperialist advance (governors 
Faidherbe, Pinet-Laprade, among others) that they stood 
indeed in the forefront of modernism--as the advanced 
cutting edge, on a planetary scale, of a triumphant 
industrial society. The undeniable sincerity of this 
belief is indeed underscored by the striking penchant of 
French colonial officers and officials to introduce, some­
times prematurely, the latest technological devices into 
Africa--telegraph and railroad lines in the 1850’s, electri­
cal municipal lighting in the 1880's, the automobile in
30
1899, the airplane in 1918.
Perhaps part of the reason for the prominence of
military engineers in imperial expansion lies in the well-
known elan and solidarity of graduates of the French Ecole 
31Polytechnique. Much more of the answer lies in the 
apparent challenge presented by the physical obstacles in 
West Africa that seemed so forbidding to intruders. It 
was here within this environment, that a certain type of 
mentality, fusing complementary elements of the (ideal) 
characters of technologist and military conqueror, could 
find a wide arena for expression in a way that would have 
seemed inappropriate in the prosaic atmosphere of metro­
politan Europe. For in Africa, both exploratory penetra-
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tion and engineering ventures, even in the name of
peaceful expansion, would take the form of assaults upon
32
a powerful, contrary, even hostile nature. This
struggle need not be grim but even exuberant. Certainly
a sense of joy is manifest in Pinet-Laprade’s espousal
of a coastal railroad in 1856, as he wrote,
what nature has done and would certainly never do, 
the Genius of man has provided the means to accomplish. 
The marvels of our century, the application of steam 
and electricity to useful things are the most power­
ful means that man has ever manipulated . . . Already 
our small steamships are considered in these parts, 
with reason, as the most powerful means to enlarge 
our relations with the interior of Africa . . .  is it 
not certain that one day it will be desirable to unite 
the important centers by other routes? Will this 
operation be accomplished by ordinary roads with 
their slow, incessant traffic, or by the perfected 
means of railroads?
Retrenchment But these early dreams of soldiers and 
builders were soon dashed, more by decisions made in the 
metropole than by the actual physical difficulties encoun­
tered in the colony. Following Faidherbe's departure and 
his successor Pinet-Laprade's death in 1869, the area of 
French-held territory was sharply reduced. French 
garrisons were withdrawn from many posts. Cayor was 
abandoned, except for Diander with its port of Rufisque 
and the thin telegraph corridor from Cape Verde to Gandiole.
The French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war 
Certainly accelerated the French retreat. But for budgetary
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reasons, French authorities had already embarked before-
34
hand, in 1869, on a policy of retrenchment in Senegal.
If financial austerity now became paramount, transporta­
tion and communication difficulties in Senegal certainly 
played a major role in determining where retrenchment 
would take place. Thus, it was easier to maintain a post 
at far-off Medine on the Upper Senegal than in nearby 
Cayor, where even modest road-building efforts had failed 
and where military rule could be enforced only with 
periodic cavalry sweeps.^ The gravity of the problem 
is perhaps best expressed in an account of the later 
conquest by a French officer of the 1890's, who wrote,
One imagines that the native constituted the 
greatest obstacle,the most fearsome peril. That's 
not so! The Negroes, except in certain regions, were 
neither warlike enough nor sufficiently organized to 
resist us. It was nature itself that in its tropical 
zeal raised itself against the European . . .The 
Negro, the savage of the woods, the cannibal, the 
Mahdist armies were nothing; their arrows or their 
rifles didn't count; the insurmountable obstacle was 
always the transportation of an enormous, heavy 
ordnance across a country without roads. 36
Railroads, of course, offered one solution of the 
military logistics problem; but, there were no funds for 
that. Instead the French retreated back into a scatter­
ing of trading and military posts dotting the coast and 
the Senegal river. Still a paramount military power in
the region, the colony had become, in some senses, once
37
again peripheral to it.
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The Transsaharan As is well-known since the important
article by Newbury and Kanya-Forstner, it was an enthusiasm
in the French metropole for a rail line across the Sahara
that rekindled, in 1879, French colonial expansion in 
3 8Senegal. Scorned in this century because it was so 
ill-conceived at the time, the Transsaharan project has 
not received the attention it deserves, for the contem­
porary debates on this project, occuring as they do on the
eve of the "scramble for Africa," offer certain absorbing
39
insights into the nascent French colonial party.
Sparked itself by an enthusiastic public response 
to the engineer A. Duponchel's book Chemin de fer 
transsaharan, a serious study of the Transsaharan had been 
undertaken in 1879 under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Public W o r k s . T h e  leading actor in this effort was 
Charles de Freycinet, the Minister of Public Works, who 
had been preparing since entering this post in 1878 an 
ambitious program for 4500 kms of new rail lines in 
metropolitan France together with proposals for extension 
of the Algerian rail network. What was more natural than 
the study of a Transsaharan railroad as well?^
Freycinet first formed a preliminary study commission 
on the Transsaharan in May 1879; and when this body issued 
a favorable report, he formed a full commission, seating 
parliamentary and ministerial representatives alongside 
explorers, railroad managers, geographic society members,
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and such "personalities” as Ferdinand de Lesseps.^ The 
full commission was divided by Freycinet into four sub­
commissions, whose members were soon at loggerheads over 
which route should be followed into the Sahara. Commission 
meetings continued inconclusively into 1881, when the
massacre of the Flatters expedition in the Sahara exposed
43more clearly the drawbacks and perils of the enterprise.
It is in the various arguments raised during debates 
on the Transsaharan that one can see a fascinating mixture 
of motives: the already archaic humanitarian concerns of 
an earlier generation mingling with the prophetic stirrings 
of a coming, harder imperial age. One humanitarian argu­
ment, soon also invoked to justify occupation of the Congo, 
was of the need to interdict slave caravan routes in 
Africa--a function that the Transsaharan would presumably 
perform as it traversed the Sahara. But the main thrust 
of the Transsaharan lay elsewhere.
Designed to overleap the barrier of the Sahara desert, 
which separated Algeria from the Sudan and blocked French 
access to the interior from the direction, the Transsaharan 
was only one of a number of bold concepts conceived by the 
fertile imaginations of French engineers in the 19th 
century. The reconstruction of Paris, the piercing of 
Alpine tunnels, and the ports and railroad nets built in 
France and elsewhere testify indisputably to their techni­
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cal v i r t u o s i t y T h e  creation o£ the Suez canal, in 
particular, was a glorious triumph, and even the abortive 
Panama canal scheme was vindicated later on as a general 
concept. A Transsaharan railroad was even more imagina­
tive than the canals since it aimed, like the contemporary 
American Transcontinental and the future Trans-Siberian, 
at transforming the nature of a vast continental region.
Unfortunately, as logically seductive as the 
Transsaharan might be, it was based at the time largely 
on two mistaken ideas. European explorers had indicated 
earlier that parts of the Sudan were rich and thickly 
populated. Speculation extrapolated the observed riches 
into an imagined opulence covering all of the Sudanese 
interior, although prudent observers realized that only 
the Hausa country in the east was known to be prosperous. 
Far more serious was the mistaken notion--which persisted 
until disproved by Binger's mission of 1886-1889--that 
the Sudanese heartland was isolated from easy access to 
the West African littoral by a chain of high mountains 
paralleling the coast: the mythical mountains of Kong 
(see Figure 3). In accordance with this idea, the 
possession of bases in Algeria, as well as at other coastal 
springboards at Senegal and Gabon, gave France an immense 
positional advantage over other European nations. A bold 
advance from Algeria would presumably deliver this rich
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Sudanese heartland into French hands. The French need 
move quickly, it was argued, because rival powers were 
supposedly preparing to outflank a French Transsaharan 
with their o’.vn railroad projects--from Morocco to Timbuktu 
(a British scheme supposedly), from Tripoli to Bornu 
(German), or from Liberia to the Upper Niger (American 
and British).^5
The Transsaharan enthusiasm was, of course, strongly
permeated by an underlying anxiety shared by Frenchmen at
this time over the apparent decline of French power. Even
in the 1860's, some Frenchmen had already been uneasy
about the greater potential strength of such powers as
Britain, Russia, and America, which controlled much larger
masses of land and people than France. These fears were
generalized within France and intensified acutely by
the military defeats of the Franco-Prussian war and the
subsequent humiliating territorial losses to a newly-
born German empire. A vivid demonstration of the nation's
vigor seemed necessary to restore confidence; but renewed
warfare in Europe was unthinkable at the time. Expansion
46
overseas, however, might serve the same purpose.
In this sense, an expanded Algeria could be regar­
ded not only as a replacement for the lost Alsace-Lorraine, 
but also as France's equivalent of the American frontier, 
with the potential to create new fields of opportunity
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fov French enterprise while expanding the nation's power 
base. A bold stroke of technical ingenuity by French 
talent might restore French eminence by opening up a 
new continental frontier or a new African India.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find the 
Transsaharan enthusiasts insisting on a French, and not 
an international complexion to the enterprise. A scheme 
outlined by one enthusiast, the engineer Alphe de Beau 
Rochas, would have had the Transsaharan opening up an 
immense French imperium in the.center of Africa, extend­
ing down from the Sahara to embrace the entire Sudan 
and generous portions of the equatorial hinterland, in­
cluding the northern Congo basin. A network of new 
Transsafrican railroads crisscrossing this empire would 
even have spanned the continent to link up with the French- 
held east African port at Obock.^
Railroads had been a great boon to commerce and 
industry in Europe and America. The common supposition 
of the Transsaharan enthusiasts was that railroads would 
generate a comparable phenomenal growth of peaceful 
commerce in the interior of Africa. The railroad was 
expected to bring not only a new prosperity to the region, 
but also peace as it curtailed and supplanted the slave 
trade--the major source of chronic, endemic warfare in 
the interior.
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There were, however, important differences in
opinion over the manner in which construction would be
undertaken. For example, in his advocacy of reconnoiter-
ing possible rail traces for a Transsaharan with unarmed
individuals dependent on local African authorities and at
their mercy, Paul Soleillet was clinging to an earlier
vision of the European explorer in Africa as the heroic
figure on which metropolitan Europe had lavished so much
adulation inthe recent past. Soleillet's approach,
however, also had the merit of making rail construction
in Africa hinge on the assent and cooperation of local
48
African authorities.
Others, even while paying lip service to the prin­
ciple of peaceful penetration in cooperation with Africans, 
were obviously inclined to more forceful methods. Duponchel, 
for one, in roundly opposing Soleillet's gentler projects 
and methods, clearly heralded a new, harsh era in Euro- 
African relations. When poor Soleillet advocated his 
contrary opinions too openly and too indiscretely, he
was summarily ejected from Senegal by the French gover-
49nor and obliged to do exploring elsewhere. Even 
Duponchel was elbowed aside in Algeria by others, includ­
ing ambitious military officers eager to lead the large 
armed parties sent to reconnoiter likely traces for the 
railroad into the Sahara.
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Few tears, however, need be shed for Duponchel,
whose work hardly merited the attention it received.
Though his credentials as an enginner could lend credence
to the practicability of the project, Duponchel had, as
he himself admitted, drawn up his Transsaharan scheme
on the basis of sketch/accounts of earlier explorers of
the Sahara and Sudan instead of making personal surveys
of the interior himself.^ He had not been above making
misleading comparisons with the American Transcontinental,
and when his proposed trace was criticized, he easily
abandoned it to advocate another.^ Duponchel was, in
fact, less interested in the technical difficulties of
a Transsaharan than in assuming command of a special
’’Direction" charged with constructing the railroad, and
he pressed for the immediate opening of construction work
on the Transsaharan without waiting for precise informa-
52
tion on the terrain beyond.
It was fortunate, of course, that the Transsaharan
project was not undertaken. Aside from the geographical
misconception about the mountains of Kong and the obvious
economic weaknesses of a long railroad passing through a
desert, it is probable that a reliable Transsaharan rail-
53road was never really technically feasible.
The exaggerated faith of the promoters in the 
potential of the Transsaharan, of course, was a common
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vice of railroad advocates in the 19th century.54 Never­
theless, it is important to note that the project had 
beenfoundering even before 1881, not so much on the 
impracticalities, but because its advocates were hope­
lessly divided into three irreconciliable factions, each 
based on a different department of Algeria--Oran in the 
west, Algiers in the center, and the Constantine- 
Philippeville area in the east. The central trace origi­
nally proposed by Duponchel and Soleillet was of little 
interest to the eastern railroads (the B0ne-Guelma and 
East-Algerian), which had no rail line with Algiers at 
this early date, or for the ardent partisans of Oran, 
eager to make their region the terminus of an expanding 
frontier.^ Each Algerian region could marshall friends 
in the metropole, and the choice of a departure point 
soon deadlocked the Transsaharan commissions.
About the best chance for a rapid solution came 
during the July 29th session of the 2nd sub-commission, 
which recommended a line of departure from Biskra to 
Ouargla--a trace equally accessible from Algiers or Con­
stantine.^ However, led by military officers sympathetic 
with a trace from Oran, the first and third sub-commissions 
soon rallied against the proposal, and it was quashed in
c 7
a plenary session of the full Commission. Henceforth, 
studies were pursued along a multitude of traces,
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until the debacle of the Flatters expedition quenched 
the Transsaharan enthusiasm. The divisions of the 
Transsaharan enthusiasts, however, presented an ideal 
opportunity for exponents of another scheme for reach­
ing the Sudan from a different direction--from the colony 
of Senegal.
Jaureguiberry The arrival in Senegal of Louis Bri^re de
l'Isle, colonel of marine infantry, as governor in 1876
is often cited as opening the second period of expansion
of the colony. Bridre's governorship from 1876 to 1881
was a period of intense activity during which the con-
58tours of the future Senegal began to take shape.
Briere was indeed intent on resurrecting Faidherbe's
dreams of military expansion, and he proceeded in short
order to initiate military actions in two widely separated
areas--on the Upper Senegal and in the coastal "Southern 
cq
rivers." Ineffectively restrained by a not always well- 
informed Ministry of Marine and Colonies in Paris, Briere's 
scope for aggressive action was, nonetheless, very limited 
until the appointment in January 18 79 of Admiral Jean 
Bernard Jaureguiberry as Minister of Marine and Colonies-- 
a key figure, as Newbury and Kanya-Forstner have pointed 
out, primarily responsible for initiating the rebirth of 
colonial expansion in Senegal.^
On taking office in 1879, Jaureguiberry was reach­
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ing the pinnacle of a career in which he had already 
distinguished himself as a commander in Vietnam and China 
during the Far Eastern c a m p a i g n s R e w a r d e d  afterward 
in December 1861 with the governorship of Senegal, replac­
ing Faidherbe, the young Jaureguiberry had erred badly in 
a treacherously-complicated situation in Cayor, and the 
situation was retrieved only with the return of Faidherbe. 
As governor in 1862, Jaureguiberry had proposed subduing
Cayor by building a good road, then a railroad, to the
6 2
post of N'Dande in the interior. He can only have been 
delighted 17 years later, when Briere submitted to the 
ministry a new, updated and detailed version of a railroad 
project into Cayor.
Bridre's project concerned only construction of a 
railroad between Dakar and St. Louis. But it was obvious 
that the current enthusiasm for a Transsaharan provided 
an excellent opportunity for more ambitious projects from 
Senegal. A glance at a map would immediately show that 
a railroad of 1200 kms from Senegal to the Sudan made much 
more sense than a 2400 km Transsaharan built across a 
desert; and a Senegal-Sudan project, as Duponchel for one 
recognized, was in reality a dangerous rival to a 
Transsaharan scheme (See Figure 3 ) . ^  Rapidly, Briere 
was able to put together a plausible program calling for 
exploratory studies of a long rail line consisting of three 
major links: one from Medine on the Upper Senegal to the
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Niger; one between Dakar and St. Louis; and one inter­
mediary link between St. Louis and Medine. This was not 
difficult, because the general idea had been entertained 
in one form or another over the previous twenty-odd years.
The Senegal-Niger link The origin of French ambitions 
on the Upper Niger lay in Anne Raffenel’s observation in 
1856 of the flat profile of the watershed between the 
upper reaches of the Senegal and Niger rivers, whose 
tributary systems seemingly stretch out to approach each 
other closely at some points (see Figure 4).65 Given 
contemporary revelations about the richness of Hausa 
country in the east, it seemed as though a lucrative trade 
might be established to this region from Senegal if only 
a relatively short gap between the Senegal and Niger 
rivers could be bridged. With this in mind, Faidherbe 
had sent a preliminary mission in 1863 under Lt. E. Mage 
to reconnoiter the terrain between the upper rivers and 
to negociate with the Segu Tukolor empire for an ex­
clusively French commercial route to the Niger, guarded
f\ f\
by five new posts. Little had come of it; but by the 
late 1870's it was still thought that construction of a 
railroad or a canal between the two riverways would form 
a thin, but firm link from the coast into the Sudanese 
heartland. Speculatively wild as the notion of an inter­
river canal or railroad far in the interior may appear
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to the modern observer, the not ion--bolstered as it was by 
the misconception about the "mountains of Kong"--did not 
seem unreasonable to contemporaries witnessing a phenomenal
tin
growth in the Americas along rails and canals. Certain­
ly these speculations could be used to justify previous 
and’ ongoing French sacrifices to control the imperfect, 
irregular Senegal river, which at least was situated more 
closely to the Niger than the shorter, nautically superior 
Gambia held by the British.
Despite the hostility of some members of the 
Transsaharan Commission, the Senegal scheme had, in fact, 
little trouble in obtaining quickly a strong measure of 
acceptance on the commission. Freycinet's benign attitude 
certainly played a role in this acceptance, for the Senegal 
rail project soon won an equal priority with the Transsa­
haran.
Jaureguiberry made Inspector of Naval Works N. Legros
directly responsible for steering the Senegal-Sudan rail
project past administrative shoals on its way to approval
and funding, and Legros was specifically authorized to
correspond directly with the governor of Senegal on this 
6 8
question. It was Legros who,in expounding the merits 
of a Senegal-Sudan rail link (claiming notably a gap of 
only 18 0 kms between navigable portions of the Senegal and 
Niger river systems), obtained full recognition for the
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Senega 1 project in the resulting decree of July 13,
1879.®^ This decree, which set up a full commission to
study the Transsaharan not only implicitly legitimized
future exploratory studies of a Senegal-Sudan route, but
specifically turned over responsibility for these studies
70
to the Minister of Marine.
Likewise, the full Transsaharan Commission posed few
problems for Legros. One of the advocates of an easterly
Transsaharan even issued a report recommending that the
Transsaharan should be directed eastward toward Hausa
country and Lake Chad, while leaving Timbuktu and the
71
upper Niger valley to a railroad from Senegal. An east­
erly Transsaharan, unlike the original goal of Timbuktu, 
would certainly have been complementary to a Senegal rail 
scheme, and perhaps a conjunction of interests between 
advocates of an eastern Transsharan and those of a Senegal 
link may have been translated into political cooperation. 
It may not have been entirely coincidental that the parent 
company of the east Algerian B6ne-Guelma railroad later 
became the builder of the Dakar-St. Louis railroad in 
Senegal. In any case, Legros was able to obtain resolu­
tions favoring the Senegal project during the July 29th
and August 14th sessions of the second sub-commission and
72the August 18th session of the first sub-commission.
He even hoped to obtain funding for exploratory studies
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from the Ministry of Public Works, but Freycinet declined,
73
even while approving the Senegal scheme in principle.
Jaureguiberry's precipitous occupation of Bafoulabe,
a strategic point 100 kms east of Medine, during the
parliamentary recess did not fail to arouse adverse comment
from members of the third sub-commission; but Legros
74
merely shrugged it off. Foes of the Senegal scheme on 
the Transsaharan Commission were able to draw blood only 
in obliging Legros to abandon plans for an intermediate 
rail link along the heights paralleling the Senegal river.
A minor flaw then in the general picture, it unfortunately 
forced postponement of plans for any intermediate rail­
road after a reconnaissance in 1879 of an alternative
route across the Ferlo to Bakel revealed that this barren
7 5region was entirely unsuitable for a rail line. Ulti­
mately, the omission of this part of the overall project 
was to cripple severely the construction of an Upper 
Senegal rail link inadequately supplied by the unreliable 
Senegal river.
In February 1880, nevertheless, Jaureguiberry 
deposited a bill with parliament calling for authorization 
and funding of construction on two rail links: a Medine-
Bafoulabe line as the first leg of an Upper Senegal rail-
7 6
road; and a Dakar-St. Louis rail line. Only the Dakar- 
St. Louis rail link had ever been the object of an exten­
sive studies.
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The Dakar-St. Louis railroad The Dakar-St. Louis rail 
project of 1880 embodied two strategic concepts. To begin 
with, a rail line to Dakar would remedy the disadvantages 
of a difficult entry to the port of St. Louis by provid­
ing a direct link between the two ports. On the one 
hand, this would simplify political and administrative 
control of the colony by assuring communications between 
its two major centers. On the other hand, this rail line 
would also seemingly assure St. Louis and the Senegal 
river basin a more reliable commercial link to the sea at 
Dakar by allowing through transhipment by rail. This 
concept had been the driving force behind the coastal rail 
line proposed by Pinet-Laprade in 18 56, at a moment when 
the political division of the two wings of the colony
into independent units from 18 54 to 1859 was already prov-
77
ing unsatisfactory. Though recognized as overoptimistic
in its cost estimates, Pinet-Laprade's proposal was indeed
favorably received by the Minister of Marine in Paris,
who was prepared to go as far as endorsing a scaled-down
7 8
effort with rail transport on horse-drawn carts. The 
proposal, however, apparently met with stiff opposition 
from Faidherbe himself. The governor of Senegal was in 
fact reversing an earlier call that he himself had made 
in 1853 for an overland rail link between St. Louis and 
Gor£e.^ In 1857, however, it had been plain that a
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possible diversion of river trade to Dakar from St. Louis 
would imperil the commercial prosperity of the town that 
Faidherbe had selected as the principal base for his 
dreams of imperial expansion.
A second strategic concept--that of the military 
dominance of Cayor--was however also emphasized increasing­
ly in subsequent proposals for a Dakar-St. Louis railroad. 
Already in 18 62, Jaureguiberry had proposed for military 
reasons a narrow-gauge animal-drawn railroad detouring
from the coastal trace at Potou towards a post atN’Dande
8 0in central Cayor. In 1872, a colonial official,
Hippolyte Vaubourg, came up with a similar version of a 
Dakar-St. Louis railroad penetrating deeply into Cayor. 
Beginning with a coastal trace at St. Louis, Vaubourg’s 
line would also have veered sharply inland at Potou and 
passed via Tiari M'Baouar to Kelle, a caravan junction 
not far from N ’Guiguis. From Kelle the trace ran south­
ward via Belgor to rejoin the coastal trace at M'Bidjem 
before reaching first Rufisque, then Dakar (see Figure
Vaubourg hoped to astound the Africans of Cayor 
with a locomotive clipping along at 35 to 40 km per hour 
and belching fire and smoke. But clearly it was the 
military and strategic aspects of the railroad that inter­
ested him. A railroad for one thing, he noted, would
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weaken the political influence of the Moors in Cayor
by ending their dominance of the carrying trade in that
country. "Next," he wrote,
an immensely weighty advantage of the first order 
arises; that is, the immediate and inevitable end 
of all our wars with Cayor . . . that we would 
dominate by the rapidity with which we would throw 
our expeditionary columns into the area where the 
darnel would be found in case he tried to interfere 
with the operation of the railroad.
Vaubourg also vaguely predicted a doubling of pea­
nut production in Cayor, but neglected to advance any 
figures. He estimated instead that the railroad's main 
revenues would come from goods shipped from St. Louis and 
Rufisque to Dakar and vice-versa. In any case during that 
era of budgetary restraint, Vaubourg's project received 
scant attention from the incumbent governor and even
8 2failed to arouse much enthusiasm from the local merchants.
The Dakar-St. Louis rail project was taken more 
seriously by Bridre as soon as he arrived in the colony. 
Aside from the strategic advantages of assuring the colony 
a reliable access to the sea from St. Louis, Briere was 
plainly intent, despite skepticism encountered in the 
colony, on using the railroad to dominate C a y o r . ^3 
During his governorship (1876-1881), Bri&re enjoyed good 
relations with the darnel of Cayor. But in relaying 
his railroad project to the ministry in Paris, in 1878, 
Briere wrote,
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It is to be feared that either by the progress of 
Islam or under the press of events that cannot be 
foreseen . . . that the administration of the colony, 
tied down on the Upper River or the countries of the 
middle Senegal, finds itself on a given day very 
embarrassed by Cayor--this turbulent country of 
difficult access--while it would always be at our 
discretion, if it were traversed by a r a i l r o a d . 84
Indeed as early as 1876, renewed studies of a Dakar- 
St. Louis rail project were calling for a trace passing 
even more deeply into Cayor with military domination the 
obvious intention. This was evident in a report of 1876 
rejecting a proposed direct, linear rail trace between the 
villages of Rao and Kebemer in favor of another plunging 
much farther inland.85 First of all, this report remarked, 
a linear Rao-Kebemer trace, passing through areas alter­
nately uninhabited or creased by deep ridges, would have 
been "placed too near the maritime zone, a depopulated land, 
without commerce, without agriculture, and without a 
future . . . too far from the rich eastern countries of 
Cayor; it will leave unserved the most populous centers, 
and their transports to St. Louis will be lost."8  ^ Then, 
continued the author, turning to his primary concern,
The combats that have had important results always 
took place in the east where the wealth of the 
country drawn from the countryside would permit in­
digenous armies to subsist freely and from which these 
same armies could flee after defeat to the forest of 
Bounoum, which would conceal them from any serious 
pursuit by us. An army of Cayor is not going to put 
itself so close to the sea where it could be trapped 
and consequently destroyed. Besides /”our_T columns 
will always avoid operating in a country so over­
grown . . . .  Thus a /“direct Rao-Kebemer_7 rail line
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could be used only for a special case--the trans­
port of troops from St. Louis to the south of 
Cayor.
A trace detouring into populated areas farther to the east 
therefore not only had certain commercial and technical 
virtues, but would enable French troops to seize quickly 
Cayor's major centers of resistance and granaries in case 
o f war.
When a full technical study of a railroad trace was 
issued in 1878 under Briere*s watchful eye, it barely 
alluded to these strategic principles, but indeed clearly 
incorporated them. Drawn up by Walter, the chief of the 
colony's Ponts et Chaussees service, this project called 
for an inexpensive, one-meter gauge, single-track rail­
road on a path well to the east, roughly through the
8 7
geographical center of Cayor. The strategic value of 
this 260 km trace is evident. Starting from Dakar, the 
trace ran through French territory, passing Rufisque to 
reach Thi&s, a military post overlooking the strategic
O O
junction between Cayor and Baol. At its northern end, 
the line ran eastward from St. Louis to M'Pal, a military 
post overlooking, on Cayor's northern border, the main 
routes for Djolof to the east and Lake Guiers to the 
north. Between Thids and M'Pal, the railroad trace would 
imbed in Cayor nine stations or way-stations, spaced 10 
to 22 kms apart (out of a total of 18 stations for the 
entire rail line). While this trace missed many large
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villages of Cayor--notably Niomre, Coki, Soguer, K. 
Mandoub6 Khary--the inflection of the line as much as 30 
kms inland from the earlier projects (the Rao-Kebemer 
detour alone adding some 27 kms of extra track) brought 
the line much closer to those centers, while closely 
approaching such well-sized villages like Louga, Mekhe, 
Kelle, and Pire.
The Walter project, largely a technical analysis 
of construction specifications and cost estimations based 
on on-site surveys of the terrain, asserted, like the 
Vaubourg project, that the railroad would develop trade 
with Cayor. Nevertheless, Walter estimated that only 3% 
of the railroad's revenues would come from passenger 
traffic within Cayor, and he made no estimate of freight 
traffic with the interior. Like Vaubourg, Walter based 
his optimistic estimates for rail revenues almost entirely 
on the movement of goods and passengers to Dakar from the 
towns of St. Louis and Rufisque, and vice-versa.
Selling a railroad The Transsaharan commissions had 
posed relatively few problems for the Senegal-Sudan rail 
project but the National Assembly was to prove another 
matter. One major, consistent theme of later imperialist 
hagiographic literature (and publicity) was the supposedly 
shortsighted parsimony of the metropolitan parliament, 
for indeed budgetary problems lay at the crux of the
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French colonial problem. It had been budgetary frugality
that had stifled a budding French expansion in the region
in the 1860’s; budgetary restrictions were to mold the
shape of colonial policy forcefully later in the 20th
century. In the late 187 0’s, the promoters of French
imperialism were still trying merely to wedge open the
coffers of a closed French treasury, and it was their
distinction that they succeeeded in large measure.
Although the cynicism of the principal actors may
be difficult to gauge in the unfolding drama, Kanya-
Forstner certainly seems correct in asserting that it was
(at least in part) a question of officers seeking promo-
8 9
tion by provoking "glorious" combats and conquests.
An unavoidable part of this process involved obtaining 
the funding--and the specialized personnel and equipment 
that would be acquired along with the funding--to enable 
the "glorious" actions to take place. It was a matter of 
that well-known bureaucratic game of justifying an expanded 
budget and staff, even in the face of government frugality. 
Provoking incidents and misrepresenting them as
90
defensive was, of course, one method of obtaining funds.
But Briere's complaints about the "anarchy" in neighbor­
ing African states or about alleged British encroachments 
from the nearby Gambia into the interior could have had 
only a limited appeal at the time; it had all been said 
before in the 1860's. A project for peaceful penetration
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by rail had a more appealing ring, and subsequent 
correspondence between the ministry and the colonial 
government in Senegal was indeed drafted to bolster 
assertions that this was what was taking place in the 
colony.
The decree of July 1879 authorizing studies of a
railroad had already been enough to justify a spate of
new reconnaissances throughout the Senegal-Sudan region,
91and even some armed expeditions. It was indeed because 
Soleillet had protested too loudly about the military 
nature of these expeditions that he had been tossed out 
of the colony in 1880.
Legros' attitude is revealed succinctly in his hand­
ling of budgetary estimates for the costs of rail construc­
tion. Walter's optimistic estimate of 1878 for a 260 km, 
narrow-gauge Dakar-St. Louis railroad was the bargain
price of 6,500,000 francs, or 25,000 francs per kilometer--
92
but then, Walter was known for overoptimism. The mini­
stry's Council of Naval Works had revised the estimate 
upward radically to 12 million francs, or 46,200 Fr/km, 
and in November 1879 Legros was estimating construction 
costs at 50,000 Fr/km for the Dakar-St. Louis link,
60,000 for a St. Louis-Medine link, and 80 to 90,000 
Fr/km for the Medine-Niger link. ^  By December 20th, 
Legros had hiked his estimates for the two former lines 
to 62,440 Fr/km and 71,800 Fr/km respectively; but these
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estimates, as incorporated in a note of the ministry's 
Director of Colonies, were rejected as too optimistic by 
Jaurgguiberry h i m s e l f .^4 Replying in a note of Janu­
ary 8 , 1880, Legros merely rounded off previous estimates 
to offer an overall cost estimate of 120 million francs 
total for all three rail links. Legros confessed that 
only his figures for the cost of transporting materiel to 
Senegal might be accurate. "I refrain," he wrote, "from 
being as affirmative about the other items of evaluation, 
for it is manifest that my calculations only rest on 
hypothetical data, except for the DSL line, which was 
studied on site." But, he asserted,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to indicate 
in advance even approximately a figure for additional 
expenses . . . and besides it does not seem to me 
that it is worthwhile being obsessed with it, consider­
ing that for most lines under construction today in 
the metropole, the cost of putting in the substructure 
reaches 100,000 to 150,000, and even 200,000 /""Fr/km_7; 
which does not impede parliament from voting 7j"the 
creditsJ7 on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Public Works, although from the viewpoint of the gener­
al interest of the country, they undoubtedly have much 
less importance than the lines projected in Senegal. 95
Thus, the Senegal-Sudan rail link was, like its con­
temporary rival, the Transsaharan, a leap into the unknown 
carrying with it patriotic dream-.; and personal career 
ambitions. But would the rest of the country go along?
Legros hoped to convince a skeptical parliament 
with a careful orchestration of information arriving from 
Senegal. Like the Transsaharan, the Senegal scheme was
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presented as an eminently pacific project designed to 
reduce internecine warfare in the African interior by 
promoting commerce. It was asserted that the terrain to 
be crossed was flat (largely true), that Africans wel­
comed the railroad (untrue), that cheap African labor 
could be recruited easily (untrue), and that materials 
for construction could be found in Africa (misleading).
On the other hand, there was virtually no serious dis­
cussion of the colony's malignant sanitary problems, al­
though the recent yellow fever epidemic of 1878 had killed
96fully half the whites then residing in the colony.
For one thing, Bri£re was ordered to elicit a
nominal subsidy for the Dakar-St. Louis rail project from 
the colony's elected General Council, in order to demon­
strate publicly the willingness of the colony's citizenry 
to participate in financing the railroad. This was rela­
tively easy to obtain, despite some local skepticism, since
the rail projects would obviously have stimulated local
97
business activity. Senegal's deputy to parliament was 
an ardent partisan of the railroads, and one local commer­
cial house even offered to undertake construction of a 
rail link between St. Louis and Medine.^^ The ministry's 
solicitation of this subsidy was however something of a 
sham, for the ministry was also dead set on prevent­
ing the General Council from having a voice in setting
railroad policy as a subsidy would have entitled it.
When the General Council asked, a short time later,to be
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released from its commitment, the ministry consented 
99
willingly.
Likewise another piece of useful publicity for the
railroad was the treaty of September 10, 1879 signed by the
darnel of Cayor to authorize construction of the line through
his realm along with a second convention promising aid in
obtaining labor locally for construction work.^^ On the
surface, this would tend, along with other treaties being
obtained on the Upper Senegal, to corroborate ministry
101
claims that Africans were welcoming the railroad. In
reality, the darnel Lat Dior had probably only signed the 
treaty, without really understanding its terms, simply in 
order to obtain French support during coincidental domes-
i 0?
tic troubles in Cayor. The treaty's vague references 
to the "route commercial" and way stations for travellers 
to be built in Cayor (there were no references to rails 
and only one to locomotives) were certainly not designed 
to enlighten Lat Dior too much. Perhaps colonial authori­
ties really did hope to beguile the darnel as well as the 
French public. However, when Lat Dior perceived the colony's 
true intentions in 1881, he promptly repudiated the treaty
and forbade construction of a railroad through his domains.
It is doubtful that Jaur£guiberry himself really 
believed the optimistic assessments that he was receiving 
from Briere or ministry officials. As a former governor 
of Senegal, Jaureguiberry would have been well aware both
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of the pitfalls of treaties in this region of confused 
internecine warfare and of the difficulties of construc­
tion in a tropical climate. Certainly Jaureguiberry was
also being warned of some of the risks of the undertaking.
103
by skeptical correspondants in Senegal. He chose, 
however, to discount these warnings while merely admonish­
ing Bridre mildly to temper his more optimistic forecasts. 
Bri^re frequently asserted that his difficulties with 
adjoining African states and in Paris had really originated 
from the secret machinations of prominent Senegalese 
merchants against his administration, and ministry officials 
apparently accepted these assertions to some degree.
At any rate, the rail projects soon came to grief against 
increasing difficulties.
The Dakar-St. Louis blocked Legros, who had probably
believed Bridre's assurances about the ease of recruiting
African laborers for construction work on the Upper Senegal,
had hoped to start railroad construction early in 1880 by
building a good supply road from M^dine to Bafoulab€ on
105
which the tracks would later be laid. However,
recruiting workers was difficult in a labor-scarce region 
where those working at menial tasks for the white would 
be scorned as servile. Some chiefs on the Upper Senegal 
might have promised facilely to supply workers; but few 
workers appeared. By March, little had been done on the
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road. Never one to admit errors, Bri&re tried to use 
the unpromising start to get more technical personnel 
assigned to the colony, and he finally blamed the debacle 
on the luckless engineer charged with the project.'*'^
But, it was henceforth evident that recruiting laborers 
for road or railroad construction was going to be a 
major stumbling block in this region.
An episode occuring shortly thereafter in May had
even more serious immediate consequences. A combined
exploratory and diplomatic mission to the Segu Tukolor
empire was ambushed enroute and its baggage taken. The
members of the mission managed to reach Segu safely; but
its ruler was so irate at the mission's attempts enroute
to treat with his enemies that he confined its members to
a small, nearby village instead of allowing them to enter
Segu. Eventually, a treaty was arranged (the treaty of
Nango of November 1880), but meanwhile the mission's
plight was embarrassing for proponents in parliament of
107
a "peaceful" Senegal-Sudan railroad.
Legros, who had already agreed to whittle down to 
40 kms the earlier project request for a 100 km line to 
Bafoulabe, was startled in June 1880 when the Budget 
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies rejected this 
compromise. Members of the Commission had expressed 
surprise at the "novelty, audacity, and breadth" of the
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ministry's projects, and at "the insistence with which
108
it had set out to obtain a quick vote." Legros was
furious. The Commission's "rapporteur" had forgotten,
Legros wrote, that
if one wishes to advance to the Niger, it is of the 
highest import to pursue the enterprise with no delay, 
with no hesitation. If . . . the minister is not 
assured of parliament's support under the conditions 
he specified, if he is begrudged the necessary credits, 
there will be no choice, except to leave the bill 
deposited with parliament while disclaiming all 
responsibility, until the program is accepted without 
restriction. 109
It was not an approach that would win many friends; 
and in the interim only a meager appropriation of 1.3 
million francs was granted, much of it for funds already 
s p e n t . W h e n  the railroad bill finally reached parlia­
ment in November 188 0, Jaureguiberry had been replaced 
as minister by Admiral Georges Clou6 , whose bumbling 
support of the bill during parliamentary debates did not 
help its passage. The questionable practicality of the 
railroad from MSdine drew much criticism during parlia­
mentary sessions in November 1880 and February 1881; but 
opponents of the measure, including some advocates of the 
Transsaharan, preferred the tactic of amending important 
financial details of a proposed concession of the more 
practical Dakar-St. Louis rail link.^* As a result, there 
were successive delays in adopting the measure despite 
nominal majorities in its favor, and the opposition was
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even able to force a technical review of the Dakar-St.
112Louis project in March 1881. In a neat parliamentary
maneuver, however, the project's supporters detached from 
the bill those unamended provisions concerning only the 
Medine line; and these were quickly passed, while the
113
Dakar-St. Louis provisions were sent back to committee.
By a strange quirk, the government was able to undertake 
the least accessible, least practicable portion of the 
Senegal-Sudan rail project. With only the Senegal river 
as a connecting link, the two separate wings of the 
Senegal rail scheme were henceforth to pursue their own 
separate destinies. That in the Sudan was to form a major 
part of the rationale for the opening campaigns of military 
expansion into the S u d a n . B u t ,  for about a year the 
Dakar-St. Louis project marked time.
Jaur£guiberry returns Although the ministry remained 
interested in Senegalese railroads under Cloue's admini­
stration, the question was pursued with much less resolve. 
In March 1881, Cloue summarily relieved BriSre of his 
command in Senegal and Legros was also obliged to retire 
from involvement with the rail p r o j e c t s . I n  July 1881, 
the Senate passed a modified form of the bill authorizing 
a Dakar-St. Louis railroad; but it was too late to send 
it on to the Chamber. On the Upper Senegal, yellow fever 
and transportation snarls completely ruined the first 
railroad construction campaign of 1881-1882. In Cayor,
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the darnel Lat Dior, apprised in the spring of 1881 by an 
indiscrete interpreter that the railroad would allow steam- 
driven "land-ships" to roll through the middle of his realm 
(and thereby dominate it militarily), chased surveying 
parties from the countryside and threatened war in case
1 i r
the rail project was undertaken. Only Lat Dior's own
precarious domestic situation prevented him from warring
with the French colony, which was badly weakened at the
117time by a reappearance of yellow fever.
The situation changed decisively with Jaureguiberry's
reentry into office as Minister of Marine in Freycinet's
1 "I 8
second government in February 1882. ± The colonial 
department, briefly annexed to the Ministry of Commerce 
during Gambetta's ministry, was transferred back to the 
Ministry of Marine. In Senegal, Vallon, a naval officer 
sympathetic to Jaureguiberry's views, replaced an incum­
bent governor too pessimistic about plans for Senegalese
railroads or military expansion; and when Vallon also began
119to doubt, he too was replaced. Once again Legros was
also consulted about technical aspects of the Dakar-St.
T • J 120Louis railroad.
Jaureguiberry also moved decisively in parliament 
to clear the way for a Dakar-St. Louis railroad. This was 
to be no mean feat, for the recent demise of the Union 
General bank in France heralded a period of financial con­
traction and, thus, resistance from the Ministry of Finance
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to additional governmental expenditures. Perhaps
Jaureguiberry now found the atmosphere in parliament more
congenial than a year before simply because the rival
Transsaharan scheme no longer competed with the Senegal
scheme for the divided attention of a nascent colonialist
party. Several details on the bill already passed by
the Senate in 1881 were clarified by May 1882, and this
bill authorizing construction of the Dakar-St. Louis
railroad passed in the Chamber on June 29th.
The darnel of Cayor, of course, still remained as
an obstacle. Jaureguiberry had hoped at first to persuade
Lat Dior to accept the railroad once again by appeasing
122
the darnel on other issues. But Lat Dior, a proud,
battle-hardened warrior, was firmly decided against a
railroad that posed such a clear military threat. In May
1882, ever as the railroad bill was about to be sent to
the Chamber, the darnel staged a military demonstration
17 3
of 1000 cavalry and 300 infantry. He pitched another
rally in August with an even greater host and was observed
124
reknitting ties to Djolof and the Trarza Moors. Lat
Dior's domestic enemies had been assuring the colonial 
government in secret correspondence that they would 
welcome a railroad; but those of the strongest of these 
mutinous factions --the chiefs of the crown bondsmen with 
their candidate for darnel, Samba Laobe--were playing a
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double game, and would fight the French when they invaded 
Cayor.125
Jaureguiberry had urged that all means of concilia­
tion be exhausted first, but French officers were planning 
a campaign in Cayor as early as July 1882, and Jaureguiberry
assured the governor of Senegal in October that reinforce-
1 7 fa
ments would be sent to the colony. ° Jaureguiberry was
happy to ratify, on December 20th, the governor's decision
to end Lat Dior's interference by launching a military
12 7force from St. Louis into Cayor.
Cayor taken Thus, on December 26th a flying column of 
horse cavalry and camel-mounted infantry entered Cayor, 
its maneuverability and speed increased by new, sturdy 
1 7 8supply carts. The column swept easily through the
length of Cayor, reaching the capital of Soguer by Janu­
ary 3rd without encountering opposition.*29 With Cayor
taken, the French promptly carved its three northern 
provinces into two new protectorates of N'Diambour and 
N*Guick-Merina under the command of reliable chiefs.
Over the remnant of Cayor they installed the pretender 
Samba Yaye Fal as the new darnel Amadi N ’Gone Fal II, and 
then undertook to build new posts within the conquered 
area--first at Louga, then N'Dande. ^ 0
Taken by surprise, the darnel and his supporters had 
fled immediately from Cayor toward the Saloum. Mass withdraw­
al from the vicinity of a more powerful enemy, leaving wide
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 5 8 -
stretches of territory empty in order to deny his armies
food and labor, was a basic, sound military strategy in
1 31precolonial Africa. Lat Dior had, in fact, repeatedly 
warned Senegal’s governors that if a railroad entered
13 2Cayor, he would lead all of his people from the realm.
The French colony, with its interest in trade within the
interior, would seem particularly vulnerable to the
strategm; and indeed with much of Cayor emptying out in
1883 (partly in fear of the war raids to come), the
merchants of St. Louis were already complaining of the
133impending loss of next year's crops.
But a mass exodus from ancestral lands was only 
possible if the leadership of Cayor displayed a firm 
unity of purpose. At first the French strategy seemed 
indeed to be breaking down, as raiding parties led by 
Samba Laobe and the crown bondsmen in March easily compel­
led N ’Gone Fal to flee to the French for safety. But 
soon mobile French columns crisscrossing Cayor were 
harrying Samba Laob&'s raiders badly. Frustrated, Samba
Laobe and his chief supporters chose to come to terms in
134
return for readmission to Cayor; and the French were 
well repaid for this leniency as the returning warriors 
induced many peasants to reenter Cayor for the summer 
planting.
This desertion badly undermined Lat Dior's in­
creasingly untenable position. Unable to settle in the
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Sal oum or to check desertions in his dwindling host,
the darnel was finally forced to seek refuge in nearby
Djolof with a few loyalists. Neither his appeals to the
French government for clemency nor his raids into Cayor
were successful. Lat Dior’s plight became even more
hopeless as the French chose to reward Samba Laobe in
August 1883 by recognizing him as darnel in place of the
137
weak N'Gone Fal. Thenceforth, if Lat Dior dared to
enter Cayor, he would be faced with the tough cohorts of
138the new darnel's supporters and compelled to leave.
For a time, Lat Dior found refuge at a village on the 
Djolof-Cayor border; but the peace treaty of April 1885 
between the French and Djolof ousted him from even this 
haven. Lat Dior reentered Cayor, begging French authori­
ties for permission to stay, but was expelled again in 
September 1885 . ^ ®
By then a finished Dakar-St. Louis railroad lay as­
tride Cayor. This thin, binding steel cord of rails had 
been encased, moreover, within a wider protective sheath 
of land yielded to the French by Samba Laobe and his 
supporters in August 1883 as the price for the crown; then 
widened in December 1884--a narrow strip 50 meters on
either side.of the track with 300 meter perimeters around
140
each rail station. Now, under these conditions, Cayor 
lay open indeed to French penetration and domination.
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Conclusions The inception of Senegalese railroads 
reveals more about conditions in metropolitan France than 
about Senegal itself. Certain military officers serving 
or having served in Senegal played crucial roles in 
launching the project; but they had done so within the con­
text of France's role in the world and of their own pro­
fessional careers, rather than the needs of the peoples 
of Senegal, or even of the tiny colony already there. In 
imposing the railroad on the colony, they were projecting 
their dreams on the distorted picture that they had of 
Africa and revealing their ignorance of it.
The Senegal-Sudan railroad was based on the same 
geographical misunderstanding that had spawned the 
Transsaharan; namely that a rich Sudanese heartland was 
cut off from the southern coast by the imagined barrier 
of the Kong mountains. And by following the line of 
the upper rivers to avoid a nonexistent barrier, the 
colonial enthusiasts were saddling France with a huge, 
but underpopulated and relatively unproductive empire.
It is possible to see, in this bizarre imperialist 
venture that yielded few overall profits to the metropole, 
the fine hand of selfish, narrow interests profiting at 
the expense of French taxpayers--namely certain colonial 
officials and officers who reaped promotions as well as 
honors. But in so doing, one must not overlook the
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psychological and social dimensions of the situation--the 
fact that it is in blending personal ambitions with ideo­
logical fervor that the more potent elixirs for driving 
social movements are created.
Georges Balandier's observations on apparently 
economically-irrational behavior among the Fang and 
Ba-Kongo* interestingly enough, suggest one mechanism that 
seems to apply to societies in general under the stress 
of rapid economic and social change. Balandier divined 
that certain ritualized, competitive gift-giving ceremonies 
among these people not only served as therapeutic outlets 
for antagonisms and created new bonds of cooperation between 
potentially rival parties, but that the ceremonies them­
selves in dramatizing economic and social relations, "pro­
viding as it were a summary of a society as a whole," en­
abled the participants to grasp the nature of their own 
142
social system. Without reading too much into Balandier’s
particular example, a similar mechanism can also be seen 
as operating in a wider sense in French society.
It must be remembered that imperial expansion be­
came popular in France at a time when this country was 
not only being challenged abroad, but badly rent by 
multiple political and social fissures at home. It was 
a time when Opportunist politicians and Gambettists were 
groping for the grounds of a fraternal, national reconci-
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liation with such projects as the industrial exhibition
143
of 1878 and Freycinet's railroad program. If garbed
in the colors of patriotism and humanitarianism, colonial 
expansion could also become a terrain for national recon­
ciliation, particularly since the colonies could serve as 
arenas where certain trusted "verities," new and old, 
could be displayed and validated; in which soldiers and 
technologistscould be seen not as conquering oppressors, 
but in their roles as explorers and builders, as bene­
factors bearing moral truths as well as material benefits. 
It was an arena in which order and the military virtues 
could be explicitly reconciled with the forces of national­
ism and industrialism.
It would be ridiculous, of course, to dismiss Euro­
pean imperialist acts as merely part of an imperfectly- 
enacted gigantic dramatic device. But the imperialist 
efforts were definitely, in part, shadow plays used by 
each of the European competitors, like the modern space 
race, to act out basic inter-European antagonisms--demon­
strating the national vigor and the validity of its social 
verities, while avoiding direct confrontations in Europe. 
The play would never be allowed, as Fashoda showed, to 
spark war between the colonial powers.
However psychologically pleasing these activities 
might be, they were producing material results. Momentar­
ily, at least, the treasury's isluicegates had been pried
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open to pour cash into the colonies; pieces of terri­
tory were being collected to form an empire; a railroad 
was being installed in Africa. How were the imperalists 
going about this, and what were they to do with it?
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APPENDIX 1
The various "ethnic” groups of the Senegambia, whose 
ruling clans were often closely related to each other, and 
which intermingled racially and geographically through m i ­
gration, marriage, and acclimatization can be distinguished 
on the basis of language, cultural traits, and historical 
traditions. (See the works listed in footnote 3 of this 
chapter especially: Lombard, Geographie; Diagne, Pouvoir 
politique.)
Important here as elsewhere throughout West Africa, 
the seasonally-migrating, pastoralist Peuls were scattered 
throughout the Senegambia and the Sudan, but formed 
majorities only within isolated pockets, such as the barren, 
sparsely-populated Ferlo plain, which provided ample pas- 
tureland during the rainy season. The other principal 
peoples of the Senegambia--Wolof, Tukolor, Manding, and 
Serer--all sedentary agriculturalists--were settled with­
in roughly distinguishable territorial blocs in the 19th 
century. Following the Senegal river, one would find 
Wolof occupying the south bank from the river's mouth up 
to Dagana in a portion of the once-considerable kingdom 
of Oualo, whose north-bank territories were now in 
Moorish (Mauretanian) hands. From Dagana, extending up­
stream to Dembankane, below Bakel, lay the heartland of 
the Tukolor, a Pular-speaking people like the Peuls, but
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settled agriculturalists with a long Islamic tradition 
going back to the 11th century state of Tekrur. Farther 
upstream were concentrations of Sarakole. Sedentary 
agriculturalists, the Sarakole combined a fervor for 
Islam with a penchant for long-distance trade, as well as 
for hiring out their labor abroad. Even farther upstream 
lay Khassonke country--a people of mixed Malinke and Peul 
origins--and beyond them the Tukolor-ruled state of Bondu. 
Much farther to the south, near the coast, lay the Futa 
Djallon, its Malinke population conquered by Islamized 
Peuls in the 1720’s. To the east and northeast of the 
Upper Senegal river lay intermingled Bambara and Malinke 
peoples, the latter generally subject to Bambara or to 
Peul overlords.
Penetrating over 300 kms into the interior, the 
Gambia river acted as the axis for other groupings, with 
the Manding in particular forming the majority around the 
river, as well as in large territorial blocs to the south 
and east. Between the Senegal and Gambia rivers, in the 
vicinity of the Atlantic seaboard and its immediate 
hinterland, lay two major groupings. The Wolof peoples, 
forming several states--Oualo, Djolof, Cayor--still lay 
in a fairly compact bloc west of the Ferlo (though with 
offshoots in the Gambia, Saloum, and Baol), from Oualo 
in the north down to Cape Verde and Rufisque in the south,
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where they met their near kinsmen, the Lebu. The Serer 
people were concentrated to the south, notably in the 
kingdoms of Sine, Saloum, and the half-Wolof Baol.
Sovereignty and political power among the Wolof 
were traditionally dispersed on a collegiate basis with 
all social classes--nobility, freeborn peasants, special­
ized artisan castes, and slaves--playing at least a sym­
bolic, and often a concrete role in the selection of a 
ruler and in the exercize of power. Pathe Diagne has 
noted, for instance, the decay of the dyarchic political 
system of Cayor by the 19th century to the advantage of 
the darnel, its leader in war, and to his erstwhile ser­
vants, the crown bondsmen ("captifs de la couronne"), 
forming the largest and most professional group in the 
"tyeddo" military forces (Pathe Diagne, Pouvoir politique, 
pp. 102-118, 125-144). Eventually the chiefs of these 
bondsmen could rise to the command of large territorial 
divisions of the realm, despite their servile origin, and 
even take a disproportionate part in the selection and 
deposition of darnels. The freeborn peasants would resent 
the depredations of the undisciplined tyeddo and also 
resent their overlords, the darnels, who tolerated the 
violence.
Islamic influences had, meanwhile, been spreading 
in the region since the 11th century, especially by means 
of itinerant traders and teachers, and by the migration
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of some heavily Islamized groups--Manding, Tukolor, and 
Sarakole. The courts of the rulers of various states had 
been major centers for the propogation of Islam. But 
many Africans, particularly rulers, were willing to accept 
the precepts of Islam only to a degree consistent with tra­
ditional fetishist ritual and practice. There was a gen­
eral retardation and even regression in the spread of Islam 
during the period coinciding roughly with the heyday of 
the Atlantic slave trade, and such states as Cayor, while 
accommodating large Muslim minorities and even prestigious 
schools of Islamic science, were dominated by rulers and 
tyeddos proud of an adherence to fetishism.
From the mid-18th century on, Muslims in the region 
were able to challenge fetishist rule with increasing 
success. A series of revolts led by reformist "marabouts" 
throughout the region and elsewhere in West Africa led to 
the overthrow of fetishist or superficially-Islamized rul­
ing strata and to the establishment of rule by Muslim theo­
cracies over large pockets of territory. Widespread dis­
satisfaction with decayed political and social structures 
undoubtedly attracted much support to the reformist cause. 
It would be a mistake, however, to consider the reformers 
as aiming at an egalitarian society. Dependent as they 
were upon military success, and therefore on fielding 
large bodies of cavalry as strike forces, the reform
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movements were almost inevitably commanded by notables 
of good family; and slave raiding, which translated into 
wealth and more manpower, was a common feature of these 
religious wars (Oloruntimehin, Tukolor Empire, pp. 51- 
57). The reform movements aimed at a puritanical purging 
and purifying of local religious practices, although 
this could mean political and social practices as well.
The wars nevertheless created new opportunities not only 
for material gain, but for access to political power for 
dissident factions within dominant aristocracies.
The religious jihad of El Hadj Umar from the 1850's 
was of prime importance for the Senegambia. Followed 
later by an impressive set of erstwhile, if less success­
ful imitators wlsewhere in the region (Ma Ba, Ahmadou 
Cheikou, Fody Kaba), this purist reformer, in leading a 
mainly Tukolor conquest of the Upper Senegal-Upper Niger 
region, apparently aimed at hegemony over the entire 
Senegambia (Oloruntimehin, Tukolor Empire, pp. 85-90, 
120-121). Particularly skillfull at obtaining the support 
of dissident factions in each state--Khasso, Bondu, Kaarta, 
Masina, Segu--El Hadj Umar’s conquests spread rapidly and 
threatened to extend to the lower Senegal. It was the grow­
ing imperialist advance of the French colony of Senegal in 
the 1850’s that frustrated Umar’s designs in this direction,
ousting him from his forward positions on the Upper Senegal 
and restricting his access to major reserves of manpower on
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the Senegal river. Umar then turned inland toward the 
Upper Niger, carving out an impressively-large territorial 
empire that was, however, unconsolidated at his death. 
Before it could be consolidated under his son, it had the 
ill-luck to be a primary target of a newly-expanding 
French imperialism in the 1880's and 1890's.
The expanding French colonial hegemony frustrated 
the militant jihadists, who had hoped to spread Islam by 
force of arms. Paradoxically, the French conquest, in 
dislocating existing African social and political struc­
tures, was to accelerate, not retard the spread of Islam. 
This was most apparent in Cayor where even the darnel Lat 
Dior became a Muslim under the shock of the conquest.
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CHAPTER II
Construction of the Dakar-St. Louis
It is also by its mass and power of destruction that 
the locomotive imposes itself upon the natives. There 
were indeed at the end of the 1883-1884 season acts of 
mischief against the DSL railroad. The impotence of 
these attempts have discouraged the authors for the 
future. The machine that cuts in two animals wander­
ing on the track commands respect.
- Alexis Bois, lSSS"*- 
The SocietS de Construction des Batignolles was 
probably one of the more intriguing examples of the type of 
French engineering firm more interested in expatriating its 
talents to labor on foreign construction projects than on 
domestic work in France. First active in works in France, 
then in Italy, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Holland, Rumania, 
and even Russia before 1871, concentrating more on Africa, 
Russia, and even Indochina after 1871, and in Poland, 
Yugoslavia, Africa, and South America after 1920, the 
company's activities seem to have matched closely the 
permutations of the French government's foreign policy in­
terests. A detailed study of this company would doubtless­
ly yield a fascinating glimpse into the interlocking rela­
tions between the worlds of French engineering and banking,
2
and perhaps that of government.
The founder, Ernest Gouin, a graduate of the Ecole 
Polytechnique, had supervised the construction of British
-89-
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locomotives for the Paris-Orleans line and then worked on 
the St. Germain-Versailles railroad, that breeding ground 
of future French rail magnates. Founding his own company 
as a family concern in 1846, then converting it to a joint- 
stock company in 1871, Gouin had begun with locomotive 
construction, had introduced iron bridge construction short­
ly thereafter into France, and then proceeded to building 
rail lines on his own. A member of the municipal council 
of Paris from 1860, the president of the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce from 1873 to 1876, he rose a few years before his 
death in 1885 to the position of Regent of the Bank of 
France. Admittedly a lesser light in the brilliant galaxy 
of French finance and industry, Gouin could count neverthe­
less as investors in his firm, such luminaries as Gustave 
d'Eichthal, the Rothschild brothers, Philippe and Henri 
Hottinguer, Francois Wilbrod-Chabrol, Emile P^reire and 
Abraham Rodrigues-Henriques. Perhaps some of the talented 
young engineer’s success can be traced to his marriage to 
Rodrigues-Henriques' daughter, Anne Mathilde, for 
Rodrigues-Henriques held almost one quarter of the Society's 
shares in 1871. Moreover, many a shareholder, director or 
responsible engineer of the firm--a Gustave d'Eichthal, 
Wilbrod-Chabrol, LeBret, Eugene Brun, de Bellanger, Lorieux, 
or Roland-Gosselin--turns out to have been married to or 
borne by a daughter of the Gouin or Rodrigues-Henriques 
families. Indeed, the meetings of the board of directors
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of the firm must have had the character of family gather­
ings,^ Ernest Gouin was ably seconded by his son and heir, 
Jules, also trained as an engineer; and Jules was to be 
succeeded in turn by his sons, Gaston and Edouard.
In 1874, the French government granted to the 
Batignolles the concession for construction and exploita­
tion of the B8ne-Guelma railroad in eastern Algeria, the 
very railroad whose extension into Tunisia was to form part 
of the basis for French intervention in 1881. The profits 
from this line came initially not so much from operation of 
the line, but from the generous guarantee of the French 
treasury. Private capital invested in the Bftne-Guelma was 
guaranteed a 6% return by the French government because of 
the supposed risks of the venture. Since contemporary bonds 
bore a return of only 4^% at most, the concession offered a 
lucrative opportunity for immediate large profits. The 
Batignolles promptly formed an operating company--the Bftne- 
Guelma railroad company--to assume the risks of construction 
and operation of the line, although the actual construction 
work was done by the Batignolles.^
To raise the necessary capital required by the con­
cession agreement with the government, the Gouins turned to 
respected financial circles that could market the shares.
In the case of the ill-fated contemporary Panama Canal 
Company, financial consortiums marketing Panama Canal shares 
were to extract such immense fees for their services that
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the finances of the Panama Company were gravely impaired 
from the beginning.^ The government guarantee not only re­
lieved the B$ne-Guelma of this concern, but with interest 
on its securities guaranteed at a high rate, the marketing 
consortium could sell them at a price far higher than par 
value. To gain easy access to sources of capital, the 
Batignolles did indeed surrender three quarters of the 
marketing profits to participating banking circles, but 
kept the remaining one-quarter for itself.
It is apparent that the Gouins hoped to ream similar 
financial advantage from a Dakar-St. Louis railroad con­
cession. In June 1879, Ernest Gouin had been nominated for 
membership on the Transsaharan Commission by a pivotal fig­
ure in its formation.^ Nothing had come of that, but by 
November 7th, Legros was recommending that a Dakar-St. Louis 
be built by a private entrepreneur backed by a governmental 
guarantee. By early January 1880, Batignolles engineers 
were already on site in Senegal, reconnoitering Walter's
q
route for the railroad.
The doubts expressed by the parliamentary Budget 
Commission in June 1880 about the seriousness of Jauregui­
berry1 s projects, only led the minister to take more de­
cisive measures demonstrating his resolve. To answer doubts 
that reliable construction firms could be found to carry out 
the project, the minister followed Legros' suggestion in 
soliciting competitive bids from reliable industrial compa­
nies for a preliminary contract award, conditional on par-
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liamentary assent.^ But only companies with acceptable
standing were admitted to this competition. Of the three
acceptable companies presenting themselves on October 12,
1880--the Batignolles, Joret (builder of the East Algerian),
Lavally and Molinos (builder of the Reunion railroad)--the
Batignolles submitted the low bid and won the contract.
Veiled accusations of collusion in the bidding did surface
during the subsequent parliamentary debates, but there is
no evident of substance pointing to c o l l u s i o n . I t  is
clear though, that the Batignolles was seriously interested
in this project from the first and retained its interest in
it, maintaining storage space in St. Louis even with the
12bill blocked in the National Assembly. A report of the 
board of directors to Batignolles shareholders in late 1881 
confessed,
The enterprises of the type that we seek are difficult 
to find in France, where the state has monopolized 
work of all kinds--railroads, ports, canals--since the 
Freycinet law; it is necessary therefore to continue to 
thrust ourselves abroad where we have solid connections, 
and where the work that we have done gives us an 
excellent reputation.13
The preliminary contract signed October 30, 1880 
between the minister and the company, with its annexed 
stipulation sheet ("cahier des charges") specified com­
pletion of the line before April 30, 1883 if parliament 
approved the agreement by January 31, 1881. But target 
dates for provisional contracts only made legislative 
opponents of the project bristle at the ministry's pre-
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14sumption.
Moreover, having already been burnt on the B^ne-Guelma 
concession guarantee, the lawmakers were in no mood to ac­
cept similar terms for a Dakar-St. Louis. Gouin's winning 
bid had committed the company to construct the single-track, 
1 meter gauge line at a maximum price of 68,000 francs per 
km. The company would raise a quarter of the necessary 
capital (an approximate total of 68,000 Fr/km times 260 
kms = 17,680,000 Fr) by issuing shares; the remaining 3/4 
in issued bonds to be raised later as the line was built.
In return, the state was to guarantee the company a divi­
dend of 3400 francs above operating costs for each section 
of track accepted by the state and placed in service--which 
amounted in essence to a guarantee of roughly 5% annual 
return on the presumed invested capital once the line was 
completed; provided, of course, that construction costs did 
not exceed the maximum.
A number of objections were raised immediately. First 
of all, a maximum forfeit price ("construction a forfait") 
meant that the state would have no real idea of the actual 
construction costs (or investment), which the entrepreneur 
had no obligation to divulge. Secondly, the guaranteed in­
terest rate of 51, with government bonds now selling at 3% 
to 4% meant that a consortium successfully marketing the
concession's securities at a higher price corresponding to
5%
a 3.51 return could gross a total of 3 “5\ x 17,680,000 Fr =
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25.260.000 francs in round figures; thus garnering a stag­
gering total profit of 7,580,000 francs on stocks and bonds.
The costs of this profitable operation would be borne in­
directly by the state through its obligation to guarantee 
for 99 years an annual profit of 260 km x 3,400/km =
884.000 francs for the completed line. It would have been
all the more profitable for the original shareholders, who 
were actually allowed by the 1880 contract to put up only 
one-half of the par value of the shares. Any deficits 
in the operation of the completed line were, moreover, 
effectively assumed by the state's blanket guarantee. The 
contract arranged for maximum operating expenses to be set 
for the rail line; but the specific means for setting the 
maximum were to be worked out later only at an undetermined 
date. Indeed in November 1880, the Minister of Finance was 
concluding that: "All the risks are . . . charged to the 
state. The concessionary can gain less. He cannot lose.
It will be advantageous to the state, which can obtain the 
funds at much less than 5%, to build the railroad
/7itself_7."16
Legros strongly disagreed. He had already decided in 
187 9 that the government was assuming too heavy a burden 
with the Upper Senegal railroad to undertake a simultaneous 
effort on a Dakar-St. Louis line. The entrepreneur, he 
felt was taking a substantial risk in agreeing to con­
struct the line at a set maximum cost, while the terms
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 9 6 -
concluded were not much different from those granted earlier
17
for Algerian railroads.
During the February 1881 debates, parliamentary oppo­
nents of these financial arrangements attacked several im­
portant details, such as the failure to specify full pay­
ments for shares in cash, and the failure to set out a 
proper arbitration procedure in case of disputes between 
the company and the state. They particularly hammered, 
however, at the methods of raising the cash for the venture, 
since plainly the state could do it at less expense by 
issuing government bonds. The Senate finance committee, 
chaired by Freycinet, proposed a solution in July 1881.
The entrepreneur was taking a substantial risk after all, 
justifying a good return, concluded the committee; but 
they recommended that the state rather than the company 
ought to raise three-quarters of the cash with its own 
bonds; and the Senate accepted a bill revised on this 
basis in July 1881.^  But it was only after the Ministry 
of Finance's objections were satisfied on all points in 
March and May 1882, that the Chamber approved the bill on 
June 29, 1882.^
This revised October 1880 convention still specified
construction of the Dakar-St. Louis line at a set maximum
price by an entrepreneur capitalized at some 5,000,000
francs, raised by an issue of stock--thisstock to be 
guaranteed an annual return of 1,154 francs per kilometer
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 9 7 -
of line put into service. The remaining 12,680,000 francs 
needed would be supplied by a state subvention, paid in 
installments proportional to the length of line placed in 
service. This subvention would be repaid with interest in 
the future; but only after the railroad's operations be­
came profitable.^
The agreement was far from perfect. That the 
guaranteed interest on invested private capital for the 
completed line was now effectively set at 6% was not the 
issue. The entrepreneur indeed was assuming a consider­
able risk in constructing the first railroad line in
21tropical Africa at an agreed maximum price. For it was
apparent by now, that with local African labor difficult
to recruit, experiencedrailroad laborers would have to be
imported from France at considerable expense. The major
flaw lay rather in the very arrangement of a set forfeit
price for construction and guaranteed operating costs. As
one deputy had remarked during the debates of February 20th
in the Chamber,
You know how our engineers . . .  to their credit have 
always refused contracts on a forfeit basis which 
makes surveillance difficult . . . The company will 
build at a forfeit price; the less it spends, the more 
it will gain, its guaranteed return already being 
fixed . . . When a railroad is badly built, what are 
the results? It is that the operation and mainten­
ance are expensive.22
The stage was set wherein the railroad would be built.
That stage was supposedly designed to facilitate coopera-
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tion between the governmental organs, ministerial and 
colonial, and the contracting entrepreneur. In fact, it 
would often make them sharp adversaries.
Construction of the DSL By prior agreement between the
company and the government, a special company was to be
formed immediately to raise the required capital of
5,000,000 francs and to fulfill the contract terms. In
reality,this company would confine itself to operating the
rail line after construction, while the actual construction
would be undertaken on its behalf by the Batignolles with
its engineers, materiel, and expertise. Thus, even while
Batignolles management undertook construction work on the
rail line in Senegal as early as December 1882, formation
of the nevr DSL operating company was delayed, obviously in
order to postpone the cash outlays involved, until the
ministry sharply warned in May 188 3 that this oversight
23
was in violation of the contracted agreements.
Finally, on May 26, 1883, Batignolles management
capitulated, and formed the "Compagnie du Chemin de fer de
Dakar a Saint Louis," or DSL for short, with an issue of
10,000 shares. A Monsieur Edouard de Traz was selected as
president and a board of directors chosen. The Dakar-St.
Louis Company was, however, as a government official noted
24
in 1886, merely a subsidiary of the Batignolles itself.
On June 9th, a contract concluded between the Batignolles
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and the DSL turned over to the Batignolles all the liquid 
assets of the new company, including the anticipated future 
government subsidies, in exchange for the original 1880 
concession franchise and an agreement by the Batignolles to 
construct the line. The Batignolles itself retained a sub­
stantial bloc of shares in the DSL, and at least one officer 
of the Batignolles always sat on the DSL board until 1927.
A central office was set up in Paris for the new 
company at 35, Rue de Rome, while headquarters in Senegal 
was set up at Dakar. For their first DSL Chief of Opera­
tions in Senegal, the entrepreneurs shrewdly chose Alexis 
Bois, a military officer who had already served in Senegal 
in 1869. On leave from the army till his retirement in 
February 1884, Bois was trained for railroad management 
in a rapid orientation course on the Bone-Guelma railro'ad 
in the spring of 1883, and he arrived in Senegal on
June 5th, not long before the official opening of the new
25line's first rail section.
Though the severity of the climate was sometimes 
exaggerated by the company, the hazards of the "hivernage" 
rainy seasons did effectively limit heavy construction work 
in Senegal to the period between December and May. The 
Batignolles, although continuing work in practice into 
July,felt obliged at the end of each work season to 
evacuate its construction workers for a rest in France in
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order to avoid the health dangers that the hivernage 
generally brought.
The first work campaign began badly in December 188 2 
because of a new outbreak of yellow fever in Dakar. Five 
of the six Batignolles agents sent to Dakar in November were 
dead by the end of December.2  ^ A shipload of construction 
workers bound for a newly-quarantined Dakar was hastily 
diverted to St. Louis and set to work on that end of the 
projected line. On hearing news of the epidemic, 300 
construction workers already hired at Marseilles walked out, 
and workers could be brought into Dakar only on January 
26th.27
Given these handicaps it is hardly surprising that 
the first season did not go well. Blondelet, the Batignolles 
engineer charged with construction, had predicted that the 
season would end with the northern branch completed from 
St. Louis to M'Pal, and possibly Louga, and the southern 
branch from Dakar to Rufisque (See Figure 6). But by 
March, only 13 kms of roadbed and 4 kms of track had been 
completed in the north, and 15 kms of roadbed and 2 kms of 
track in the south; even by May 24th, only 8 kms of track 
had been laid from Dakar. Hopes of opening the northern 
branch for service to M'Pal were dashed that year as pieces 
essential for a bridge at Leybar were lost in an accident
in the waters of the sand bar at the entrance to St.
T . 28 Louis.
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In the south, however, the 30 km section linking
Dakar to Rufisque seemed just advanced enough to open
service between these towns, connected previously only by a
packboat cruising between Goree and the mainland. This
section was proudly inaugurated on July 23, 1883 to the
delight of the inhabitants of Dakar, who spontaneously
climbed onto the inaugural train, over the protests of
authorities, and remained aboard or clung to its sides for
29
the maiden voyage to Rufisque. Service, however, had 
been opened hastily on this line without construction work 
completed. Only 15 days after its opening, seasonal rains 
cut parts of the new line, and it could barely be reopened 
for service on November 10th.
The next campaign of 1883-1884 went much better. A 
larger more proficient work force was put to work from 
December to July. By January 29, 1884, the St. Louis- 
M'Pal section (32% km) was opened for service, and as the 
season advanced, a Rufisque-Pout section was opened on 
May 7, 1884, an M ’Pal-Louga section on June 21 and a Pout- 
Tivaouane section on July 24th. An impressive total of 
over 134 km had been delivered, with the rails reaching 
beyond Louga in the north and approaching Piregourey in the 
south; with less than 100 km to go. During the final, thiid 
season, with a work force of similar strength working from 
two ends toward a common goal, completion was rapid. A 
20% km section from Louga to Gueoul was put into service on
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February 1, 1885, and two sections,Gueoul-Kebemer and
Tivaouane-N’Gaye Mekhe, were opened simultaneously on
March 16th. A line of 21.9 kms from N'Gaye Mekhe to
N'Dande was opened on May 1st. Finally on May 14, 1885,
the ceremonial driving of a silver spike to connect the
last rail on the Kebemer-N’Dande line signaled the bridg-
30
ing of tl a last gap between Dakar and St. Louis.
Defects Unfortunately, as had been predicted, construc­
tion had been pursued with an eye to speed rather than to 
solidity. The governmental subvention of 12,680,000 francs 
(actually 48,769.23 francs per kilometer) would only be 
paid, and the guaranteed dividend applied to operations, 
only as successive sections of the line were accepted.
Thus, the immediate problem for the entrepreneur was to 
obtain acceptance of rail sections quickly. Of course, the 
accepted sections of line had to be sturdy enough to handle 
the flow of materiel and crews to construction sites at 
the ends of the line, as well as to carry the rail traffic 
that might develop. But there was a temptation to cut 
corners, to risk that the embankments holding the rails 
would endure under adverse weather, and to house station 
service temporarily in shacks. Regular service would re­
quire a sturdier infrastructure; but the state’s blanket 
guarantee of operating costs could be abused in this re­
spect by writing off reconstruction costs later on as
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operating repairs and maintenance, or as expansion of ex-
31isting facilities.
In April 1884 a government inspector was warning the 
governor of Senegal of the weakness of the railroad’s em­
bankments because of the company’s use of inferior soils 
and questionable excavation and construction practices. By 
August, the same inspector had noticed that rails were not 
always held by standard-sized spikes, but sometimes merely
fixed in grooves cut into the wood traverses by inadequate
32spike nails that could loosen under slight stress.
The ministry had arranged for inspection and sur­
veillance of the DSL's financial accounts only by December 
31, 1883, with a decree modeled on experience in Algeria. 
The decree provided for an interministerial commission 
(the Commission de Verification des comptes du chemin de 
fer de DSL), on which both the Ministries of Finance and 
Marine were represented, to verify the financial accounts 
of the company in Paris, while an Inspector of Naval A d ­
ministrative and Financial Services in Senegal verified the 
DSL’s financial records in the colony itself. In late 
1883, the technical surveillance of completed sections of 
line was entrusted to the director of the colony's Service
of Public Works, doubling as the Technical Surveillance
33
Engineer of the DSL at an extra salary of 5000 francs.
The official acceptance of sections of completed rail 
line for service--a key formality authorizing payment of
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the governmental subsidy and operations guarantee--was less 
precisely regulated. The line would first be inspected by 
ad hoc commissions formed locally, whose favorable conclu­
sions would then be ratified by the governor. It was 
strange, given the pivotal role of these commissions, that 
the governors generally selected members lacking in techni­
cal competence. Even stranger was the reception of un­
finished and incompletely-equipped sections, for none of 
the sections accepted during the period of construction was 
finished at the time of acceptance, and all were received 
on condition that the unfinished work be completed later. 
This procedure made sense in the case of the Dakar-Rufisque 
section in July 1883, because it had been the government's 
indecisiveness in choosing the sites for the terminal 
facilities and the railroad's right of way in Dakar that 
was to blame for construction delays in that town."^ The 
acceptance of other incomplete sections, however, was less 
reasonable, particularly after the washouts of the hiver- 
nage of 1883 on the Dakar-Rufisque line. The DSL, of 
course, welcomed the early reception of rail sections, 
because it thereby received governmental payments all the 
sooner. But the state's financial interests were suffer­
ing.
Although expressing a few misgivings about the rail 
line's obstruction of the main caravan route from St.
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Louis, a commission o£ January 17, 1884 complacently 
ratified acceptance of a still-unfinished St. Louis-M'Pal
7 c
rail section. However, a like reception on April 28th 
of the Rufisque-Pout rail section by another commission 
was challenged by the Inspector of Finances, Friocourt. 
Friocourt was scandalized by the apparent weakness of the 
line in many places, and the numerous resulting derailments. 
Already, the Inspector had concluded that some of the 
personnel and material charged to the DSL's exploitation 
accounts were actually being used for initial construction 
work, although verification was almost impossible with 
Batignolles records closed to government inspection. By 
accepting uncompleted rail sections, the reception commis­
sions were making it even easier for some construction 
work to be charged to the DSL’s maintenance account, which 
the state was than obliged to subsidize since the DSL was
•Z (L
operating at a loss.
Despite skepticism voiced by officials of the Mini­
stry of Marine, most members of the Accounts Verification 
Commission for the DSL in Paris were impressed by the 
inspector's energetic protests, and this body tended
thereafter to scrutinize the DSL's accounts with great 
37care. But the inspector's efforts had little practical 
immediate impact in Senegal. Overriding his objections, 
the governor authorized immediate reception of the Rufisque-
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Pout line on May 6th. Friocourt seemed to have better luck 
with the commission meeting in early June 1884 to consider 
reception of M ’Pal-Louga line. This ad hoc body, taking 
exception like Friocourt to the ommission of drainage 
ditches and other works, refused to accept the uncompleted 
line. But during Friocourt*s absence and despite his tele­
graphed protest, the governor overruled his own reception
3 8
commission and formally accepted the section.
Alfred Razy, the colony’s Director of Public Works
played a pivotal role on these reception commissions. As
Surveillance Engineer, Razy would be responsible not only
for inspecting the operation of lines put in service, but,
from January 1884, he was the only member on the reception
commissions really competent to judge the technical merits
of the lines and equipment. Indeed, later investigations
of technical defects on the lines were to accord Razy a
major share of the blame. Razy consistently accepted the
rosy estimates of DSL management and supported conditional
reception of unfinished sections regardless of Friocourt’s
objections. Friocourt complained to Paris about Razy's
39
indifferent surveillance over the DSL. But for his 
pains, Friocourt received only soothing words from the 
ministry while neither he nor his successors go much 
practical support in tightening surveillance of the DSL.^®
A later investigation concluded that perhaps the 
various Surveillance Engineers had been misled by regulations
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inadequately defining the Engineer’s role in verifying 
construction work. In fact, Razy had probably been 
carrying out the wishes of his superiors. On December 5, 
1883, not long after becoming Public Works Director, Razy 
had directed acting Governor Bourdiaux’s attention to 
irregularities in the transverse profiles of rail embank­
ments and cuts; but had been told in reply to allow the
company more latitude in building according to the topo-
41
graphy of the site and climate. When Razy urged that the 
reception of the Rufisque-Pout section be delayed until 
certain works, such as the telegraph line, were completed, 
a reception commission was appointed to receive the line 
over his head. Razy protested his exclusion, but when his 
own reception commission met later to reconsider the line, 
Razy was arguing for reception--without the telegraph line. 
In a report on the M'Pal-Louga line, Razy recognized that 
in accepting unfinished lines early he was putting an extra 
financial burden on the state; but by this time he was 
balancing the fiscal loss against the "strategic advantage" 
of opening the lines for service.^
Policy was decided ultimately, not by the Surveillance 
Engineer, nor even the governor. The dispute between Razy 
and Friocourt over the Rufisque-Pout section had been re­
layed to the ministry, and the answering dispatch of June 
5th deciding firmly against Friocourt’s views settled the 
issue not simply for that section, but for the M ’Pal-Louga
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and subsequent sections as well. It was only after receiv­
ing this dispatch that the governor overrode the M'Pal-
43
Louga commission's veto. Razy had argued as late as 
April 6th that the Pout-Tivaouane section not be opened for 
service--even if completed--until that section's earthworks 
had a chance to settle over the following hivernage. Never­
theless, on July 9th, a reception commission approved 
reception of this incomplete section on Razy's recommenda­
tion. Quick reception of rail sections, despite the finan­
cial risks, was now definitely the policy of the colonial
, . . . 44administration.
The shortsightedness of these procedures was amply 
demonstrated during the hivernage of 1884 when sudden 
tornadoes on August 8 and 16 cut the rail lines between 
Rufisque and Tivaouane. Another storm then cut the Dakar- 
Rufisque section on August 29th, and rail service was only 
restored along temporary tracks on November 15th. The DSL 
was to claim that the abnormal ferocity of the storms 
absolved the company of responsibility. It was a wise 
claim under the circumstances for it enabled the company 
eventually to recover half the repair expenses from the 
government. But it was questionable. The severity of 
storms did vary widely from one hivernage to another; but 
the storms that caused the washouts were not uncommon for 
the region. Razy's report, not surprisingly, upheld the 
company's claims. But Bois, in communicating privately
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with his superiors in the DSL in Paris, admitted that the 
storms, though severe, had not really been exceptional.
But who, he asked, had known the local climate well enough 
before the railroad was built?^
The washouts were an example of the difficulties of 
erecting and maintaining permanent structures in the 
Senegambian region. The sharp contrast between the dry 
season and the hivernage could be particularly deceiving, 
since many apparently suitable areas, solid and apparently 
high during the dry season, could be innundated under 
torrents of water during some of the sporadic, tempestuous 
storms characteristic of the hivernage. Two successive 
innundations occurred in Rufisque during the hivernage of 
1884 because that rapidly growing municipality had care­
lessly allowed new buildings to block the natural drainage 
of the locale.^ St. Louis was also plagued by floods 
whenever the Senegal river reached high levels during its 
annual innundation, and many an enticingly attractive 
nearby island of the dry season would be submerged by the 
river during the hivernage.
There were other difficulties as well. The aridity 
of the dry season, the humidity of the hivernage, and the 
heat of both could crack or erode building materials 
rapidly. Termites were a trying nuisance, especially when 
they ate up the wood traverses holding the tracks, and most 
of the small wood buildings put up at stations in the in-
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terior were destined to crumble rapidly. Too much, of 
course, should not be made of these difficulties, though it 
was in the DSL's interest to do so. Construction and main­
tenance in the tropics had their problems; but the company 
did not at least have to deal with the ravages of ice and
snow, or the wide swing in temperatures of northern 
47climes.
The washouts of August 1884 ought to have been a 
personal disaster for Razy, since he had vouched for the 
technical solidity of the line during the receptions. In­
deed, the ministry did order Razy's suspension in October 
1884. It seems though, that Razy was really removed from 
his post because of a longstanding feud with his superior, 
the colony's Director of Interior, dating back at least 
to June 1884. Moreover, in spite of his removal from office 
and his unremitting insubordination, Razy continued on as 
Director of Public Works and Surveillance Engineer until 
March 1885 while the ministry ostensibly searched for a 
replacement. Tn March Razy was finally sent back to Paris
to face charges, and was shipped from there to French
48Guiana, dying shortly thereafter. The DSL's management,
49
at least, was sorry to see him go. His departure in any 
case made no difference in the procedures of receiving in­
completely-equipped sections of rail line.
If there was a possible safeguard remaining in the 
procedure of conditional receptions of line sections, it
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lay, as Razy had once pointed out, in a final review for 
the general and definitive reception of the entire line at 
completion (contract annex, art. 28). By the end of April 
1885 only one, short unfinished section of 13.3 km between 
N ’Dande and Kebemer remained, and this was ready by June 
1st. Like all previous sections, some work remained to be 
done; but the reception commission of June 5 and 6 was 
willing to open the section, though without payment of the 
final portion of the subvention until completion of all 
works. DSL officials, however, flatly refused the offer.
It was not simply the subsidy. The DSL was also demanding 
general and definitive reception of the entire line. Full 
acceptance of the line was ludicrous when some stations 
were still unbuilt, when important accessories were not in 
place, and when some parts of the line were on temporary 
tracks. But the DSL threatened to keep the N'Dande-Kebemer 
section closed, blocking long-haul traffic between the two 
ends of the line unless its terms were m e t . ^
The new Director of Public Works, Chapron, proposed a 
solution decidely favorable to the company. General and 
definitive reception of the line would be declared immedi­
ately, conditional upon completion of unfinished work later, 
and the final subsidy would be paid on completion. The 
governor, following Chapron*s advice, overrode a still- 
resisting commission to adopt Chapron*s solution. But, 
unexpectedly, DSL officials refused to accept all of
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Chapron's conditions. While a perplexed governor was writ­
ing the ministry for new instructions, ministry officials 
in Paris were already striking a new bargain with top DSL 
officers. It was essentially the Chapron solution, but 
with immediate payment of the subsidy. A ministrial tele­
gram of June 27th ordered the governor to accept the line 
under these conditions; and so, on July 3rd, the governor 
declared full reception of the line. As of July 6th, 
service between St. Louis and Dakar was begun, and on
July 26, 1885, the complete, though not completed line was
51inaugurated at S. Louis.
The ministry's haste in accepting a badly-built line 
is curious, but understandable. Ministry officials had 
certainly been aware of the defects of the line, at least 
since the disastrous breaks of 1884; and there were indica­
tions of a cooler attitude toward the company from that 
52
time. Yet ministry officials were apparently entangled 
in a trap of their own making. To obtain parliamentary 
approval earlier, they had prepared a project for con­
struction of the railroad at the lowest possible price.^ 
Their objective had been to obtain a rudimentary line as 
quickly as possible, and there is reason to believe that 
they had deliberately allowed the entrepreneur to build 
cheaply and poorly, knowing that the necessary improvements 
for a commercially viable line were to follow later--at the 
state's expense. There was no point in stopping just short
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of completion, when the state was already obligated to 
assume any deficits in receipts for the other 95% of the 
line. Certainly, there was no point in provoking a serious 
dispute that might lead to embarrassing public disclo­
sures .54
Construction Wrangles The Batignolles Company had gener­
ally followed the Walter project in laying out the Dakar- 
St. Louis rail line, but not exactly. Company engineers 
had resurveyed the original trace on-site in 1880 and 1881, 
and, after approval of the concession law in June 188 2, the 
Batignolles submitted for ministerial approval a compre­
hensive set of definitive plans specifying the route, grad­
ient, profiles, and construction works along the line, as 
well as sketches of many station buildings.^ These plans 
of September 30, 1883 naturally differed in many details 
from the original plan, compelling review and reapproval 
by the ministry; but this meant that colonial authorities 
in Senegal and the citizenry of the colony became ac­
quainted with the project's details at the last minute.^
It was possible for Paris to disregard the impact of 
the rail line's trace on local conditions in the rural 
interior, where passage followed by right of conquest. But 
the route followed by the railroad at the approaches to the 
colony^s ports did raise some important legal and economic 
questions.
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In the case of Rufisque, Walter had projected a trace 
passing 2 kilometers outside the town, with the implicit 
intent of rerouting long distance traffic around it, and 
even of draining local commerce away from that town to 
Dakar. The lusty, spontaneous growth of the merchant’s 
commune of Rufisque at the expense of Dakar, some 30 km 
away, had been jealously resented by colonial officials
r m
since Pinet-Laprade. Briere de 1 ’Isle had explicitly
informed the ministry that his railroad plan was indeed
designed to transfer Rufisque's commercial activity to
Dakar by bringing the latter town with its superior harbor
58into closer contact with the interior.
When the projected railroad plans were revealed in 
late 1882, however, they raised a storm of protest from the 
communal government and merchants of Rufisque. With large, 
essentially vacant areas just outside the immediate peri­
meter of the town, a colonial governor, less hostile to 
Rufisque than Briere had been, found it easy enough to 
satisfy the irate citizenry of the town. With the Batig­
nolles also willing, modified plans were quickly drawn up 
to bring the station much closer to Rufisque.^
It was much harder to deal with the approaches into 
St. Louis and Dakar. Proponents of the project in the 
colony and the ministry had made much of the colonial rail­
road's purported advantage over metropolitan railroads in
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obtaining land for the right of way through territory 
supposedly vacant and free. But land within the communes 
of the colony was not necessarily unfettered under French 
law, even if it was vacant, for even colonial authorities 
had been selling or conceding plots within them for some 
years.
The problem at Dakar was serious and complex. The 
original plans had called for establishing the Dakar rail 
stations, passenger and freight, on the bay of Dakar toward 
the northern limits of the town. In September 1882 , 
Batignolles engineers, not wishing to wait for the sub­
stantial sea defenses that the colony was to build at this 
site, suggested withdrawing both terminals into the empty 
sand dunes farther north beyond the town's outskirts. To 
Legros, who was consulted on this question, it seemed as 
though the freight terminal might indeed be located in the 
dunes, but that the rail line should also be run down to 
the quais and piers of the port and the passenger terminal 
located centrally in the port. Whereas the precise site 
for the passenger terminal was left to further studies, 
Legros drew up in October a tentative trace for the track 
leading to the piers (the Mtrac§ bleu"), and this was 
promptly accepted by the Batignolles, which needed immedi­
ately a track leading from the port to unload construction 
material coming by sea from France.^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 1 7 -
With construction work scheduled to start in November 
1882, this, however, was a late moment to begin revising 
construction plans, at a time when expropriation procedures 
ought to have been under way. Furthermore, when the commune 
of Dakar-GorSe learned of the revised plans, its citizens, 
land owners, and merchants protested bitterly. The rail 
line's approach into Dakar, coming as it did so close to 
the shoreline from the north, meant that the track leading 
to the piers would parallel the quais, blocking or at least 
hampering access to the port. Moreover, a passenger termi­
nal in the port would congest an already overcrowded 
commercial area,squeezing out some merchants.^ Opinion in 
the commune was divided, of course. Some wished to see 
both rail terminals at their original site at the edge of 
the port; others wished both out in the sand dunes, with 
no track along the quais. Others were in favor of the 
trace bleu, and still others proposed siting the passenger
terminal well inland in the plateau area to the west of
f\ ?
the commercial area. But opposition was strong enough 
to pass strong resolutions against the trace bleu in the 
commune's municipal council and chamber of commerce, while 
such important firms as Maurel and Prom, the Compagnie du 
Senegal et de la C8te Occidentale d'Afrique, and the 
Messageries Maritimes, and even Senegal's deputy to 
parliament attacked the government's plans.
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Batignolles engineers naturally protested against 
the delays blocking occupation of terrains needed for the 
railroad's main terminals in Dakar--terrains that the state 
was obliged, according to the 1880 contract, to deliver 
free. With an uneasy military situation at the time in 
Cayor the incumbent governor was also anxious to speed up 
work on the railroad, and he was determined not to let 
Batignolles officials use the delays in the delivery of 
terrains to blame him for any shortcomings in constructing
the rest of the line. He therefore authorized the Batig­
nolles in late February to lay track along the trace bleu, 
and ordered expropriation to begin. Expropriation pro­
cedures in this colony were slower than in the metropole; 
but the entrepreneur impatiently took possession of 
terrains as yet unexpropriated to lay down much of his
track along the quais, to the outrage of the adversaries
of the trac£ bleu. ^
At this point, the ministry tardily recalled that 
parliament had not appropriated any funds to cover ex­
propriation costs for the railroad, and Senegal's General 
Council refused to let the colony cover the discrepancy,, 
even temporarily.^ Apprised by new of the mounting local 
opposition to the trace bleu, of the inconveniences of 
the trace, and of its own financial embarrassment, the 
ministry promptly suspended expropriation in early April, 
and called for further studies.
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It was already too late. Much of the "permanent” 
track already lay along the quais, and the purported costs 
of removal exceeded the costs of expropriation. Moreover, 
a newly laid foundation for the freight terminal blocked 
any relocation of the passenger station in the dunes. 
Unfortunately, the Batignolles track was now also occupying 
unexpropriated land illegally. Promptly hauled into court 
by one irate landowner, the Batignolles sued the government 
in turn. After a long, tortuous series of legal and poli­
tical maneuvers too complicated to relate here, the mini­
stry finally chose to retain the trace bleu.^
The strong will of acting Governor Bourdiaux forced
a solution. Local oppotition was eroded by placating some
(such as the Messageries Maritimes) and by such stern
measures as dissolving the commune's municipal council.
Terrains expropriated for both terminal and line were
reduced to the bare minimum, while the deviations of the
Batignolles track from the trace bleu at some points were
£ \ 7
used to whip the company into line on this question. 
Nevertheless, it took until December 1883 - January 1884 
before the extent of expropriation was settled, until 
March 1885 before all terrains were delivered to the 
company, and until January 1886 for the expropriation 
procedures to be concluded, with one proprietor holding 
out until late 1887.^
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Batignolles officials were naturally annoyed at the 
deliberate pace of expropriation procedures and at the gov­
ernment's procrastinations, which slowed and hampered their 
construction efforts. It was a bad beginning, but the com­
pany was able to turn it to account as an argument for the 
reception of unfinished rail sections, beginning with the 
Dakar-Rufisque.
The access route into St. Louis,and the sites for its
rail terminals were resolved more easily. The terminals
were not to be placed on the island of St. Louis since that
would have required building a costly metal bridge parallel
with the wooden "pont Faidherbe." The passenger and freight
terminals were slated instead for sites well removed from the
bridge in the sparsely populated suburbs on the continental
69"island” of Sor. In partial compensation for the termi­
nal's remoteness, an additional riverfront freight terminal 
was destined to be installed downriver from the pont Faid­
herbe; but this supplement to the original plans would be
70built after completion of the railroad.
Much of the property on Sor was not privately owned; 
but only a small portion of this marshy island was solid 
enough to hold the tracks and rail stations. To save time 
and expense the ministry had proposed that the tracks simply 
be placed on the existing public road leading out of St.
Louis into the interior. Local merchants were unhappy with 
the siting of the terminals so far from the city center, but 
even more concerned about clearing the road for commercial
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traffic by removing the tracks from it. To please them, the 
track was shifted to one side by 12 meters; but since this 
shift entailed expropriation of a few properties along a 6 
meter wide strip, more expense was involved than originally 
anticipated.?1
The Batignolles had been anxious to start work at this 
end of the line quickly, but they were unable to occupy some 
needed properties until March 1883 after the colonial govern­
ment belatedly started expropriation. As in Dakar, the min­
istry, finding itself without the necessary funds, attempted 
in April to halt the expropriation procedure. However, in 
this case, the expropriations were too far advanced in the 
courts to be halted.^2 procedures were slow, neverthe­
less, with some land for the town's passenger station turned 
over only by December 1883.^
More awkward problems were encountered on the access 
route only 5 kilometers outside St. Louis. At that point, 
the public road crossed the marigot of Leybar by means of 
a small bridge. By agreement in Paris, the railroad company 
was scheduled to built a 120 meter, metal bridge for the 
railroad at Leybar after tearing down the colony's wooden 
bridge. Since this was the only structure of any signifi­
cant size in the Dakar-St. Louis project, the company was 
anxious in December 1882 to dismantle the old bridge and 
pour concrete supports for the new as quickly as possible. 
Unfortunately, with the only other usable road between St. 
Louis and the interior flooded and impassable until the
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following February, the demolition of the Leybar bridge 
would not only hinder St. Louis' commerce, but also en­
danger the military expedition about to be launched into 
74
Cayor.
The Batignolles was, nevertheless, entitled by prior 
agreement in Paris to proceed with demolition, and the col­
ony had little choice except to organize a temporary ferry 
service quickly in order to assure pedestrian and caravan 
traffic across the marigot. A resentful colonial govern­
ment hoped that the entrepreneur would at least share the
75expense for this unforeseen ferry service.
This was only the first of several wrangles to dog the 
passage of the railroad at Leybar. Colonial officials were 
soon at odds with company officials over the width of a 
passageway on the bridge to carry pedestrian and carrier 
traffic.^ Frustrated in its initial efforts to be refunded 
for the ferry, and forced to pay for a widened bridge passage­
way, the colonial government hoped at least to make the 
Batignolles reconstruct the unusable pedestrian approaches
to the bridge. Ultimately they were indeed able to get both
77the Batignolles and the ministry to share in the costs.
The relationship between the railroad and the colony 
it served was obviously influenced by the circumstances and 
variations of local political and economic conditions. But 
the discords over access routes, as well as the methods of 
construction illustrate the surprising extent to which the
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ministry was attempting to insulate the DSL from the vagar­
ies of local conditions. The terrain on which the company 
would operate, with which its officials would be most con­
cerned, was the legal and financial terrain laid out in the 
revised contract of October 30, 188 0. Operating conditions 
in Senegal would be a primary concern of the entrepreneur, 
but only within the context of the convention and subse­
quent agreements that had carved out paths leading into 
the French treasury. Company management was centered in 
Paris, not Dakar. Contacts between officers of the company 
and ministry officials, or regulatory bodies overseeing 
colonial railroads, would mean that railroad policy could 
be set above the heads of colonial officials in Senegal,
sometimes to the latter's surprise, and often to their
. • 78chagrin.
Ministry officials in Paris would often be annoyed 
when they felt themselves at a disadvantage with DSL 
executives, who were better informed by company agents on 
the scene than the officials had been by technically less- 
proficient colonial bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the metro­
politan authorities basically wanted this arrangement.
The Dakar-St. Louis had been inserted into Senegal on the 
ministry's initiative for strategic reasons, but at great 
expense to the state. Government officials would aim now 
at minimizing the railroad's financial burden on the metro-
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pole's budget, or at least to avoid the appearance of a 
needless drain. Attempts by colonial administrators or 
merchants to expand railroad services at metropolitan ex­
pense would be regarded from this viewpoint as serving 
narrow interests in disregard of the common good. The 
metropolitan interest was to terminate the tax cash flows 
to the colonies, and in this sense the metropolitan author­
ity was pitted, to a degree, against leading elements of 
its own colony and the colony's well-being. That this 
fundamental conflict between the metropole and its colony 
did not develop into more open discord in this era, was due 
not only to a growing rail traffic that reduced the govern­
ment's fiscal losses, but also to the sharp tactics of the 
company itself. The local colonial government and metro­
politan officials were induced to form a common defensive 
front in the face of suspicious DSL actions and operations. 
Local merchants, defending their own commercial interests, 
would also keep the government informed of any DSL errors 
or abuses that might arise. But, later on, the three- 
sidedconflict would emerge again, with the metropolitan 
treasury officials and the DSL allied, often as not, against 
the local interests of the colonial government.
Africans and the DSL There is less information about the 
initial relations between the railroad and the Africans who 
were served by it, or simply lived near it. The abuses of
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either party against the other, moreover, were more likely
to attract attention than any mutual satisfaction. Both
the entrepreneur and the colonial officials were deeply
concerned about the possibility of armed attacks by African
warriors, especially the "tyeddo" of Lat Dior, against
railroad facilities or personnel. But railroad construction
encountered few troubles in Cayor. First of all, the tracks
did not enter Cayor until the hivernage of 1884, and then
the vigilance of Samba Laobe and his supporters prevented
serious incidents. The most notable incident in Cayor, in
1884, was the disappearance during the hivernage of 1200
79
meters of pickets marking the railroad trace.
Far more serious incidents occurred in territory 
long-annexed to the French colony, in Serer country be­
tween Rufisque and Thies. The area had long been reputed­
ly dangerous for travellers and caravans enroute to or 
from Rufisque, and, as such, an embarrassment to a French 
administration incapable of mastering it. One June 15,
1884 a fight broke out between railroad agents and an 
African at the well of Pout. Soon thereafter, large rocks 
and other obstacles were found lying on the tracks in 
obvious attempts to derail moving trains. Attempts by 
railwaymen to seize suspects in the vicinity of the 
sabotaged lines only increased the seriousness of the 
incidents, with an armed band trying to free a prisoner
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in one instance, and projectiles or even shots fired at 
trains in others. The company quickly withdrew European 
workers from the a r e a . ^
The news of the incidents alarmed French colonial 
authorities. Their first reaction was to make an example 
of two presumably guilty villages by razing them; but the 
colony's chief military officer counseled against an armed 
expedition in this densely wooded area during the hiver­
nage. Military action was wisely confined to escorting
81trains through the area aid patrolling the line.
Colonial authorities investigating the incidents 
soon found that many had been instigated by railroad per­
sonnel. Railroad agents had tried to bar Africans from 
the well at Pout. In other cases they had seized apparently 
innocent bystanders near sabotaged tracks. The acting 
governor complained to the ministry of these acts in a 
letter of August 9th, and the ministry asked the DSL to
make sure that their personnel respected Africans
8 2neighboring the rail line.
The DSL reacted peevishly to these charges. The 
imputation of the incidents to their personnel, they 
answered, was preposterous. These charges arose, they 
claimed, because the inquiries had been conducted without 
DSL participation, and they asserted that the actions of 
the railroad agents seemed reasonable. Moreover, they
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added, in a separate note:
It appears to us that precise orders ought to be given 
so that the railroad and its environs are respected in 
fact as properties of the company and the state. To 
this effect, it would be necessary in our opinion that 
the black be persuaded indeed (and only an example 
would persuade him) that he cannot attack with impunity 
the property and agents of the company. For that, it is 
henceforth necessary to treat seriously the official 
reports drawn up by company agents against the blacks, 
and to take appropriate actions . . . When an aggression 
occurs, an immediate and serious repression is neces­
sary and not an inquiry two months after the events.83
It is probable, however, that the allegations against
o a
the railroad agents were true. Railroad laborers of the
era, it should be noted, were generally notorious for their
8 5tough behavior and devil-may-care antics. Moroccan
laborers hired for work on the Upper Senegal, for example,
quickly gained a reputation for resorting readily to
knives.^ Most of the construction workers brought in by
the Batignolles were Italian, though a few hundred Africans
8 7were also recruited locally for clearing brush. As early
as February 1883, municipal authorities in Rufisque were
asking for a larger police force to handle visiting
construction workers. In St. Louis the death of an African
in a brawl with laborers, led the. mayor of that town in
January 1884 to prohibit workers of Italian nationality
from entering St. Louis--a measure withdrawn after ener-
8 8getic protests by the Italian consul.
This kind of rough-hewn arrogance may also have been 
carried over into the countryside. In one recorded inci­
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dent of December 1884, laborers at KM 37.5 reported an 
armed attack by a band of Serers. A careful police in­
vestigation later showed that the "band of 8 armed Serers" 
was really two unarmed Lebus who had been beated by the
laborers after the latter refused to pay for provisions
8 9
brought them by the Lebus.
The presence of civilian railroad personnel residing 
at stations in the interior of Senegal was also a new fac­
tor, and it was unclear what the relationship between rail- 
waymen and the inhabitants would be. But it is clear that 
colonial officials considered the newcomers a nuisance to 
some degree. In September 1886, the stationmaster of Kelle, 
witnessing a pettytrade dispute, mistakenly took the medi­
ator of the dispute, a trader from St. Louis, for a danger­
ous agitator. After foolishly provoking the trader into 
a fight, the stationmaster spread the alarm about the 
imagined a g i t a t i o n . U n i m p o r t a n t  in itself, the incident 
illustrates the arbitariness and suspicion which could 
arise with isolated agents thrust into positions of 
authority in a culturally alien milieu.
The tendency of some stationmasters to give shelter to 
escaped slaves also roused the apprehension of colonial 
officers.^ In fact the insertion of a thin ribbon of 
French-controlled territory in Cayor, with commercial 
centers beginning to form in the perimeters about each
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of the stations, had brought a host of new political 
problems.
The year 1886 had started out with good relations
between the darnel of Cayor, Samba Laobe, and the colonial
government of Sfcnegal. The darnel had rendered the French
signal services. He had kept the rail line relatively
trouble-free in Cayor, and when a rail paymaster's car was
ambushed by some Africans --disgruntled former employees--
the darnel ordered his men to track them down. When Cayor's
peasants refused to sell their peanuts at low prices .in
1885-86, Samba Laobe dutifully encouraged peanut sales.
Despite a strong initial reluctance, the darnel had also
consented to extend the perimeter of French holdings
around tail stations from 100 to 300 meters in December
1884. He had hoped to receive in compensation some
rights over the lost northern province of N'Diambour or
the right to collect taxes at the rail stations; but had
finally settled merely for a free pass for himself and
92
an entourage on the railroad.
The abortive attempt by the darnel to conquer Djolof 
ended the era of good feelings. With Cayor facing invasion 
in turn from Djolof, the new governor of Senegal intervened, 
restoring peace at the price of a heavy fine on Samba Laobe. 
According to Governor Genouille's later account, a humili­
ated Samba Laobe had ungratefully vented his spleen by
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maltreating French subjects and permitting outrages against
93
French territory. There is no doubt of the darnel's 
annoyance. Nevertheless, the colonial government had not 
played an entirely innocent role. Despite later disclaim­
ers, it may actually have had a hand in Samba Laobe's in­
vasion of Djolof in the first place. Moreover, the new 
governor had tried to profit from the darnel's embarrass­
ment by again expanding the perimeter around the rail
stations in Cayor from 300 to 500 meters, while forcing the
94
darnel to accept a permanent French resident at N'Dande.
The darnel was obliged to accept these terms with an army of
Djolof entering Cayor; but he avoided implementing them
later. Perhaps he really was encouraged, as the governor
suspected, by important merchants of St. Louis who were
95
Genouille's political enemies.
Many of the growing disputes centered on the new 
commercial nuclei growing next to the rail stations in 
Cayor. On the one hand, the colonial government was con­
cerned over generous grants of land by the darnel to favored 
merchants just outside the French-controlled perimeters a- 
round the stations. Closely linked to this question was 
the problem of taxation, with some merchants complaining 
about having to pay taxes to both the darnel and the French 
administration. It was not that commerce was hostile to 
Samba Laobe; on the contrary. Maurel and Prom's agent at
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Tivaouane for one, favorably contrasted the darnel's prompt 
assistance to the administration's inaction. Probably some 
traders were simply using an ambiguous situation to avoid 
paying colonial taxes.^ It was a minor jurisdictional 
question. But it touched on fundamental issues of sover­
eignty, and Genouille took it seriously enough. He began
to consider deposing the darnel, and breaking up the re-
97
mainder of Cayor into 4 or 5 provinces.
That the colonial government was following a hard 
line toward the African populations after the start of 
Genouille's administration is evident from an incident of 
some gravity on the railroad line. On September 10, 188 6, 
a train had run over some cattle near the village of 
Diarmeo Gueye in N'Diambour not far from Louga. Irate 
villagers beat up a train's crewmen. Furious, the officer 
commanding the fort of Louga ordered that the village pay 
a heavy fine, the two principal culprits to be hung in case 
of nonpayment. The obliging chief of N'Diambour promptly 
hanged the hapless wretches publicly in Louga, while levy-
98
ing the fine as well.
Another serious incident relating to the railroad 
occurred during Genouille's temporary absence from the 
colony, as a body of horsemen menaced the station of 
Tivaouane in August to recover a pair of escaped slaves 
taking refuge there. The incident was not taken seriously
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by the French Commandant nearby at Thids, who chose to 
ignore the problem. Indeed it is likely that had no force 
been used, French authorities would have returned the fugi­
tives and reprimanded the stationmaster. But officials in 
St. Louis were horrified by the impression that this armed 
action against the station might make. The Commandant of 
Thi§s was reminded that Tivaouane's station lay in French 
territory, not Cayorian. "By your action," he was informed, 
"you have sanctioned a violation of this right." A platoon
of "spahis" was dispatched to N ’Dande on the railroad, its
99
officers changed with obtaining satisfaction. The in­
fluence of the chiefs of the crown bondsmen, Demba War 
and Ibra Fatim Sar, on the darnel was particularly deplored. 
Demba War, the perpetrator of the Tivaouane incident in­
deed was to be arrested if possible.
From the arrival of the spahis at N ’Dande, archival
sources are inconveniently meager. According to the gover­
nor, Samba Laobe began to threaten to expel traders from 
Tivaouane if they did not pay him taxes by October 6th. 
Recently returned, Genouille sent an officer to N'Dande
with orders to interview the darnel. But when this officer 
reached Tivaouane by train with the troop of spahis, Samba
Laobe refused to meet him. Tempers grew short and the
officer ordered a mounted charge into the darnel’s camp.
While the darnel’s men were caught dismounted, obviously
taken by surprise, Samba Laobe fled. Pursued, he was over­
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taken and cut down. Ambush, charged a St. Louis newspaper 
linked politically to the darnel, despite the governor's 
denials
In any case, Samba Laob^'s death created a major
political crisis in Cayor. To secure the rail line, the
governor had two special trains outfitted with replacement
rails and Hotchkiss machine guns--a sight, he noted, that
102produced a visible impression on the populace. But the
Cayorian notables and the governor quickly came to terms 
in this crisis in order to bar from power their common 
enemy, Lat Dior, a logical successor to the deceased Samba 
Laobe.
With a completed railroad bestriding Cayor, the 
political imperatives of the situation were altered sub­
stantially. It was not simply that the railroad had opened 
up that country to direct French military and political 
domination. The railroad now represented an expensive and 
vulnerable fixed investment that needed protection, and the 
incompatabilities of French and African interests persuaded 
French officials that African interests had to be strictly 
subordinated to their own.
Direct annexation of Cayor was unpalatable, because 
legal and political problems relating to slavery and taxa­
tion were then currently stirring up turmoil in rural 
districts long-annexed to the colony. That was why no part
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of Cayor had been annexed in 1883; and if anything these
I f)T
domestic turmoils had grown worse by 1886. A weak darnel,
like the deposed N'Gone Fal, would only invite ambitious
9 ^
pretenders; a strong darnel, like Lat Dior--or even like 
Samba Laob§ despite his cooperativeness--would remain a 
possible source of autonomous dissension in a new political 
dispensation calling for chiefs to serve as effective, but 
obedient subordinates.
The solution, as imposed by the governor and ratified 
by an assembly of Cayorian notables at N'Dande on October 
19th was to divide Cayor into six provinces. Despite the 
objections of the leading hereditary notables of Cayor, the 
territorial command of each of these provinces was given 
to the chiefs of the crown bondsmen--leaders of the only 
significant military forces in Cayor. Ironically, Demba 
War, only recently under a cloud, was given command of the 
province of Saniokhor and appointed "President of the 
Confederation of Cayor.
It was the end of an independent Cayor. When Lat 
Dior tried to interfere, he was pursued, then killed in 
an armed encounter. Attempts by other pretenders to assume 
the crown were also quickly s q u e l c h e d . D e m b a  War and 
the other appointed chiefs certainly retained a share of 
the power. But if the French resident now installed at 
N'Dande gave an order, they were henceforth expected to 
obey.
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DSL construction under fire As for the Dakar-St. Louis 
railroad, the tranquility of its operations now seemed 
assured. Its employees no longer reported manifestations 
of hostility, and its agents could concentrate on operation ,. 
of the line in Senegal and on legal and contractual battles 
in Paris. Construction of the entire line had officially 
been completed in October 1885; but massive repair and re­
building of the rail lines and facilities were also under­
taken by the DSL after the line opened.
Unfortunately for the DSL, this initial phase of 
construction could not be closed easily or quickly. The 
enormous annual deficits of DSL operations and maintenance-- 
deficits guaranteed effectively by the state according to 
the contract--aroused a great deal of concern in Paris.
Most members of the governmental Account Verification 
Commission were shocked by the size of the payments by the 
state to the DSL, and they were trying vainly to pare down 
the DSL's massive operations expenses.
In November 1886, Paul Etienne, an engineer of roads 
and bridges on loan from the Ministry of Public Works, was 
finally sent to Senegal to check conditions on the line. 
Etienne's report of March 1887, impressive for its techni­
cal thoroughness, was a severe indictment of the original 
construction of the line to which he attributed the blame 
for the washouts of 1883 and 1 8 8 4 . The line's trans-
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verse profiles, he found, did not generally conform to
profile types of the approved plans. Confirming Friocourt's
earlier observations on roadbed and track construction, he
noted that soil for embankments and ballast had simply been
taken from the vicinity of the line, much of it entirely
unsuitable and unstable, despite the supply nearby at
10 8Rufisque of excellent stone for a proper ballast. Soil
extracted from cuts had simply been cast to the rear by 
shovel and was easily blown back by the wind. Etienne 
found many of the short spans along the line defective, and 
a short bridge at Hann, badly damaged in 1883, was still 
only propped up unsteadily and needed to be redone. After 
reading local records on the construction, he had particu­
larly harsh words for the role of the Surveillance Engineers 
and the functioning of the reception commissions. Neither 
the state nor the DSL, he concluded, had properly defended 
its interests against those of the Batignolles.
The report of 1887 was politically embarrassing. It 
was therefore permitted, as the phrase goes, "to slumber 
in the dossier." Nevertheless by the end of the parlia­
mentary session of November 1888, a deputy, Adolphe Turrel, 
apprised of the report's contents, read some choice excerpts 
in the Chamber to the outraged deputies, while the Under­
secretary of Colonies could only reply with embarrassed 
evasions. Although no enemy of colonial expansion, Turrel 
raised the question again in November 1890, with even more
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revelations, but nothing was done. With the 10 year 
limit on a builder's responsibility about to expire, Turrel 
again took to the floor of the Chamber in March 1895, de­
manding that the builder be held to account for any mis­
deeds. The result of his demand was a new investigation 
by a 3-man commission, headed by the engineer Chaper.’*’^  
This commission's report, obviously designed as an 
attack on the Etienne report of 1887 and as a defense of
the builder, effectively closed the affair as a political 
111
issue. The line's transverse profiles,it admitted,
often did not conform to contract specifications, but this 
stemmed, it claimed, from the use of inferior soils, whose 
employment had been specifically permitted in the annex to 
the concession contract of October 30 (article 18). With 
this inferior soil, the profiles used were more stable 
than the regulatory profiles. In any case, the builder 
was legally covered by the government's official reception 
of the line. Construction expenses, it noted, had certain­
ly entered the DSL's operations accounts, but at this late 
date it was impossible to know by how much; so the company 
was also legally secure on this point. It might be said 
that the entrepreneur's agents had acted high-handedly and 
deviously, but they had not acted fraudulently according 
to the contract's terms and the tolerances permitted by 
agents of the state. The crucial faults lay instead,
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they concluded, in the defects of the original Walter
project calling for unrealistic economies, in the defects
of a contract annex copied blindly from those of Algerian
railroads, and in the poor defense of the state’s interest
112by governors and Surveillance Engineers.
This report is a fascinating document, as much for 
its apparent blindness to the key responsibilities of top 
ministry officials in neglecting the state's financial 
interest, as in some remarks on the builder's construction 
methods that were in some ways more damning than Etienne's 
report of 1887. The final trace of the line, it noted had 
been laid out by company engineers with an eye to reducing 
construction time and cost to a minimum by turning the 
least volume of soil. As a result, the tracks were located 
in many places on the lower part of slopes, so that flood 
waters cascading down the slopes into rail embankments 
of unstable earth easily washed out the roadbeds during 
the hivernages of 1883, 1884, and 188 5. Sufficient drainage 
would have solved the problem; but the works had been 
accepted as they were by the state, absolving the company 
of blame. One of the major defects in the structure of 
the line was the over-extended spacing between traverses 
along the rails, which (while saving the company 600,000 
francs) left the track unstable under stress, causing 
numerous derailments. Once again the builder was absolved,
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because the ministry had specifically granted a variance
1 1 7
on the spacing of traverses in February 1881. The
short masonry spans, seemingly defective in 1886, now
seemed solid enough. But the bridge at Hann was still as
delapidated as in 1883. Furthermore the metal Leybar bridge,
the one structure which Etienne could praise in 1887, had
developed dangerous cracks, owing to defects in the origi-
114nal construction.
A careful analysis of the results of this report by 
a high official of the new Ministry of Colonies in 1896 
drew more judicious conclusions. The fault, he wrote, did 
not lie with Razy or Chapron, however poorly they had per­
formed, but with higher governmental authorities in the 
ministry who failed to give the necessary orders. These 
officials apparently had thoughtthat,
it was a matter of a sort of provisory line, construc­
ted at little expense and designed ultimately to re­
ceive complementary installations and successive 
improvements. But if it were thus, duty required inform­
ing parliament and offering it the alternative: either 
to construct a railroad under normal conditions with 
a slightly higher immediate expense, or to sketch out 
a rail line, put hastily into service and completed by 
the concessionary company by means of an annuity during 
the period of concession. In fact, it is the latter 
result which was attained.115
The company then had only followed its contract, and 
if it had profited, perhaps even unduly, it could not be 
sued for illegal acts or for most of the defects of the line. 
All that could be done at this point were some minor legal
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actions compelling the company to advance an additional 
80,818 francs of capital to match an extra governmental 
subsidy covering an extra Ah kilometers of constructed 
rail length on the line, and to force it to pay for repairs 
on the bridges of Hann and Leybar.
X16
In fact, this was all that was done.
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1879 that the estimated building costs of 50,000 to
60,000 francs per kilometer "ne serait pas accepte 
par des Compagnies pr£sentant de s€rieuses garanties."- 
Batignolles engineers were surveying the line from 
January 7 through 16, 1880. (Bois, S€n£gal et Soudan, 
p. 33; GS to MMC, January 8, 1880, FOM, Senegal 1,63).
10. Note to Minister, July 5, 1880, Legros Resume, p.46; 
same, August 18, 1880. Ibid., pp. 51-52 (latter in 
FOM, Senegal XII,41); Ministerial arr§te of September 
3, 1880, AMMP, GGl-carton 45.
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11. P.V. of bidding and all three bids are contained in 
FOM, Senegal XII,41; E. Labiche remarked in the Senate 
debate of February 17, 1881 that Freycinet, who was now 
strongly for the Senegalese railroads, had also played 
an important role for the BSne-Guelma in 1879 (JORFj^ 
Debats Parl.-Senat, February 17, 1881, p. 110).
12. Batignolles to Director Interior, Senegal, April 1, 
1881, SARS, DCF.
13. Report to Batignolles stockholders, meeting of Novem­
ber 25, 1881, ANF, 89AQ11.
14. See Article 2, of the annex ("cahier des charges")
to the contract of October 30, 1880; JORF-Debats Parl.- 
Chambre, February 20, 1881, pp. 296-298.
15. Legros originally intended that the entrepreneur put up 
only half the capital in cash (Note to Minister, 
November 22, 1880, Legros ResumS, pp. 54-57), and the 
railroad bill of November 1880 specified that "at 
least” half the capital be in cash. Members of par­
liament objected particularly to effective payments
by means of "apports." See JORF-Debats Pari.-Chambre, 
February 20, 1881, pp. 296-305, and S6nat, February 23, 
1881, pp. 179-185. The final bill of June 1882 stipu­
lated full payment for shares in cash, but the DSL de­
layed full payment, by noting that there was no stipu­
lation for immediate payment. See DSL to Sous-secre- 
taire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies (henceforth 
S/Sec), October 19, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,42; draft 
MMC to Minister of Finances, December 20, 1883, Ibid.
16. Quoted in note to minister, November 22, 1880, Legros 
Resum€, pp. 54-57.
17. Ibid.
18. See the report of Ch. Brun to the Senate, no. 373, 1881 
session, "seance" July 1, 1881, in FOM, Senegal XII,69; 
and the report by Arthur Leroy for the "Special commit­
tee charged to examine the law adopted by the Senate 
for a Dakar-St. Louis railroad," no. 688 of the Chamber 
of Deputies, seance of March 27, 1882, Ibid.
19. Law of June 29, 1882, in Ministry of Colonies, Docu­
ments relatifs au chemin de fer de Dakar a St. Louis 
XParis, 1914), pp. 1-35; copy of Minister of Finance to 
MMC, March 6, 1882, SARS, DCF; copy Lemaire to MMC, 
March 10, 1882, Ibid.; copy Minister of Finance to
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M M C , March 18, 188 2, Ibid.; See copy Lemaire to MMC, 
September 18, Ibid.; The Batignolles board of 
directors approved Lemaire*s engagements dated Decem­
ber 18, 1880, February 1881, and March 10, 1882 in 
their meeting of April 25, 1882, ANF, 89AQ1, p. 182.
See also Alfred Picard, Les chemins de fer francais, 
Vol V (Paris, 1884), pp. 677-681.
20. With annual interest and amortization at 2,246 Fr/km-
or 4.6%.
21. Ch. Burn report no. 373, loc. cit., footnote 18.; see
also "Note relative 5 la construction et 1*exploita­
tion du DSL," published by the DSL in December 1888 
(copy in FOM, Senegal XII,68), which noted than an 
error in cost estimates of only 10% would wipe out 
marketing profits.
22. JORF-Debats Pari. Chambre, February 20, 1881, p. 291.
23. Draft MMC to Batignolles, May 1, 1883, FOM, Senegal 
XII,42; P.V., Consultatif du Contentieux, April 24,
1883, Ibid.
24. See note by LePeuple, in annex to P.V., May 17, 1886, 
in FOM, TP,-Register of the P.V. of the Commission
de Verification des comptes du chemin de fer de DSL- 
numbered 31_ (henceforth: Reg. 31), pp. 124-129.
25. Bois’ career is outlined in document no. 103, ARS, 035.
26. Bois, Senegal et Soudan, p. 34; Moniteur du Senegal,
December 8, 188 2, p. 2T5. A quarantine for yellow 
fever, lifted in October, had to be reimposed on 
November 28th.
27. Copy of GS to MMC, December 23, 1882, FOM, Senegal
XII,43; Bois, Senegal et Soudan, p. 35.
28. Draft GS to MMC, March 23, 1883, ARS, 033; Blondelet
to GS, March 24, 1883, SARS, DCF; GS to MMC, May 24,
1883, FOM, Senegal XII,43.
29. A printed brochure on the inauguration of the Dakar- 
Rufisque section is in FOM, Senegal XII,42; see also 
Bois, Senegal et Soudan, p. 37.
30. The dates are taken from the draft of the Chaper
report, August 6, 1895, FOM, TP, pp. 227-294, passim., 
and from the draft report in FOM, Senegal XII, 69;
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the numbers of workers are given in Bois, Senegal et 
Soudan, pp. 38-41, as 570 laborers impored in 1&82- 
831 5TT engineers or agents and 750 laborers in 1883- 
84; and 55 engineers or agents and 7 07 laborers in 
1884-85. The driving of the silver spike is noted in 
GS to MMC, May 14, 1885, FOM, Senegal 1,73; but the 
Chaper report contended that the line was only ready, 
in reality, on June 1st.
31. Article 4 of the convention of June 29, 1882.
32. Friocourt to GS, April 28, 1884, SARS, DCF; Friocourt 
to MMC, August 22, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,68.
33. The arr§tS of December 31, 1883, appears in Bull Admin 
du S^nSgal, 1884, pp. 4-5; The procds-verbaux and 
reports of the Verification Commission are recorded in 
three registers, labelled 31, 32, and 33, in FOM TP.
On technical surveillance, see: S/Sec to GS, November 
3, 1883, SARS, DCF; same, April 4, 1884, Ibid.; GS
to MMC, March 9, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,6F]
34. Article 28 of the annex to the Convention of June 29, 
1882 authorized provisory reception of line sections 
by representatives of the colonial administration; 
the ministerial dispatch of May 6, 1883 (copy in
Bui Admin du Senegal, 1883, no. 262) see also dispatch 
of Director of Colonies, May 19, 1883, Ibid.; no. 269.)
35. A description of the P.V. of the ad, hoc commission is 
in the draft of the Chaper report of August 6, 1895, 
pp. 245-255.
36. Friocourt to GS, April 28, 1884, SARS, DCF; report by 
Friocourt, May 10, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,68; Frio­
court to MMC, May 10, 1884, Ibid.; DSL to S/Sec, May 29, 
1884,Ibid.
37. Friocourt1 s complaints were discussed in the Verifica­
tion Commission's session of June 27, 1884, Reg. 31, 
pp. 10,11; see also the annex, Ibid., pp. 13-19.
38. Extract P.V., Administrative Council of Senegal,
May 6, 1884, SARS, DCF; P.V., Commission of reception, 
M'Pal-Louga, June 4, 1884, Ibid.; DSL (Bois and 
Vieuxtemps) to GS, Ibid.; Legros approved of the 
governor's action in overruling the commission-Note 
for S/Sec, July 12, 1884, Legros Resum€, p. 154.
39. Friocourt to MMC, August 22, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,68.
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Friocourt quoted from a letter by Bois to his superi­
ors at the DSL in Paris, December 13, 1883: "the 
Surveillance Engineer appears to forget completely 
the interest of the State that he is charged to de­
fend."
40. Draft S/Sec to GS, June 4, 1884, no. 160,congratulated 
Friocourt for his zeal, in FOM, Senegal XII,68; draft 
S/Sec to GS, June 4, 1884, no. 161, Ibid., while 
commending Friocourt, suggested that the documentation 
he requested was superfluous. Felix Faure suggested 
that Friocourt stick to a verification of DSL r e ­
ceipts, not expenses; and that any further recommenda­
tions on construction methods would not be "useful," 
since the company was living up to the contract:-- 
the draft S/Sec to GS, October 18, 1884, Ibid., sug­
gested only minor changes in surveillance.
41. Razy's copy of the conference of December 5, 1883 in 
the Cabinet of acting governor Bourdiaux, FOM, TP: the 
Chaper report of August 6, 1895, Ibid., p. 242, was 
trying to throw the blame on Razy by taking his remark 
out of context.
42. Report by Razy, March 14, 1884, SARS, DCF; report by 
Surveillance Engineer, May 30, 1884, Ibid.
43. 6S to MMC, May 9, 1884, ARS, 2B58; same, June 23, 1884, 
Ibid.; Director Interior, Senegal, to Chief Public 
Works, May 17, 1884, SARS, DCF; draft S/Sec to GS,
June 4, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,68; according to the 
Chaper report of August 6, 1895, pp. 183-184, a dis­
patch of June 5, 1884, no. 169,decided in favor of 
Razy. Friocourt kept up his complaints, as in his 
letter to MMC, September 5, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,68, 
which bore a ministry official's notation "This is the 
business of technical . . . surveillance, not finan­
cial surveillance."
44. Razy's report of April 6, 1884 on the Pout-Tivaouane 
line is mentioned in the note to S/Sec, May 15, 1884, 
by Legros, FOM, Senegal XII,43. Legros agreed that 
the section not be opened until after the hivernage;
A series of incidents occuring in rural districts of 
the colony in June made the colonial government jittery. 
War was feared in case Samba Laobe chose to betray them. 
The acting governor wrote in the political report to 
MMC (August 23, 1884, ARS, 2B75): "The essential
thing is to construct the line,whose completion will 
permit us to regulate this question finally as we
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please."; see also same, September 9, 1884, Ibid.
45. P.V., Verification Commission, November 6, 1885,
Reg. 31, pp. 98-105; the DSL had already protested 
suspension of the interest guarantee for the period 
in 1883 when the Dakar-Rufisque had been cut, and 
officials of the Ministry of Marine had sided with 
the DSL (P.V., Verification Commission, January 31, 
1885, Reg. 31, pp. 38-49); but an early report by 
Razy for the Director of Interior, August 22, 1884, 
SARS, DCF, actually blamed the company for the wash­
outs; See also the copy, arret of January 13, 1888
of the Conseil d'Etat in Reg. 31, pp. 216-221; and the 
useful "R^ponse aux pourvois formes par la Compagnie 
DSL concernant le r^glement de ses comptes d'exploita­
tion 1883-85," by Houette-February 1891, copy in FOM, 
Senegal XII,65.
46. Mayor Rufisque to Director Interior, August 10, 1884, 
SARS, DCF; Director of Public Works to Director In­
terior, August 13, 1884, Ibid.; Municipal Council of 
Rufisque, P.V., seance of November 21, 1884, SARS, DCF.
47. See "Rapport sur l'€tat des postes du fleuve et sur les 
reparations nfcessaires," by Constant, doc. 26 (Plans 
1870-75) ARS, P3; the climate's effect on wood is dis­
cussed in a report on the functioning of the "voitures 
systeme Labastie," ARS,0243.
48. An unsigned, undated note in the acting governor's 
handwriting (the Director of Interior, Quintrie) 
accompanying a Razy letter of December 22, 1884, SARS, 
DCF, said: "Besides, M. Razy has entered into open 
warfare with his bosses from the moment he received 
his notification of recall. He refuses requests for 
service addressed to him from the Director of the In­
terior, and if I were not tied by your instructions,
I would make him leave without waiting for his 
successor, as his attitude is becoming intolerable."; 
a letter of Razy to Director Interior, September 25, 
1884, SARS, DCF, refers to the earlier quarrel in 
June 1884; a copy of Director Interior to Director 
Public Works, December 1, 1884, Ibid., refers to the 
ministrial dispatch of October 21st relieving Razy 
of his functions.; Legros was furious with Razy on 
hearing of the innundations--Note to S/Sec, Legros 
Resume pp. 156, 157; Razy's death was mentioned in the
P.V., November 6, 1885, Reg. 31, p. 99.
49. DSL to S/Sec, March 30, 1885, FOM, Senegal XII,43; Razy
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was a particularly quarrelsome fellow who undermined 
his boss in the Haute Fleuve railroad campaign of 1882-
1883, and who unsuccessfully attempted to seduce the 
wife of a subordinate in 1885 shortly before being 
shipped out to Paris.
50. Definitive reception of the entire line was first 
broached in Blondelet to GS, May 19, 1885, SARS, DCF; 
and it was apparently welcomed in Director Interior to 
GS, June 1, 1885, Ibid.; see also the Chaper report, 
August 6, 1895, pp. 294-304.
51. See Chaper report, pp. 309-317; Director Interior to 
GS, June 9, 1885, ARS, 035; copy DSL response to 
Chapron offer,June 12, 1885, and copy Chapron offer, 
FOM, TP; copy Felix Faure to DSL, June 27, 1885, Ibid.; 
copy GS to MMC, June 27, 1885, Ibid.; excerpt P.V., 
Private Council, June 13, 1885, FOM, Senegal XII,57.
52. Report annexed to seance of October 1, 1884, Reg. 31, 
pp. 20-21, 25-27; from note to S/Sec, September 16,
1884, Legros Resum£, pp. 156ff.; the Chaper report, 
pp. 280-281 notes a critical dispatch, S/Sec to GS, 
September 19, 1884.
53. Kimon Doukas, The French Railroads and the State (New 
York, 1945), p~ 45n., remarked that the construction 
costs of rail lines in the metropole averaged around
200,000 to 250,000 Fr/km. A. Picard, Les chemins de 
fer, Vol. VI (Paris, 1885) indicates that these 
figures are typical, although citing (pp. 37-39)
the case of a 170 km, 1 meter line to be built in 
France at 69,713 Fr/km. The price of 68,000 Fr/km 
for the DSL in distant Africa, even though it was a 
narrow-gauge, 1 meter line, was thus clearly a bargain 
price. On the other hand, company records indicate 
that the company did not pay out even the full amount 
of the government subsidy on the DSL. The accounts 
presented in the reports to Batignolles shareholders 
(registry entries in ANF, 89AQ11, for June 30, 1882, 
November 29, 1882, December 15, 1883, December 6, 1884 
and December 12, 1885) show total Batignolles expenses 
for "etudes diverses", July 1882 through June 1885 as 
totaling 772,794 francs, and total Batignolles "depen- 
ses a l'exterieur" for the same period of 11,772,542 
francs. To this should be added the expense of out­
fitting the DSL in Senegal, which includes 110,000 
francs of equipment sent in 1883, and the cost of 
required rolling stock, which I estimate from other 
purchases as 1,800,000 francs. This amounts to a
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total of 15,345,336 francs of expenses on outside work 
at a time when the Batignolles was also involved in 
constructing the Tunis-Algeria railroad and the 
Pierrelatte Canal in France. Total Batignolles divi­
dends and bonuses, Dec. 1883-Dec. 1885, amounted to
6,875,000 francs.
54. See Note of Director of Surveillance, July 1, 1896,
FOM, Senegal XII,73; note Legros' strong defense of 
the company in the January 31, 1885 session of the 
Verification Commission, Reg. 31, pp. 38-46; -- Be­
sides the Ministry of Marine was already entangled in 
other, disastrous and expensive colonial campaigns
in Tonkin and Madagascar, and had finally been 
obliged to admit the failure of the Kayes-Niger rail­
road building program earlier in mid-1884.
55. A copy of these plans and cost estimates is contained 
in FOM, Senegal XII,42 bis (a). Details of the 
projected station emplacements in FOM, Senegal XII,42 
bis (b).
56. Informed of the final plans in November, the colonial 
government arranged for an expropriation inquiry with 
an arr£t£ of November 22, 1882 [in Moniteur du Senegal, 
November 28,1882, p. 222.)
57. Commandant Goree to GS, May 9, 1862, with added foot­
note of 1865, in Charpy, Fondation, p. 328.
58. GS to MMC, April 8, 1879, FOM, Senegal XII,41; See also 
GS to MMC, political report, July 20, 1876, ARS, 2B73.
59. GS to MMC, January 25, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,45;
Mayor Rufisque to Director Interior, January 27, 1883, 
SARS, DCF; Blondelet to GS, February 12, 1883, ARS,
033.
60. Copy note for Direction des Colonies, by Legros,
October 14, 1882, FOM, Senegal XII,45; copy note for 
Direction des Colonies, by Legros, October 7, 1882,
FOM, TP.
61. The FOM dossier Senegal XII, 46 (a) is concerned with 
this question; see also GS to MMC, February 23, 1883, 
FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS to MMC, January 25, 1883, FOM 
Senegal XII,45; Notes to Direction des Colonies, 
February 14, 1883, and February 13, 1884, Legros 
Resum£, pp. 108, 147; see also P.V., local commission, 
June 11, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,46; same, June 18,
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1 8 8 3 ,  I b i d .
62. GS to MMC, March 23, 1883, ARS, 2B57; Note of July 21,
1883, Legros Resume, pp. 135-136.
63. Maurel 8 Prom to MMC, May 1, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,46; 
Gasconi to S/Sec, March 1, 1884, Ibid.; same, March 13,
1884, Ibid.
64. The history of the authorization is recounted in GS to 
MMC, September 9, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,46; see also 
GS to MMC, June 9. 1883, Ibid.; Blondelet to GS, 
February 12, 1883, ARS, 033; Director Interior to 
Blondelet, April 5, 1883, SARS, DCF.
65. GS to MMC, February 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,43, 
calculated an outlay of 200,000 francs in Dakar and 
about 52,000 francs in St. Louis; the ministerial dis­
patch of April 5, 1883 (copy in Bull Admin du Senegal, 
1883, pp. 140-141) suspended expropriation in Dakar; 
see also GS to MMC, April 24, 1883, ARS, 2B57; same,
May 24,1883, FOM Senegal XII,43.
66. Ministerial dispatch, May 4, 1883, Bull Admin du 
S€n€gal, 1883, no. 258; same, May 5, 1883, Ibid., no. 
260; same, May 19, 1883, Ibid., no. 270; excerpt P.V., 
Administrative Council, Senegal, June 30, 1883, FOM, 
Senegal XII,46; draft S/Sec to GS, October 18, 1883, 
Ibid.; GS to MMC, October 24, 1883, Ibid.
67. GS to MMC, September 9, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,46; same 
September 24, 1883, Ibid. ; note to S/Sec, November 2, 
1883, by Legros, Ibid.; GS to MMC, January 8, 1884, ARS, 
2B58; same, March 23, 1884, Ibid.; Delegate Interior 
(Dakar) to Director Interior, November 14, 1883, SARS, 
DCF. Bourdiaux, an important figure in the Ministry of 
Marine, was in Senegal temporarily as acting governor 
in order to rectify administrative and political 
problems.
68. An arret£ by Bourdiaux, October 22, 1883 (Bull Admin du 
Senegal, 1883, no. 739) designated terrains for expro­
priation for the rail line in Dakar; the arr§te of 
March 5, 1884 (Ibid., 1884, no. 224) fixed the compensa­
tion; the terrains for the passenger terminal were 
chosen in an arr§te of May 6, 1884 (Ibid., no. 441); an 
arrete of July 7, 1884 fixed compensation for those 
terrains (Ibid., no. 407); the letter Blondelet to GS, 
May 19, 1885, SARS, DCF, indicated that the terrains
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for the Dakar passenger terminal were turned over 
March 24, 1885 to the DSL; see Director Interior to 
proprietors, Dakar, January 20, 1886, SARS, DCF; Chief 
of Operations, DSL to Director, Public Works, August 4, 
1887, Ibid.
69. Sor became an island during the annual innundation of 
the Senegal river, but with relatively easy access to 
continental ground.
70. Plans had called for the tracks leading directly up to 
the vicinity of the Faidherbe bridge, but the company 
had rejected that solution. (DSL to MMC, September 4,
1882, FOM, Senegal XII,43); note for Direction des 
Colonies by Legros, September 5, 1882, FOM, Senegal XII, 
46; same October 14, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,45.
71. P.V. inquiry, December 6, 1882, FOM, Senegal XII,46 
(b); GS to MMC, January 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,45; 
report by Dupre, January 27, 1883, SARS, DCF; estimates 
by Couteau, February 10, 1883, Ibid.; Blondelet to 
Director Interior, February 26, 1883, Ibid.
72. Director Public Works Service, Dupr£ to Director In­
terior, March 5, 1883, SARS, DCF; draft MMC to GS; April 
16, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,46; note for Direction des 
Colonies, April 5, 1883, Ibid.; GS to MMC, May 24, 1883, 
FOM, Senegal XII, 43; there was an altercation over the 
occupation of unexpropriated land by the Batignolles in 
March 1882--see Director Interior to Blondelet, April
5, 18 83, SARS, DCF.
73. Director Public Works to Director Interior, March 5,
1883, SARS, DCF; Director Interior to Blondelet, April 
5, 1883, SARS, DCF; Director Interior to GS, April 30, 
1883, Ibid.; J. Hubler to Director Interior, December 
19, 1883, SARS, DCF; G. d'Erneville to Director Interior, 
December 19, 1883, Ibid.; see also DSL (Bois and 
Vieuxtemps) to GS, June 7, 1883, SARS, DCF, complaining 
of the non-delivery of some terrains at St. Louis.
74. The other road ran across the marigot of Khor. See 
Director Interior to Chief Public Works Service, Decem­
ber 9, 1882, SARS, DCF; GS to MMC, December 23, 1883, 
FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS to Director Interior, January 
25, 1883, SARS, DCF.
75. GS to MMC, December 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS 
to MMC, political report, December 26, 1883, SARS,
DCF; S/Sec to GS, June 4, 1883, SARS, DCF.
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76. Razy's copy o£ the conference of December 5, 1883, in 
the Cabinet of acting governor Bourdiaux, FOM, TP; GS 
to MMC, December 23, 1883, FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS to 
MMC, January 8, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,45; draft S/Sec 
to GS, February 4, 1884, FOM, Senegal XII,43; GS to 
MMC, February 8, 1884, ARS, 2B58.
77. Response administrative note, Director Public Works to 
Director Interior, September 1, 1884, SARS, DCF.;
S/Sec to GS, January 29, 1885, Ibid.; same, August 29,
1885, Ibid., with report of July 3, 1885 by Chapron; 
see also Note to S/Sec, September 16, 1884, Legros 
Resum€, p. 156.
78. See report no. 564 bis by the Surveillance Engineer, 
Sallenave, August 24, 1886, FCM, Senegal XII,.50, in 
which this capable official complained; "Often the 
Chief of Operations of Dakar (DSL) asks us to approve 
certain projects, basing /^his request_7 on authori­
zations already given by the ministry to the central 
administration of the company at Paris. The Service 
of Surveillance at Dakar knows neither the spirit 
nor the letter of these authorizations, so it may be 
indecisive in responses which it makes to the company's 
demands, and even in contradiction with the orders 
given Jby the ministry. We ask, therefore, /~to be 
given_/ the orders or observations that /~the minis- 
try_7 addresses the company . . . The task of the 
Surveillance Service will be better defined, if this 
service will be able to stay in touch with the ideas 
of the ministry on the subject of the affairs of the 
Dakar-St. Louis Company." See also the note to S/Sec 
by the Inspector General of Naval Works, October 26,
1886, FOM, Senegal XII,50.
79. Blondelet to GS, April 10, 1884, ARS, 033; GS to MMC,
political report, December 8, 1884, ARS, 2B75, ex­
pressed pleasure at the good relations between rail­
road workers and the inhabitants of Cayor; see also: 
same, August 8, 1884, Ibid.; same, March 11, 1885,
Ibid.
80. The letter by Blondelet to GS, June 26, 1884, SARS,
DCF, informed the governor of the evacuation of
European workers, and added: "I am confident . . . 
that you will seek out and punish without delay the 
culprits, for a too great forbearance on your part 
will only encourage the blacks to multiply their 
aggressions." See also: GS to MMC, political report, 
ARS, 2B74; GS to MMC, July 8, 1884, SARS, DCF.
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81. Acting High Commander to GS, July 19, 1884, SARS, DCF; 
instructions on security measures to Capitaine, July- 
August 1884, ARS, 033.--The DSL used the situation to 
get the colony to open the Pout-Tivaouane line for 
service. See, e.g., Bois to Chef de bataillon 
Troismaison, June 27, 1884, Ibid.
82. Delegate Interior (Dakar) to Surveillance Engineer,
June 17,1884, SARS, DCF; GS to MMC, August 9, 1884,
ARS, 2B58.
83. Copy note by DSL (Paris) to S/Sec, attached to letter 
of October 25, 1884, SARS, DCF, which went on: "It
is necessary that black police agents not be permitted 
to arrest without warrant one of our foremen in the 
performance of his duties, on the simple complaint made 
to them by a Negro as happened in Dakar on June 21, 
without the police agents being reprimanded."--See also 
copy DSL to S/Sec, October 25, 1884, Ibid.; Director 
Interior, Senegal to Surveillance Engineer, October 27, 
1884, SARS, DCF.
84. Despite the conflicting testimony on the incidents, 
the conclusions of investigating French officials, who 
were not generally favorable towards the inhabitants 
of this area, suggests that the African version of 
events was closer to the truth.
85. Terry Coleman, The Railway Navvies, (Harmondsworth, 1969), 
pp. 93-114.
86. GS to MMC, June 7, 1881, ARS, 2B55. See also, Director 
Interior to Director of Public Works, March 20, 1883, 
ARS, 3G2/9.
87. A brief reference to the working party in 1883-84, at 
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C H A P T E R  I I I
THE DSL'S IMPACT, 1885 to 1911
je vous assure que, pour un vieux Senegalais comme moi 
... ce n'est point petite joie que de cheminer 5 la 
remorque d'une locomotive ^ui^siffle alldgrement et 
d^roule son panache de fumee a travers ce Cayor naguere 
fermee.
--anonymous, 18841 
It is not surprising that the railroad's promoters, so 
unreliable in their estimates of construction costs for a 
Dakar-St. Louis railroad, should also prove equally inaccur­
ate in their rosy predictions of traffic and receipts for 
this rail line.^ Both Walter and Vaubourg had based the fi­
nancial viability of a projected DSL on rail service between 
the ports of Dakar and St. Louis (and Rufisque to a lesser 
extent) without that much regard for traffic in between.
It is true that the rail express running daily in both 
directions between Dakar and St. Louis quickly replaced the 
slower, more expensive maritime passenger service between 
the two ports; but there was little profit in this element
*Z
of traffic alone. Freight traffic between the ports could 
have been more lucrative. However, unlike the promoters' 
predictions, freight was generally not transhipped by rail 
from St. Louis to Dakar or vice versa, despite St. Louis'
157
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difficult access to the sea. The cost differential be­
tween freight sent directly by sea between France and 
St. Louis and that detouring by the railroad and the port 
of Dakar was at first simply too great. Even the govern­
ment of Senegal, for example, preferred importing coal 
from France into St. Louis by sea at a cost of 35 francs 
a metric ton, rather than via sea and railroad at a total 
cost of 54 francs a ton.4 Even if the sand bar at the 
mouth of the Senegal river blocked larger ships from enter­
ing the port, it was still often cheaper to load the cargo 
onto schooners at Dakar for transshipment to St. Louis by 
sea, rather than taking the railroad.^
Nor was it easy for the DSL to capture this traffic 
by creating special, low freight rates between the two 
ports. The railroad terminal facilities at both ends of 
the line were plainly inadequate for substantial traffic, 
especially at St. Louis where the freight terminal was 
too distant from the port and where the poorly-constructed 
riverfront terminal was reached only with difficulty.^
When special low rates were indeed essayed from 18 97, 
they had little initial success. Even as late as 1909, 
after creation of an improved port at Dakar and sub­
stantial improvement of rail facilities at both ends of 
the line, only 12,000 tons of freight was sent from Dakar 
to St. Louis by rail as compared to 33,000 tons imported
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to St. Louis by sea; and only 2000 tons were sent out by
7
rail from St. Louis in the other direction. In the inter­
lude, the DSL had found it convenient to transfer its 
scant freight business at Dakar to the small passenger ter­
minal near the port, while converting the freight terminal
g
into a dormitory for its personnel.
Political impact Vaubourg and Walter had undoubtedly been 
so careless in their economic and financial estimates of 
the railroad's prospects because of a more abiding concern 
for its strategic potential; and in this respect they were 
certainly justified by subsequent events. Not only had 
the French been able to master Cayor quickly during the 
crises of October 1886, but local resistance faded rapidly 
in the aftermath. French dominance in that country was 
never seriously challenged again by an military action or 
insurrection, and the DSL railroad also served subsequently 
as a useful springboard to subjugate the neighboring king­
doms of Djolof and Baol, as well as to assure a rapid 
passage of troops and military supplies by rail to the 
Senegal river (and thence to the Upper Senegal) from bases 
and entry points at Dakar (see Figure 7).
Nevertheless, even though the railroad had been ef­
fective in assuring a rapid, almost painless conquest of 
regions adjoining the littoral between St. Louis and Dakar, 
it certainly had not been absolutely necessary for this
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purpose. French expansion toward the upper and middle 
Niger was proceeding at the same time with only minor as­
sistance from a jerry-built, uncompleted Kayes-Niger rail­
road. To be sure, both this railroad and the DSL provided 
some useful logistical services. However, much of the 
credit for the rapid, wide-ranging movement of French 
military forces should go instead to the humble, but 
versatile "Lefebvre" supply carriages, which made possible
reliable supply transport over long cross-county distan- 
9
ces. Within Senegal itself, the events in Cayor had been 
paralleled by deep French advances farther inland into 
areas--Niani, Ouli, and parts of Saloum--far from any rail­
road lines. The occasion for expansion in this direction 
had been the suppression of a formidable Sarakole jihad on 
the Upper Senegal from March 188 6 . ^  The pursuit westward 
in 1887-1888 of its defeated leader, Mahmadou Lamine, link­
ing up to a French advance in Rip, extended the colony's 
frontiers well southward--without benefit of direct rail 
support--into areas hitherto part of the economic sphere 
of the British Gambia and sealed the fate of Djolof and 
Baol, both now encircled and destined for absorption after 
1890.11
The French conquest of these areas, unlike Cayor, owed 
little to the railroad directly. Nevertheless, as Villard 
so perceptively noted, the creation of the DSL was playing
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a major role on a more general political plane by assuring
12
the unity of the colony of Senegal. St. Louis and Goree- 
Dakar had each been serving as the staging areas for two 
radically different directions of French expansion into 
West Africa--a continental axis penetrating from St. Louis 
into the Sudan along the Senegal river and a coastal ex­
pansion down the African coast from GorSe as far as Gabon. 
The administrative severance from Senegal in 188 2 of the 
outreaches of each of these tendencies--an autonomous Upper 
Senegal military command in the Sudan and a coastal 
"Rivieres du Sud" where the future French Guinea would be 
formed--was an important step in assuring the continued
unity of the two base colonies of St. Louis and Gor6e- 
13
Dakar. This unity was strongly affirmed by the DSL, which 
now assured an easy political communication between the two 
ports while also opening the intervening hinterland to 
direct, mutual economic exploitation. Despite some later 
variations in the colony's frontiers, Villard's Senegal-- 
the populated ring enclosing the barren central Ferlo 
desert--was now firmly stitched together by the iron band 
of the railroad between its two principal links.
Closely associated to the DSL's political impact was 
its expanding economic role as a major carrier of peanuts 
from the interior for Senegal's export trade. Both Vaubourg 
and Walter had waxed enthusiastic about the trade supposedly
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to be generated by the railroad in the interior. But the 
vagueness of their estimates casts doubt on their serious­
ness in this respect. Indeed contemporary government 
officials were skeptical about the commercial value of the 
railroad until the volume of peanut traffic that rapidly 
developed on a newly-opened DSL line pleasantly surprised 
them.
Export volume and economic geography The contemporary 
drop in market prices for Senegal's trade unfortunately 
obscures the precise impact which the DSL railroad might 
have had on peanut exports from its completion in 1885.
One set of figures shows peanut exports dropping from a 
peak of 53,498 tons in 1880 down to a low of 18,714 tons by 
1887. During this period the once thriving peanut trade 
of the Damga and Galam on the upper Senegal river vanished, 
and it remained moribund around Matam as late as 1904 de­
spite a subsequent recovery in commodity prices.^ It may 
be inferred, on the other hand, from the continuing trade 
activity along the DSL that the railroad had indeed ar­
rived in time to save a good deal of the shrinking volume 
of trade by reducing transportation costs in the area near 
the railroad corridor.
Almost from its inception, the railroad captured a 
major share of Senegal's peanut export traffic, and as the 
trade began to expand again from 1892 the railroad con-
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sis tently carried about 70% of Senegal’s peanut exports 
(see Table 1). With even greater peanut exports in re­
sponse to higher commodity prices after 18 98, the DSL 
prospered with greatly swollen freight loads; but its 
share of total peanut exports dropped closer to 50% of 
total exports, indicating an extension of peanut cultiva­
tion into areas remote from the railroad (notably the 
Saloum)
The interplay of external market price and local 
transport costs was molding the geographic contours of the 
export trade in Senegal, and it may be assumed that without 
a railroad and with lower prices, peanut cultivation for 
export would have hugged areas bordering the coast and 
rivers for easier exportation. But two of the more access­
ible areas--the lower and middle Senegal river basin and
the "niayes" coastal region between St. Louis and Dakar--
1 8were unsuitable for peanut cultivation. Other more pro­
ductive regions, such as coastal and fluvial areas of 
Diander, the Sine-Saloum, and the Casamance, of course?
might have expanded their production somewhat in the ab-
19sence of a railroad. Improvements in river navigation 
might have saved some of the shrinking peanut trade on the 
Upper Senegal. But one ought to rule out any significant 
compensating spread of the perimeter of marginally profit­
able land in response to higher prices--as that suggested
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by Fogel for American farmland near river valleys--because
falling peanut production in Senegal apparently made little
impact on prices in a European commodity market fed by
2 0other areas competing with Senegal.
The railroad had certainly expanded the zone of profit­
ably cultivable land by creating a new inland corridor, 
along which agricultural products could flow cheaply and 
rapidly to the colony's ports while imported trade goods 
travelled in the opposite direction. This was most obvious 
in terms of the land immediately bordering the rail tracks. 
The zone was also expanded, less obviously, because of an 
effective increased capacity of domestic means of overland 
freight transportation.
Even before the DSL railroad's inception, the export 
trade in this region had been well served by freight-haul­
ing pack animals rented by local entrepreneurs during the 
trade season. As the peanut trade had grown from mid­
century, Mauretanian owners of camels and donkeys had been 
lured seasonally from the vicinity of the Senegal river 
southward to hire out their animals for hauling peanuts 
from the interior to the ports. Other Africans, particu­
larly those of Gandiole, had also joined in renting their
21
pack animals in this profitable carrying trade. These 
herds of animal porters had spared Senegal from transport 
by human porterage--that curse of much of tropical Africa--
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but hauling rates for animal porters were generally high,
and the routes followed from many inland centers could be 
2 2very long. Caravans from Baol and southern Cayor, for 
example, would avoid the direct route to Rufisque via the 
dangerous "ravin des voleurs" between Thi&s and Pout, with 
a wide detour from Thi&s to the fort of M'bidjem on the 
coastal telegraph road, and thence to Rufisque via the 
Tamna bridge. Often enough it was just as easy for trans­
porters to bring their peanuts all the way to distant St. 
Louis.^
The DSL railroad did not eliminate pack animal trans­
portation in the interior, but altered its employment. By 
bringing a number of new export outlet points closer to 
producers in the form of the rail stations, the DSL reduced 
the distance necessary for hauling by animal porter, dimin­
ishing thereby the overall costs of pack freight and in­
creasing the total seasonal volume that the pack animal
24
herds could haul. Overall pack freight rates were prob­
ably reduced as well simply because this service also be­
came thereby less critical; and the reduction in overall 
hauling costs obviously extended the perimeter of margin­
ally profitable areas for cultivation and sustained a 
higher level of export volume.
It can hardly be said, however, that the railroad was 
optimally situated to stimulate maximum peanut production.
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Two stations, Thies and Tivaouane, alone consistently pro­
vided about half the peanuts shipped on the railroad (see 
Table 1). Some of these peanuts came from southern Cayor.
A good many came, however, from nearby Baol, an important 
center of production before construction of the railroad.
But the railroad was placed too eccentrically with respect 
to Baol to serve that region well, with much of Baol’s 
consequently-diminished production escaping the railroad 
entirely via the small ports of Nianing, Joal, and even 
Fatick.25
As early as 1885, Alexis Bois was advocating, on be­
half of the DSL, construction of a new branch line from 
ThiSs into Baol and Sine--as a first section for a future 
rail line penetrating into the Sudan.2  ^ Indeed, when the 
engineer P. Etienne made his inspection of the DSL line 
in 1886, he spent much of his time accompanying a DSL
official on a reconnaissance of a possible trace for a
27
rail spur through Baol to Fatick. By 1892, the colonial 
government, now also keen to see a rail line built in this 
direction, dispatched a military engineering officer to 
explore a trace in the area. Although nothing came of this 
officer's project at that time, his detailed report pin­
points areas of Baol and Sine already being exploited 
(such as the Diarring-Gate region).28 Full exploitation 
of Baol and the Sine-Saloum's productive potential, however.
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had to await higher market prices and construction of the 
Thies-Kayes railroad in the 20th century.
Ports and rail The upgrading of Dakar into the major
seaport for the interior's export trade had, of course,
been one of the primary goals of the promoters of a Dakar-
St. Louis railroad. These expectations, unfulfilled in the
case of traffic from St. Louis, did not materialize to any
great extent for peanut exports either. It was the port
of Rufisque instead that harvested the major share of this
traffic, rather than Dakar. Merchants and traders from
Rufisque were establishing posts at rail stations even as
the line was being built, and Rufisque quickly captured the
2 9peanut trade up to N'Dande. Poorly endowed with an in­
adequate wharfage and an occasionally turbulent anchorage 
that forced tedious offshore loading of ships from small
boats, Rufisque nonetheless possessed the adequate space
3 0for commercial activities that Dakar lacked. While Dakar 
received only a few hundred tons of peanuts by rail annu­
ally until 1906, Rufisque consistently drew 80 to 90% of 
the railroad's peanut freight after 1888 (see Tables 2 and
3). Dakar had to await construction of a special commer­
cial port, undertaken from 1904, before it could capital­
ize on its excellent harbor. In the meantime, Dakar served 
as a major coaling station for maritime shipping, as well 
as an administrative center both for government services
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and the DSL railroad company.
St. Louis at first drew the peanut freight of the
northern stations of the railroad line, occasionally even
from as far away as N'Dande. Nevertheless, after 1890
St. Louis generally attacted no more than 10 to 151 of the
peanuts shipped by rail. This came about partly because
the more northerly stations feeding St. Louis lay near
areas apparently less productive than those closer to 
32
Rufisque. But the marked tendency after 18 94 for peanuts 
from northerly stations, such as Kebemer and even Goumbo 
Gueoul, to exit via Rufisque (Table 3) also indicates that 
St. Louis' inadequate rail terminals and relatively diffi­
cult access to the sea were playing a role in this respect. 
The higher costs of shipment through St. Louis would, of 
course, also shrink the zone of marginally profitable 
land whose produce could exit from the northern rail sta­
tions via St. Louis.
Structures of trade Senegal's external commerce was cen­
tered principally on the export of gum and peanuts. Gum 
procured along the Senegal river, mainly by barter with 
Mauretanians for imported European "trade" goods, was the 
more ancient commerce of the two and the major basis for 
the commercial prosperity of St. Louis. Earlier, the trade 
had officially been confined by the government to designat­
ed riverain trading posts called "escales." But enter -
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prising small traders had succeeded so well in evading
government restrictions from 1853 that a liberalized
statute in 1880 finally permitted trading at any point
33
along the river. The river trade was, nevertheless, never
wholly free. It was restricted by law to French citizens--
a profitable monopoly so jealously guarded by St. Louis'
merchants that they strongly resented even the few Moroccans
and African British subjects who tried to trade on the 
34
river. This marked conservatism of St. Louisian merchants? 
more concerned with preserving an acquired position on the 
river than in entering new fields on the Upper Niger, indeed 
exasperated French colonial officials and military officers, 
who were complaining before the conquest that Sierra Leone's 
African traders were outpacing the complacent Senegalese
7 C
merchants even on the Upper Senegal.
From the 18 50's a growing demand for oils in Europe 
encouraged increased cultivation of peanuts by individual 
peasants in the Senegambia. St. Louis profited from the 
cultivation of the product in its suburbs, from caravans 
bearing peanuts from Cayor and Baol, and from a short­
lived peanut trade with the Upper Senegal. However, it 
was the coast of Diander and Baol that became major sources 
of peanut exports. Nearby Goree, largely somnolent after 
the end of the slave trade, revived to some extent because 
of this trade; but the trade also showed some tendency to
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shift to less-cramped coastal ports instead--to Nianing,
Joal, Dakar, and above all Rufisque. The advent of the DSL
decisively confirmed this shift by dramatically transfering
the greater part of Goree's commercial activity in peanuts
3 6
to mainland Rufisque.
The larger expatriate merchants, mainly of Bordeaux,
owed their commanding position in Senegalese commerce to
their shared virtual monopoly in maritime freight transport,
which enabled them, if they curbed mutual competition, to
manipulate the local price relation between imported goods
and produce bought for export. Obviously if they acted
together, they could give the peasants less for their
produce in terms of the trade goods imported from Europe.
On the other hand, they could also freeze out of the trade
any interloping small merchants by contrarily paying the
peasant high prices in terms of imported goods bartered for
his produce. A small interloper obliged to pay shipping
rates set by his larger competitors could be whipsawed,
especially in a barter system, between the maritime freight
costs extracted by the shippers and the direct competition
from the shippers themselves, who could better afford to
pay the peasant with more imported goods for a given amount 
37
of produce.
Hardly less important to the position of European 
merchants was the development of networks of credit in
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Senegal that allowed a wide geographical distribution of 
trade through intermediate African and creole traders, 
while sparing the Europeans, based at coastal ports--St. 
Louis, Goree, and later Rufisque and Dakar--from the trou­
ble of venturing inland for commerce. The merchants would 
lend goods to a trader, who might in turn lend them to a 
host of lesser traders. The cultivator to whom the goods 
were ultimately sold might also borrow the goods on credit 
from a trader in anticipation of delivering his harvested
70
produce later.
Newbury has uncovered a very valuable clue to the 
nature of this credit system in a contemporary account 
describing the huge debts that European firms would allow
•z g
their traders to incur. A trader might return from the 
interior with produce worth only a fraction of the value of 
the trade goods previously lent to him. Nevertheless, since 
these goods had been pegged at artificially inflated prices 
to begin with, the lending firm would in fact garner a tidy 
profit, even while the trader remained in its debt.
The wise European merchant, it must be surmised, would 
also be shrewd enough to play on occasion the part of 
magnanimous patron--in tune with local African notions of 
generosity--by "forgiving" the debts of his trader, and 
thereby earning the trader's gratitude and loyalty cheaply. 
This credit system would also be a factor in excluding un-
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inf ormed European interlopers, who in failing to adapt to 
local social conventions by granting generous credit terms 
would find it difficult to buy produce or market goods.
Despite their mutual dependence, relations between
the larger European merchants and the African traders were
nonetheless inherently unstable. European firms used
their monopoly in shipping at times to set low purchase
prices in common for export crops, thereby squeezing trader
profits. The trader might cheat his patron in many ways, in
some cases simply absconding into the bush with his trade 
40
goods. European merchants in turn would often compete 
with their own traders by sending regular firm employees to 
trade directly with producers in the interior. The rivalry 
between merchant and trader was probably a major reason for 
the efforts in the 1880’s to limit trade on the Senegal 
river once again to fixed escales, where established com­
mercial houses had decisive advantages over the independent 
small trader.4'1' It was certainly a major factor in the 
formation of a political party in the 1880’s around J. J. 
Crespin and the DevSs family, who claimed to stand for the 
economic interests of the petty traders against the dominance 
of the Bordeaux houses.4^
In the eyes of the merchants, the independent petty 
traders might be viewed after all as troublesome, super­
fluous intermediaries, whose interference only diminished
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profits. Yet even the most annoying of these traders--
the "maitres des langues," who diverted road caravans to
particular patrons in trading centers--performed a useful
44
function in the trade. The African trader had a superior 
knowledge of the market and client preferences. He could 
count on old political, economic, and perhaps family con­
nections in the interior. Most importantly, he would oper­
ate easily and willingly in the interior, which most Euro-
45
peans would care to visit only occasionally, if at all.
Contemporary documents seem to detail few outward 
changes in the structure of trade in Senegal with the com­
ing of the railroad. There was indeed some initial con­
fusion about its future role in the trade. One prominent 
merchant of St. Louis, for instance, was surprised and 
deeply distressed that traders and merchants were going to 
the expense of setting up branch operations in new centers 
forming near rail stations in the interior instead of let­
ting African cultivators themselves haul the peanuts by
rail to St. Louis for direct trading with European commer-
46
cial houses right in the city. In reality, by affording 
Europeans an unprecedented easy access into the interior, 
the railroad had tipped the economic "balance of power" 
decisively in favor of the European commercial houses.
Even as rail stations were being opened on the DSL, the 
larger firms were rushing to open branch operations for
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direct trade with cultivators in the interior in the new
a n
trade centers that were mushrooming next to the stations.
The implications of this movement were obscured at 
the time by the continued prominence of the independent 
African trader in the trade. European firms often employed 
Africans in these branch operations, and African traders 
had their own operations in these new trading centers, which 
seemed to resemble the riverain escales so much that they
A O
were promptly dubbed "railroad escales." Even while 
keeping a respectable share of the escale trade, the African 
trader still remained indispensable in nearby centers of 
production unserved by the railroad--Baol, Sine, and east­
ern Cayor. Moreover, contemporary resistance in Senegal to 
projects in the 1890’s for a new DSL rail spur into Baol 
indicates indeed that many European merchants were satis­
fied with the existing trade arrangements.^
Trading conditions had, nevertheless, been fundamental­
ly, if not overtly altered by the railroad. It now became 
much easier for European merchants to check their traders’ 
activities frequently on the spot. It was easier and 
simpler for European merchants or European employees of 
expatriate firms to trade directly with African producers 
in the interior. Moreover, in contrast to a river or a 
highway, the DSL railroad was not equally accessible to 
all users at all t i m e s . A c c e s s  to it was confined to a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 7 6 -
limited number of points, and it was controlled and regu­
lated according to rules set by a foreign-based administra­
tion, which would be more responsive to the wishes of Eur­
opean merchants than to African traders or producers (e.g., 
by lowering freight rates for larger shipments of peanuts). 
Unlike even French-controlled maritime shipping, where the 
creole commercial house of the Dev^s, at least, could with 
its own ships compete on equal terms against the expatriate 
Bordeaux firms, Africans could never hope under ordinary 
circumstances to capture control of the railroad financi­
ally or to compete with it commercially.^
In time, a merchant exercizing a more effective sur­
veillance of his African traders, could reduce them to the 
status of firm employees, while a concerted effort of the 
European firms would allow elimination of the more un­
cooperative traders during period of commercial contrac­
tion. This apparently happened after about 1900, when the 
rise in the market price for peanuts probably made the 
employment of salaried agents, European and African, in the 
interior more remunerative and when the collapse of the
market in gum drove a surplus of traders into the peanut
5 2trade. Unfortunately, growing profits in the peanut trade 
did not necessarily shore up the position of the African 
trader in the face of this general threat, because even a 
temporary decline in market price could easily ruin those
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who had extended credit too freely.
The cardinal role of the railroad in the eclipse of 
the once-prosperous independent African trader was even 
more clearly illustrated from 1908 in nearby Baol, Sine, 
and points east as a new ThiSs-Kayes railroad was being 
constructed, enabling the larger commercial firms to es­
tablish new branch operations at the new rail escales grow­
ing along this new line.^ The independent African trader, 
though surviving as a significant factor in the trade 
until the 1930's, was able to do so largely by his abili­
ty to move out farther into areas remote from the rail lines 
and their escales.^
Population distribution The DSL's impact on population 
distribution,though difficult to assess, is one of the most 
intriguing aspects of change under colonial rule.^ On the 
surface, the railroad's role in remolding the contours of 
Senegal's social and economic geography seems most im­
pressive. The growth of the ports subsequent to the rail­
road's construction, for instance, was dramatic (see Table
4). Rufisque, especially, mushroomed.during the period 
that the DSL was being built, probably drawing most of the
population leaving Goree between 187 6 and 1885, though
57apparently Dakar drew some also. The line of French 
military posts along the coastal telegraph could also be 
abandoned as a new telegraph line was built along the rail-
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road, and the colony felt secure enough to close down
58
the military posts at M'Pal and Pout. Some villages
near stations on the new line mushroomed almost immediately
(see Ta.ble 5) .
The line, it should be noted, was passing through a
section of Cayor, which had already been well populated--
a map drawn by Walter for the rail project of 1878 showed
some 15,000 people of Cayor living within a band of 1 km
5 9on each side of the projected trace. Nevertheless, many 
important villages of Cayor--Niomre, Coki, Soguer, K. 
Mandoube Khary, N'Diagne--were located well east of the DSL 
trace, along the old main caravan routes from Baol and 
Djolof toward St. Louis.
The growth of Tivaouane, which quickly became the most 
active commercial center on the line, was one sign that the 
railroad was drawing people. Tivaouane,which had 650 in­
habitants in 1878, according to the Walter map, boasted 
1,178 people by: 1885 . By 1897, the perimeter of Tivaouane, 
which had been expanded to cover a square of 2 km on a side, 
enclosed some 3,135 inhabitants--almost double the 1,670 
in the same 4 square kilometer space shown on the Walter 
map in 1878.61 Thies also grew abruptly from two small 
villages totalling 260 people in 1878 to 1,003 people in
1885. After a slow start, the escale of Mekhe also grew
. ,. . 62 
to a respectable size.
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The growth of railroad escales seems less impressive 
in other cases, however. Already listed in Walter’s 1878 
report as the "largestmarket of Cayor," Louga did not grow 
much beyond the 1000 inhabitants shown in 1878 on the
fi ^
Walter map, until the turn of the century. Kelle and 
N'Dande seem not to have grown very much either; while M ’Pal
certainly, and perhaps Piregourey as well, seem to have
64
actually declined in population. The growth of Thies, 
though due in part to the railroad's passage, also owed 
something to its choice as an administrative center, and to 
the fort and Catholic mission that were installed there.
Nor does the size of these escales seem impressive if it is 
remembered that villages of 2000 and even 5000 people had 
been observed by Mollien and Caille in the interior in 1818 
and 1824.65
This is not to deny that railroads had an important 
influence on the growth of urban and semi-urban towns in 
Senegal, nor to imply that these agglomerations did not 
differ fundamentally from the large agricultural villages 
common in the region before the conquest. It is rather 
that both the redistribution of population and the growth of 
urban areas were more complex processes subject to the in­
fluence of other factors--some of which were also acting 
through the railroad.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 5, for instance, indi-
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cates that, as might have been expected, the growth of 
each of the escales was closely related to the volume of 
peanuts shipped out of the escale. The volume of peanut 
freight at an escale would be related to the location of 
the escale relative to productive areas--Louga with respect 
to Djolof; Thi^s and Tivaouane with respect to Baol and 
southern Cayor--and to the cost of shipping from station to 
port.
The problem of water availability during the dry 
season was also one of the most important factors in limit­
ing the size of an escale--or any village for that matter. 
N'Dande, for instance, seemed destined for a bright future 
in 1886 when the colonial administration designated it as 
the headquarters of its colonial resident in Cayor and when 
the DSL also decided to install a central repair shop for 
its locomotives and a midpoint rest stop for the daily ex­
press trains there. Unfortunately, the wells of N'Dande 
were incapable of supplying the railroad's needs, much less 
those of an increased number of villagers; so that the rail­
road was sometimes obliged to haul in additional water by 
rail. The colony's administrative headquarters soon moved 
to Tivaouane, while the railroad's refreshment stop and re­
pair shop were also eventually transferred to the more 
favorable site of Kelle.^ The contrary case is best ill­
ustrated by Thiks, whose abundant, clear water figured 
largely in its selection later on as the junction point
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-1 8 1 -
6 7
for a branch railroad into Baol.
A steady supply of water for steam locomotives along 
the rail line of course was a particularly acute problem 
in a hot, semi-arid, tropical climate, and the Batignolles 
had been especially diligent in digging wells for supply­
ing water at each rail station when the line was built.
Any surplus well water, as both the DSL and the colonial 
government realized, could also serve to bring more Afri­
cans to settle and stay in the vicinity of the escale. Pre­
occupied as it was in the 1880's and 1890's with solving the 
water supply problems in St. Louis, Rufisque, and Dakar, 
however, the colonial government itself did little for the 
rail escales. In the period 1892 to 1897, the new Protec­
torate budget financed a paltry total of only 66 wells 
(895 meters total) of which 25 wells (416 meters) were put 
in near the Senegal river.^ An extensive governmental 
program of well-drilling designed to use abundant water to 
attract and fix African populations in Certain favored areas 
had to await the 1900's and was only undertaken seriously 
when construction of the Thi§s-Kayes railroad began.
Lateral roads were another factor in tying escales to 
nearby areas of production. With few serious physical 
obstacles encountered near the rail line, except for the 
narrow Thies scarp and an occasional marigot bed, roads for 
caravans could be built equally well in most directions.
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However, there was little governmental planning of road
systems except in the major communes, where only less than
50 kms of streets and roads were kept up by the colony's
69
Public Works service. Road building in rural districts 
was largely left to the discretion of French colonial ad­
ministrators stationed on the spot--generally the command­
ants of the McerclesM--who would do it by means of annual
corvees (called "prestations") of villagers living near 
70the routes. But since these officials were usually 
stationed only for short periods in any one area, the
efforts of one administrator were often negated by his 
71
successors. An 1897 survey of rural roads, most of them 
little more than trails, shows a total of only 1400 to 1500 
kms, of which some 286 kms led out from Tivaouane alone.77 
Around 1895, it was suggested that a network of light, 
narrow-gauge rail lines ("systeme Decauville") branching
out from the DSL be built deep into Djolof, Baol, and
73Sine--but northing ever came of the proposal.
Interestingly enough, the DSL line itself immediately 
became popular--to the annoyance of DSL officials--as a 
well-cleared major highway along which caravans and travel­
lers could pass. The company's efforts to cordon off its 
tracks with barriers of thickets along the edge of its 
property proved fruitless as the rail line became, in
74
effect, a convenient "royal highway" for the interior.
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Unfortunately this traffic also resulted in numerous 
accidents in which herd animals or unwary travellers were 
run over by trains. DSL officials were particularly u p ­
set about several train derailments that occurred when 
livestock wandering on the tracks were hit, and there were
attempts to impose heavy fines on the owners of errant
75
animals straying in the vicinity of the track. Ultima­
tely, however, DSL officials became resigned to the use of 
their line as a major highway.
The DSL's influence on population settlements and 
movements can only be properly appreciated within the con­
text of the general problem of population distribution and 
mobility in the Senegambia. The Senegambia was a region 
relatively rich in land, but sparsely populated. Moreover,
these populations--at least as it struck French observers--
7 6seemed to move about in the region with a marked mobility. 
Outside the river basins, the sedentary populations--though 
much less mobile than the region's pastoralists--were 
obliged to leave soil untilled for long periods of fallow. 
The variations in scarcity of subterranean water during 
the dry seasons also would often force the shifting of 
village sites or the thinning of village populations. 
Sentiments of attachment to ancestral soil could be strong; 
but it was not uncommon for young men to migrate tempor­
arily to distant regions, such as the European ports, to
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earn a small nest egg of trade goods. Political disagree­
ments would also often be solved or a tyrant's misrule an­
swered by mass migration.^7
The successful and prosperous states of the region 
were those that could extend their control over sources 
of manpower--perhaps simply by attracting people to move 
into their sphere of control--and then benefiting from the 
fruits of the toil and military support of these people.
The French colonies were no exception, particularly since 
they needed a labor supply for construction work and for 
the handling of goods in commerce, as well as an assured 
supply of foodstuffs. French colonial governments, even 
before the period of imperial expansion, were very sensi­
tive to any actions, political or economic, that might 
attract African populations toward European centers--or 
conversely repel them. The trade goods and arms sold by 
Europeans, the opportunities to sell products or learn 
trade skills, and the relative immunity of French-con­
trolled districts from petty warfare were solid advantages 
attracting many Africans.
At the same time, the vexations of French law and 
taxation or simply the annoyance of truckling to foreign 
rule repelled many other Africans. French officials had 
to exercise constant vigilance from 1886, for instance, to 
prevent an exodus of slave-holding Peul pastoralists, many
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o£ them longstanding French allies, toward the Segu
Tukolor empire, because these herders feared that new
7 8colonial legal measures would free their slaves. The
turmoils raised by the issue of slave emancipation only
ceased when rural areas of the colony were removed from
the trammels of French law through disannexation in 
79
1890.
The colonial conquest of the 1890's altered the 
situation in one sense by absorbing some of the states 
hitherto competing with the colony for manpower (e.g., 
the Segu Tukolor empire). Nevertheless, eager as they 
were to show that the colonial venture would pay, and 
saddled as they were with a substantial and growing in­
vestment in such fixed installations as ports, rail lines, 
and trading escales, French colonial officials were even 
more keenly interested in drawing Africans into cultiva­
tion for export and in fixing them in locales where they 
could best support the export trades. In essence, the 
French colonial administration was engaged in redistrib­
uting the scarce labor resources of the conquered regions 
spatially as well as into certain economic sectors, and in 
so doing, it was fixing a rigid geographical framework 
upon the preexisting fluidity of the region's social geo­
graphy .
Conditions had been transformed, of course, by the
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completed conquest. It now became possible to legislate 
rural slave emancipation and to impose previously
o n
uncollectable taxes, without provoking mass emigration.
The imposed colonial peace also conversely permitted
greater dispersal of population--as witnessed in the rapid
decay of M ’Pal, which had boasted 2,500 residents in 
81
1878. The railroad, of course, played an important role 
in drawing Africans into certain areas by providing trade 
activity, water supplies and road facilities. Neverthe­
less, it was only one of number of factors in the picture. 
From the 18 90's the need to earn a head tax in cash, for 
instance, may well have been far more effective in impel­
ling Africans toward certain favored areas in order to 
raise agricultural produce more profitably or to labor for 
wages.
An export enclave In his excellent study of railroad de­
velopment in the former Belgian Congo, Huybrechts observed 
that railroads in that region had been used to distort
domestic trade patterns by reorienting commerce toward the
8 2
exterior while neglecting domestic traffic. This point 
merits attention in the case of the DSL, all the more be­
cause of recent problems encountered by developing former 
colonies in promoting more equitable dispersals, spatial
83and sectoral, of economic activities within their borders.
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It does seem strange--perhaps even perverse--that 
the DSL, though a major transporter of peanuts, should have 
played such a small direct role in transporting domestic 
commercial products. This is apparent from the figures in 
Table 6 on annual rail haulage of millet, the basic food 
staple grown in the region. Some millet did enter the 
ports by rail; but much apparently bypassed the railroad 
overland. Livestock, a major item in domestic markets, al­
so avoided the railroad, and were driven overland instead 
on foot. The DSL moreover never did try seriously to 
develop these lines of domestic traffic, although it did
carry large volumes of imported foreign rice, which re-
8 4placed millet in local diets to some extent.
This evidence, though strongly suggestive, seems
less conclusive, however, if argued from a different angle.
Local domestic trade, after all, must have been stimulated
to some degree by the profits from the export trade, even
if the goods did not move by railroad to any measurably
significant extent (e.g., the growing ports created a
8 5
larger market for meat). Even without a railroad, after 
all, the peanut trade and rice imports would have developed 
to some extent in narrower enclaves in coastal and fluvial 
areas, and it may be asked whether a significantly heavier 
domestic traffic in the relatively small area covered by 
the DSL could have been generated by rail in millet,
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cattle, salt, kolas, or any other products of local con­
sumption, given the relatively low value of these products 
locally. A factor in inducing some local sectoral dis­
locations (as in the substitution of foreign rice for 
millet), the DSL had in fact redressed certain prior 
spatial disparities by inserting a corridor of trading 
escales within the interior.
Of course the DSL, as one of the factors involved 
in a redistribution of population in the region, was help­
ing to drain some of the substance from more remote regions, 
while benefiting a relatively small enclave.^ But this 
was unavoidable given the modest area that the line could 
service by itself. The distortions due to rail systems 
designed to encourage export trade to the neglect of 
domestic trade become more pernicious and more apparent 
within a wider interregional context, as in the case of 
the regional network of rails for French West Africa, dis­
cussed in the next chapter.
DSL traffic, rates, and fares The DSL served principally 
then, aside from its strategic role, as an instrument to 
integrate Cayor and adjacent areas into a colonial "open 
economy" by carrying a cash crop to port and conveying 
back in return imported goods--cloth, rice, and diverse 
manufactured items. Like rail systems elsewhere, the DSL 
discriminated among classes of passengers and freight.
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The so-called "slow" freight formed the bulk of commercial
freight carried by this railroad, in contrast to a more
costly express freight comprising excess passenger baggage
as well as perishables that had to be transported quick- 
8 7ly. The slow freight was classed in turn, according to
the nature of the goods transported, into three different
categories, each of which was subject to different rates
8 8
generally proportional to weight and distance. In 
addition, a multitude of preferential "special rates" were 
introduced at various times for particular types of goods 
according to the size (weight or volume) of the shipment, 
season of the year, or stations of passage (e.g., St. Louis 
to Dakar).
Peanuts, finally treated as third class slow freight 
after some initial hesitation, generally accounted for most 
of the freight carried by the DSL--usually around two-thirds 
of the annual freight volume on the DSL (see Table 1). In 
addition, receipts from the traffic generated directly by 
the trade in peanuts--that is, from imported trade goods 
and a portion of passenger traffic as well as peanuts--must 
have accounted for a plurality of the railroad's annual re- 
caipts, although receipts from peanut freight per se 
constituted only about a third of the DSL's annual receipts 
(see Table 7) .
The economics of rate setting for a variety of goods
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could be complicated. Ideally each product would be 
charged enough to cover not only the operating costs of 
transportation, bu^ also a s 
reasonable profit. Unfortunately, shipping costs of par­
ticular items can be extremely difficult to calculate since 
costs are based partly on the total volume of traffic for 
this type of item and indeed partly on the total pattern 
of traffic on the line.®® Competition with maritime ship­
ping and with animal porters in some cases could, moreover, 
force lower rates on some products. A low-priced product, 
such as peanuts, would also be charged relatively low rates 
to encourage a larger volume of peanut sales in the hope of 
generating a compensating flow of imported goods that could 
be charged the higher rates. In practice, therefore, rates 
were set or modified haphazardly according to whether a 
given rate promised to generate a respectable volume of 
traffic and whether profits in more lucrative elements of 
traffic seemed to be balancing losses in critical, but 
less-profitable goods. The art of rate setting, which 
obviously required sound managerial judgment in predicting 
changes in various elements of traffic as well as in com­
puting costs, would also clearly have a political side, be­
cause the juggling of rates would favor the commerce of 
some merchants and some locales.
The freight rate structure on the DSL, it should be
har e of fixed costs and
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noted, favored peanut exports from points near the ex­
tremities of the line over points on the central parts of
90the line. Freight rates on the DSL, general or special,
were almost all based on a kilometric rate per weight 
shipped, so that shipping from stations located far from 
ports would pay higher freight charges. For instance, the 
railroad would charge 9.95 francs a ton for a shipment of 
peanuts from Tivaouane to Rufisque; 13.8 5 Fr/ton from 
Mekh£ to Rufisque; and 18.40 Fr/ton from Kebemer to 
Rufisque--a spread that could influence the volume of trade 
and production along the line in the 18 90's, when a ton of
peanuts was priced typically at 150 francs a ton in
91Rufisque. Table 3 indeed confirms the point by showing
an upsurge of peanuts exported from north-central stations 
of the line, from Kelle to Goumbo-Gueoul, after about 1904, 
when increased commodity prices in Europe raised prices at 
Rufisque into the 200 to 250 Fr/ton range and above--re- 
ducing rail costs to a much smaller percentage of the price.
Perhaps the regions near the center of the railroad 
might have developed their export cultivation even sooner, 
had the DSL utilized either sliding-scale kilometric rates 
that decreased with distance or fixed rates that would 
apply uniformly over wide zones on the line. Rufisque's 
chamber of commerce repeatedly suggested introducing flat 
zonal freight rates for peanuts in the mid-1890's; but St.
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Louisian merchants, fearing that a zonal system would work 
against their interests, opposed it. DSL management, per­
haps realizing that zonal freight rates could mean the 
loss of traffic out of ThiSs and Tivaouane with higher
rates at these stations, stubbornly opposed changing the 
92rate structure.
The predominance of peanut freight on the DSL also 
aggravated operating problems for this railroad by intro­
ducing a pronounced seasonal variation in the rhythm of 
its traffic. Because the peanut crop unfortunately needed 
to be shipped almost entirely during the dry season from 
harvest in November until the rains of the following May 
or June--after which aiyunshipped peanuts risked being 
spoiled by the rains--a heavy tempo of rail traffic during 
this season would be followed by a long slack period during 
which rolling stock and personnel would lie idle. Attempts 
to cut down on the fixed costs of this idleness by buying 
less rolling stock or hiring a smaller work force would 
only cause long delays and provoke customer complaints dur­
ing the busy season--a chronically recurring problem on 
the DSL. This could be particularly acute on the single- 
track DSL line, since one late or stalled train would tie 
up a string of other trains at stations behind or at cross­
over points ahead.
Ideally rail traffic needed to be spread more evenly
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over the year; but no appreciable rainy season freight
traffic ever developed. Government shipments of building
materials or troop supplies by rail were too sporadic to
assure a steady slack-season traffic, and domestic freight,
as noted earlier, formed no significant part of rail 
93
traffic.
On the other hand, the magnitude of passenger ser­
vice, an element of traffic with a steadier year-round 
demand, pleasantly surprised DSL and government officials 
from the beginning. The railroad immediately became a 
popular mode of transportation in the interior, with pass­
engers accounting for over one-half of the railroad's 
receipts at first, and between a third and over two-fifths 
of the line's receipts from 1892 to 1910 (see Table 7).
As intended, the DSL railroad's daily express trains 
replaced the dispatch-boat service previously carrying 
passengers between St. Louis, Rufisque, or Dakar. Yet, a 
breakdown of company statistics for the years 1885 to 1895 
(Table 8) shows that 3rd class passengers with short 
journeys of only 54 kms one-way on the average (compared 
to 100 kms for 1st class) accounted for about 90% of all
passengers and 85% of passenger traffic receipts. The
statistics testify to the popularity of the railroad with
Africans, who made up virtually all the 3rd class pass­
engers; and also indicate that, given the rudimentary com-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-1 9 4 -
forts and service in 3rd class, these passengers were also 
paying a disproportionate share of the railroad's receipts. 
Thus, African 3rd class passengers were effectively sub­
sidizing lower peanut freight rates, as well as a more 
comfortable service for first class passengers (who paid
a relatively low 0.12 francs per km as compared to 0.055
94Fr/km for 3rd class).
The DSL company Relations between the DSL company and the 
colonial government of Senegal became smoother and more 
amiable in the period after construction. In 1890, the 
governor wrote that he considered the DSL's Dakar-based 
chief of operations as virtually a loyal member of Senegal's 
colonial administration, and this cordial spirit of co­
operation seems to have persisted for about the first
Q C
twenty years of DSL operations." Most important were
the efforts of the colony on the DSL's behalf in promoting
the company's project for a new branch line into Baol--a
96venture that was almost approved in 1898-99.
The DSL's relations with the government in Paris, on 
the other hand, were far less congenial during this period. 
For one thing, unresolved litigation left over from the 
period of construction remained as irritants--the last 
being resolved only in 1917. Of far greater moment were 
the company's struggles with the metropolitan government 
over the financial conventions governing the DSL's profits
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on the line.
During the period 1885 to 1900, government officials 
and members of the National Assembly were particularly in­
censed over the large, recurring operating deficits being 
run up by the company, since the state--as agreed in the 
1880 convention--had to make substantial outlays covering 
these deficits as well as the statutory minimum dividend.
The detailed, informative annual reports of government in­
spectors and the monthly technical surveillance reports 
were basically directed at reducing the size of these de­
ficits, which soon assumed alarming proporations (see Table 
97
9)- Commenting that the railroad had been created, after 
all, for strategic rather than commercial purposes, govern­
ment officials were urging in 1886, for instance, that 
costs be reduced by cutting down sharply on company staff 
and rail services. It was suggested that some way stations
be shut down, that passenger runs be reduced, and the
98company’s medical service be eliminated. These short­
sighted economies seemed less necessary as rail traffic 
picked up sufficiently to allow all but one way-station 
to collect enough receipts to cover expenses. But with 
the DSL still showing annual operating deficits until 1898, 
the metropolitan government was even asking the DSL to raise
freight rates for peanuts--a measure that the DSL wisely 
99resisted.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 9 6 -
One means o£ reducing the massive annual government­
al subsidies was to end the government's blanket guarantee 
of operating deficits by pegging DSL costs at artificial 
maximum levels that the company could exceed only at its 
own expense--a procedure already envisioned in the con­
vention of 188 0 and strongly advocated by the joint-minis­
terial Verifications Commission. This in fact had been 
one of the main reasons for sending the engineer P.
Etienne to Senegal in 1886. A workable formula could be 
set, however, only after experience taught what "normal” 
operating conditions for the line would be; so the DSL, 
not surprisingly, balked at accepting any formula until 
1891--a precaution that allowed the DSL to get by the 
costly initial period of operations (and line reconstruc­
tion).^® The 1891 arrangement, however, proved unsatis­
factory.
A compromise hammered out by a panel of experts, the 
"Sentence Arbitrale" of April 10, 1891 pegged costs per 
kilometer of track in service according to the formulas:
n
4,500 Fr/km + * for operations (where R was the annual 
receipts per kilometer); and a fixed 1,650 Fr/km for 
maintenance.101 Mindful of these limits, the DSL company, 
as was intended, curtailed its real expenses, trimming 
staff and waste for a more streamlined operation; but 
governmental outlays continued at a high rate under this
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arrangement. From 18 92, the DSL's volume of freight ship­
ments and receipts jumped significantly and remained at 
high levels throughout the 1890’s. This reduced the gap 
between real expenses and receipts, but inflated the cal­
culated nominal operating costs, which rose directly as a 
function of receipts. Now it is true that only a part 
(ultimately 101) of the difference between calculated and 
real operating expenses could be kept by the company as a 
bonus for its economizing efforts; the larger part of the 
difference was set aside in a reserve fund to be used for 
emergencies arising on the DSL. But government officials 
were scandalized by the growth of this reserve, which 
totaled 8 million francs by 1900 even while the cumulative
governmental outlay for DSL operations since the inception
102had swollen by 1900 to a total of over 43 million francs.
DSL officials had hoped to use these reserve funds
103
to build a new rail spur from ThiSs. But this was not
to be, as a new convention of December 21, 1900 replaced
the 1891 arrangement, and the old reserve was broken up
and its funds divided between the DSL and the state. The
new 1900 arrangement ended the limitless accumulation of
large reserve funds, at least, by creating two smaller
funds restricted to 1.25 and 1.5 millions respectively,
with any excess difference between calculated and real
104
expenses to revert back to the state. The old 1891
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expense formulas were replaced by a more reasonable single 
equation of: 3,250 Fr/km + | + 0.015 V + 0.05 T (with R as 
receipts per kilometer and with V and T respectively the 
equivalent annual total of passengers and freight tonnage 
traveling the entire length of the line). The DSL's old 
economy bonus was retained, however, and lifted up to its 
old levels by doubling the company's share of expense 
"economies" from 10% to 20%.
Fairer than the 1891 arrangement, the 1900 conven­
tion soon became much more profitable for the DSL than 
expected. A mushrooming freight traffic from 1900 brought 
prosperity to the line: receipts soon far exceeded real 
expenses, even while the company reaped additional profits 
from an economy bonus based on a calculation of fictional 
expenses.
The growing prosperity of the DSL was soon reflected 
in the attention increasingly paid to its stock in metro­
politan financial markets. Up until 1900, DSL shares had 
been valued at a stable 650 francs per share, reflecting 
the nominal 500 franc investment and the government's 
guarantee of an annual dividend of 29.60 francs per share 
(on slightly more than 10,000 shares outstanding).105 In 
1901, the DSL's directors were able to declare an addi­
tional dividend of 5 francs per share for the first time 
because of burgeoning receipts and, in 1902, raised the
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dividend by 8.40 francs to a total of 38 francs per share. 
After fluctuating between 660 and 710 francs per share in 
1901, DSL stock prices shot up to the 706 to 785 range in 
1902; to the 788 to 860 range by 1903; and to the 845 to 
925 franc range by 1905.^^
The economy bonus played a key role in the DSL's 
profitability; in 1907, for example, the DSL's board was 
able to declare a larger extra dividend of 16.40 francs 
(making a total of 46 Fr/share) even though receipts had 
fallen in 1906, because the bonus had more than compensated
£ «.!. J 107tor tne drop. Prospects for the line seemed exception­
ally bright because the government had undertaken construc­
tion of a new rail line branching the DSL from ThiSs to­
ward Kayes, where it would link up with the Kayes-Niger 
railroad, and the DSL had obtained in 1908 a franchise for 
2 years to operate the first section of this line to 
Diourbel--a lucrative arrangement in which the DSL received 
40% of the new line's receipts even as the new traffic 
swelled the old line's receipts and economy bonuses.
For 1908 the DSL dividend reached 50 francs; in both 
1909 and 1910 it rose to 55 francs. In 1908 the stock 
sold above 900 francs; by mid-1909 it was at 1165 francs, 
by mid-1910 at 1218 francs. Even the government's decision 
in 1910 to exclude the DSL from participation in operating 
the Thies-Kayes line depressed stock prices only temporar­
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ily, since it also fueled rumors of governmental plans to
buy the DSL railroad outright--in a settlement that would
108
be decidely advantageous to the company. in 1911,
the stock price reached a peak of 1415 francs a share: but
then the bubble burst as the government unexpectedly
denounced the convention of 1900, ending speculation that
the railroad would be purchased or that its profits would
109
be as high in the future.
Why was the 1900 arrangement denounced? Perhaps it 
was due to political changes in the Ministry of Colonies, 
which was increasingly reflecting the local government's 
growing coolness toward the DSL.^"^ It was certainly due 
in part to the very success of the DSL in economizing in 
its operations despite a growing traffic load.
With the extra burden of assuring service on the 
Thi^s-Diourbel rail branch, DSL railroad operations were 
put under a severe strain. Frequent breakdowns of an 
overworked rolling stock and the resulting long delays 
evoked strong protests from local merchants. Stung by the 
criticisms voiced in a session of the colony's General 
Council, DSL management unwisely called for an official 
inquiry to clear the company of these charges. The result­
ing inquiry only prompted a new flood of criticisms that 
tarnished the company's image. Dakar's chamber of commerce 
commented, for instance!
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Operations are defective from all points of view. 
Passenger trains never arrive on time, or rarely, and 
often delays are over one to two hours, and more.
These delays are caused generally by the considerable 
time lost in stations from loading and unloading freight 
so as to leave empty wagons behind while taking only 
full wagons, and from a scarcity of personnel. This 
wouldn't happen if passenger trains were only passen­
ger trains and not also freight trains.
The rolling stock, locomotives as well as freight 
cars, is defective and insufficient. Passenger cars 
are badly kept /^and"7 of a repulsive filthiness--the 
seat cushions staineoT with grease spots. Passengers-- 
some women--he e been seen standing for the entire 
journey of 10 hours rather than sit on the cushions 
that repel them. One must note that the cars are old 
and badly assembled. The insufficiency of personnel 
and materiel has often been signaled by this Chamber 
with r e s u l t . m
Unfortunately for the DSL, moreover, an official in­
vestigation of the charges led the governor of Senegal to 
conclude, "that the complaints formulated by the General 
Council of Senegal . . . are in great part justified."
The DSL's equipment was found to be old and insufficient 
and obviously in need of replacement, its passenger service 
in some circumstances in violation of conditions set out in 
the convention of 1900; and many of the operational defects 
resulted from the company's exploitation of overworked and
underpaid European agents, who in turn took it out on the 
112
public. The DSL only compounded its difficulties by 
asking in September 1910 to be allowed to extend the 
maximum statutory shipping delay for peanuts from the 
regulatory three days to five days. The request evoked a 
storm of protest from local merchants and even earned a
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rebuke from the influential Union Colonial Francaise.
Conditions were no longer as favorable for the 
operation of a government-subsidized private company in 
the French colonies. The National Assembly was unwilling 
to pay for these ventures, and the Ministry of Colonies 
had itself finally turned away from this method for 
developing an empire. The DSL was indeed to survi/e and 
even prosper. World War I suspended governmental efforts 
to nullify the convention of 1900, though with the DSL's 
economy bonus reduced from 2 01 to 151 as of January 1915. 
However, in retrospect, the position of the DSL had 
suffered one damaging blow from which it never really did 
recover. That lay in the failure of the company to obtain 
the options to build or operate the Thi^s-Kayes railroad, 
which not only lost it the profits that could come from 
managing the new line and from-the profitable traffic 
patterns that could have been developed to the advantage of 
the old line, but henceforth also embroiled it in intermin­
able, often bitter controversies with the colonial govern­
ment over coordination of the two lines. Inevitably, the 
role of theDSL company was thenceforth to diminish 
considerably, first politically and then eventually 
economically.
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was insurance, to some degree, for lost or stolen 
goods.
41. GS to MMC, December 20, 1886, ARS, 2B64; Aumont, p.3.
42. See the extremely interesting GS to S/Sec, March 3, 
1893, ARS, 2B68; the actions of the Deves-Crespin 
party are discussed and analyzed in Robert July,
"The Politics of Assimilation in Senegal," in The 
Origins of Modern African Thought, ed. by R. July 
(New York, 1968), p p . 234-253.
43. The rivalry between European merchants and African 
middlemen was only part of a more general process 
going on to some degree all along the west coast of 
Africa during and after the conquest. Some European 
traders preferred to continue dealing with long-time 
African trading partners on the coast, but many others 
were hastening to bypass these African intermediaries 
for direct trade inland with producers. In other 
parts of West Africa, such as the Niger delta, the 
economic clash of importer and intermediate trader 
was translated into dramatic and military conflicts 
because African intermediaries were defending their 
interests with the apparatus of politically indepen­
dent local states. In Senegal, where trader and im­
porter were generally both French citizens or subjects 
owing a common fealty to the same political entity, 
the conflict was more subtle--less open or bloody-- 
but real nonetheless. E.g., see C. Newbury, "Credit 
in Early Nineteenth Century West African Trade," 
Journal of African History, XIII (1972), no. 1, pp.
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8 1 - 9 5 .
44. On the maitres des langues, see e.g., Bois, Senegal 
et Soudan, pp. 51-52. The persistence of the maitres 
des langues in the trade is verified by the many 
arretls against the practice. E.g., arrete of
Mayor of Rufisque, October 29, 1883, SARS, DCF; Presi­
dent, CC-St. Louis to Director Interior, March 16,
1893, SARS, DCF, complaining that the arr§te of 
May 24, 1862 against the maitres des langues be 
enforced; also President, CC-Rufisque to Director 
Interior, December 5, 1896, SARS, DCF.
45. See Jean Robin, "Fondation d'une marche. Le Marbat," 
Senegal. 56, September 1943, pp. 307-315, on the role 
of the "n’diatiguis" in the market of Louga. See also 
Dr. Colin, "Le commerce sur le Haut Senegal," Bull,
SGC de Paris. 5, October 1882-October 1883, pp. 165- 
166. (article quoted by Newbury as cited above foot­
note 39). Cf., Bauer, pp. 22ff.
46. Aumont, pp. 3-4 who wrote: "II semblait naturel au
debut que les indigenes auraient charge leurs graines 
sur la voie ferree et qu'ils n'auraient eu qu'st se 
presenter dans les diverses maisons de commerce oil on 
leur aurait achete leurs produits sur le rec£pisse du 
chemin de fer, ils y auraient eu avantage car ils 
auraient &vite les frais enormes de charrois par b£tes 
de somme qui suivant la distance des lieux de produc­
tion leur coutaient le quart, le tiers ou la moitie 
des graines transportees, de plus ils £taient toujours 
certains de vendre d un prix plus £lev& leurs produits 
& St. Louis oil le negociant exportateur les leur 
achetant sans frais pouvait leur offrir davantage. 
Ainsi cultivateurs, negociants y trouvaient leur 
avantage et le petit commer^ant detaillant profitait 
de cette situation qui jetant 1'argent sur la place
de St. Louis lui permettait l ’gcoulement de ces 
marchandises ... Mais h€las.' La concurrence a fait 
que chacun a voulu et a cru s'emparer de la proie et 
que tous ceux qui pouvaient attendre se sont pr^cipites 
sur tous les points oil existe une gare, y ont installs 
des comptoirs, divisant ainsi leurs forces, decuplant 
leurs frais generaux, 6parpillant les esp&ces et se 
rendant impossible une situation exceptionnelle dont 
il leur *etait si facile de profiter. Le petit commerce 
a ressenti le contre-coup de cette tactique et est 
oblige de suivre cette mauvaise voie. II faut esp^rer 
qu'un jour viendra ou cessera cette situation qui ne 
profite ni au commerce ni a l 1indigene." Aumont wrote 
these lines when he was president of the Chamber of
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Commerce of St. Louis in 1889.
47. See above footnote 29. An auction of 99 plots of land 
at M'Pal in 1883 delighted colonial officials since 
they raised 65,525 francs thereby (excerpt, P.V., 
Administrative Council of Senegal, November 20, 1883, 
SARS, DCF). Sales of lots at Thies followed in 1886, 
and merchants were clamoring for similar sales of 
lots at Tivaouane as early as 1884 (acting GS to MMC, 
September 9, 1884, ARS, 2B58) .
48. Adam, pp. 103-110. To some extent the position of the 
African trader was associated with the barter system, 
which persisted in the Senegal gum trade and in more 
distant areas for the peanut trade. A growing ten­
dency to use specie instead of barter in the peanut 
trade did not necessarily lead to separate sale and 
purchase transactions in the trade because of the 
widespread practice of loans to cultivators secured 
with pawned valuables (see Aumont, p. 108; Adam,
pp. 105-107).
49. The proposed Baol rail spur to Fatick, of course, 
might also have weakened the position of commercial 
operations already based in the DSL escales or even 
diverted business to Fatick. See Robert report,
August 14, 1894, ARS, 036, report by Valantin, June 
12, 1889, FOM, TP; comments by Noirot in a report to 
GG, March 1, 1909, ANF, 148 A P 5 .
50. Interestingly enough there was some general uncertainty 
in the early years of railroading as to whether or not 
a railroad could be managed much like contemporary 
turnpikes and thus be available to users at all times 
(see Stephen Salsbury, The State, the Investor, and 
the Railroad. The Boston and Albany, 1825-1867 
/Cambridge, Mass., 196 7_/ , pp . 63 - 64, 82-85) . In 
reality, safety requirements precluded running the 
railroad like a toll roadway.
51. Of course, the Deves family of Senegal also had rela­
tions with the Bordeaux branch of the family. A Deves 
incidentally did become a member of the seven-man DSL 
board of directors in 1910. Henceforth, a Dev§s was 
always seated on the board until 1929.
52. See especially Samir Amin, Le monde des affaires 
senegalaises (Paris, 1969), pp. 15-21. As noted earl- 
ier, there was a general movement of commerce into the 
interior after 1900. E.g., as noted in a political
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report of January 1906, GS to GG, ARS, 2G6-4,calling 
attention to the installation of new commercial opera­
tions in both eastern and western Baol, "la concur­
rence formant les negociants a s'etablir dans les 
centres de production au milieu meme des indigenes!'
53. As in 1903, when low prices led cultivators to hold 
back sales. At Louga, merchants who had granted 
long-term credit since the famine of 1901 were 
deserted by debtors who preferred to sell at higher 
prices to traders at other escales (commercial reports 
for the "cercle" of Louga for the 1st and 2nd tri­
mester of 1903 to GG, April 1903, ARS, 2G3-6). A 
report by the Customs Service in Senegal, for 1903, 
ARS, 2G3-22, noted that an entente existed between
the major firms to keep prices low in 1903, because
prices had been too high the previous year.
54. The Thibaud report on a Casamance railroad project, 
dated 1914, copy in FOM, TP, p. 54, is explicit on 
this point in reference to the TK and the projected
Casamance railroad. It is the key piece of evidence
which led to the general argument, presented in the 
text. After this, more indirect remarks, as in Adam, 
pp. 104, 150, take on more meaning.
55. X. Guiraud, L'arachide senegalaise, pp. 115-120.
56. Each urban center had large seasonal floating popu­
lations, in which many would try to evade census rolls 
out of fear of taxation. At the same time frequent 
shifts in the administrative boundaries of urban 
centers, as well as rural districts, greatly reduce 
the value of the limited statistics available, 
particularly since extension of a boundary could add 
in long-time residents not previously counted. In 
reality, some long-time residents of the absorbed area 
might also have moved away because of the change, 
thereby decreasing the local population rather than 
increasing it as the next census might suggest.
57. On the growth of the ports in Senegal, see especially
Roger Pasquier, "Villes du Senegal au XIXe siecle," 
Revue Frangaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 47 (I960),
pp. 387-426.
58. On the proposed suppression of all military posts,
see GS to MMC, July 26, 1885, ARS, 2B64. On the new
telegraph line, see GS to MMC, July 28, 1885, ARS,
2B59.
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59. A map by Walter, November 14, 1878, is in FOM, TP.
60. See the copy of the 1865 map of "Diambour, Cayor et 
Saniokhor" by Regnault, FOM, Senegal XII,41; and the 
June 1883 "Carte du Cayor et du Diambour, 1858-1883" 
by P. Famin, map BD-4, ARS, map files.
61. Walter map, November 14, 1878, FOM, TP; the Walter 
report, November 14, 1878, FOM, TP, described 
Tivaouane as a "grand marche des produits du Baol 
et du Cayor." A note by Inspector General Bernard 
for S/Sec, May 28, 1887, FOM, Senegal XII,71, sig­
nalled the growing importance of Tivaouane as a 
caravan junction, which he felt was natural because 
Tivaouane "est le point central de culture des 
archides dans le Cayor." See also Paul Vigne, "La 
question du Soudan-Le chemin de fer de DSL," Bull.
SGCB, 15, August 1, 1887, pp. 449-465. Up to 1897, 
a perimeter of 300 meters around each rail station 
in Cayor belonged to the French state. In 1897 this 
was expanded to a square of 2km x 2 km for Tivaouane 
and squares of 1 km x 1 km for all other escales in 
Cayor (see copy of treaty of March 23, 1896, SARS,
DCF). In 1902 the size of the squares were increased 
to a 4 km x 4 km for Tivaouane and 2 km x 2 km for 
the other escales.
62. P. Etienne noted in his report of March 31, 1887
that Mekhe's receipts barely covered expenses in 1886. 
Apparently some of Baol’s peanuts also exited via 
Mekh€.
63. See Table 5 Walter report, November 14, 1878, FOM,TP.
64. Pire, centered in a lush forest, might be the same 
village mentioned in some sources as a center of Muslim 
scholarship in Cayor.
65. Mollien, L'Afrique Occidentale, pp. 59, 135, 147; Rene 
Caille, Voyage 3 Temboctou et 3 Jenng, I, (Paris,re­
printed T965)T~pir 34-35; GS to Minister, March 13,
1858, FOM, Senegal 1,43 estimated that Niomre had held 
a population of 5,000 before its recent conquest.
66. A continual run of 264 kms without a break was too 
long for the train engineers, so N'Dande was selected 
as a stop although it was not exactly half-way between. 
(Note by Inspector General Bernard for S/Sec, January 
10, 1885, ANF, DD-2/1094). A private entrepreneur ran
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a buffet for express train passengers from 1888 until 
1891. The water problem at N ’Dande became acute dur­
ing the trade season of 1888-1889 (Petyt report on 
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, FOM, Senegal XII,69, pp.
45-56) . Transfer of the crossover point and workshops 
from N ’Dande to Kelle was suggested as early as 1890 
(Sallenave report of December 1890, FOM, Senegal XII, 
71). but this was done only after 1899 (Chief of 
Public Works service to GG, January 11, 18 99, SARS,
DCF) .
67. The poor quality of Tivaouane*s water as compared to 
that of Thies was noted in the Etienne report of 
March 31, 1887, FOM, Senegal XII,67, p. 36. This^was 
one of the main reasons that Marmier selected Thies 
over Tivaouane as the junction point for a spur into 
Baol and Sine (report of June 5, 1893, FOM, Senegal 
XII,81, Chapter II, since locomotives would need 
the purer water available at Thies.
68. See report by the Chief of the Secretariat of the 
Government General, 1897, with the attached list of 
July 12, 1897, ARS, P40.
69. Rapports d*ensemble, GS to GG, 1912, folder 4, on 
public works by the Chief of Public Works. ARS, 2G12-8. 
Streets and roads maintained in and around St. Louis 
totalled 24.5 km; in and around Dakar there were 22 km.
70. See the joint report of 1912 on public works, ARS, 
2G12-33, on the question of converting the administra­
tors trails into good feeder roads for the railroads, 
and Adam, p. 148. Roads predating the railroad are 
mentioned in Bois, Senegal et Soudan, p. 17, as:
a coastal road from St. Louis to Rufisque via Gandiole, 
B£t£te, and M'Bidjem, a "route du Cayor" built in 
1864 by Pinet-Laprade from Rufisque to Thi£s and ex­
tended to N'Dande later by the Batignolles and a road 
from St. Louis to Loumpoul.
71. Noirot wrote in a report of March 1893, ANF, 148AP3, 
for instance, that the roads built by an administra­
tor in Cayor in 188 9 had already disappeared.
72. Report by the Chief of the Secretariat of the Govern­
ment General, 1897, with attached list of routes built 
in the protectorate in the period 1892-1897, dated 
July 12, 1897, ARS, P40, (210 kms in Cayor, 369 kms
in Thi£s, 146 kms in Louga). There were, of course, 
many other routes less formally established in the
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interior, such as a route of 12 days journey noted by 
Noirot from the Futa to the Saloum via the Ferlo and 
Niani (by OuarnSo)--Noirot report of 1890 on the 
Djolof campaign, ANF, 148AP3,
73. Project by R. Eckman, n.d. £ ”circa, 1897J7> with 
cover letter Descemet to "Mon cher Raymond," SARS,
DCF.
74. The lines of thickets were also intended to stop sand 
dunes from encroaching onto the track. Later barri­
cades of old traverses served for this purpose. See 
Etienne report of March 31, 1887, FOM, Senegal XII,67; 
note by Inspector General Fourni6, May 8, 1890, FOM,
TP; draft report by Petyt for 1892 through 1897, FOM,
TP.
75. See Petyt report on DSL expenses, 1890, FOM, Senegal 
XII,69, pp. 48-49; DSL Chief of Operations to GS,
August 20, 1891, SARS, DCF; project of arrete-1891;
Ibid.; Director of Political Affairs to Director 
Interior, December 21, 1891, Ibid., especially side- 
note.
76. Report by Surveillance Enginner for May 1889, FOM, 
Senegal XII,71, commenting on an influx of war refu­
gees from the Saloum into Cayor, wrote: "Of our
civilization the natives only appreciate one benefit, 
that of peace . . . but it is necessary to consider 
these groupings entirely transitory, except for some 
centers such as St. Louis . . .  On the one hand, the 
natives don't make permanent and fixed structures that 
they could leave to their descendants; on the other 
hand, they don't adapt to the habitat that they have 
chosen so as to live here indefinitely. They do not 
have a love for planting over a long duration, which 
among civilized agricultural people attaches man to 
the soil. They live from day to day, and a small 
influence can arouse their nomadic or warrior instincts."
77. Majhemout Diop, Histoire des classes sociales dans 
l'Afrique de l^Ouest-Le Senegal CParis, 1972), p . 63, 
terms this act, the "Douki," a method of typically 
African for solving problems.
78. See Klein, Islam and Imperialism, pp. 165-167; note by 
acting Director Interior, August 28, 1886, ARS,
13G-41; Chief of Native Bureau to Director Interior, 
April 5, 1887, Ibid.; discourse of governor to General 
Council, in Mohiteur du Senegal, December 19, 188 9,
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no. 1774, p. 431.
79. The arr£te of January 15, 1890 only disannexed rural 
areas of the 1st arrondissement near St. Louis.
Other rural areas were attached in 1902 to the 
Sen£gambie-Niger in exchange for a strip of territory 
of one kilometer width on either side of the railroad 
track and large square zones around the escales. 
Attempts to collect the head tax in rural areas of 
Senegal--Gandiole, Bargny, and in Serer None and Dioba 
country--led to all kinds of turmoil. Collections 
were resisted in some cases and had to be forgiven in 
others. E.g., see GS to S/Sec, December 7, 1889, ARS, 
2B67.
80. E.g., see Klein, Islam and Imperialism, pp. 160-164.
168ff. ------------- ----------
81. Paul Pelissier, Les Paysans du Senegal, pp. 139-142.
82. Andre Huybrechts, Transports et structures de develop- 
pement au Congo (Paris, 1970), pp. 72-76, 287-290.
83. There is a massive literature on this point. The 
pioneering work is Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory 
and Under-Developed Regions (London, 1957), see pp. 
51-57. "K good recent work is Thomas P. Melady and 
R. B. Suhartono, Development-Lessons for the Future 
(Maryknoll, N.Y., 1573'j , see pp. 78-7 9, 187-214.
84. The political report, GS to GG, 1st trimester-1908, 
ARS, 2G8-10, complained that shipments of millet 
needed in Salde went overland by means of dioula tra­
ders rather than by railroad and then by the fiver. 
Into the 1970's herdsmen still preferred to drive 
livestock overland by foot to Dakar rather than using 
the railroad.
85. Although the DSL’s categories for traffic statistics 
were too broadly defined to affirm this, one contem­
porary observer wrote that the kola trade flourished 
in Cayor only after the railroads1 construction (see 
Paul Vigne, "La question du Soudan-Le chemin de fer de 
DSL," Bull, SGCB, 6, August 15, 1887, p. 483). For 
the general argument, see A. G. Hopkins, An Economic 
History of West Africa (London, 1973), pp“ 245-253.
86. E.g., see political report, Niani-Ouli, April 1909, 
ARS, 2G9-36; monthly reports for Kedougou, 1912, ARS, 
2G12-57.
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87. For rail rates and fare structures in the French 
metropole, see Kimon A. Doukas, The French Railroads 
and the State (New York, 1945) , pp. 147-158.
8 8 . The original 1880 "cahie^j des charges" put s u H l items 
as spirits, oils, wood, and sugar in 1st class at 
0.24 francs per ton and per kilometer; wheat, rice, 
charcoal and wine in 2nd class at 0.20 Fr/fkm; coal, 
stone, salt, and sand in 3rd class at 0.13 Fr/t*km.
89. Arthur Hazelwood, Rail and Road in East Africa (Oxford,
1964), pp. 83, 88-94, gives a good idea of the com­
plexity involved.
90. From 1892 the north-central stations of the line Kelle
to Goumbo-Gueoul sent out a respectable 16% of total
production shipped on the railroad. But the potential 
of that area became more evident after 1904 in response 
to higher prices (see Table 5).
91. According to a schedule ("bareme") approved December 4,
1897, copy in FOM, TP. This applied to shipments of
at least 1500 kgs.
92. See excerpt P.V., Chamber of Commerce (henceforth CC)-
Rufisque, April 24, 1894, SARS, DCF. (The two zones
were to be Rufisque-N'Dande and St. Louis-N*Dande) ; 
P.V., CC-St. Louis, June 2, 1894, Ibid.; same,
April 1, 1897, Ibid.; copy of DSL (Paris) to H^laut, 
March 10, 1895, SARS, DCF.
93. A problem commonly confronting enterprises with busy
seasons or busy hours (such as a telephone company, 
to use another example with heavy investment in 
technical equipment). The solution is to spread out 
business more evenly with time. In the case of the 
DSL, the slack season served, at least, to repatriate 
European agents for long recuperative vacations in 
France.
94. Inspector Bideau’s report of September 23, 1886, FOM,
Senegal XII,66 compared the kilometric fares in 
Senegal with those in France andReunion and recommended 
unsuccessfully that 1st and 2nd class fares be raised 
in Senegal to levels comparable to the fares in colon­
ial Reunion. The fares were:
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Fraric e Reunion Senegal
1st class 0.123 Fr/km 0.25 Fr/km 0.12 Fr/km
2nd class 0.092 0.15 0,08
3rd class 0.067 0,06 0.055
First and second class passengers were also more 
likely to. benefit from reduced (military, clergy* 
etc.) and round-trip fares,
95. GS to S/Sec, March 9, 1890, ARS, 2B67, which recommen­
ded the DSL Chief of Operations Helaut for the Legion 
of Honor. In 1897, the DSL helped the colony to pre­
pare the new approaches to a new, metallic pont 
Faidherbe at St. Louis. In 1907 the government accor- 
ded a contract for an electrical generating plant in 
Dakar to a company run by DSL officials.
96. See draft of note by Binger to Inspector General of 
Public Works, Ministry of Colonies, November 7, 1899, 
FOM, Senegal XII,111; note by Bricka, October 5, 1899, 
FOM, TP; report by Valantin to General Council,
June 12, 1899, FOM, TP.
97. The report by Bideau, September 23, 1886, FOM, Senegal 
XII,6 6 , noted that DSL expenses were six times as 
high than the predictions of the Walter report. The 
report by Petyt on DSL expenses 1888-1889, FOM, 
Senegal XII,69, exposed that the Batignolles, for 
instance, was still drawing money from the French 
treasury indirectly by charging the DSL high rates for 
renting a short rail spur on the large jetty at Dakar. 
Members of the interministerial DSL Verification 
Commission were particularly incensed that the 
Batignolles had not furnished its subsidiary, the DSL 
company, with a reserve fund for current expenses out 
of the government-furnished subsidy. Instead, the 
Batignolles was covering only a small part of the 
DSL’s cost of borrowing; the government covered the 
rest through its guarantee of DSL operating expenses 
(see Reg. 31, FOM, TP, especially annex to May 17,
1886 session of Verifications Commission, pp. 124ff).
98. See Bideau report, September 23, 1886, FOM, Senegal 
XII,6 6 ; Etienne report, March 31, 1887, FOM, Senegal 
XII,69; Petyt report for 1887, Ibid. But by 1890, 
Petyt felt that the number of DSL agents in Senegal 
was too small for effective service CPetyt report on 
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, Ibid.).
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99. Note by de Traz to S/Sec, June 23, 1890, FOM, TP, 
pp. 17-18.
100. On reconstruction of the line, see Petyt report for 
1887, FOM, Senegal XII,69, pp. 60ff; Petyt report on 
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, Ibid., p. 55.
101. The Sentence. Arbitrale and the guidelines followed 
by the arbitration panel are in a booklet published 
by the French Ministry of Colonies, Documents relatifs 
au chemin de fer de Dakar eL St. Louis (Paris, 1914), 
pp. 45-46.
102. Draft report of the Commission on the DSL, October 1, 
1900, FOM, Senegal XII,75bis. The company's economy 
bonus was applicable only to the operations formula 
(4500 + R/2) and not to maintenance; the company 
received only 2% of any economies in thefirst year; 
the bonus then rose by an additional 2% each succeed­
ing year until a maximum of 10%, henceforth applicable, 
was reached.
103. draft of note by Binger to Inspector General, Novem­
ber 7, 1899, FOM, Senegal XII,111 (cited above).
104. Boutteville report to Minister of Colonies (henceforth 
MC) August 4, 1900, FOM, Senegal XII,75bis; the text 
of the convention of 1900 is in Ministry of Colonies, 
Documents ... DSL, pp. 57-62.
105. See the newspaper clippings on DSL stock in ANF,
65AQ/ E-267; e.g., Guide du Capitale, December 25,
1902, and Pour et Contre, October 23, 1904. Original­
ly there were exactly 10,000 shares of DSL stock of
a nominal value of 5 million francs of investment.
On technical grounds, the government forced the 
company to ante up an additional 8 0,818 francs of 
investment capital, so that now there were 10,161.6 
shares outstanding.
106. Le Rentier, December 27, 1907, ANF, 65AQ/ E-267;
Le Globe, October 25, 1906, Ibid.
107. "Notes Utiles," Le Mouvement Financier, August 24,
1907, p. 540, ANF, 65AQ/ E-267.
108. "Etudes Financieres," Revue Miniere, September 24,
1908, ANF, 65AQ/ E-2677~L~a Revue FTrianciSre, Septem­
ber 1, 1910, Ibid.; Revue MiniSre, November 9, 1911 
Ibid.
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109. "Etudes F inane ieresj' Le Bulletin Financier. May 15, 
1910, ANF,-65AQ/-E-267; "Dakar a St. Louis,"
Finance Cbloniale, February 25, 1911,Ibid.; Journal 
des Mines et-' des Travaux Publics, February 24, 1912, 
Ibid.; Revue Ecoriomique et Firiancihre, May 10, 1913, 
Ibid. ; F. Jourdier, "Le rapport sur 1 ‘emprunt de
1 ’A0F- II," La Depeche CoToniale, March 29,1913, no. 
573, p. 1.
110. By late 1908, the Minister of Colonies was already 
unhappy with the arrangement allowing the DSL to run 
the newly-opened section of the Thies-Kaye line. See 
copy of MC to Governor General of French West Africa 
(henceforth GG), December 23, 1908, FOM, TP.
111. Excerpt of P.V., CC-Dakar, May 20, 1910, ARS, 043.
See also Conseil General, 1909, December 19, 1909,
pp. 616-620; MC to GG,March 10, 1910, ARS, 043; P.V., 
CC-St. Louis, May 21, 1910, ARS-L; Conseil Ggniral, 
1910, May 31, 1910, pp. 68-74, June 8 , l$l0, pp. 241- 
249.
112. GS to GG, April 11, 1911, ARS, 043. See also the 
report on DSL workers, January 20, 1911, Ibid.
113. DSL to MC, September 8 , 1910, SARS, DCF; Director
General of the Union Colonial Fran§aise, Chailley
to MC, January 11, 1911, Ibid.
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C H A P T E R  I V
PENETRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-THE THIES-KAYES
If the Sudan is still today Ma beautiful house without 
doors," our duty is to give it the doors it lacks and 
not to destroy the house.
-J. Van Vollenhoven, 1917 
The completion of the colonial conquest in West Africa 
by 1900 heralded a new era of railroad building in the 
French colonies of the region. To some extent, the projects 
of this new phase of railroading in the decade before World 
War I were simply the outgrowth of previous efforts. An 
easy access to the Niger river valley from the littoral, 
expansion of the area’s export commerce, political consoli­
dation under French rule, and aggrandizement of the port of 
Dakar-- targets already set during the period of inception 
from 1878 to 1882--were also the major objectives pursued 
in this era, while the already existing DSL and Kayes-Niger 
railroads, moreover, had to be taken into account in future 
plans. The railroad promoters of the earlier era had been 
recklessly overoptimistic about the prospects for develop­
ment through railroad building. Having been fed for a gen­
eration on colonialist propaganda glorifying the pioneering 
colonial railroad builders, many of the officers and admini­
strators of the new era also clung, at least at the outset,
- 221-
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to much of the earlier confidence in the ability of the 
railroad to foster--indeed create--rapid economic growth.
Nevertheless, in this new era it was no longer 
feasible, or at least as easy, to finance railroad construc­
tion from tax money raised in the metropole. According to 
the financial law of April 13, 1900, the colonies themselves 
became responsible for their own budgets--meaning that any 
new rail construction and rail operations would have to be 
funded ultimately from revenues collected in the colonies.^ 
Even more significant for West Africa was the transformation 
from 1902 to 1904 of the Government General of French West 
Africa into a powerful federal agency of administrative and 
political authority interposed between the metropole and the 
individual colonies of the region. Itself assuming direct 
control over certain key federation-wide matters, the Govern­
ment General--jealous of its custody of the federation's 
general interests and potent in its budgetary and administra­
tive powers--became the main driving force in designing and 
implementing an ambitious series of public works programs of 
port development and railroad construction aimed at penetra­
ting into the hinterland of French West Africa.4
In this era of colonial consolidation and fiscal re­
sponsibility, any proposed railroad projects would be 
scrutinized much more carefully than during the earlier era 
of military expansion, especially for their financial pru-
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dence and their prospects for carrying commercial traffic. 
Thus, it becomes more difficult in this era to distinguish 
in contemporary documents advocating a particular course of 
action between overlapping economic and political motives-- 
although political considerations seem in reality to have 
always been foremost. An official interest in economic 
development and political consolidation could and did shade 
off into a genuine concern for the social well-being, 
immediate and future, of the African populations who were 
being directly affected by the government's policies. 
Nevertheless, in line with the dominant colonialist belief 
that an expanding export commerce would form the basis of 
African prosperity, governmental efforts to foster regional 
development concentrated on developing the overseas trade-- 
efforts which if successful would also swell the customs 
receipts that funded the Government General itself.^
As in 1880, governmental authorities held that the 
key to regional prosperity lay in opening up the Sudanese 
heartland to the export trade with a network of railroads 
linked to coastal ports. As a vital, integral part of this 
new venture in colonial railroad building, a projected 
railroad between Thi^s and Kayes was intended by government 
planners to perform a variety of functions both locally and 
regionally. Unfortunately, these ambitious plans for a 
grandiose regional network of railroads into the interior
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were to be carried out only partially— leaving a scattered 
handful of unfinished, isolated rail segments lancing in­
land from several points on the littoral. The Thi^s-Kayes 
railroad, although forming an impressive portion of the 
longest and most important of these segments, also proved 
to be a more fragile economic instrument than the planners 
had anticipated.
The "Grand Transversal" Formed at the crest of military 
conquest in 1895 to oversee a loose federation of French 
colonies, the Government General of French West Africa 
truly became the primary agency directing political and 
economic affairs in these colonies only after it had 
acquired its own autonomous, stable financial footing in 
1904.^ Aside from its crucial role as the chief political 
authority of French West Africa, the Government General 
also attended to functions of general interest to the 
entire federation, such as education, justice, and public 
works. The Government General's monopoly of the federation's 
customs receipts enabled it to redistribute essential services 
and developmental projects more equitably among richer and 
poorer colonies, and it could finance public works requir­
ing heavy investment of capital far more easily than any 
individual colony because of a superior ability to raise 
large consolidated loans in the metropole for these projects.
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Featuring some programs o£ drainage and sanitation, of 
public building construction, and of riverway clearance, 
the successive major public works loans floated by the 
Government General concentrated particularly on the con­
struction of commercial ports along the coast and on rail­
roads of penetration leading from these ports to the 
vicinity of the Niger valley deep in the Sudanese inter­
ior.^
A master plan for a comprehensive program of rail­
road construction in the territory, apparently originating 
in the Ministry of Colonies around 1902 and henceforth 
associated with the incumbent Governor General Ernest 
Roume (1902-1907), centered primarily on construction of 
a long strategic railroad of penetration starting from the 
Dakar-St. Louis railroad and running eastward through 
Senegal; then over the Kayes-Niger railroad to Bamako; and 
then straight across the region within the Niger bend to
g
Ansongo, a point on the Niger below Gao. (see Figure 8).
Designed perhaps partly in reaction to renewed con­
temporary speculations about a Transsaharan or Trans- 
african from Algeria to West Africa, this Transsudaniian 
"grand transversal" was intended to the the primary line 
of French penetration into the Sudan, opening up the 
Niger bend region, especially, to French economic exploi­
tation. Other rail lines penetrating inland from several
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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French colonies on the southern littoral would be attached 
at different points to this grand transversal, thereby weld­
ing the disparate parts of French West Africa together 
politically and economically into a solid unity. This 
grandiose network would bind together the colonial federa­
tion by facilitating operations of the government's 
administrative machinery in the interior and by enabling 
troops to be transported rapidly in case of need.® The 
scheme, however, was also designed in large measure as 
a major weapon for economic warfare with rival powers.
A railroad already begun by the colony of Guinea 
from Conakry, a railroad also begun already from Cotonou 
in Dahomey, and a line projected to be run from the littoral 
of the Ivory Coast toward Mossi country--all of which were 
slated to be grafted onto the main transversal--had been 
deliberately traced in such a manner as to compete with the 
railroads and rivers of foreign colonies in attracting the 
products of border areas toward French p o r t s . T h e  mini­
stry also contemplated a "petite ceinture" railroad nearer 
the coast linking Senegalese railroads to those of Guinea 
and the Ivory Coast in such a way as to closely encompass 
the frontiers of the foreign colonial enclaves lying between. 
A ministerial letter of December 1902 to Roume explained 
that:
The foreign colonies would be narrowly hemmed in by
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the network in such a way as to paralyze their 
economic development in their respective hinterlands 
and to drain the products of the soil . , , to the 
French coasts.H
At the same time the grand transversal was clearly 
designed to magnify the role of Dakar as the political and 
economic linchpin of the federation by making it the main 
port for exporting products from the Sudan. Dakar had al­
ready been designated in 1898 as the site of a major 
strategic base for the French fleet and had become the seat 
of the Governor General after 1902. Both the Government 
General and naval authoritiesi were now interested in see­
ing Dakar change from a mere port of call for ocean liners 
into an active commercial port, attracting thereby the 
accessory facilities and amenities that would facilitate 
the smooth functioning of the naval base and the administra-
V. 1 2txve bureaus.
At first glance, prospects for expanding shipping 
traffic at Dakar appeared bright because the impending 
completion of the Kayes-Niger railroad, in 1904, seemed to 
promise more commercial traffic for Dakar as the railroad 
funnelled a much larger flow of exports from the Niger 
valley via the Senegal river toward the Senegalese ports. 
Yet, on the one hand, it was by no means certain that this 
traffic would indeed bypass the decaying port of St. Louis 
to flow down to Dakar via the DSL railroad. On the other 
hand, it was not that certain that the KN could really
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generate that great a volume of traffic from the Sudan as 
long as the unreliable, intermediate link of the Senegal 
river was utilizable for only four months of the year at 
best. Indeed, despite the outlay of so much blood and 
treasure since 1881 to complete the KN, despite the personal 
efforts of so many prestigious colonial officers (among them 
Gallieni and Joffre), even the economic viability of the 
K N ’s operations seemed questionable as long as its long-
haul export traffic was dependent on the capricious
13river. An all-year grand transversal railroad that linked 
Dakar directly to the KN, via the DSL, and even entered 
deeper into the Niger bend, promised to resolve both 
problems. But, there were certain drawbacks to this 
approach.
The projected junction at Bougouni of the grand 
transversal and the Conakry-Niger railroad, for instance, 
would have been 1400 kms from Dakar and only 950 kms from 
Conakry. Even before this junction was made, produce trans­
ported on the Niger river might easily be exported south­
ward to Conakry from Kouroussa via the Conakry-Niger (CNj 
railroad rather than passing westward toward Senegal via 
the KN line. To prevent this from happening, the cost of 
freight shipped from Bamako to France via Dakar was equal­
ized to that shipped to France from Kouroussa on the Niger 
via Conakry. This was done by lowering freight rates on
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the KN to unremunerative levels, while rates on the CN 
railroad were deliberately raised despite the difficulties 
the CN was having in generating sufficient traffic for its 
line. Ostensibly, this arrangement was meant to assure the 
KN and CN railroads their "respective spheres of attraction 
on the Niger river." But obviously the real motive was to 
secure passage of KN exports westward toward the coast of 
Senegal.^
The choice of the longer rail line as the main axis 
of penetration to the Sudan, however, added to the admini­
stration's burdens. Successful growth of the export trade 
by means of a long rail line of penetration would really 
depend on the rates that the railroad would charge for 
delivering produce to the coast and vice-versa. Rates set 
low enough to ship exports profitably over long distances 
might be too low to cover the railroad's transportation 
costs. To solve this, the administration intended to 
resort to the versatile expedient of a "degressive" freight 
rate structure,which, unlike rates strictly proportional 
to distance (such as on the DSL), would let rail charges 
for certain goods rise more slowly as the shipping distance 
increased by means of a sliding-scale of levies for differ­
ent mileages travelled by rail. In so far as commerce was 
concerned, degressive rates (known as "tapering" in England) 
would telescope long export distances into apparently
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"shorter" runs. But since in reality the railroad had to 
cover its own transportation costs, the viability of a 
degressive rate scheme would depend either on any compen­
sating economies arising from long distance traffic or on 
the balancing of any losses incurred in low-rate long­
distance traffic with surpluses earned on other, more 
profitable elements of traffic on the line. The problem 
was not as simple as the planners imagined.^
The Thies-Kayes project A rail line bridging the gap 
between the DSL and the KN was an obvious first step in 
creating the projected grand transversal. But first, this 
proposed railroad link had to be justified as more practi­
cable than the existing connection via the Senegal river, 
and once it was justified a particular path through 
Senegal would have to be selected, and a builder would 
have to be chosen.
The scheme for a railroad link passing through Senegal 
had to contend at this time with a rival plan for simply 
improving the navigability of the already-utilized Senegal 
river link. Of obvious direct benefit to St. Louis at the 
mouth of the river, this longstanding idea found substantial 
backing among St. Louis's merchants and from Senegal's depu­
ty to the National Assembly, while also enjoying support in 
the metropolitan press.^ Considered a cheaper investment 
than a railroad, the river plan also promised to assure
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cheaper freight hauling rates by water than was possible
by rail; and at first the new Governor General Roume
appeared to be giving equal consideration to this Senegal 
17
river scheme. Studies of a barrage and lock system on 
the Senegal river were indeed undertaken by military 
officers during the period 1902-1904, and an initial pro­
ject for a short rail spur from Kayes downriver to Ambidedi 
was approved in 1904 with little question since it could be
used equally well for a mixed river-rail or an all rail 
18
route. Despite governmental disclaimers, the two projects
were of course competing for the same limited construction
funds and the same potential export traffic--a rivalry
underlined by the sharp criticisms penned by the officer
19
in charge of the river project against the railroad.
Studies for the railroad began modestly enough with 
Roume*s simple request to Paris in June 1902, shortly after 
his arrival in Senegal, for a loan of two military engineer­
ing officers to reconnoiter possible traces for a connecting
railroad between the KN and either Louga or Thies on the 
2 0DSL. The ministry apparently saw the question in wider 
terms, for it assigned the duty of exploring a possible trace 
between the DSL and the KN to no less a figure than the 
director of the Kayes-Niger, Colonel Rougier, then visiting
n  • 2 1Par is.
The shortest trace to Kayes would have started from
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Louga, but in a letter of January 1903 Roume ordered 
Rougier to explore only a line of penetration starting in­
to Baol from Thies, which, unlike one from Louga, would
22
probably generate a substantial local traffic. Not only 
would the export trade itself therefore undergo further 
local development in Senegal, but the railroad of penetra­
tion would be assured a profitable local traffic that 
generated sizeable receipts to help finance other railroad 
operations. Roume chose Thils over Tivaouane partly for
the advantages of the site and partly because this juncture
2 3would bring the new line closer to Dakar. After follow­
ing Marmier's trace of 1893 to Bambey and extending it to 
the vicinity of Diourbel, the direction of the projected 
line and its junction point on the KN was left to the 
explorers' findings, with neither a direct-line trace to 
Kayes nor one to Bakel ruled out at that point. Roume 
urged, nevertheless, that beyond Diourbel the rail trace 
ought to dip southward in order to avoid the Ferlo barrens 
and to penetrate into border areas that, at the time, were 
conducting most of their trade with the British Gambia. The 
purpose was, of course, to siphon the products of these 
regions toward French ports; but Roume also cautioned Rougier 
not to allow the trace to pass so close to the border that 
traffic on the railroad could be diverted inversely toward 
the Gambia river.^
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The exploratory studies of the railroad trace went
well. Rougier himself scouted ahead, making a rapid
reconnaissance of the most likely potential route from
Thies to Kayes while a larger expeditionary party slowly
25
followed in his track surveying the trace carefully.
The so-called Rougier-Belle trace crossed through well-
populated parts of Baol, passing by Diourbel and N'Gahayes;
then swung sharply southward toward Tambacounda skirting
areas bordering the Gambia; and then turned north in a
direct bee-line to Ambidedi (see Figure 9). This trace,
which was favorably received in Paris by the governmental
Committee of Colonial Public Works in July 1905, also
prevailed over the river project when it became apparent
that the waterway would be usable for only part of the year
2 6
even after extensive, costly construction work.
This decision having been taken, it seemed natural
that the DSL company, which had almost been granted the
concession for a Thi^s-Fatick spur only five years before,
should now be awarded the franchise for building at least
the first 140 km section of the projected line from Thies
27
to the vicinity of N'Gahayes. Construction by a private 
firm like the DSL also seemed logical, given the precarious 
condition of the new Government General's financial situa­
tion at a time when it was floating its first major loan.
Nevertheless, discussions between the DSL company and
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the French government did not go well. The DSL was demand­
ing that the Government General guarantee a bond issue to 
finance construction, agree to a very favorable financial
formula governing rail operations, and give the company a
? 8
virtual veto over rates and fares. ° Negotiations had 
not advanced very far when the Government General's Conseil 
du Gouvernement, meeting in May 1906 to consider a second 
public works loan for French West Africa, essentially 
scuttled the DSL's bid by voting to borrow an additional 
10 million francs for construction of the first section 
of the railroad with the federation's own resources and
i 29personnel.
Seemingly a contradiction of conventional theories
about the role of private investment capital in developing
the colonies, this action provoked a lively debate in
30
French colonial circles. It was, nonetheless, a logical 
outgrowth of past difficulties that had cropped up whenever 
private firms had undertaken colonial railroad building in 
such diverse places as Indochina and French Guinea. The 
colony of Guinea, for instance, had been obliged in 1902 to 
take over construction of the Conakry-Niger railroad, 
begun only in 1900, even while compensating the inept private
71
builder with almost 2.8 million francs. In Dahomey, the 
railroad's concession contract had to be revised radically 
in 1904 with an outright payment to the entrepreneur of
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almost 12 million francs. One common problem was the 
difficulty of recruiting African labor for construction 
work, opening the colonial government to litigation in 
case insufficient government recruitment was blamed for 
construction delays. Not less important was the Govern­
ment General’s determination to retain control over rail 
freight rates, which might be manipulated to spur the ex­
port trade more easily if not limited by a private firm's
•7 T
need to show a given profit on invested capital.
The DSL's exclusion from construction of the new line 
was certainly also due in part to the successful efforts 
of groups of military engineering officers formerly 
associated with construction of the KN in the Sudan and the 
railroad in Guinea to secure an important role in construc­
ting the Thies-Kayes. With the conquest accomplished and 
a civilian Government General firmly in control of the
federation, the political ascendancy of the military in
34
important parts of West Africa was over. Colonial mili­
tary officers, however, were apparently still not prepared
to relinquish the enterprise of colonial consolidation
35
entirely to civilians. Previously, only those unprofit­
able colonial construction projects, where private capital 
did not care to venture, like the KN railroad, had been 
entrusted to the military engineers. Now these officers 
were arguing that the government should also undertake the
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more profitable colonial projects, such as the line from 
Thies, the fruits of which could be used later to finance 
less profitable projects. Modification of a projected 
rail trace while construction was in progress, it was also 
reasoned, would be far easier if there were no prior commit­
ments to a given route because of a contract with a private
... 36firm.
Construction of the first part of the line from Thi£s
to Diourbel was begun enthusiastically by the Government
37
General in late 1907 along the Rougier-Belle trace. With 
few physical obstacles intervening to limit the ultimate 
direction of the trace between Thies and the KN, however, 
alternatives were soon being considered. A trace to 
Kayes over barren terrain by way of Bakel had been rejected 
easily in 1903, and a trace going directly to Rufisque 
without using the DSL line had also been considered and 
rejected in 1906.^
Calmel's suggested variant aroused much more interest 
from 1907. The first part of the variant, from Diourbel 
to Tambacounda, passed south of the Rougier-Belle trace 
with a straighter line--shortening the track mileage slight­
ly while dipping into regions where water was presumably 
easily available. From Tambacounda Calmel's trace ran 
directly eastward to Kita via Talary, bypassing the section 
from Kayes to Kita on the KN line, and thereby shortening
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the distance to the Niger by 69 km. The direct line to 
Kita would have actually entailed more construction expense 
because more new track would have had to be laid and a 
chain of hills would have had to be crossed at Tambaoura 
beyond the Faleme river. On the other hand, it would have 
also reduced future railroad operating costs and freight 
charges with a shorter line to the Sudan, while bringing 
the railroad into more fertile territory near the gold- 
fields of the Faleme. The adoption of this trace was re­
sisted energetically, however, by both the governor of 
Upper Senegal-Niger and the director of the KN, who were 
defending the commercial importance of the town of Kayes 
and of the section of the KN that would have been bypassed
by the Calmel trace. Eventually, the ministry agreed with
40
them and rejected the Tambacounda-Talary variant.
Smaller modifications made on the trace between Diour­
bel and Tambacounda, however, were highly significant. The 
final line adopted for this section dipped even farther south 
than Calmel's trace, bringing the railroad closer to the 
Gambia river and only 22 km from Kaolack on the Saloum river. 
While some merchants were concerned that the railroad's 
traffic could be diverted to the nearby British Gambia, the
DSL and some merchants were also surprised to find that it
41
might now exit by way of Kaolack. Engineering officers 
charged with construction of the railroad explained that
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the trace had been redrawn southward in order to pass 
through areas where water was easier to find. A diversion 
of railroad commerce into the Gambia, was unlikely, they 
claimed, because the high mortality of the pack animals 
near the river limited the volume and range of traffic to 
it. Rail traffic exiting via Kaolack admittedly now be­
came inevitable, but it was argued that Dakar and Rufisque 
would lose little traffic since maritime shipping to 
Kaolack was limited by the difficulties of navigation along 
the Saloum river.^
In reality, the new trace profoundly altered the char­
acter of the railroad.^ The argument about water avail­
ability seems specious in retrospect in view of the diffi­
culties which the government experienced later in supplying 
water at Gossas and G u i n g u i n e o T h e  trace was almost 
certainly redrawn to attract more trade from areas bordering 
the Gambia; but at that the government was only able to stem 
the flow of produce from the vicinity of the rail line 
toward the Gambia itself by introducing special, low freight 
rates for produce shipped to Kaolack from the rail stations 
between Kaffrine and Tambacounda.^  It is indeed hard to 
escape the notion that the rail trace had really been 
displaced toward Kaolack not so much for any water supply 
problems as to reduce the new railroad's dependence on a not 
always cooperative DSL management, by giving the Thies-
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Kayes its own direct access to a coastal port.
By 1909, plans were being drawn up to expand Kaolack's 
port facilities and to link the port to the Thies-Kayes with 
a short rail spur from Guinguineo. By virtue of its 
geographic position and the new railroad, Kaolack was in 
a position to become the natural port for the rail line 
from Diourbel to the Niger.
The problem might have taken an even more interesting 
turn economically had France only controlled the Gambia, 
enabling a even shorter rail line from the Niger to termi­
nate on a superbly navigable exit to the sea. However, 
various French attempts to obtain the Gambia never succeeded. 
The Anglo-French treaty of 1904 had indeed accorded to 
France navigation rights on the Gambia, inspiring various 
projects for a major French port on that river; but the port
and a Gambia-Niger rail link were rejected finally as too
46advantageous for the economy of the British colony.
Construction of the TK The initial section of the Thies- 
Kayes within Baol was an immediate success as soon as it 
opened. Merchants flocked into Baol to open business at 
the escales forming near the new TK stations,which were soon 
shipping out large volumes of peanuts. The DSL company 
particularly benefited with this development, not only from 
the additional traffic flowing on its old line but from a 
two-year contract with the Government General that turned
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over operations on newly-opened sections of the TK line 
47
to the DSL. Entranced by the profits from its share of
the new line's revenue, the DSL and its parent company,
the Soci£t€ des Batignolles, indeed hoped for a time to
obtain the concession to build succeeding portions of the
Thi^s-Ambidedi beyond the first 140 km section already
48undertaken by the colony.
However, these hopes were soon disabused. Buoyed by 
the striking commercial success of the first section of the 
Thiks-Kayes and by the solidity of the federation's finan­
ces, Governor General Ponty decided instead in late 1909 
that the government itself should continue to build succeed­
ing portions of the line. A new loan of 14 million for 
constructing the second section was proposed, and it was
4 9duly authorized by the National Assembly in February 1910.
Moreover, with criticism mounting against the DSL 
company's deteriorating service, it was also decided in 
early 1910 that the company's two-year contract for opera­
ting the Thies-Diourbel rail section would not be renewed.
To run the TK line the government created instead, in 1910, 
its own special agency with headquarters and supporting 
services at ThiSs. Placed ostensibly under the command 
of the governor of Senegal, this new government service, 
whose budget formed a special annex to the general budget 
of French West Africa, functioned autonomously, in reality,
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under the guidance of the Governor General.^ By 1911, 
Ponty was already asking (within a new public works loan 
of 150 million) for 25 million francs to complete the last 
section of the Thil's-Kayes line and even for 15% million 
francs to start on the next section of the grand transver­
sal from Bamako to Bougouni.^
However, subsequent construction of the Thies-Kayes 
proved more difficult than anticipated. Originally it was 
thought that the entire Thi^s-Kayes line (62 5 kms to 
Ambidedi) would be completed within seven years, and indeed 
the station at Diourbel (Km 79) was opened as early as 
J anuary 1909.
Unfortunately, the farther inland construction pro­
ceeded, the more slowly it seemed to go and the more 
costly construction expenses became. The first section of 
140 kms. was only completed at the end of 1910, and 
Mal^me-Hodar on the second section at Km 211 was only 
opened in March 1912. Moreover, meager profits from a 
disappointingly small traffic on operating portions of
the TK in 1911 and 1912 provided few extra funds to finance
52
new construction.
The proposed loan of 150 million, which included 
funding for further TK construction, soon ran into diffi­
culties in the National Assembly, where voices were raised 
against the management of both TK operations and new
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construction. Work on the TK had to be halted for lack of
money. Only a'fter William Ponty reluctantly satisfied some
parliamentary critics by including projects for improved
ports at St.Louis and Conakry in the omnibus public works
loan, was approval finally obtained in December 1913 and
53
work resumed on the TK in March 1914.
The outbreak of war in Europe found the TK track not
even as far as Tambacounda (Km  395) ; but construction of
the TK line continued into 1917 with the meager resources
at the colony's disposal because the unfinished line was
also proving very useful in shipping recruited African
troops from the Sudan to the trenches in France. A system
of supply and mail convoys was organized to bridge the gap
between the end of the line and Ambidedi--a run made regu-
54
larly by automobile from 1917.
The Grand Transversal Unfulfilled Nevertheless, it was 
clear even before the end of the war, that the program 
of railroad construction was a shambles. Rail line con­
struction, other than on the TK line, had necessarily been 
postponed during hostilities, leaving at war's end only a 
disjointed network of unconnected, stubby limbs pointed 
uncertainly toward the Niger valley. The economic strain 
imposed during the war on the metropole, in obliging her to 
draw more heavily on the colonial empire for support, had 
exposed all the more clearly the economic backwardness of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 2 4 5 -
colonies such as those of French West Africa. Thus, the 
postwar period brought renewed interest in completion of a 
consolidated rail system for French West Africa, not only 
because it would allow greater access to the Sudan, which 
officials perceived as a rich storehouse to succor a war- 
weary France, but also because it promised to spur economic 
development in the region.^ Some voices, however, were 
already questioning the emphasis of the earlier program of 
railroad construction on an east-west strategic transversal.
From at least 1917, a proposed major railroad of
penetration to the Niger bend from the Ivory Coast began
to attract increasing attention because its shorter length
promised lower rail shipping costs for Sudanese exports.^
Lines run inland from this direction would have had the
added advantage, as Cosnier noted in proposing a great,
two-pronged "V" network of rail lines from Abidjan, of
linking existing population concentrations in the interior
in such a way as to capitalize upon and reinforce existing
local and long-distance currents of African domestic 
57
commerce.
Oriented generally in north-south directions because 
of the greater possibilities of crosswise exchange among 
the differing climatic and vegetative zones of West Africa 
that lie east to west, the currents of domestic commercial 
traffic presented a singularly favorable opportunity to
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encourage healthy economic growth in the region. Not only 
might the growth of the domestic trade have fostered the 
development of greater interegional exchange and greater 
linkage between regional sectors of production (e.g., rice 
grown in the Sudan replacing rice imported from Indochina 
or cattle meat shipped to the forest regions), but this 
commerce would indeed have supported the growth of the 
export trade rather than supplanting it. In essence, 
domestic rail traffic, whether passenger or freight, local 
or long-haul, was likely to have generated additional rail 
revenues. With these additional revenues, it would then 
have been possible to set certain long-haul rail rates at 
lower levels in order to stimulate a greater long-haul 
export traffic.
Postwar plans did indeed pay increasing attention to 
construction of a new port at Abidjan and a long rail line 
of penetration from the Ivory Coast. Nevertheless, with 
so much already invested in the port of Dakar and in the 
Thies-Kayes railroad--a project so near completion--colonial 
authorities evidently opted to continue emphasizing this 
east-west approach as the easiest and quickest way to reach 
the Sudan.
Governmental efforts were necessarily limited in the 
postwar era by budgetary considerations. The Minister of 
Colonies, Albert Sarraut, had indeed called in April 1921
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£or a renewed program of colonial public works for develop­
ment (”mise en valeur"), which included much of Roume’s
r  o
prewar program for West Africa. Officials in French 
West Africa realized, however, that they would have to 
settle for a scaled-down effort, which one official hope­
fully characterized as a "programme partiel et d'attente."^ 
The funds still authorized for the prewar loan of 167 
million were applied only to the most urgent projects in 
the program of 1913, such as the completion of the TK and 
port facilities at Dakar, while heavier emphasis was placed 
on the extension of the Ivory Coast’s railroad inland.
Other projects, like the Bamako-Bougouni section of the 
grand transversal, however, were postponed indefinitely.^ 
The scheme for a grand transversal was in effect 
being shelved, never to be completed. But the Government 
General was nonetheless clinging to the notion of an east- 
west line of penetration to the Sudan, while now concen­
trating on the agricultural development of the great inter­
ior delta of the Niger, whose products were to be exported 
via Dakar by a completed Thies-Kayes railroad.^ Thus, the 
great imperial route from Thi^s to the Niger continued to 
be emphasized for political and strategic reasons, with 
the line’s projected financial viability based on the 
optimistic French expectations for quick successes in the 
agricultural development of the Niger river bend.
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Work on closing the gap on the TK was again being 
pushed in 1920, though with costs far exceeding the origi­
nal appropriation of 25 million. The completed TK rail-
6 2
road was fused with the KN in January 1924. Nevertheless,
despite sustained governmental efforts in the Niger valley
in the 1920's and 1930's, the results in production were
6 3disappointingly meager. The agricultural potential of 
the Niger region had been grossly misunderstood by govern­
ment officials, and the completed Thi^s-Niger railroad of 
penetration had itself become a source of difficulty.
Growing pains Operations of the TK line by the colonial 
government had never really gone smoothly. When it took 
over operations on the TK in late 1910 from the DSL, the 
Government General had been obliged to purchase new rolling 
stock quickly and to organize hastily a new government agency 
for TK operations, whose top posts were soon largely staffed 
by military officers.*^ It is understandable therefore that 
initial operations on the TK were plagued with a number of 
misadventures, which raised much criticism in 1913 during 
the parliamentary debates on the loan of 150 million.^ 
Merchants hastening to expand their commercial operations 
along the new line particularly resented the TK's frequent 
delays in moving freight.
During World War I, service on the line was reason­
ably well maintained, considering the economic dislocations
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due to the war (loss of foreign markets for peanuts, diffi­
culty of obtaining replacement parts and coal); but by the
end of the war, the TK's worn equipment was in a sorry 
66
state. The DSL railroad, facing similar problems, im-
67
proved its service noticeably by 1922. However, with a
much longer line, with heavy construction underway at the
far end of the line, and with only inadequate, rudimentary
repair facilities available at Thies, the TK was unable to
recover as quickly. In 1921 the TK attempted to stimulate
commerce and traffic with lower freight rates, but from
1922 to 1924 the railroad's inadequate rolling stock was
unable to keep up with the growing traffic. Merchants were
particularly irate that their peanuts were not being shipped
before the arrival of the season's rains spoiled the exposed 
68
produce. Already under fire for underestimating the costs
of construction of the final section of the TK, Pierre
Ballabey, director of the TK since 1910, was blamed for the
69
sad situation, and his ouster planned in 1924.
The fusion of the TK and KN in 1924 considerably 
worsened the plight of the railroad, and led to a disastrous 
transportation debacle in 1925. The thin rails, steep 
gradients, and sharp curves of the KN section obliged the 
railroad service to use four times as many locomotives to 
haul a given weight load on the KN than on the better-built 
TK section. Thus, even though little produce could actually
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be shipped from the Sudan in 1924 and 1925, the burdens of
the new long-haul service on the TKN, requiring as it did
additional rolling stock (especially on the badly built KN
section), impaired the already-strained local service on
7 0
the Thies-Kayes section of the TKN. The bumper crop of
1924 simply overwhelmed a now overextended TKN, forcing
some merchants to beat the rains in 1925 by shipping pea-
71nuts to port overland by slow-moving pack animals.
The TKN's immediate troubles stemmed largely from an
inadequate rolling stock and insufficient personnel, and
these could be remedied with purchases of new equipment
72
and a vigorous recruiting campaign in France. The new,
incoming director of the TKN (from 1927 the Thies-Niger or
TN) proceeded to do just that, and to conduct a thorough
purge of the railroad's staff and workers as well. The
railroad's painful process of recuperation was well begun
in 1926; but before it was completed in 1930, a growing
world crisis in the commodity trade hit the railroad hard,
diminishing its freight volumes and revenues just as local
73
commerce was clamoring for lower freight rates.
The TN was also suffering, however, from a serious, 
long-term predicament stemming from the unevenness of 
productivity along the length of the rail lines. The earlier 
success of the TK in Baol along the initial Thi^s-Diourbel 
section had indeed been misleading since it was not repeated
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to the same extent farther down the TK line. From 1911 to 
1922, before the fusion of the two lines, most of the rail­
road's receipts were generated by traffic on the 79 km 
stretch of line from Thies to Diourbel, and to a lesser 
extent from the 77 km Diourbel-Kaolack section (see Table 
10). The longer section of line east of Guinguineo (more 
than 200 km long by 1913) produced only a small portion of 
the line's total receipts. A unified TN was in even worse 
financial shape than the incomplete TK, since the KN line 
consistently produced a net operating deficit, which be­
came extremely serious from 1930 on, when running costs 
exceeded receipts for the entire line (see Table 11). The 
lopsidedness in the distribution of receipts along the line 
was all the more disappointing because of the government's 
efforts to encourage production in the interior by means 
of sharply degressive freight rates in use from 1913. In 
1913, for instance, peanuts on the TK could be shipped 
at the rates of 0.13 francs per ton and per kilometer for 
the first 50 km (the normal flat rate), at 0.065 Fr/t*km 
for the next 100 km, at 0.045 Fr/t*km for the next 150 km, 
and 0.03 Fr/t-km for the following 200 km.74 Another 
special rate allowed peanuts from stations between Kaffrine 
and Tambacounda inclusive to be sent to Kaolack at even 
lower prices. At the fusion of the TKN, peanut freight 
rates were set at 0.45 Fr/t*km for the first 50 km stretch
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in a sliding scale down to 0.04 Fr/t.km for distances
75
greater than 800 km.
Clearly the scale of degressive rates was not matched
by decreasing costs for long-haul freight since the costs
of shipping on the KN were much higher than on the TK--so
much so that reconstruction of the entire KN had to be
7 6
undertaken soon after fusion. The deficits involved in 
lower freight rates for long-haul traffic, thus, had to be 
assumed by more prosperous elements of traffic on the 
section of the line nearest the coast. Unfortunately, the 
economic results of this sacrifice were disappointing. Of 
the total tonnage of products exported via the TN rail­
road during the trade seasons of 1928-29, 1929-30, and 
1930-31, over two-thirds originated along the section
Thi^s to Kaolack, and less than 15% on the KN (see Table 
77
12). The fusion of the two lines had brought only a
modest increase in combined freight tonnages, but an
enormous ballooning in the volume of traffic as measured
7 8in tonnage times distance (t»km) (see Table 13). Long
haul traffic sharply increased operating expenses, while 
generating proportionately little additional revenue or 
exports.
TK impact in Senegal The Thids-Niger of course had been 
designed to function not only as a major axis of penetration 
into the interior, but as a generator of local agricultural
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production. and a commercial rival to a major waterway in 
the adjacent foreign colony of the Gambia. In some of 
these respects it was clearly a success.
For one thing, it drew trade away from the Gambia. 
Before construction of the new railroad, some of the peanuts 
of the Saloum and almost all shipped from Niani and Ouli 
had been exported by French commercial houses via the 
British-held Gambia river. Now, as the railroad was built 
into the northern parts of these territories, peanut traffic 
shifted direction from such southern river escales as Oualia 
and Guenoto to the new rail escales, such as Koussanar. The 
shift was all the more strongly confirmed when the TK reached 
Tambacounda in 1915 and when the government barred the export 
trade via the Gambia after World War 1 . ^
Like the DSL, the TK had also rectified some of the 
more irksome regional disparities previously afflicting 
the region. This was evident in the case of the Wolof of 
the Saloum, who had often been obliged before the TK rail­
road was built to emigrate seasonally to farmland along the 
DSL where cultivation was more remunerative. The entrance 
of the TK into the Saloum not only made these migrations 
unnecessary, but induced a large seasonal counterflow of 
cultivators from less productive or overworked areas of
northern Senegal into the rich, virginal land of the 
8 0
Saloum. It is also evident that groups of Mouride
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'.'talibes" were taking advantage of the new railroad from
the first to plant new agricultural colonies along the TK
in lands now made accessible for remunerative cash-crop- 
81
ping.
Most significant was the TK's rectification of the
DSL's earlier failure to serve Baol directly--a failure
which had severly hobbled the growth of the earlier export
commerce in that area. The first three stations of the
TK--Khombole, Bambey and Diourbel--were quickly exporting
impressively large quantities of peanuts--some 53,084 tons
total for all three stations in 1909, and 48,788 tons in 
8 2
1910. Some of Baol's peanut tonnage had already been
exported previously via animal carriers to the DSL or
coastal escales, particularly with higher peanut prices from 
8 31900. But clearly the railroad accounted for significant
84
increases in local production. The Baol escales quickly 
became among the most prosperous trading centers in Senegal, 
and accounted thenceforth for much, if not most of the TK's 
peanut exports and rail receipts. About a third of the 
peanut traffic carried on the DSL would also subsequently 
originate on the TK, mostly from these escales (see Tables 
14 and 20).
As some merchants had feared earlier, the shift in 
Baol's trading patterns impaired the prosperity of some 
DSL escales formerly profiting from a proximity to Baol.
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After averaging shipments of 17,000 tons in the period 1905
to 1908, peanut tonnages exported from Tivaouane fell
sharply to 12,000 tons in 1909, and stayed below 10,000
tons for a number of years (see Table 15). Peanut shipments
from the escale of Thies held up better at first, but then
8 5
slipped to much lower levels.
On ports The TK brought about dramatic changes in the flow
of export traffic toward the different ports.^ St. Louis
was plainly the main loser in the competition among the
ports of Senegal. Once completed, the TKN railroad, of
course, had been slated to take the long-haul commerce of
the Sudan from St. Louis; but the TK also injured the port's
prosperity in a more indirect way.
St. Louis' problems stemmed fundamentally from the
sand bar that blocked and endangered ships trying to enter
the mouth of the Senegal river. An inconvenient obstacle
for 19th century shipping, the bar had become a major bar-
8 7
rier to the larger commercial ships of the 20th. A pro­
ject for fixing the sand bar and clearing a reliable channel 
had been on file since 1886, and Senegal's public works
service prepared updated technical studies for the project
8 8
between 1904 and 1910. Unfortunately, the large sums 
necessary for such a project could now only be raised by 
the Government General, whose officials were plainly reluc­
tant to invest in an undertaking that might divert some of
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the Sudan's traffic from the TK railroad. Ponty, in
particular, flatly refused to use the federation's funds
89
for fixing the sand bar at St. Louis. The colony's
General Council, many of them St. Louisians already at
odds with the centralizing tendencies of the Government
General on other issues, took up the project's cause.
But the Council could do little against the federal govern-
90
ment's obstinacy. A split in the ranks of St. Louisian
merchants over the question did not help the city's case 
91
either.
Momentarily St. Louis seemed to have won the issue
when the deputy of Senegal succeeded in forcing Ponty to
earmark and additional 10 million francs in the loan of
1913 for this project. But the Government General managed
to stymie work on the sand bar indefinitely by insisting on
further, more extensive studies that were in fact never 
92
carried out. In 1920 and 1921, some political figures
tried to revive the project for this now commercially-
moribund port. But almost all of the 10 million originally
allotted in the loan of 1913 was diverted instead in 1923
93
to projects of higher priority. Proposals to pour new 
peanut exports into St. Louis from a new rail spur into 
Djolof were also frustrated since construction on this 
railroad began far too late to help St. Louis' port. Only 
its role as capital of Senegal and Mauretania allowed
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modern St. Louis a modicum of its ancient prosperity, as 
traffic in its port dwindled to a thin trickle of river 
trade.^
The TK railroad project had been designed with the
intention of augmenting the traffic of the new commercial
port being constructed at Dakar, and indeed the play of
degressive freight rates did funnel Sudanese exports all
the way to Dakar after fusion of the TKN. Nevertheless, it
was Kaolack, lying 182 kms closer to the Sudan along the
railroad, that benefited most from the new rail line.
Despite navigational difficulties on the Saloum river,
exports through the port of Kaolack, already growing with
an upsurge in peanut exports from the Saloum after 1900,
increased dramatically after a rail spur from Guinguineo
linked Kaolack with the TN in January 1912.^ In 1913 and
1914, Kaolack quickly captured the peanut shipments from
all TK stations east of Diourbel and most of Diourbel's
96
peanuts as well (see Table 16).
After a temporary concentration of maritime traffic
at Dakar during World War I, Kaolack’s natural geographic
advantages soon made it the main port for the TK's peanuts
97in the post war era. Whereas peanuts exported via the
Saloum river had accounted for only 23.3% of the total from
Senegal in the period 1909-1913, it amounted to 36.7% by 
981925. Despite the predictions of colonial officials,
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almost all peanuts of the TK from Gossas eastward were
exported via Kaolack, and from 1923 it again drew the
99
majority of Diourbel's produce as well.
Merchants based on Dakar and Rufisque were discontent­
ed with the growth of a rival port at Kaolack, which would 
oblige them to invest competitively in subsidiary operations 
at that port.'*'^ Theoretically, it was possible to channel 
the flow of peanut freight all the way to Dakar or Rufisque 
by instituting special degressive rates cancelling the cost 
of the extra 44 kms involved in sending Diourbel's peanuts 
to Rufisque or the 18 2 kms in sending peanuts from Guinguineo 
to Dakar by rail instead of K a o l a c k . I n  reality, the 
cost of the extra mileage, if it were not subsidized by the 
government, would have to be borne by the TK railroad ser­
vice, whose financial situation as noted above was none too 
bright. Moreover, the DSL, which controlled the 7 2 km run 
from Thies to Dakar, resisted implementing a common unified 
degressive rate for long-haul traffic on the TN since the
company would clearly gain little revenue while augmenting
102
costs with this arrangement. Under the prodding of a
vigorous local chamber of commerce at Kaolack the govern­
ment decided by 1928, to erect a modern, well-equipped port
at Kaolack, which from 1929 was to capture the major share
103
of peanuts shipped from Senegal.
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PopUlation movements Population growth in the various 
coastal ports of Senegal from 1908 to the 1930's clearly 
reflects not only the redistribution of the export trade 
among these ports but also a significant movement of 
population in Senegal toward urban and semi-urban areas 
(See Tables 17 and 18). Dakar's population, which had been 
reasonably stable at around 24,000 from 1908 to 1916, shot 
up to over 37,000 by 1921, to 54,000 by 1931 and to 76,100 
by 1934. Thi^s, whose losses in caravan trade from Baol 
were more than compensated by its selection as a major 
transportation crossroads and by the location of TK head­
quarters nearby, bounded from a total of 1,7 50 inhabitants 
in 1908 to 3,044 in 1914; and then to 6,427 people in 1921. 
Towns that lost out in the new commercial dispensation-- 
St. Louis, Tivaouane, and ultimately Rufisque--maintained 
more stable population levels in contrast to agglomerations 
such as Thies, Diourbel, and Kaolack, which mushroomed 
spectacularly; but the disadvantaged towns also tended to 
grow from the increasing urbanization of the society. A 
tabulation of population in 13 urban centers in 1914 
enumerated a total of 77,598 people in these locales at a 
time when the total population of Senegal was estimated at 
1,247,000. There were a total of 139,635 people in 34
urban centers other than Dakar in 1930 at a time when the
104
total population of Senegal was still around 1.6 million.
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Whereas the ports of St. Louis and Rufisque jointly held 
39,402 of these people in 1930 and Kaolack some 13,348 
more, nine DSL escales including Thies boasted a respect­
able combined total of 30,308 people, while eight of the 
TK escales already held a total of 26,265 people--that is, 
the larger rail escales alone accounted for over 40% of 
the urbanized population in 1930, exclusive of Dakar. The 
European population in Senegal, an element almost exclusi­
vely urban, was also on the rise during this period, especi­
ally in Dakar.
Construction of the TK railroad had contributed toward 
urbanization in Senegal by nurturing a string of new escales 
abutting the railroad's new stations. The growth of these 
escales seems all the more interesting considering that the 
new rail stations had generally been located, regardless of 
the size of nearby centers, at spaced intervals of 25 to
30 kms along the rail line at sites that promised sufficient
105
water.
The section between Thi£s and Diourbel, at least, had 
been deliberately traced through a densely settled area.
But even Diourbel had been chosen not for its size, but 
because of a coincidental transfer of French resident's 
quarters there from Sambe.^^ Beyond Diourbel, politico- 
economic strategy guided the direction of the trace, which 
bypassed many of the larger villages in the corridor between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 2 6 1 -
the Ferlo and the Gambia. Kaffrine with 226 people,
Koungheul with 191, Koussanar with 79, Koumpentoum with
107
111 were hardly of impressive size. Even Tambacounda
with 320 people was mainly chosen because of its proximity
108
to a junction of four existing overland trading routes.
The social dimension Although it is hazardous to infer
social attitudes from statistics, the TK railroad, like
the DSL, was apparently a source of much social satisfaction
to Africans. Aside from the growth of population at the
rail escales, this is clearly reflected in the heavy third-
class passenger traffic (and fourth-class in the Sudan) on
both railroads, as well as in the opportunity to farm new
109land previously too remote for cash-cropping. in
Myrdal's terms, the railroad was extending the range of 
the "spread effects" produced by the peanut export trade, 
particularly by equalizing previously severe spatial 
disparities. Henceforth, cash-cropping was diffused 
over a much wider zone, and any incipient land shortages 
were eased. The extensive campaigns of well-drilling 
deliberately undertaken in conjunction with the construction 
of the TK, in order to attract and fix populations in the 
vicinity of the rail lines and other favored areas, were
also welcome boons to rural populations chronically suffer-
111m g  from water shortage.
The railroad, however, as an instrument of external
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market forces, tended to increase sectoral disparities 
by stimulating an overstressed export trade; and there were 
drastic limits to the railroad’s ability to redress spatial 
disparities. The T K ’s impact on eastern parts of its line 
had been disappointing, and areas too remote from rail­
roads- -such as Kedougou and the Senegal river basin--suf­
fered from "backwash effects," in which the play of taxes
and prices would lure the young men for work, seasonally
112or permanently, to the favored areas. Furthermore, 
there was still the question--raised by Frankel in con­
nection with African railroads in general--as to whether
the region’s population was really large enough to make a
113long railroad of penetration financially viable.
This does indeed seem to have been a problem for the
Thids-Kayes in the 1920’s. Population increases along the
TK line were substantial, as indicated in census figures
for the cercles of the TK line (Baol, Sine-Saloum, Niani-
Ouli); but these increases seem less impressive if matched
against comparable increases for Senegal as a whole (see 
114
Table 19). Census figures on the basis of cercles would
not, of course, reflect population movements within cercles 
or seasonal sharecropper migrations toward areas along the 
rail trace. However, the relatively low absolute increase 
of population in Niani-Ouli indicates that the disappointing 
agricultural production in the 1920’s of areas east of
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Guinguineo indeed stemmed partly from the shortage of
settled population in these areas.
Thus, as early as 1917 a governor of Senegal had
proposed that the government bring in African settlers from
the more remote areas of the Sudan to fill underpopulated
115
areas near the TK escales. This particular suggestion
never got far; but by the 1930's the colonial government 
was undertaking several actions that tend to confirm that 
the existing population distribution was a major factor 
in the weakness of productivity on the TK line. One im­
portant action was to formalize and encourage the habitual, 
seasonal influx of share-cropping migrant farmers, or 
"navetanes,” from the Sudan and Guinea toward coastal areas 
of Senegal. This seasonal migration, antedating even the 
French conquest, was now actively encouraged in the 1930’s 
by propaganda campaigns in the navetane homelands, and the 
navetanes were organized rigorously for the round-trip 
seasonal journey into large supervised groups travelling at 
reduced train fares. Even more significant was the
encouragement given to the Mouride brotherhood of Senegal, 
whose earlier far-ranging drive to establish peanut-growing
colonies had been deeply distrusted by government officials
117during a first period of expansion from 1907 to 1927.
The larger, better-organized second period of Mouride expan­
sion was conducted from 1932 to 1945, with government approv-
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al, eastwards into the upper valleys of the Saloum and
1 1 8
Sine and along the "new territories" of the TK railroad.
Not entirely unconnected with the Mouride migrations, was a
government-sponsored program organizing a sometimes-forced
migration of Serer people from Sine into the new terrains
119
of the northern Saloum. However effective these govern­
ment measures may or may not have been, they were clearly 
undertaken in response to perceived needs. The core of 
the economic problem for the TK escales farther in the 
interior lay not in freight rates, but in the shortage of 
manpower willing to settle there. In any case, after the 
1930's the center of gravity of Senegal's population did 
shift eastward along the TK, and with it the distribution 
of agricultural production.
Auxiliary railroads The policy of moving people to 
accommodate railroads was one that increased spatial dis­
parities to some extent. On the other hand, construction 
of auxiliary branches to serve productive or promising 
areas of Senegal too remote from the DSL and TN railroads 
seemed, for a time an alternative solution. The notion of 
laying down low-cost, narrow gauge (60 cm) lines for freight 
hauling between various points in Baol (Bambey-Gaoune, 
Diourbel-Gassane, or Guinguineo-Gassane), from Kaolack to 
Rip, into the Upper Casamance, or from Louga into Djolof
120indeed enjoyed a certain popularity in the postwar period.
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At that time, a narrow-gauge rail enterprise would face
growing competition from motor truck traffic; but several
firms, notably a consortium formed in 1927 by major
Senegalese commercial houses, the DSL, and the Banque de
l'Afrique Occidentale, seemed enthusiastic about these 
121
projects. One imaginative scheme would have combated
truck competition with a hybrid of road and rail--using
a rail-guided, gasoline-powered truck as a locomotive, with
its weight on wheels rolling on the ground on either side 
122
of the track. However, the colonial government itself,
in fact, not any private firm, finally undertook these
auxiliary railroad projects.
The most promising of these lines was the Louga-
Linguere railroad, which promised to tap the productivity
of Djolof, reputedly a major breadbasket in ancient times
and still an exporter of peanuts and millet despite its
remoteness from the coast. The project had indeed already
been actively promoted from 1908 by a merchant of Rufisque,
Ferdinand Maury, who even won the colonial government's
backing for his scheme before the war disrupted his 
123
plans.
After the war, the project was taken up directly by 
the government of Senegal, which constructed the entire 134 
km railroad as a one-meter gauge single-track line branching 
on the DSL at Louga by 1931.^^ Construction of the line,
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begun in December 1926, was directed by French military
officers using locally recruited labor. The government,
however, yielded the line's operation to the DSL company
in a 25 year lease granted in December 1928--a logical
arrangement since the Louga-Lingu^re's export traffic was
125
obliged to pass via the DSL railroad.
Unfortunately, the line proved a dismal failure. 
Construction costs were much higher than anticipated, and, 
despite preliminary surveys, its new escales suffered from 
severe water shortages. The new line, which had the mis­
fortune of opening just when the Great Depression was 
beginning to strangle the peanut trade in Senegal, was also 
penalized by the decay of St. Louis' port, obliging traffic 
from Louga to exit at high cost at the more distant ports 
of Dakar and Rufisque. From 1929 through 1932, the Louga- 
Lingu^re took in 1,458,000 francs in receipts while chalk-
1 *7 f\
ing up 4,364,000 francs in expenses.
The Louga-Lingu^re had been built partly because the
influential "bourba" Djolof, Bouna N'Diaye, among others,
127
had been campaigning on its behalf for years. The
project for a Casamance railroad arose out of similar
efforts on the part of local political figures in the 
128Casamance. The Casamance project unfortunately did not
get far. The ineptness of civilian and military personnel 
assigned to the initial surveys and the governments indeci-
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siveness in choosing the railroad’s terminal points ham­
strung the project at the planning stage. By 1929 a study 
commission recommended against a railroad because of doubts 
that sufficient rail traffic could be generated in the 
underpopulated Upper Casamance. By then local merchants 
were more interested in improving the navigability of the
Casamance river than in any railroad, and the colony of
129Senegal ceased its studies.
The one-meter single track railroad built from 
Diourbel to Touba stands out from the other two projects 
as a notable commercial success. Designed with the inten­
tion of continuing beyond Touba to Taltal, and eventually 
to the Louga-Linguere, the Diourbel-Touba (or Sine) rail­
road had first been suggested only in 1924. Senegalese 
merchants apparently would have preferred rail lines in 
other directions, such as toward Gassane or the Gaoune 
forest, and Diourbel's merchants especially feared that the
Diourbel-Touba would capture much of the produce then being
130
brought directly into Diourbel.
It is clear, despite the paucity of pertinent docu­
ments, that French authorities decided to go ahead with the 
rail spur to Touba for political reasons connected with the 
death in 1927 of the spiritual leader of the Mouride brother­
hood, Ahmadou Bamba. With the remains of Ahmadou Bamba 
slated to be transferred for buriel at Touba, this village
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was likely to become a major center of devotion and pilgrim­
age for the Mouride faithful. In any case, construction 
of this 46 km line, branching directly from the TN at 
Diourbel, began in November 1929 and was terminated in
1933 with the aid of an ample labor offered by Mouride 
131
volunteers. Despite the depression, this new line was
immediately a striking commercial success--its new escales 
of N'Doulo and M'Backe became two of the busiest shipping 
centers in Senegal--and its success offers a useful object 
lesson when taken together with the failure of the other 
lines.
First of all, regardless of the economic issues in­
volved, all three of the auxiliary rail projects seem to 
have been initiated for predominantly political reasons. 
This is in line with Myrdal's observation that local 
political action is often directed to equalize spatial 
disparities, and it also indicates a noteworthy capacity
of local political figures to influence colonial policy
132
at that time to some degree. Expectations that the
railroad in itself would actually increase total peanut 
exports, however, do not seem realistic, and the optimistic 
project studies seem calculated more to suit the political 
needs of the moment than to tap genuine economic opportuni­
ties. At the least, it could be said that governmental 
planners certainly entertained an exaggerated notion of
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the commercial development that a railroad could generate. 
The new Diourbel-Touba railroad was certainly a success.
But much of its new tonnage, especially from N'Doulo, had 
previously been shipped out via the nearby rail station 
of Diourbel or by a fleet of truck haulers who had devel-
1 3 r
oped a heavy traffic in the area. This is not to deny
that production expanded in the area subsequent to the 
rail spur's construction; but much of this can also be 
attributed to its favorable situation along a major axis 
of future Mouride colonization aimed at the religious 
center of Touba, rather than because of the railroad per se. 
At best, the railroad to Touba had managed to tap produc­
tion in an area already ripe for expansion, rather than 
creating those conditions itself.
The disappointing failure of a railroad to stimulate 
any significant production in Djolof reaffirms the point.
The factors supportive of production in that area, though 
similar to those present on the Diourbel-Touba line, were 
unfortunately just too weak. The cost disadvantages of the 
region, located so far from good port outlets, and the 
shortcomings of the Louga-Linguere line were all the more 
painful at a time when a depression was choking down market 
prices for peanuts. If anything, the railroad drew labor 
away from the Djolof, by enabling local cultivators to 
escape seasonally to other areas where cash crops could
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command better prices. Later in the 1930's market prices
rebounded to levels that might have sparked productive
growth earlier along the Louga-Linguere. But it was too
lage. By then, the government, which had taken over the
line from the DSL, was ready--perhaps all too ready--to
write off the Louga-Linguere as an unfortunate investment
134
of little potential, and to leave Djolof a backwater.
Conclusions Railroads were one of the proudest marks of 
imperialist enterprise. They fortified the imperialists' 
perception of themselves as teachers and builders engaged 
in an enterprise that would benefit the colonized as well 
as the metropole and would justify thereby the European 
presence in West Africa. The French envisioned the rail­
roads as tools to free the Sudanese interior from a prison
of economic isolation, enabling indeed a new major world
135
center to flower there.
The Thies-Kayes formed only a portion, though an 
essential portion, of a grand transversal railroad that was 
to bring this about. The Thi&s-Kayes had been designed 
to fulfill several roles, and it had certainly performed 
well in bringing an added measure of spatial equalization 
and prosperity to wide areas of Senegal. However, the 
railroad's impact had been more feeble than expected, even 
in Senegal itself. It had stimulated production in areas 
where human and material resources were already concentrated
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in sufficient number--areas already being exploited by 
the export trade. But the railroad had a disappointingly 
meager impact in other places.
The reason for this failure--brought out clearly in 
the case of the Louga-Linguere--lay in the interplay of 
world market prices, local productivity, the cost of 
living, rail freight structures, and the need to cover 
rail expenses with receipts. At root, much of the problem 
lay in the relative sparseness of population that made a 
long railroad of penetration barely viable with insuffi­
cient traffic. Since the colonial government would not 
subsidize rail operations, the rail line could only stay 
solvent if a sufficient, productive population could be 
induced to move to the vicinity of the line--even if it 
did leave some other areas, such as Djolof with its poor 
rail line, in the "backwash" of progress. Just as 
fundamental a problem was the shortage of export (or domes­
tic) freight of high value per unit weight of volume--a 
problem that had crippled the long-distance trade in pre­
colonial Africa earlier. The low value of goods transported,
such as peanuts, now also hobbled the financial viability
136
of the railroads and their reach into the interior.
Another part of the problem lay in the east-west 
orientation of the grand transversal project as the major 
axis of penetration to the Sudan. The longer distance of 
the east-west trace selected and its crosswise orientation
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to major lines of domestic trade simply magnified the 
financial problems of the railroad, while only generating 
3s a feeble export and domestic traffic. As the post-World
War II prosperity of the Ivory Coast indicates, an emphasis 
on developing trade on north to south rail lines might not 
only have encouraged the growth of a wider regional domes­
tic trade (probably, with fewer consequent sectoral
dislocations), but also might have stimulated a greater
137
volume of long-distance export traffic.
French officials paid much lip service to the primacy 
of economics as a justification for the colonial effort.
But despite the possible financial difficulties of an 
east-west route, of which they were well aware, these 
officials clearly subordinated economic development to 
political and strategic considerations. For them, commerce 
was only one dimension of a general political struggle 
with foreign powers. These officials had hoped that the 
inconvenience of economic geography could be redressed by 
a simple manipulation of freight rate structures. But 
the railroad had proven a fragile economic tool in the West 
African setting. In the prosperous period 1927 to 1929, 
the TN with a longer line was carrying about the same volumes 
of total freight, peanuts, and passengers as the much smaller 
DSL (see Table 20). While the Thies-Niger barely covered 
expenses, the DSL was prospering. Soon the economic health
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of both railroads, and indeed their existence, would be 
tested by the calamity of the Great Depression.
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1. GG (Van Vollenhoven) to GS, September 10, 1917, SARS, 
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pp. 432-433; Georges Hardy, Histoire sociale de Ta 
colonisation francaise (Parish 1953), p. 147; As 
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History, I, 1960, pp. 111-128; Rheinhart report of 
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4G15; the Monguillot report of November 25, 1913, Ibid., 
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consulted on personnel matters.
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6. See C. W. Newbury, "Government General" cited above.
The key enactments in the formation of the Government 
General were the decrees of October 15, 1902 and the 
decrees of October 18,1904.
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each of the items on the proposed loan from the Ministry 
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mentary assent in a bill approving the loan.
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in ARS, 0228 and 065, with map in 0228; the map in 
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excellent article by Jacques Mangolte, "Le chemin de fer 
de Konakry au Niger, 1890-1914,M Revue Frangaise d'His- 
toire d'Outre-mer, LV, 1968, n° 168, pp. 38-105.
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Africa. (Oxford, 1964), pp. 82-141, especially pp. 82- 
84. Long-distance hauls on the Thies-Niger, however, 
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Works (Comite des Travaux Publics de Colonies), session 
of February 2, 1903, with its negative reaction to a 
railroad project. See also Charles Duffart, "Le chemin 
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32. The original contract of June 26, 1900 with Borely and 
Company of Marseilles had accorded that company an 
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Also see the report for the 1912 session of the Council 
of Government, ARS, P13, and GS to GG, June 4, 1912,
ARS, 087.
53. The Governor General's plans were strongly criticized 
in the Committee of Colonial Public Works, See report 
by Pontzen to the Committee of Colonial Public Works, 
February 14, 1912, Ibid. Note by Boutteville, July 12,
1912, Ibid.; Report #24^59, Chamber of Deputies, session 
of December 23, 1912, copy in Ibid.; GG to MC, January 2,
1913, Ibid. See also Lemaire and Picaron to_MC,April 11, 
1913, Ibid. A variation of the Tambacounda-Talary
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trace was again being considered seriously. See the 
Pontzen report of February 14, 1912, and "A propos du 
Thi&s-Kayes,"' Dep’&c'he Coloniale, December 1, 1911, p. 1.
54. MC to Minister of Finance, August 26, 1914, FOM, TP; 
Political reports, Senegal, 1st and 4th trimester 
1916, ARS, 2G16-5, noted that the gap was already being 
crossed by automobile for mail service at the end of 
1916. Also see Director TK to IGTP, November 12, 1914, 
ARS, 088; same, November 15, 1914, Ibid.
55. See Henri Cosnier, L*Quest Africain (Paris, 1921)
pp. VIII, XIX-XXIIl" Cosnier, who was a strong critic 
of past French economic policy in the region in other 
respects, strongly endorsed a renewal of railroad 
construction.
56. Report of acting Lt.-Governor Upper Senegal-Niger, 
December 1, 1917, ARS, 6P166-36. The acting IGTP, 
Thomasset, suggested in a report of February 10, 1919 
to GG, ARS, 6P166-36, that the railroad nets in the 
colony have two major axes of penetration: Dakar-Bamako 
and Abidjan-Bouak6-Bobo-Mopti. Aubry had suggested a 
Bamako-Bani railroad rather than the line to Bougouni 
in his report of June 15, 1914, FOM, TP.
57. See Cosnier, pp. 129-130, 219-224, Cosnier was not the 
first to do so. Binger had already suggested earlier 
in his account of 1892 of his explorations that the 
Ivory Coast be made the entry point for lines of pene­
tration and development in West Africa. See G. Binger, 
Du Niger au G o l f e d e Guinee par le pays de Kong et le 
Mossi, Volume II (Faris, 1892), p. 345; maps showing 
routes and population concentrations are on pp. 398,
401.
58. See Albert-Sarraut, La mise en valeur des colonies 
francaises (Paris, 1923), pp, 361ff,; Suret-Canale, 
L ’dre coloniale, pp. 350-354. Also the report by 
Georges Bartheiemy, for the Committee of Algeria, the 
Colonies, and Protectorates on the "mise en valeur" of 
colonies, 1921, copy in ARS, 1P35-32. Implementation 
of the entire program was predicated on a massive flow 
of German materiel to French Colonies as a part of war 
reparations.
59. Report of May 10, 1922 by Mouneyres, FOM, TP.
60. The funds of 1913 were reallocated in the laws of
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Au gust 8, 1920 and July 29, 1923. See the report by 
Raymond Godfernaux to the Committee of Colonial Public 
Works, January 10, 192 2, FOM, TP; Report n° 5059 by 
Georges Boussenot for the Chamber of Deputies, session 
of November 14, 1922. GG Carde indicated that even 
the Sarraut program was outdated in his note of April 8, 
1926, ARS, 4G-87-105.
61. See report of GG on the program of port Work and_trans­
portation routes for French West Africa, /^1919_/, ARS, 
6P166-36. Note the continuing interest in a Transsahar- 
an. A Comite du Rail Africain, of prominent French 
citizens, proposed in 1918 that French West Africa be 
served by North African ports through a rail connection. 
The Governor-General of French West Africa was very 
hostile to the notion. See GG to MC, March 15, 1919, 
ARS, 6P166.
62. The rails of the completed line were first joined on 
August 15, 1923. See ’’Inauguration Thids’Niger," in 
the special issue of Annales Coloniales, December 26, 
1923. The fusion was put into effect as of January 1, 
1924 by the arrete of November 17, 1923, but the 
budgets of the two lines were not merged until 1927 
(by a law of December 30, 1927).
63. The failure of the Niger development scheme is outlined 
in Jean Suret-Canale?L 'dre coloniale, pp. 354-360.
64. See report Director TK, April 8, 1910, SARS, DCF, on 
the purchase of locomotives; report Director TK on 
railroad operations, September 18, 1913, ARS, 087.
65. On TK operations problems see: Director TK to GS, 
December 22, 1910, SARS, DCF; Director TK to GS,
March 4, 1913, SARS, DCF. See criticisms of the deputy 
Barthe during debates of the proposed loan of 150 
million in December 1912, excerpt in ARS, 087.
66. Launay "Note relative au fonctionnement des chemins 
de fer du S£n£gal," April 10, 1920, FOM, TP; Economic 
report, February, 1922, ARS, 2G22-26. One problem had 
been the rapid degeneration of locomotive fireboxes 
designed for coal-burning when they had to use wood.
See Director TK to GS, April 1, 1916, ARS, 0233; same, 
April 23, 1917, Ibid.
67. Report of Chief Surveillance Engineer, DSL, March 1, 
1923, ARS, 6P104-36.
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68. See monthly economic reports-February, March and May, 
1922, ARS, 2G22-26; President CC-Rufisque to Director 
TK, March 29, 1922, SARS, DCF; President CC Rufisque 
to GG, February 14, 1922, SARS, DCF; GG to GS, Octo­
ber 25, 1923, SARS, DCF.
69. See GG to MC, June 10, 1924, confidential, ARS, 1P6-10. 
GG to MC. September 8, 1924, Ibid. Ballabey's person­
nel dossier is #A-496 in SARS^ ^Tee also Thies au 
Niger, pp. 37,42.
70. See the publication by Government General of French 
West Africa, Sur les difficult£s rencontr£es au 
r'&seau Thi&s-Niger depuis sa crSation et sur- les 
m^sures prises en vue d fassurer une exploitation normale 
et rationnelle de ce reseau (n.d.-circa 1927); Thids au 
Niger, pp. 62-67; Launay report on functionning of TKN 
for GG, June 3, 1924, ARS, 1P119-32; Report of Director 
of TKN, September 24, 1924, SARS, DCF. See P.V., CC- 
Kaolack, February 27, 1924, pp. 38-40, ARS-L.
71. See monthly Economic Report, April 1925, ARS, 2G25-2.
See also monthly Economic Report, May 1922, ARS,
2G22-26; P.V., CC-Kaolack, June 26, 1924, SARS, DCF.
72. See Difficulties Thies-Niger, pp. 7-10; Thids au Niger, 
pp. 67-69. Ficatier had warned of the insufficiency 
of rolling stock and personnel in his report to GG,
May 3, 1922, SARS, DCF; but his recommendations were 
largely rejected for budgetary reasons by IGTP Mouneyres 
in his answering note of June 19, 1922, Ibid. See also 
adjoint Director TN to GG, April 19, 1925, ARS, 1P6-10, 
Merly report on TKN personnel, June 15, 1925, ARS, 
4G86-105.
73. See Inspector Merly to MC, July 3, 1926, FOM, TP; 
Demongin report, May 20, 1926, Ibid.; "Bulletin Mensuel 
sur la Situation Economique et Politique de l ’AOF,"
May 1926, copy in SARS, DCF; Acting GG Dirat's response 
of July 2, 1926 to the Merly report of June 12, 1926, 
ARS, 4G87-105; P.V., CC-Kaolack, April 26 and May 31, 
1930, FOM, TP.
74. Report of Director TK on four tariff projects, October 4, 
1913, ARS, 096.
75. See Report A ”Launay_7 > May 1924, ARS, 6P172-36, the 
price to 50 km was 0.45 Fr/t-km; from 51 to 80 kms,
0.32 Fr/t-km; 81 to 150 km, 0.18 Fr/t-km; for 151 to
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350 km, 0.08 Fr/t*km; for 351 to 800 km, 0.05 Fr/t*km.
76. The need for more appropriations to repair the KN had 
already been recognized earlier; see GG to MC, March 8, 
1923, FOM, TP on a proposed new loan of 55 million.
77. See the table in a report by the acting Director TN to 
IGTP, September 26, 1931, SARS, DCF.
78. Le Gregram report, Mission Sol, June 16, 1930, p. 6,
See also Thids au Niger, p. 84.
79. Commercial Bulletin, Sine-Saloum, July 1909, SARS, DCF; 
monthly reports on Niani-Ouli, 1915, ARS, 2G15-36; 
commercial bulletin, Tambaccunda, January 1920, SARS, 
DCF. See also Adam, pp. 19, 139-140; Riembau, Dakar
au Niger, pp. 42-56.
80. This seasonal migration from the Saloum was mentioned 
in Rougier's report of 1903, ARS, 063, chapter 3, p.
11; Government General, AOF, DSL-TK, pp. 162, 175.
81. See Paul Pelissier, Les paysans du Senegal (Saint 
Yrieix, 1966), pp. 302-310; Administrator cercle Sine- 
Saloum to GS, May 20, 1910, SARS, DCF. See political 
report, 2nd trimester 1914, ARS, 2G14-6.
82. Statistics from the annual reports of the DSL board of 
directors to stockholders, 1910 and 1911.
83. See for instance, the political report for January, 1906, 
ARS, 2G6-4, political report 1st § 4th trimester 1908, 
ARS, 2G8-10; report for Sine-Saloum, January 1911, ARS, 
2G11-45.
84. Friry noted in his project report of June 9, 1906, p. 7, 
that the port of Fatick also drew peanuts from Diourbel 
40 kms away and even from N'Gahayes. The total freight 
exported from Baol may have been in the order of 15,000 
to 20,000 tons of peanuts before the railroad's con­
struction.
85. For the protests of the merchants of Tivaouane and Thi§s, 
see petition to GS, May 9, 1907, ARS, 085; extract of 
P.V., Municipal Council of Thi§s, May 21, 1907, Ibid.;
GS to GG, May 23, 1907, Ibid.; GG to GS, June 2 , 1 W 7 ,  
Ibid.; copy GG to MC, October 6, 1907, Ibid.; acting GS 
to President, CC-Rufisque, March 28, 1908, SARS, DCF, 
claimed there was little to fear, since in a rich country, 
the new outlet would create new products. See also the
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report for 1909 in folder 1, ARS, 2G9-6; the commercial 
bulletins for Tivaouane in ARS, 2G11-44, and January- 
through March 1909 in SARS, DCF,
86. See Roger Pasquier, "Villes du Senegal au XIXe siecle," 
Revue Franchise d *Histoire d*Outre-Mer, X L V H  (1960), 
pp. 3"87- 426.
87. A report by Inspector Pherivong on the sand bar of St. 
Louis, December 15, 1910, FOM, TP, noted that ships of 
1200 tons at most could pass the bar. Nevertheless when 
the sand bar was in a favorable position the commercial 
activity in the port of Saint-Louis could still exceed 
that of Dakar, as in 1909. See the annual economic 
report 1909, ARS, 2G9-4, folder 4. The situation for 
St. Louis had deteriorated markedly by 1912 (annual 
economic report, ARS, 2G12-8, folder 5). Difficulties 
of river navigation also played a role. Senegalese 
commerce found it difficult to evacuate by river a
mere 2500 tons of freight from the Sudan in 1925 
(Difficultes ThiSs-Niger, pp. 4-6).
88. See Camille Camara, Saint-Louis du S£n€gal (Dakar, 1968), 
pp. 103-106, 123-127, and Commandant Geo MadaJ7, La 
barre du Senegal , Une fleuve sans issue (Bordeaux,
/71918_7), rare copy in ARS-L; See also MC to GG, May 3, 
1906, FOM, TP; report by Director Public Works, Mouneyres, 
(Blache-Mouneyres project), July 18, 1910, Ibid.
89. GG to MC, June 12, 1911, FOM, TP; Copy note for Minister, 
March 4, 1913, Ibid; GG to GS, April 10, 1911, ARS,
P246. Meniaud, Director of the Bureau of Economic 
Affairs in the Ministry, noted in his report, Septem­
ber 1, 1910, ARS, P244, that if the bar were cut, St. 
Louis would retain almost all of the long-distance 
import freight and some of the export freight which the 
TK would otherwise get. Many articles were written on 
all sides of this subject in metropolitan newspapers 
(e.g., Pierre Mille. "Le Fleuve Senegal," Dgpgche 
Coloniale, January 7, 1904, p. 2; J, Hubler, "La Barre 
du S^ntgal," Ibid., February 9, 1910, p. 2-4; same, 
Ibid., August 13, 1912, pp. 1; same* Ibid., August 21, 
1912, p. 1; F, Jourdier, "La Barre du Senegal," Ibid. 
February 26, 1913, p. 1). Ponty attempted to avoid 
undertaking the project by claiming that it ought to be 
done instead by a private company, which would exploit 
the improved harbor; but the Governor General never 
displayed any interest in pursuing this solution. See
GG to MC, July 13, 1912, FOM, TP; Note by Inspector
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General Devos, August 10, 1912, lb id.
90. As in Conseil General, extraordinary session, Decem­
ber 21, 1910, pp. 84, 85,
91. In 1902, CSee P.V., CC-St. Louis, March 28, 1902, ARS, 
Q28) the chamber of commerce rejected even the notion 
of ameliorating the bar. In 1909, the chamber was more 
favorable, but certainly not enthusiastic (See excerpt 
P.V., CC-St. Louis, November 22, 1909, copy in FOM, TP). 
See excerpt of letter form Administration of CFAO to 
its branch office at St. Louis, June 1, 1910, FOM, TP; 
same, January 9, 1911, Ibid. The DSL had created a 
special low rate on goods between Dakar and St. Louis
as an alternative to remedying St. Louis portuary 
problems.
92. Boutteville note for MC, March 4, 1913, FOM, TP; 
Boutteville to M. Cochery, March 17, 1913, Ibid. J. 
Renaud's report recommending new, more detailed studies 
of the project was published as "Amelioration de 
l'embouchure du Senegal," in La G^ographie, 19, (1914), 
pp. 397-400. Renaud's recommendation was affirmed by 
the Committee of Colonial Public Works on July 7, 1913. 
See copy MC to GG, July 25, 1913, ARS, P248; copy 
P.V., Committee Public Works, July 7,1913, Ibid. See 
also the report by Louise, March 4, 1914, ibid. The 
vissicitudes of the problem to 1917 can be followed in 
ARS dossiers P2-44 through P249.
93. Excerpt P.V., CC-St. Louis, May 5, 1919, ARS, P42;
Blaise Diagne to MC, July 8, 1920, FOM, TP. Blaise 
Diagne, to MC, March 30, 1921, FOM, TP. See also 
Conseil Colonial, August 1921 (extrordinary) pp. 46-
50. The funds were first diverted to other works by 
the law of August 8, 1920 and confirmed in the law of 
July 29, 1923. By 1923, the entrance to St. Louis was 
so silted up that exports from the river had to pass 
by rail to Dakar, (1923 report by Chief of Customs 
Service, Senegal, SARS, DCF, p. 38), The memorandum 
on the bar of St. Louis prepared by Boutteville for 
fMC) Sarraut for his trip to West Africa, n.d.
£  September, 1921J  FOM, TP, stated: "Dakar maintenant 
est le veritable port du Sdn£gal et il n'y a pas 
avantage a 6parpiller les travaux et les d£penses comme 
on l'a fait trop souvent en France..."
94. Camara, Saint-Louis, pp. 111-123. Camara also writes 
optimistically of plans to ameliorate the entrance to
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the port in the future (ojo. c it. pp. 122-126). For 
St. Louis as the port for Djolof, see the report by 
Pherivong to MC, January 6, 1911, FOM, TP; Aubrespin 
report of June 20, 1911, ARS, 053.
95. The Political report, 4th trimester 1912, ARS, 2G12-9 
noted that the port of Kaolack was taking an important 
part of the products of East Baol, heretofore exiting 
via Rufisque. The work by A. Dessertine. Un port 
secondaire de la cote occidentale d 1Afr ique, Kao1ack 
(Kaolack, 1967) is essential for a study of this port. 
See also Joseph Fouquet, La traite des arachides dans 
le pays de Kaolack... (St” Louis, 1958), especially 
pp. 52-60, 108-116.
96. Some chamber of commerce statistics show that Khombole 
and Bambey generally shipped all of their peanuts via 
the DSL. Obviously, from column 9 of Table 16 an 
estimated 6,292 tons of Diourbel's peanuts went to 
the DSL in 1913, and 5,136 tons in 1914. The remain­
der, roughly 10,000 tons in 1913 and 15,000 tons in 
1914 went to Kaolack.
97. See Economic Affairs report-Senegal, January 1924, ARS, 
2G24-2. Note that the play of the railroad's rate 
schedule would send to Kaolack all peanuts shipped from 
Guinguineo to the Faleme, but the exports of the Sudan 
would go all the way to Dakar.
98. See "L'AOF en 1925," a special issue in 1926 of the 
Bulletin Mensuel de l'Agence Economique de l'AOF, 
pp. 41-43, for the figures.
99. See the following P.V., CC-Kaolack: May 31, 1922 for 
the 1921-22 trade season, January 8, 1924 for 1922-23 
trade season Bulletin, CC-Kaolack n6 12 (Dakar, 1926), 
pages 42, 46 has statistics for the 1924, 1925 trade 
season; Bulletin, CC-Kaolack, n° 13 (Dakar 1927), page 
43 for 1926-27 trade season; all of above found in SARS, 
DCF. See the note by Ficatier to GG, May 3, 1922, SARS, 
DCF; Note by IGTP of June 19, 1922, Ibid. IGTP 
Mouneyres doubted that Kaolack would ever be as impor­
tant as Ficatier thought. The marginal notes on 
Ficatier's report also indicated skepticism that Kaolack 
would ever be a major port. See also Chief Customs 
Service, Senegal, report of 1923, SARS, DCF, p. 36.
100. E.g., Director General, Union Colonial Franjaise to GG, 
June 27, 1914, ARS, 076. Copy President CC-Dakar to 
GS, November 27, 1923, SARS, DCF. The government was
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reluctant to improve the approaches to Kaolack, hop­
ing instead that degressive freight rates would bring 
at least some of the peanuts along the line to Dakar. 
See the speech by President CC-Kaolack on the visit of 
the acting GG June 1922, copy in ARS, 17G190-104.
Also P.V. , CC-Kaolack, February 27, 1924, pp. 35-57.
101. See Director of TK, Thibaud, June 16, 1910, SARS, DCF; 
contrast it with Ballabey to Surveillance Engineer, 
September 16, 1910, ARS, 042. Director General of 
Union Coloniale Frangaise to GG, June 27, 1914, ARS, 
075; GG (Ponty) to Director General of Union Coloniale 
Franfaise, September 7, 1914, Ibid.; Report of Director 
of TK, October 4, 1913, Ibid. See Director, TK, 
Thibaud, June 16, 1910, SARS, DCF.
102. DSL to MC, December 13, 1921, FOM, TP; DSL to MC,
April 14, 1922, Ibid. Report by Director TKN, Ballabey, 
December 18, 1923, ARS, 1P50-32. See also the esti­
mate by Chief of Public Works Service to GS, Janu­
ary 15, 1924, SARS, DCF; Lach&ze (DSL) to GS,
January 17, 1924, ARS, 1P50-32.
103. See GS to GG, June 28, 1928, StL; GS to GG, Septem­
ber 19, 1928, SARS, Confid.; report by Aussel 
(Demongin mission), April 16, 1936, FOM, TP.
104. The table for 1914 was in SARS, 22G50; the table for 
1930 was in SARS, DCF. See J. Lombard, Ggographie 
humaine, pp. 21, 25-26, 31, 135-156.
105. The spacing was for technical as well as commercial 
reasons since a series of stations at spaced intervals 
was necessary both for water and for regulation of 
traffic on a single-track line.
106. The census figures for the cercle of Thi§s, ARS, 1G296 
in 1904 lists a total of 1,995 people at the village 
of N ’Diourbel in East Baol, but this is not confirmed 
by the Rougier-Belle studies. The account by Belle 
originally dated May 30, 1904 and printed in Govern­
ment General, AOF, DSL-TK, p. 114 specified only a 
halt at Diourbel, the seat of a French resident that 
"se reduit a quelques cases occupees par le personnel 
indigene de la residence. Le veritable village 
indigene est un peu au snd de Diourbel, a Diarren."
The station was slated in this report for Sambe at
KM 86. On p. 170, the population of the four villages 
of Samb£ was estimated at 3,165 people.
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107. The figures are for 1904 from ARS, 1G290 for the 
Sine-Saloum (indicating many villages of 500 to 700 
people) and from ARS, 1G293 for Niani-Ouli. In 
Niani, the village of Maka-Colybentan had 1205 people 
at the time. Diourbel, Gossas, Koussanar and 
Tambacounda notably were adjacent to marigots. The 
Rougier-Belle trace took into account existing 
concentrations of populations on its way to Kayes, 
but the route finally adopted was determined more by 
topography and economic geography. See Rougier re­
port, June 3, 1903, ARS, 062; Belle report, May 30, 
1904, ARS, 063. The final trace skipped large 
villages situated further north, (some of them sites 
of abundant water at the junction of two different 
vegetative zones).
108. For Belle's description of Tambacounda, see DSL-TK, 
p. 152. Tambacounda became the chief center of the 
cercle in 1920. See J-F. Dupon, "Tambacounda, 
capitale du Senegal Orientale," Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 
April-June 1964, pp. 175-214, especially pp. 179- 
180, 207-213.
109. For a breakdown in passenger traffic by class, see 
the Legregram report, June 16, 1930, FOM, TP,
pp. 33-34 Third and Fourth class passengers accounted 
for over 95% of the total number of passengers on 
the TN from 1925 to 1929. Despite the length of the 
line, the average distance travelled by a passenger 
in that period was between 86 to 99 kms. Neither 
first nor second class traffic was remunerative, but 
the two lower classes were.
110. Gunnar Myrdal, pp. 27-33.
111. From 1906 to 1914, a special well-drilling brigade 
operated in Senegal drilling by mid-1913 on the TK 
alone some 103 new wells (totaling 2952 meters of 
drilling depth). See Ballabey list, June 7, 1913, ARS,
087. Friry report, January 16, 1907, ARS, P37; situ­
ation report, Director Public Works, April 20, 1907, 
ARS, P38; Administrator Sine-Saloum to GS, December 23, 
1910, SARS, DCF; same, December 22, 1910, Ibid.,
with two maps pinpointing locations of wells for 1910; 
report on Public Works situation, November 1913, SARS, 
DCF; Public Service Report 1913, ARS, 2G13-35.
112. See GG to GS, July 1, 1915, ARS, 2G15-6; report 2nd 
trimester, Ibid.; May report, Kedougou, ARS, 2G11-38; 
Kedougou reports, ARS, 2G12-57; Kedougou reports, ARS,
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2G13-50; February-March report for Kedougou, ARS, 
2G15-34.
113. S. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa 
(London, 1938), pp. 375-376.
114. It is hard to drawn any firm conclusions from statis­
tics taken on a cercle-wide basis partly because of 
boundary shifts between cercles. Unfortunately 
changes during the crucial period after 1925 are 
obscured by several changes; viz., the merging of 
Djolof into Louga; the dismemberment in 1928 of 
Tivaouane between neighboring cercles, and the cession 
of the two cantons of Fand^ne and Diack (totaling 
28,400 inhabitants in 1904) from Baol to ThiSs in 
late 1927. See the report of the Chief of the Politi­
cal Bureau, to GS, February 1928, FOM, AP3085; same,
May 16, 1925, Ibid.; GS to GG, October 5, 1929, ARS, 
13G17-17.
115. GG to GS, September 10, 1917, SARS, DCF. Van Vollen- 
hoven commented: "It is certain that the prosperity 
of the Sine-Saloum and in a more general way the 
cercles traversed by the TK could only gain from 
notable augmentation of their farming population. But 
the means foreseen by M. Brocard, which consists of 
organizing a sort of official migration, of compact 
masses of natives of the Nigerian region to the Sine- 
Saloum, seems unrealizable in practice..."
116. Charlotte Quinn, Mandingo Kingom, p. 27 noted Sarakole 
coming to the Gambia as navetanes before the conquest. 
The colonial administration acted to promote and or­
ganize the seasonal movement of navetanes in groups 
from 1932. Some notions of this can be gleaned from 
Economic report-1932, ARS, 2G32-40; Customs report,
ARS, 2G32-6. Economic report 1933, ARS, 2G33-4; 
Economic report, 1935, ARS, 2G35-36; Economic report- 
1936, ARS, 2G36-3; Political report 1937, ARS, 2G37-17. 
The history of the navetanes is being studied by M. 
Phillippe David, a former French administrator, who 
wrote Gens de l'hivernage. Sur la route du Sgnggal 
avec les navetanes de 1954 / Paris, 1955_/, M§moire 
Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer.
117. See especially Pelissier, Paysans du Senegal, pp. 302- 
310. See also annual political report-1929, ARS, 
2G29-15. The government of Senegal had discouraged 
settlement of Mourides along the Louga-Lingu^re rail­
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road as late as 1928. See GS to Administrator Louga, 
February 4, 1928, SARS, Confid. The political report 
of 1934, ARS, 2G34-5 notes the movement not only of 
Mourides along the TK line, but also movements of 
population from Louga and Djolof toward these regions.
118. Pelissier, Paysans du Senegal, pp. 302-310. Type 
report of Lucien Nekkach, Le Mouridisme depuis 1912 
(Saint Louis, 1952), ARS-L.
119. Pelissier, Paysans du Senegal, pp. 308-310. Pelissier 
added on page 307 that a spontaneous colonization of 
Tidjani Wolofs was also taking place along the rail­
road, but interestingly enough mainly in the sector 
between Gossas and Kaffrine, the same area favored
by the navetanes.
120. E.g., see P.V., CC-St. Louis, September 15, 1923,
SARS, DCF, pp. 8-9; the letter M. Carrie and Abrigeon 
to GS, July^l7, 1923, SARS, DCF, expressed an interest 
by the Societe des Etudes des Voies Economiques 
d'Afrique Occidentale in building Louga-Coki and Bambey- 
Gaouane lines. An economic conference under the aegis 
of Governor-General Carde, March 25, 1926, SARS, DCF, 
notedthe usefulness of building lines into Djolof and 
the Casamance.
121. Syndicat d'Etudes de Chemin de Fer de la C&te 
Occidentale d'Afrique (henceforth SECCOA) to GS,
October 13, 1927, StL^ GG to GS, November 19, 1927,
ARS, 6P46-36. Societe Auxilliare Africain to GG,
March 29, 1927, Ibid. described the formation of SECCOA. 
See also copy SECCOA to GS, June 9, 1927, Ibid., GS to 
GG, January 7, 1928, Ibid,; GG to GS, January 21, 1928, 
Ibid.; Note on 60 cm railroads, February 22, 1928. Ibid. 
The Monguillot report, February 10, 1938, FOM, TP, p.
22, remarked that SECCOA had only been an "emanation" 
of the DSL.
122. The "road-rail" system was proposed by Director of the 
Societ£ d'Etudes des Voies Ferrees Economiques de 
l'Afrique Occidentale to MC, December 6, 1924, ARS, 
6P42-36; see the brochures of the company for the 
Louga-Yang Yang, Bambey-Gaouane, Diourbel-ThieX, 
Bignona-Velingara and Sedhiou-Kaorane lines. See also 
MC to GG, April 10, 1925, ARS, 6P42-36; copy of GG to 
GS, June 18,1925, Ibid.
123. The ARS dossiers 052 through 056 are concerned with
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the Maury concession for a Louga-Linguere rail­
road. See especially GS to GG, June 6, 1908, ARS,
052; project of convention, February 7, 1914, Ibid.; 
reconnaissance by Aubrespin, May 24 to June 4, 1911,
ARS, 053; Parmentier study, June 11 to August 5,
1911, Ibid.
124. The overall technical study was drawn up by the
Chief of Senegal’s Public Works Service, July 4,
1927, copy in FOM, TP. Construction of the Louga- 
Lingu&re Line by the colony was decided at the urg­
ing of the colony’s Colonial Council by 1925. See 
copy acting GS to GG, August 8, 1925, FOM, TP.
125. See GG to MC, October 14, 1927, FOM, TP; DSL to MC,
December 2, 1925, Ibid.; GG to MC, January 26, 1927, 
Ibid.
126. Report by Coste to MC, June 4, 1938, FOM, TP.
127. See note by Friry to IGTP, October 6, 1908, ARS,
065; Bouna N ’Diaye to GG, December 26, 1920, ARS,
17G239-108; Bouna N'Diaye to GG, November 3, 1937,
ARS, 13G48-17 credited Van Vollenhoven for getting 
favorable consideration of the Louga-Lingu^re rail­
road.
128. See the Thibaud report of July 22, 1914 on the 
Casamance railroad project, FOM, TP; Report by Ponty, 
January 19, 1915, ARS, 088; The Casamance project 
was raised again by Abdoul Diallo in the 1922 session 
of the colony’s Colonial Council (GS to GG, March 3, 
1923, ARS, 088; Olivier to IGTP, March 14, 1923, Ibid.). 
See Inspector Muller report on the Casamance railroad, 
January 1, 1928, FOM, TP; Muller to MC, May 17, 1928, 
Ibid. The Chamber of Commerce of Ziguinchor threatened 
to resign in 1926 because of delays in implementing
the project. See also P.V., CC-Ziguinchor, session 
January 25, 1923, excerpt in SARS, DCF.
129. See the report by Monguillot, February 10, 1938, FOM, 
TP; High Administrator of the Casamance to GS,
February 28, 1923, SARS, DCF; Report acting chief
of Public Works, August 31, 1926, St. Louis; Beurnier 
to High Administrator of the Casamance, August 14,
1928, SARS, DCF.
130. P.V., Syndicate of Defense of Senegalese Interests, 
January 18, 1929, SARS, DCF; President, CC-Dakar to 
President Defense Syndicate, March 28, 1929, Ibid.;
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GS to Administrator Baol to GS, April 16, 1928,
SARS, DCF.
131. See annual political report-1929, ARS, 2G29-15.
Formal approval for a complete Diourbel-Taltal
line was obtained in 1931 (arrete by GG, February 18, 
1931); The section Diourbel-M'Back£ was opened for 
partial exploitation as of April 1, 1931 (arrSte of 
March 28, 1931).
132. Myrdal, pp. 44-45.
133. In ARS, 6P438-36, tables of monthly shipments of 
peanuts from stations on the TN and Sine railroads, 
show that Diourbel only shipped out about 14,000 
tons in 1933 (compared to over 40,000 tons in 
1931), while the Sine escales of N'Doulo and M ’Backe 
together shipped out a total of about 13,000 tons.
For truck traffic, see project by Surleau, June 28, 
1930, FOM, TP.
134. Inspector Monguillot report, December 20, 1937, FOM, 
TP; GG comment on report, April 9, 1938, Ibid. The 
note by Launay, October 18, 1935, FOM, TP, remarked 
that no serious effort had ever been made to develop 
land along the line.
135. See the report, annex n° 445, 2nd seance, session of 
November 22, 1906, Documents Parlementaires, Chambre, 
p. 148.
136. See the comments by Hopkins, Economic History of West 
Africa, pp. 72-77, on pre-colonial transportation 
problems.
137. A north-south African-based trade continued to 
flourish notwithstanding the east-west orientation of 
the export trade. When railroad traffic was cut with 
the breakup of Mali and Senegal in 1960, Mali devel­
oped a heavy truck traffic with Abidjan. See e.g. 
Claude Meillassoux, Urbanization of an African Commun­
ity. Voluntary Associations in Bamako (Seattle and 
London, 1968) p p . 20-22. See also the remarks in 
Hopkins, Economic History of West Africa, pp. 243- 
253; R . Peterec, Dakar and West African Economic 
Development (New York, 1967), p p . 14-24.
138. The DSL was only 264 kms long, while the TK section 
of the 1220 km Thi^s-Niger was 669 kms long (395 kms 
Thies to Tambacounda alone).
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CHAPTER V
RAILROAD LABOR
Le premier devoir de 1'administration coloniale est de 
rfpandre chez les indigenes la notion de la hbcessite 
du travail...
-special commission report, 1928^ 
The mobilization or channeling of labor for imperial 
ends lies at the heart of the imperialist enterprise. This 
may have been less apparent in other colonized areas, where 
looted mineral treasures have distracted the observer's 
attention. It was evident in tropical Africa, where the 
local labor supply was vital for all phases of economic and 
political activity, whether for growing export crops, build­
ing railroads, or carrying out even the simplest directives 
of the few imperial proconsuls on the scene.
European dependence on African labor in Senegal was 
aggravated by the general scarcity of labor in the region. 
Doubtlessly recalling the earlier slaving days, some mis­
guided officials in Paris were urging into the 1890's that
Senegal send manpower to other labor-short French colonies,
2
such as Guiana in the Americas. French officials and 
merchants in Senegal, better aware of their own colony's 
chronic labor shortages, were in turn trying unsuccessfully 
at the same time to promote the emigration of both Europeans
-295-
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and non-Europeans into Senegal. The problem was felt even 
more acutely after the conquest, as the scarcity of popula­
tion throughout most of French West Africa became apparent 
and after colonial authorities launched extensive public 
works programs requiring large contingents of skilled and 
unskilled labor. By the 1920's, the colonial administration 
was openly resorting to the massive recruitment of involun­
tary manpower for both public and private needs.
The efforts of French colonial circles in the 1920's 
to enlist formal government support in intensifying the 
exploitation of colonial labor throughout French West Africa 
and the countervailing attempts of the International Labor 
Office at Geneva to abolish forced labor in European colo­
nies clearly deserve more detailed treatment than is 
possible in this study. In brief, certain French companies, 
firmly dismissing the notion of some government officials 
that the colonies be formed into nations of free peasants, 
were urging instead in the 1920's that colonial authorities 
be specifically enjoined to recruit labor for French firms 
in the colonies.4 As a result, in 1925, French West Africa 
received its first comprehensive labor decree, which was 
designed, even while establishing some wage, health, and 
work condition safeguards for African workers, to introduce 
into the colony "offices du travail" for labor recruiting 
and "conseils d'arbitrage" to prosecute infractions of the
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labor contracts that African workers would be obliged to 
sign.^ From 1927 on,the ”2&m'e portion du contingent," an 
inactive army reserve consisting of the surplus of young 
Africans liable for military duty, was converted into a 
pool of unskilled labor for both public works and private 
industry.^ Many other men would hire on directly with priv­
ate firms or emigrate as "navetanes" simply to be exempt 
from this onerous service.
Senegal stood apart to some extent, however, from this 
repressive trend in colonial labor policy, with only a few 
companies in its remoter areas taking advantage of the
O
decree of October 1925. This is not to deny the occasional
abuse of African workers both in its remote and its urban 
9
areas. Some involuntary labor was recruited within Senegal
or brought into Senegal from other French colonies, first
by direct recruitment and later by the 2kme portion.^
Sometimes, as in the case of some Mossi brought in for
railroad construction in the 19201s,recruited laborers could
, 11be horribly mistreated.
Nevertheless, the abuses were infrequent and generally
not widespread. Porterage was apparently rare in Senegal,
12
even in the Casamance. The new offices du travail and
conseils d*arbitrage were generally disregarded in Senegal,
where Africans had long been hired on a free and informal 
1 ^
basis. Indeed, one of the chief attractions of the
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Senegalese labor market was its relative freedom, which 
drew many laborers and navetanes from other French colo­
nies, just as others were also being drawn into neighboring
14
British colonies. Despite occasional labor shortages,
European firms in Senegal, for their part, continued to
prefer the informal hiring practices customary in Senegal,
if only to avoid the expense involved in the worker care
15provisions of the 1925 act.
Like other French colonies in Africa, Senegal imposed 
on its African rural subjects an annual labor service 
obligation ("prestations") for extending and maintaining 
bridges, roads, and other rural colonial facilities (such 
as telegraph lines). Yet even in this case, Senegal's 
comparatively light prestation obligation was redeemable 
in cash from 1928, and there are indications that prestations 
were generally applied with less rigor than in other parts 
of West Africa."^
Railroad labor Heavily dependent as they were on the 
quantity and quality of available workers and agents for a 
variety of functions for both the original construction of 
the rail lines and their later operation, colonial railroads 
can provide some particularly useful insights into labor 
problems in Senegal. For instance, it will be recalled that 
a scarcity of local labor had forced the Batignolles to 
import experienced Italian laborers at great expense in
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order to build the DSL originally. The colonial administra­
tion had resorted to a similar expedient for the Upper 
Senegal railroad in 1881. But the Chinese and Moroccan 
workers imported for this purpose were decimated by yellow 
fever. It is significant that construction of the Kayes- 
Niger was only undertaken seriously from 1898, when a large
African work force had been collected forceably and brought
17
into the Sudan. The experiment in importing non-African 
manual labor was never repeated. Henceforth, labor for 
construction of railroads and other public works was 
recruited locally or brought in from other parts of West 
Africa.
Labor questions were equally important for ongoing
railroad operations. Wages and related employee costs,
after all, formed the major share of operating expenses on
1 R
both the DSL and TN railroads. Besides the central 
management offices in Paris and Dakar, the DSL's employees 
were distributed amont three main operating divisions--a 
Movement division called ("Exploitation") providing personnel 
to run the stations, terminals and trains, a Rolling Stock 
division ("Materiel et Traction") to run the locomotives and 
to repair and maintain rolling stock, and a Track division 
("Voie et Batiments") to repair and maintain the track, 
roadbed, and company buildings.
There were four categories of employees at the DSL:
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permanent European agents hired under contract with a 
monthly salary, European skilled workers under contract on 
an hourly basis, permanent African employees, and temporary 
workers ("auxilliaires"), the latter category including a 
few Europeans hired temporarily, but also including African 
skilled hourly workers and low-level, regular African emplo­
yees, as well as a great mass of casual day laborers tempo-
19
rarily hired on a day-to-day basis. The salary scale of 
a permanent or semi-permanent employee and his advancement 
in the company would be determined by his position within an 
array of occupational grades and classes presumably corres­
ponding to his seniority and skills, which also roughly 
determined the specific job position that he occupied within 
the company's table of organization.
The TK and successor TN and DN railroads had similar
operating divisions, although the TK did combine the Movement
and Rolling Stock divisions for the first few years of its 
2 0existence. The gradings and echelons of regular employees, 
although differing greatly in detail, were similar to those 
of the DSL; but European employees were organized into a 
permanent administrative cadre ("cadre commun"; later a 
"cadre superieur" and "cadre commun supgrieur") or hired 
temporarily under contract. Some African personnel were 
hired on a permanent basis into an administrative cadre 
("cadre local"; later divided into primary and secondary
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levels); and a great mass of African regular and temporary
21
workers were hired on a daily basis. Unlike the DSL, the 
TK and TN always retained a Service de Travaux Neufs, 
largely run by military personnel and fielding a large work 
force. In 1926, for instance, this service employed 1,692
laborers, of whom 896 had been forceably recruited and 612
2 2others obliged to "volunteer.”
The number of agents and workers employed by the DSL
and TN over a number of years are shown in Tables 21 and 22.
One point emerging from the tables is the large number of
African day laborers, of whom the majority were employed for
the hard manual labor necessary for maintenance work and
freight loading. Another is the persistent employment of
significant numbers of European agents, especially on the
DSL--a particularly important point since Europeans were
23
paid so much more handsomely than African employees.
European employees From the inception of the railroad, it 
was necessary to bring in skilled and experienced railwaymen 
from Europe capable of organizing and controlling traffic, 
possessing the requisite technical specialties for maintain­
ing, replacing, and repairing rail equipment, or simply 
literate enough to follow some of the manifold accounting 
procedures involved in shipping freight, selling and 
checking passenger tickets, and storing and distributing 
parts and equipment.
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Eatignolles management had paid lip service to the
principle of European immigration when the ministry in
Paris was proposing the permanent settlement of Italian
24
laborers in Senegal. Yet in hiring European agents for
the DSL, they were estimating privately instead that a
European’s health would not be able to resist Senegal's
climate for a period longer than six years and limited the
duration of the contracts of DSL agents to this maximum
2 5
period of six years. Indeed, during the first few years
of operation, the attrition rate among DSL European employees
was extremely high. In 1887, an estimated 8%% of the DSL's
European agents died, and another estimated 16% had to be
discharged for poor health, while many others were incapa-
2 6cited by ill-health for short period of time. Of the
197 "permanent" European employees hired by the DSL from
1883 to 1885 for work in Senegal, 120 of them (61%) had left
the company within two years (90 within one year). Twenty
one of them died within their six-year period (9 within their
first year of service), and 52 more are listed in company
27
records as having left for health reasons.
With time the DSL came to realize that Europeans could
be employed on a long-term basis in Senegal if certain pre-
28cautions were observed. Sixteen of the original 197 
survived to serve for periods longer than six years, nine of 
them serving for more than 15 years (5 for more than 20
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years) . The DSL took care to repatriate its European
agents with their families to France for a three month
vacation at two-thirds pay for every two years of service 
29
in Senegal. The company's staff became more stable as 
working and housing conditions improved.
The TK railroad and its successor TN, coming into 
existence as they did at a much later date when conditions 
in Senegal were more amenable for accommodating European 
agents, did not suffer from the same initial upheavals in 
staff. It must be remembered that the bulk of European 
personnel hired for the TK and TN railroads became, thereby, 
functionnaries working for a government agency on a long­
term basis. Many of the posts on these railroads were filled 
by military personnel attached for this purpose to the rail­
road, and many railroad civilian employees were retired 
colonial officers and sergeants, deliberately hired by the 
railroad because of a proven acclimatization to West 
Africa.30
The lot of a DSL European railwayman was not particul­
arly pleasant during the period preceding World War I. Re­
curring epidemics of yellow fever continued, at least to 
1927, with European agents and their families having to be 
withdrawn from the colony en masse during the severe epidemic
71
of 1900-1901. Company operations were centered at Dakar, 
which was always regrettably short of good housing. At
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first, DSL agents often had to resort to makeshift arrange­
ments (as sleeping in railroad cars) or to dormitory
facilities that the DSL rented to its agents in a converted
3 2freight station. Along the railroad line, the hastily-
erected wooden stations housing the stationmasters quickly
33
feel into disrepair. The discovery after 1900 of the 
mosquito's major role in transmitting yellow fever obliged 
the DSL to pay more attention to the sanitary and housing 
needs of its personnel and their families at the same time 
that a large influx of Europeans was exacerbating the 
housing situation in Dakar. The DSL in that period under­
took to build:new housing for its European personnel and to 
purchase some well-located houses in Dakar.^
The Thi§s-Kayes railroad was concerned with housing for 
its European employees from the start. But it was the efforts 
of the unified TKN to attract large numbers of new rail 
employees after fusion in 1924 that led this railroad 
administration to appropriate over 4 million francs for
European housing in 1925, over 3.5 million in 1927, and over
35
6 million from 1928 to 1930.
A number of litigations brought by DSL railwaymen
against the company in the 19th century are the only remain-
3 6
ing echoes of the grievances of European DSL agents. It 
is in a report of 1911 investigating DSL operations, though, 
that the company's exploitation of its European employees is
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37more clearly exposed. According to this report, many an 
unemployed worker in France had been lured to the colony 
by the misleadingly high pay offered by the DSL. Once in 
the colony, the newly-hired worker would discover that his 
high colonial wages • were relatively meager in view of 
Dakar's extremely high cost of living. Effectively, the 
agent was forced to work long hours of overtime for the 
company, at a peril to his health, in order simply to make 
ends meet. Since an agent's work contract entitled him to 
prepaid passage back to France only under certain conditions, 
he was virtually trapped in his job, unless he was able to 
find employment in commerce (the colonial administration
?  O
apparently had agreed tacitly not to hire DSL men).
Frustrated railwaymen took out their grievances against the 
company, the report lamented, by serving the public badly 
and rudely.
The plight of European railroad employees as depicted 
in the report of 1911, while probably accurate, is too 
narrowly drawn to give a complete picture of the complex 
situation of these railwaymen. There were, after all, agents 
who prospered with the DSL and TN in long-term careers. On 
the other hand, there were also a number of European rail­
waymen ready to take advantage of their positions either by 
setting African rail subordinates to work for the European 
agent's own personal benefit or by brazenly cheating African
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passengers too ignorant of French procedures and of their
39
own rights--or too frightened to insist upon them. It 
should be remembered also that European agents occupied the 
better paying, less strenuous posts on the railroad from 
which they were expected to oversee and direct the African 
workers, who carried out, after all, the heavy labor.
African manual labor The colonists’ admonition, "any Euro­
pean who digs in the earth, digs out his own grave," was 
indeed heeded on the railroads in Senegal. Both the DSL and 
TK had to rely on Africans hired on a casual day-to-day 
basis to fulfill the backbreaking tasks of loading and u n ­
loading (freight cars, coal, etc.), maintenance and recon­
struction of the track and roadbed, lifting heavy machine 
parts in the repair shops, and so on. In the DSL's Track 
service, even the Europeans who had originally formed the 
majority of the foremen of the track work gangs--an arduous
task in the sun's heat--had to be replaced gradually after
40
1889 by experienced African foremen. By the time the TK 
was built, virtually all its maintenance work gangs were 
directed by African foremen.
There were a number of other enterprises in Senegal 
competing with the DSL and TN for unskilled day laborers. 
Merchants needed manpower for hauling and stacking peanuts 
and other goods at their trading stations in the interior 
and at ports, and to load and unload ships. The colonial
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administration and private contractors needed workers for
public works projects and municipal works (streets, sewers,
etc.) in the communes. It should be noted that the total
number of African wage laborers of all types accounted for
only a small fraction of the able-bodied men in West Africa
--only an estimated 60,000 men for all of French West Africa
in 1928. Furthermore, many of them were concentrated at
Dakar--the worker population of Dakar in 1924 was estimated 
41
at 15,000. Tables I and II indicate that the DSL and TN
accounted for a significant percentage of the total work
force, and a tabulation of some 5,491 Africans regularly
employed for 34 different firms in Dakar in 1930 listed over
550 regular African employees for the DSL--a contingent second
in numbers only to the 1,07 0 men employed at the time by the
42
Entreprises des Travaux du Port de Dakar.
Despite the relatively small number of workers needed, 
there were severe manpower shortages in Senegal from the 
end of World War I. This was due, to a degree, to demands 
made on local manpower by military conscription for the 
colonial army from 1912, as well as by government recruit­
ment for local and general public works. The shortage of 
casual labor for loading ships at Dakar became so severe by 
the waning days of the war, that it was only resolved by
the administration’s importation of forced labor recruited
43
in other parts of Senegal and the Sudan. But plainly, the
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steep rise in wages received by African., laborers during the
post-war period, which was partly a reflection of rises in
living costs and the devaluation of French currency, was
made possible largely by a significant increase in business
activity in the area. As might be expected, merchants were
complaining bitterly about the supposedly unfair, high wages
that African workers were asking, and they were demanding
through the local chambers of commerce that the administra- 
44
tion intervene. The TK was also experiencing difficul- 
ties--the shortage of African laborers to load peanuts onto 
trains in 1925 was a major cause of bottlenecks in TKN 
operations--and this railroad was also appealing for govern­
ment intervention.^
The TK had already resorted to forced labor for con­
struction 6f unfinished sections of its line as early as 
46
1913. In the early 1920's,the construction of the TK line
was finally completed by using large contingents of force-
ably recruited African laborers, most of them Mossi brought
in from Upper Volta. From 1927 on, about 1550 men on the
average of the 2&me portion du contingent of the French
Sudan was regularly assigned to the TN, despite the complaints
of the Lt. Governor of the Sudan against their use in Senegal
when the Sudan was suffering from its own labor shortages.^
The evidence indicates that the DSL, on the other hands,
48
rarely resorted to requisitioned labor. At least on
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occasion, the DSL was able to use its Track maintenance
49
crews for loading trains during the busy trade season.
And, of course, the DSL also benefited indirectly as the 
conscripted laborers imported for other employers, such as 
the TN, eased shortages generally in the labor market.
Labor in Senegal, it has been noted, was generally 
hired on a voluntary basis. In the case of hiring in rural 
areas though, a careful distinction must be made, for often 
the French would recruit laborers in these areas simply by 
applying directly to local chiefs. It was the chiefs who 
were made responsible by the colonial government for raising 
prestation labor annually. Indeed, labor recruiting for 
prestations was one source of the chiefs' authority under 
French rule.^® Hiring laborers in groups was, of course, a 
natural expedient in a society where communal solidarity was 
strong; but it may be asked whether recruitment was truly 
voluntary in all cases. Mouride talibes volunteering to work 
on the Diourbel-Touba rail spur were almost certainly really 
volunteers. But it is doubtful that this was true for 
Africans recruited for clearance work in the original con­
struction of the DSL in the 1880's or for the labor recruited
locally for construction of the Louga-Linguere line by
51chiefs strongly favorable to the project.
Those unskilled laborers willingly offering their labor 
for wages in urban areas can be generally classified into
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two categories. Those living adjacent to work sites--
generally farmers willing to supplement their income during
the agricultural slack season after November--and those
emigrating deliberately to earn wages for a short period
with the intention (like the navetanes) of returning home,
usually at the end of the trade season, with trade goods and
head tax payments. As one former DSL laborer (in Track
maintenance) of the 1920's explained, a young man would
emigrate for a season to join a work crew where some of his
relatives might already be working. He would intend to work
for a season only, living as frugally as possible, but would
acquire a taste for the work and the money it brought. He
would be drawn to return year after year, and finally be
induced to settle down permanently in the vicinity of his
52work on the railroad.
Not that the regular unskilled laborer divorced himself
entirely from the land. Many laborers who came to live in
the vicinity of the urban areas and along the rail line,
even those who were employed full time by the railroad and
even some who were skilled workers, continued to farm at
least on a part-time basis and, in the case of the Lebu, to 
53fish. This was not unwelcome to European employers, be­
cause their workers could thereby get along with lower wages 
and would have something on which to fall back during slump 
periods when wages were not available. This meant, naturally
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that labor would be scarce from planting to harvest. But
this was not objectionable in an economic system based
largely on exporting peanuts, for which the busy exporting
54
season coincided with the agricultural slack season.
Indeed, even officials in the colonial government considered 
in the late 1920's that recruited laborers would be happier 
during their turn of service if they were allowed to culti­
vate their own food in their spare time.5^
It would be worthwhile to know more about the organi­
zation of work gangs on the railroad. A report of 1907 
indicates that, in general, piece rate payments were not 
welcomed by African day laborers in Senegal.^ The usual 
method adopted was to pay daily wages while supervising 
the output of the work crews closely, discharging the crews 
that did not produce at the expected rate. Given the 
unstable employement of individual temporary laborers, this 
meant that European management would probably depend greatly 
on the ability and reputation of the African foreman organ­
izing the crew. Indeed, although the railroads kept pay 
records listing individual workers by name, there are 
indications that payments to crews may have been made, at 
least at times,in monthly lump sums to be divided among the 
workers on the crew.^
It would be of considerable interest to learn the 
origins of the African laborers working for the DSL and TN.
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Records unfortunately are lacking in this respect; but a few
chance references indicate that most of the African laborers
hired by the DSL, at least in its formative years, came not
from nearby Cayor, Serer country, or Baol, but were rather
Tukolor, Sarakole, and Bambara of the middle and upper
reaches of the Senegal river--groups which had already been
serving as the bulk of the floating labor population for
5 8
the commerce of St. Louis. With time, of course, many 
Wolof also came to work for the railroad, probably coming 
to form the majority, at least on the DSL. But the facili­
ty with which many African immigrants Wolofized their names 
(and in time their speech and culture) makes it difficult 
to be precise on the evolution of the work force with time. 
Tukolors, it is generally agreed, were particularly numerous
in the Track service and were highly valued as laborers for
59construction work on the TN line. Bambara were also 
prominent as laborers in all branches of railroad service 
and were especially numerous on the TN line. The Sarakole, 
as we shall see, were especially drawn to work on locomo­
tives .
The movement of African workers and their hiring by 
European employers in Senegal was not regulated by official 
government statute until the 1890's. From 1891, the colonial 
administration became increasingly alarmed as agents of the 
Belgian Congo began to recruit Senegalese for work in that
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colony (some as laborers, some for specialized skills 
some--claimed the French--as soldiers). Conducted openly 
at first, later clandestinely through various subterfuges, 
this recruiting, which drew significant numbers of Senega­
lese to the Congo (the French consular office at Bathurst 
estimated in 1897 that as many as 1300 Senegalese had passed 
through there to the Congo in the previous year), provoked 
the first labor legislation in Senegal. A series of acts 
forbade foreigners to recruit Africans without government 
assent and ultimately restricted African emigration.^
Given the limited labor supply, it might have been 
expected that European employers would be concerned about 
their laborers’ well-being or at least attempt to husband 
this manpower by substituting mechanical power for human.
But expensive imported mechanical devices tended to wear 
out quickly in a tropical climate where there were few 
skilled workmen to maintain them properly; and many employer^ 
colonial officials lamented, were all too willing to squeeze 
profits out of underpaid, overworked African laborers with 
the blind assurance that the colonial administration would 
provide replacements by dipping into a seemingly inexhaus­
tible pool of cheap manpower--whereas in reality manpower 
resources were strained to the breaking point.^ That there 
were fewer abuses in Senegal (though they were not inexis- 
tent) is strongly indicated by the large, voluntary season­
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al flow of immigrant laborers and navetanes into Senegal. 
Abuses were also much less likely to occur in the operating 
divisions of the railroads, which as the only really indus­
trial enterprises in Senegal aside from the naval arsenal 
at Dakar, were obliged to hire not only unskilled laborers, 
but large numbers of skilled African workers as well.
African skilled labor Africans had long been drawn to
European colonial trading posts and ports not only for the
attractive trade goods available there, but also for the
6 2
specialized skills which Europeans might teach. This
was certainly why many Africans of the interior came to
enlist in the French colonial armed forces before and during
the era of conquest, since many of these soldiers returned
to their homelands on discharge with newly acquired martial
skills--which in some cases were turned against their former
6 3
European mentors. Likewise, other Africans would come
to European ports, as St. Louis, to learn European skilled
crafts in order to pursue this trade within the colony or
• . 64
back in the interior. The most famous example of the 
latter was certainly Samba N ’Diaye--a Bakiri of the Upper 
Senegal, despite his Wolofized name--who became the chief 
cannoneer and military architect for El Hadj Umar when the 
latter conquered an empire in the interior.^
There were, of course, the traditional specialized
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artisans of the Senegambian-Sudanese region, highly skilled 
in their inherited specialties in metal-work, leather, or 
weaving. Some of these, like the Wolof gold jewellers, 
justly enjoyed fine reputations for their excellent workman­
ship. Their husbanded skills reach back to an era long 
antedating contact with Europeans.^ But these artisans were 
formed into special, hereditary castes, like the traditional 
musicians and praise-singers, whose members might become 
wealthy and even be feared, but with whom "honorable" 
families avoided marriage. The "European" skills, even 
those involving metal and woodwork, were regarded in an
entirely different light than the traditional artisan 
6 7skills. Education in a European "metier" was sought by 
people from different strata of society, not just the 
members of the traditional castes; nor did the exercize of 
the skill "dishonor" the artisan. The reader would natur­
ally expect that metiers on the railroad would serve as 
opportunities for ambitious slaves or their descendants for 
advancement in society. He might be surprised to learn that 
they also served as particularly well-paying opportunities 
for the sons of notable families, especially those literate 
enough for clerical positions in commerce or the colonial
administration, after the French conquest had eroded the
6 8traditional means of support of the notable classes.
An obvious solution to the heavy financial burdens on
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the railroads--of high salaried European agents brought in
at great expense, periodically repatriated for health
reasons, escounced in special housing, and not operating at
par in a foreign climate--was to train and educate Africans
69to take over their positions at more modest salaries. In
the case of the DSL, a certain delay might be expected from
the inception while sufficient numbers of Africans were
being trained in the requisite skills--no mean feat when
most Africans had first to learn French before mastering
the unfamiliar railroad techniques. Indeed with time, a
significant number of Africans became permanent employees at
the DSL either at lower-echelon positions in the company’s
bureaucracy, as skilled workers in the workshops, or as
locomotive engineers. Yet the top and higher middle-echelon
posts in all branches of the DSL were always reserved for
Europeans. In all the years of DSL operations, only three
AFricans were ever allowed to attainthe grade of station-
master and only one held it for any length of time (serving
in the small way station of Rao). Africans became train
engineers (though the title of engineer was at first
withheld) only because European engineers could not endure
the heat in a coal-burning locomotive under a tropical 
70
sun. One might have expected government officials to have 
been pressing the DSL to reduce its heavy expenditures in 
the first few years of operations by substituting African
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employees for European. But L. Petyt, the main government 
financial inspector in the company's formative years--who 
went so fer as to urge the DSL to close the company hospital 
in order to economize--was also insisting at the same time 
that Africans be barred from responsible posts on the DSL, 
and particularly complained against letting Africans run 
the locomotives.^
National, cultural, and racial prejudices were clearly 
involved in the persistent preference on the DSL for the 
employment of European agents where AFricans would have 
functionned just as well. But this is not a complete expla­
nation. One piece of evidence indicates a fundamental, 
rather obvious motive, to which there is rarely an explicit, 
written reference. Referring to the high cost of the 
company's European employees in Senegal, a DSL publication 
of 1888 explained their need. The European, it stated:
ne repr€sentant que 18% de l'effectif total ... 
D'ailleurs, a d€passer la limite actuelle on 
s'exposerait d se mettre d la merci des indigenes, 
d£s qu'ils se sentiraient maltres de la s i t u a t i o n .72
This frank admission of insecurity--indeed of an under­
lying elemental fear--was perfectly understandable shortly 
after Mamadou Lamine's Sarakole jihad and only shortly be­
fore Tukolor rail workers were to aid Ahmadou's raiders to
73
cut the fledgling Upper Senegal rail line. This parti­
cular concern was indeed affirmed just a bit further in the 
publication as it cautionncd:
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II est n^cessaire dgalement de mSler dans les 
Squipes des diverses races noires, Saracolets,
Bambaras, Toucouleurs, S€r§res, Gabonais, Yolofs, 
afin de ne pas se mettre a la discretion de fanatiques 
ou d'indisciplines.74
There is no question that European uneasiness must have 
diminished as French colonial rule was consolidated. Cer­
tainly the severe yellow fever epidemic of 1900-01 during 
which operation of the DSL was virtually in the hands of
its African employees, must: have clearly demonstrated that
7 5they could be relied upon. Yet, diminished as it must 
have been with time, the underlying element of fear and in­
security was never wholly absent. Rather, it appears to 
have been comingled with the self-serving interests of Euro­
pean agents who were pursuing long-term careers with the DSL 
later on. These agents now had a stake in preserving the 
discriminatory status quo which had come to be institutiona­
lized on the DSL. After World War I, colonial officials 
remarked on a notable improvement in the technical profici­
ency of African workers on the railroads. Nevertheless, 
they also noted at the same time the emergence of a new and 
disquieting independent attitude on the part of many of 
these workers, especially those who had seen military service 
in France. 76
There was significantly different attitude on the TK 
and the TN toward allowing Africans into more responsible 
positions than on the DSL, although the top and middle-
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echelon posts were also reserved on those railroads for 
77
Europeans. It may be argued that this was due in part
to the fact that the TK was built during an era of imperial
tranquility, with diminished fears for security. Certainly
it was also due in part to the continued pressure on the TN
railroad administration to cut operating costs, particularly 
7 8after 1924-25. Perhaps though, it stemmed in good part 
from the character of top officials in the railroad admini­
stration, most retired or detached active army officers and 
sergeants who were accustomed to commanding large bodies of 
AFrican troops and who were therefore able to form good 
opinions of the abilities of African subordinates before 
coming to the railroad. Certainly European military men with 
experience in the colony would have a greater self assurance 
about their own personal role in West Africa and feel less 
uneasy in commanding Africans than the civilian European
agents of the DSL, who after all were protecting acquired,
79but fundamentally vulnerable positions.
This is not to say that African employees were neces­
sarily better off working on the TK or TN. The use by these 
railroads of requisitioned labor has already been mentioned. 
Those who worked on these rail lines also recall the distin­
ctly military tone in work discipline,which gave these 
railroads a harsh reputation. Work discipline on the DSL 
could also be strict; but some ex-DSL men at least still
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8 0harbor a nostalgia for the company.
It should be emphasized, however, that the TK and TN, 
unlike the DSL, did set out to hire large numbers of 
educated Africans. As government agencies, these railroads 
were prepared to accept the graduates of primary and tech­
nical schools that were run by the Government General or 
by the colony of Senegal. A very few well-educated Africans
were even admitted into the Cadre Commun Superieur on the
81
TN, especially after 1925. Retired railwaymen recall 
though that the railroad administration did not actively 
undertake to attract large numbers of young, French-educated
Africans until later, in 1937, under Giran's directorship
8 2of the Dakar-Niger railroad.
In considering what particular categories of African
skilled craftsmen might have been drawn to working for the
railroads, one immediately thinks of the inhabitants of St.
Louis and Goree as forming a pool of skilled workers as
well as clerical help for the railroad. But St. Louisians
of long residence were generally reputed averse to taking
up a workman's trade. This went back at least to 1855, when
according to Carrdre and Holle, St. Louisians, previously so
eager to learn metiers before 1848, were now leaving them to
8 3
recent Tukolor, Bambara, and Sarakole immigrants.
St. Louisians of good family preferred to engage in 
commerce, to be clerks for merchants, or to serve in the
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colonial administration. A number of St. Louisians had been 
educated in France; some, such as Justin and Georges 
d'Erneville, had even received a technical education and
O A
served for a time in the colony's Public Works service.
There were indeed a good number of St. Louisians and Gor&ens,
both African and creole, in all branches of the colonial
government's bureaucracy, including the technical service of
8 5
posts and telegraphs. But few St. Louisians entered DSL 
ranks, even in clerical capacities, because DSL management 
based in Dakar apparently regarded St. Louisian creoles with
O fL
disdain almost from the start. Many St. Louisians prefert
red, in any case, to engage in commerce or land speculation
(such as the above-mentioned Justin and Georges d'Erneville).
When commerce became less attractive after the turn of the
century, it is apparent that they chose the more hospitable
8 7ranks of the colonial bureaucracy over the DSL railroad.
As such they became part of a larger general movement of
young, educated West Africans who were coming to grips with
colonial domination in the 20th centruy by taking positions
within the French colonial administration and demanding
8 8
equal treatment with their European counterparts. It was 
by this means that some entered the new Thies-Niger railroad, 
another branch after all of the colonial bureaucracy. Even 
in this case, educated St. Louisians apparently would serve 
on the railroad only if unable to gain a post in other, more
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attractive branches o£ colonial service, such as tax
8 9collection and "conditionnement."
The ethnic composition of the skilled labor force in
either the DSL workshops in Dakar or the TK workshops in
Thils is difficult to determine precisely. It seems that,
despite their small number, Goreens were prominent as
skilled workmen in the shops; and even as locomotive engi- 
90
neers. The Lebus of Dakar, as might be expected, became
prominent in the main DSL workshops in that town,but
91apparently only around the turn of the century.
The corps of locomotive engineers deserves a special
mention. Its members were of diverse origins, of course,
but it contained a significantly large proportion of Sarakole
from the very first. The Sarakole had long been renowned for
emigrating temporarily as young men to seek fortune outside
92their homeland on the Upper Senegal. Many of them tempo­
rarily became petty merchants--"dioula"--on the long-dis­
tance trade routes of the interior. Others went to the
coasts of the Senegambia to farm as navetanes or serve as 
93mercenaries. A good number of them were attracted to urban 
areas of Senegal to work for merchants or the French admini­
stration, particularly as sailors on ships in the Senegal
94
river or on the ocean. It was easy for them to make the 
transition from steam-driven boats to steam locomotives, 
and the Sarakole quickly became renowned for relishing the
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prestigious role of driving the iron behemoths.
Clerical skills naturally would be learned in the 
schools set up by the French in the colony. A metier 
whether it was a skilled craft or a specialized job, like 
that of a train engineer (who also had to make minor re­
pairs) , might be learned at one of the few trade schools in
95
Senegal open to apprentices. it was more likely, however,
that a young man would learn a trade skill during a term of
apprenticeship with an older, skilled workman (at whose
home he might live). Even if both teacher and pupil were
both illiterate in French, they were often capable of
attaining high technical precision with only rudimentary 
96
tools. Often a skilled craftsman could train his own son
or nephew on the job at the railroad, until the young man
was ready to apply directly to a railroad manager for a
job as a skilled apprentice (by passing a simple craft test
for admission). In fact before training in regular trade
schools became common, the railroad administration preferred
97
to hire the sons of regular employees.
Employment stability Skilled craftsmen, like the general 
mass of laborers, were often unwilling to be employed at 
the railroad, or with any other one employer, for any ex­
tended length of time. Instead, many of them preferred to 
move as temporarily employed day laborers from one job to 
the next, better-paying job, depending on the work avail-
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able. This tendency is related to the phenomena called
98the "backward-sloping labor supply curve." Simply put, 
it means that the African worker, especially the seasonal 
migrant, often labored with a target sum in mind. Once 
the sum was amassed, he would quit his job. Increased 
wages, according to the theory, only hastened his depart­
ure, lessening productivity instead of raising it. Some 
scholars, such as Pfefferman, argue rightly that European 
employers exaggerated the importance of the phenomena and
the transiency of their African employees simply to justify
99
paying low wages. Even the colonial administration, which 
was capable of deploring the greedy exploitation by private 
firms of African laborers, was itself not exempt from re­
cruiting unskilled workers at low wages on a short-term 
basis, rather than paying the additional costs for long­
term workers with greater productivity.^-®®
There was, nevertheless, a real reluctance on the 
part of many Africans to work for Europeans on a long-term 
basis. Target wages many have been one factor in the case 
of some skilled African workers, especially if these workers 
could fall back on some lucrative alternative (as farming). 
But this factor was far more important for the seasonally 
migratory unskilled laborers. In the case of skilled work­
men, an instinctive, culture-bound aversion to long-term 
labor obligations, which implied a servile relationship in
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the Senegambia, may have been far more important--especially
since the French were also resorting to formal contracts
101
elsewhere as a means of enforcing work. Mobility in
employment was also a matter of practical self-interest,
for a skilled worker often was able to find a higher paying
job or better working conditions somewhere else at a given
moment. Many would move from the DSL to the TK, to Public
Works, or the naval arsenal, and back again--but for higher
102wages, not for the sake of change alone. An extreme 
example of this job mobility was the Belgian Congo's re­
cruitment of Senegalese workers in 1896, when the DSL lost 
at least 17 locomotive engineers of various grades and 6 
skilled workers who left for higher paying jobs in the 
Congo
Interestingly enough, when asked what as railwaymen 
had set them apart from other Senegalese, to a man the retired 
Senegalese railwaymen could suggest'nothing except the 
assurance of a steady salary and comforting retirement pay 
that they had received from the railroad. Their common un­
pretentious answer perhaps goes to the heart of the matter. 
The railroads, as other European firms, did offer steady 
salaries, even in the early days. But they were pitifully 
slow to arrange for any long-term employee or retirement
benefits, which might have stabilized their work force 
104
earlier.
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Railroad employee benefits France notoriously lagged be­
hind other industrialized European nations in passing 
legislation-to guarantee social benefits and work protection 
to its workers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
A law on work accidents was passed only in 18 98, working 
hours for women and children was limited to 10 hours daily 
in 1900, and a six-day week made obligatory only in 1906.^^ 
It is not surprising therefore to find European employers 
in Senegal resisting attempts to extend any metropolitan 
social legislation into the colony.
Out of necessity, the DSL ran a hospital and medical 
service for its e m p l o y e e s i t  also permitted its Euro­
pean employees, again out of necessity, long vacations in 
France every two years during the railroad's slack season.
For a number of years though, its only other benefit arrange­
ment for European employees was a bonus of one year's salary 
payable in a lump sum to the employee only if he survived to 
complete a full six years service. There was no provision 
for sickness and accident benefits--a serious matter in 
Senegal, since an unlucky agent might find himself simply 
repatriated back to France with few resources and his health 
broken. In 1893, the company did begin, in conformity with 
a metropolitan law of December 1890, to set up for its Euro­
pean employees a retirement fund, which accumulated regul­
arly (from 1894) 5% of its employees salaries along with
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twice as much.'in matching company funds in a specially
earmarked Account. But company officials had not even
bothered to draw up a statute regulating disbursement of
107these funds to its personnel, even as late as 1898.
The DSL’s pension plan, finally elaborated fully in 1903,
was not far different from the earlier bonus of one year's
salary after 6 years of service. Aside from 5% withheld
from his salary, the agent would receive company funds
equal to 13% (later 16%) of his total accumulated salary
108only after six years of service with the company.
After World War I, the fringe benefits accorded to European
109
DSL agents did improve. This was a reflection not simply
of changes in metropolitan law, but more importantly of in­
creased worker militancy in the colony after the war. 
European employees of the Thi^s-Niger were more fortunate 
in this respect than DSL employees, since as agents for an 
autonomous government agency their employee benefits tended 
to parallel those given to other functionnaries in the 
colonial bureaucracy.
Demonstrably reluctant to accord benefits to their 
European agents, employers in Senegal were certainly less 
willing to accord any to their African personnel. In 
response to queries about extending metropolitan laws on 
pensions to West Africa, Senegalese chambers of commerce 
objected that its administration would be extremely diffi­
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cult, because most Africans lacked a civil identity 
(registered birth, marriage, etc.) and because so many 
Africans moved about freely in urban areas changing their 
names at will.^^ Even accident insurance was opposed on 
the grounds that Africans could easily obtain the tradition­
al charitable aid available in their own society; and some 
even claimed that accident insurance would only lead some
Africans to mutilate themselves deliberately in order to
«. 111get it.
In this respect, the DSL was better than most. At 
least the DSL set up a retirement fund for its permanent 
African employees in 1908. In one account, 2%% of a worker's 
salary would be set aside, payable to him with accrued in­
terest whenever he left the company; while a second account 
fed by company funds equal to 51 of the employee's salary
would be payable in full to him in a lump sum only after
11220 years of service (a part of it after 15 years).
This was not much; and during the period of labor militancy 
following World War I, African workers concentrated on im­
proving salaries and allowances, not pensions. It was only
113
later that pension benefits came to be appreciated.
Strike activity Labor militancy in the period before 1933 
was seriously circumscribed. French subjects in French West 
Africa were not permitted to join labor unions; nor were 
labor unions officially permitted to form as such until
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 3 2 9 -
1 9 3 7 An industrial labor consciousness and solidarity 
among Africans in Senegal, at least as expressible specifi­
cally in French terms, did not emerge clearly until the 
great railroad strike of 1947-1948, and to a much lesser 
extent in the strike of railroad day laborers in 1938. 
Nevertheless, the period before 1933, an era of labor 
Mpre-historyM for Senegal as it were, is instructive for 
understanding later developments and the patterns of 
transformation of African labor.
There were attempts, it should be noted, to form
unions well before 1937. European railwaymen on the DSL
were trying to form a union as far back as 1 9 0 8 . But
the courts denied them this right, because the law of 1884
permitting unions to be formed in metropolitan France had
not yet been promulgated in French West Africa. In 1920,
an act signed (inadvertently) byt the Governor General seemed
to have promulgated the act of 1884 in the colony. But it
did so in such an ambiguous fashion, that in the face of the
colonial government’s opposition it was unclear whether the
117
formation of unions had really been permitted or not.
In this legal twilight period after 1920, however, the 
colonial government did permit the grouping of rail employees 
in "associations amicales"--organizations, which were not 
exactly unions, but were entitled to a legal personality, 
could collect dues from their members, and thereby give
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workers a voice in the defense of their economic interests.
Naturally, there was strike activity even without
formal worker organizations. The DSL locomotive engineers
went on strike briefly in 1909, and there were isolated
118
strikes in other sectors of the economy as well.
Historians of African labor will find the DSL strike
of April 1919 instructive. It broke out in response to
rapidly increasing prices and embraced virtually the entire
119
personnel of the DSL. Since the strike leaders remained
anonymous in view of the ban on unions, there were no worker 
representatives available to negotiate with management.
The government therefore decided to break the strike quickly 
by simply inducting railroad personnel into the military 
(the same expedient used to break railroad strikes in France). 
In Dakar, European personnel confronted with induction sub­
mitted immediately. But the strike held, simply because the 
African personnel, especially the critical locomotive en­
gineers, could not be located--and the trains could not run 
without them.^^
The colonial administration was naturally worried about 
the bad example that European workers were giving their 
African subordinates. Even more important was the demonstra­
ted dependence of the European workers on the support of the 
skilled African workers, and this lesson was strongly re­
inforced by events shortly following the strike. Realizing
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that their successful, but too hastily conceived strike
demands had been too meager, the African workers proposed
to launch a second strike and appealed for support from
their recent European strike comrades. The African DSL
workers were scornfully rebuffed by these now-satisfied
European workers, but proceeded nevertheless on their own--
121
and won the additional gains.
After 1920, new labor associations were formed on both 
the DSL and TK. An amicale was formed on the TK in 1920 and 
amalgamated with one on the KN in 1924. Europeans and Afri­
cans had separate "committees" on this association, but a
separate association was created for African TN agents in 
1221929. Both European and African employees within the DSL
each formed their own separate active associations from the 
first. The activities of these organizations were circum­
scribed. But they could channel the grievances of workers 
to railroad management, and they certainly served to school 
a generation of African workers and their leaders in hand­
ling labor problems. Even illiterate African subjects, 
though theoretically not permitted to join, could in fact 
make their grievances known through the associations. The 
associations were a two-way street in another sense. The 
closely detailed police reports on meetings of even small 
numbers of railwaymen reveal that they also served in keep­
ing the colonial government well informed of the mood and
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intentions of rail workers and their leaders.
By 1925, in the face of rapidly rising prices, both
European and African workers were again prepared to strike
for higher pay and benefits. Their actions were now
124markedly different than in 1919. Not only were the 
workers on the DSL better organized to win a quick strike, 
but this time the TKN workers were also prepared to carry 
out their own threat to strike. DSL workers actually went 
on strike for several days; but no strike was necessary on 
the TKN. In the year of crisis in overloaded rail transport, 
neither the DSL nor the TKN could afford a strike; and so 
both were obliged to satisfy worker demands quickly.
Historians may be tempted to posit a linear progression 
in African worker sophistication and strength from the years 
1919 to 1925 to 1938 to 1947. This might be true in limi­
ted respects, but would be entirely misleading in others. 
Governor General Carde was furious about the labor unrest
of 1925 on the railroads and because of it refused to allow
125
legalization of unions in the colony later that year.
The government's riposte was not long in coming. On the 
TN, Chardy, the new director, brought in new railwaymen 
from Europe as short-term "contractuals" in order to 
balance and weaken the TN's militant cadre, while the 
broom which he wielded against incompetents on the rail­
road was certainly directed against the "troublemakers'1
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of 1925 as well. At the same time, Chardy acted to
gratify basic employee needs by such actions as setting
up food-buying cooperatives on the TN for both European
and African employees, with the administration of the
African cooperative firmly in the hands of the TN admini- 
127stration.
The DSL associations were stronger and more cohesive. 
They were able to threaten strikes as late as 1929, and even 
1931, and were able to obtain higher levels of overall pay 
and benefits than their TN compatriots. 1^8 But this gave 
them little respite as the economic crisis that began in 
1928 induced the colonial government to purchase the DSL 
from its owners. In the aftermath of the government's take­
over in 1933 and the abundance of labor during the depres­
sion, the ranks of the DSL workers were decimated and they
129were cowed into quiescence. A close examination of 
events leading to the labor strike of 1938 would probably 
show that the seeds of unrest did not come from the succes­
ses of 1925, but from the subsequent repressions of 1927 
and 1934.
Tentative Conclusion This survey of aspects of labor 
practices on Senegalese railroads is much too limited to 
allow firm conclusions; but I hope it suggests some direc­
tion for future studies. Basically the chapter has attempted 
to sketch out a frame of reference, linking historically the
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dependence of European enterprise on African labor with the
g
emergence of a growing African industrial labor conscious­
ness. Closely related to this historical evolution was the 
seminal role of expatriate European workers as both teachers 
and taskmasters, while they themselves were adjusting to 
work conditions in a foreign climate.
The year 1933 is significant within this chronology, 
not only because it marks the time at which the colonial 
administration was successfully snuffing out an incipient 
trade union militancy among both European and African rail 
employees, but also because it signaled the elimination of 
the structure of Afro-European labor relations distinctive 
to the DSL. Previously there had been two autonomous tenden­
cies on the railroads, with the African employees on each 
line recruited on a different basis and subject to a 
different s t a t u t e . O n  the TN, a tiny African elite had 
been given European status, while the lower ranks of employ­
ees had been subject to a harsh discipline. On the DSL, a 
racially discriminatory line had been drawn between European 
and African employees, but the consequent solidarity among 
African personnel apparently bettered the general lot of 
the rank-and-file, who often were able to offset the dis­
advantage of less education with their status as French 
citizens. With the elimination of the DSL company, the TN 
pattern of development was imposed uniformly on both lines,
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easing the color line for an assimilated elite, while the 
workers as a whole were bent to the administration's will.
Much more remains to be done on this pre-amalgamation 
era of labor history on both the DSL and TN. What is needed 
are complementary efforts on statistical surveys by ques­
tionnaire and on additional oral interviews. This would 
help to determine the origins of African railroad workers 
(social, regional, and ethnic) and their personal experiences 
(duration.of employment, mobility, promotions, skills, and 
disposal of earnings). Such work should be accomplished as 
soon as possible, while so many railwaymen of the pre-1934 
era or their sons are still alive.
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Notes
1. Conclusions of Commission Speciale de la Main d'Oeuvre 
Coloniale, February 24, 1928, ARS, K56-19.
2. GS to MMC, April 9, 1883, ARS, 2B57; GS to S/Sec,
April 7, 1889, ARS, 2B62; same, September 7, 1893, ARS, 
2B70; same, June 18, 1894, Ibid.; Governor French Guiana 
to GS, October 2, 1894, ARS, K30.
3. S/Sec to Gasconi, February 6, 1884, FOM, Senegal XV,1; 
Gasconi to S/Sec, February 21, 1884, Ibid.; acting GS 
to MMC, March 13, 1885, ARS, 2B58; see GS to MMC,
March 6, 1882, FOM, Senegal XIV, 25, and document #41, 
n.d., (1897), ARS, L22, on proposed Chinese and Vietna­
mese immigration to Senegal. Later on, officials were 
skeptical about European immigration in GS to French 
Consul, Sao Paulo, Brazil, February 24, 1897, SARS, DCF, 
and President CC-St. Louis to Director Interior,
October 24, 1895, Ibid.
4. Interest in forced labor recruitment for private firms 
centered particularly on the Ivory Coast and, to a 
lesser extent, on the French Sudan. See Conference 
minutes of GG with Governors on manpower, ARS, K82-26;
GG to Lt. Governor, Ivory Coast, .March 1 , 1924, ARS, 
K81-26; excerpt P.V., Conseil du Gouvernement,
November 13, 1924, ARS, K93-26; P.V., Commission Speciale 
de la Main d'Oeuvre Coloniale, February 24, 1928, Ibid.; 
P.V., Conseil Economique, June 15, 1928, Ibid.; L.E. 
Schwartz, MLe travail...," Courrier Coloniale, May 4,
1923, copy in ARS, K55-19; also copy Secretary General, 
Union Colonial Francaise to MC, July 5, 1930, ARS,
K409-132.
5. The prestation obligation was first regulated in an arr^te 
of November 25, 1912. The study of labor contracts by 
the Government General began in 1912. See ARS, K398-132. 
In its response to the 1912 questionnaire, the DSL came 
out solidly against government regulations in general
and work contracts in particular (DSL to GS, July 3, 1912, 
StL); Demongin remarked in his report of February 20,
1926, FOM, TP, that laborers forceably recruited for the 
TN railroad were furnished with contracts that they were 
forced to sign by the colonial government. See the 
typed resume on the proposals of different colonies of 
French West Africa, December 1923, ARS, K55-19; two 
decree projects on "native labor" in French West Africa, 
Ibid.; projects approved, November 13,1924 (Guiraud),
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Ibid.; GG to MC, July 26, 1928, ARS, K56-19; circular,
MC to Governor Generals in colonies, July 22, 1924, 
Ibid.; circular, GG to Governors, October 11, 1929,
ARS, K60-19.
6. See opinion of Lt. Governor of Upper Senegal-Niger in 
a resume of propositions on labor legislation,
(1923 or 1924), ARS, K55-19; GS to GG, November 12,
1930, ARS, K66-19; Annual Report on workers of 2§me 
portion-French Sudan, 1933, ARS, K47-19; Annual Report 
on 2§me portion-French Sudan, 1938, Ibid.
7. P.V., Office du Travail (Sudan), October 27, 1927, ARS, 
K56-19. The question of forced labor in French Africa 
is taken up by J. Suret-Canale, L'ere coloniale,
pp. 312-327.
8. Companies taking advantage of the decree of October 
1925 in Senegal were the Compagnie des Cultures 
Tropicales (Tambacounda), the Compagnie des Sisaleraies 
et Carburants Africaines, the Soci^te? des Plantations 
de la Haute-Casamance, and the Soci^te des Mines de 
Falem£-Gambie (acting GS to GG, September 29, 1930,
ARS, K60-19).
9. As in political report, January 1906, ARS, 2G6-4; 
acting GG to Administrator Dakar, June 3, 1931, ARS, 
K60-19; Report on Charles Lombardini, May 18, 1931,
Ibid.
10. GS to GG, November 17, 1918, ARS, K408-132; GG to GS, 
October 19, 1918, Ibid.; GG to GS, December 19,1927,
ARS, K47-19. This leaves aside the occasional use of 
soldiers and the common use of jail prisoners as 
laborers.
11. Report Lt. Governor Upper Volta to GG, October _7, 1922, 
ARS, 10G11-107; copy Taillebourg report (^1922_/, Ibid. ; 
Ballabey to IGTP, February 2, 1923, Ibid.;Report 
acting Director TK, August 28, 192 2,~T5Td.; GS to Lt. 
Governor, Upper Volta, February 12, 1924, SARS, Confid; 
GS to GG, February 23, 1924, Ibid.
12. See acting GS to GG, August 8, 1916, SARS, Confid. The 
exceptions were the cercles of Upper Gambia, Matam, and 
parts of the Upper Casamance. See economic report 
1929, 4th trimester, ARS, 2G29-2; political report 1939, 
ARS, 2G39-4; political report 1940, ARS, 2G40-2. Con­
trast this with an arret6 of 1938 of the French Sudan
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13. See the answers by the St. Louis and Dakar chambers of 
commerce to the 1897 Union Coloniale Franjaise 
questionnaire on manpower, SARS, DCF; GS to GG, Janu­
ary 10, 1924, ARS, K82-26. See also acting Admini­
strator Dakar to GG, August 19, 1927, ARS, K81-26;
Note of Inspector General, May 4, 1940, ARS, K99-26.
14. Administrator Dakar to GG, March 23, 1931, ARS, K66-19, 
remarked: "II n'est pas douteux, en effet, que du jour 
oft le travail force serait organise a Dakar, la popu­
lation flottante menacSe de recrutement disparaitrait, 
ainsi de main d'oeuvre les entreprises des particuliers." 
Recruited labor, though, could be brought into Dakar 
from neighboring colonies.
15. Acting GS to GG, September 29, 1930, ARS, K60-19.
16. Only Dahomey had less onerous prestation obligations.
See annexed table 1930, ARS, K69-19 which shows Senegal 
having an annual obligation of 4 days of labor. See 
circular of September 23, 1913, GS to Administrators of 
cercles, JOS, 1913, p. 949; GG response to Rheinhart 
report, December 13, 1913, ARS, 4G15; Senegal annual 
reports: ARS, 2G27-18(2); ARS, 2G28-8; ARS, 2G39-4; 
circular of GG, September 12, 1930, ARS, K120-26; Note 
by Inspector du Travail for IGTP, May 31, 1933, ARS, 
K143-26; Berthet note to Director Cabinet, April 19,
1940, Ibid.
17. About 1000 of Samory's "sofas" captured as war prisoners 
were brought in to build the railroad. Crosson- 
Duplessis, Le chemin de fer de Kayes au Niger, copy of 
excerpt of Bulletin de la SociStS Francaise~cfes 
Inggnieurs Coloniaux (Paris" 1904) in RA, wrote on pages 
68-69: "il en est presque toujours ainsi dans les 
entreprises coloniales; au d£but, on est souvent oblig£ 
de constituer un noyau de travailleurs avec de la main 
d'oeuvre import£e peu ft peu les indigenes de la region 
traversde viennent se grouper autour de ce noyau;...
L'initiation ft la loi du travail est alors faite et la 
recrutement de la main d'oeuvre locale est assur£."
In fact, labor requisitions caused many to flee the 
vicinity of the KN. See MC to GG, October 29, 1902,
ARS, 2G2-1, and Crosson-Duplessis, pp. 11-13,67.
18. For the DSL, see Petyt report of DSL expenses, 1888- 
1889, FOM, TP, Senegal XII,69, pp. 107,111-112; report 
of Chief Surveillance Engineer, December 7, 1917, FOM, 
TP; report of Chief Surveillance Engineer, December 8, 
1928, FOM, TP. For the TN, see Legregram report,
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July 12, 1930, FOM, TP, along with Chardy's response 
of July 20, 1930, Ibid.
19. For a concise explanation, see E. Deveze, Chef du Bureau 
personnel de la Direction Fed6rale des Chemins de Fer
de l'AOF, Formation Professionnelle-Cours de Personnel, 
1956-1957, RA, pp. 9-23 which went into a detailed 
explanation of DSL cadres for 1925-1926. For a brief 
comparison with rail workers in France, see K.A. Doukas, 
The French Railroads and the State (New York, 1945), 
pp. 64-74.
20. The report of Director TK, May 6, 1914, SARS, DCF, 
recommended division of the unwieldy combined Movement 
and Rolling Stock division.
21. See Dev&ze, Formation, pp. 23-78, 91; arretS of Novem­
ber 29, 1910, JOS, December 1, 1910, pp. 872-873, 934- 
936; an arrete of April 1, 1921 reorganized the cadre 
commun.
22. Report Demongin, February 20, 1926; FOM, TP. Of the 
896 forced laborers, 201 were from Senegal; the rest 
from the Sudan. Demongin's impression is confirmed 
in Lt. Governor, Sudan to GG, April 12, 1926, ARS, 
K410-132 (and K81-26). The Sol report on TN personnel, 
August 5, 1930, FOM, TP, listed as working on the 
Travaux Neufs service a total of 64 Europeans (57 
military), 1,497 hired laborers and 1,320 of the 2eme 
portion.
23. E.g., see salary scales for Africans and Europeans in
1925 in Deveze, Formation, pp. 11, 14-21, 38-40. The 
Pruvost report on the Dakar-Niger railroad, June 25, 
1935, FOM, TP, p. 103, noted that Europeans accounted 
for 58.6% of the total personnel expenses (chapitre I) 
in 1930, for 46.7% in 1931, and for 51% in 1932. See 
Legregram report, July 4, 1930, FOM, TP, pp. 18ff.
24. Gasconi to S/Sec, February 21, 1884, FOM, Senegal XV,1;
GS to MMC, March 13, 1885, Ibid.
25. See DSL brochure, "Notes relatives a la construction et
eJ 1'exploitation du chemin de fer DSL," December 1888, 
copy in FOM, TP, p. 35. "La compagnie ne peut envoyer, 
en effet, au Senegal que des agents experiment's ...Quel 
avantage trouveraient-ils cL quitter les Compagnies ... 
pour s'expatrier s'exposer & un climat dangereux, et 
revenir en France au bout de 2, 3, ou 6 ans au maximum, 
avec une sant€ d£truite, car l'Europlen ne s'acclimate 
pas au S£n£gal ..."
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26. See Ibid., pp. 34-35, and the Etienne report, March 31, 
1887, FOM, Senegal XII,59, p.36.
27. The following tables were tabulated from individual 
employees records in the archives of the DSL Company 
in Paris /~henceforth DSL (Paris)_7:
#Left Company Within
Less One Six One Two Three More
than to m o . year yrs. yrs. than
year # one six to 1 to 2 to 3 to 6 six
hired hired mo. m o . 71*. yrs . yrs. yrs. yrs.
1883 21 0 5 1 4 6 3 2
1884 51 0 12 9 9 9 9 3
1885 125 7 27 30 17 7 21 16
TOTAL 197 7 44 40 30 22 33 21
year
hired fired
laid
off quit died
died
with­
in
year
repatri­
ated
for
health other
1883 5 4 3 5 2 1 3
1884 11 7 9 5 - 14 5
1885 10 15 18 16 7 38 28
TOTAL 26 26 30 26 9 53 JS
28. The DSL must have recognized that European employees 
could work on a long-term basis by the early 1890’s, 
although the personnel statute of 1897 was still laid 
out on the basis of a six-year agent contract. The 
Fontaneilles report of July 17, 1898 concerning the 
DSL, in FOM, TP, makes it clear tht long-term employment 
was possible.
29. See DSL personnel regulations-1897, copy in FOM,TP.
The Petyt report of expenses for 1890, FOM, Senegal
XII,69, indicated that European agents went on vacation 
with their families in France at company expense.
30. For general policy on hiring retired military personnel 
at the Kayes-Niger, see answer to question 7 by Director 
KN, September 9, 1912, ARS, K399-132. A list of Euro­
pean personnel on the KN, in a report of January 18,
1907, RA, listed 14 active military personnel out of a 
total of 68. See Demongin report on TKN personnel,
April 10, 1926, FOM, TP, and especially Chardy's comments 
pp. 6, 10. See also Petyt report 1891-1892, FOM, TP,
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p. 28, on the proposed use of military personnel on the 
DSL. TK agents were subject to the decree of August 5, 
1910 regulating personnel in the "Travaux publics 
des colonies." See acting GS to Director TK, March 30, 
1915, SARS, Confid. As "functionnaires," they had 
more job security than someone hired by contract on a 
temporary basis.
31. Report of DSL board of directors to stockholders,
June 15, 1901, FOM, TP.
32. On rentals, see DSL board of directors report to stock­
holders, April 28, 1888, FOM, TP; unsigned note on 
Dakar station (1897 or 1898), FOM, TP.
33. Petyt report, DSL expenses 1890, FOM,Senegal XII,69, 
p. 60; DSL to MC, November 8, 1894, FOM, TP. The 
Jacquerez report of September 14, 1901, FOM, TP, found 
several stations unsuitable to house rail agents and 
their families.
34. DSL to MC, November 23, 1900, SARS, DCF, proposed using 
government reserve funds for various constructions on 
the DSL line, including five new stations which would 
shelter European agents in more sanitary circumstances; 
DSL to MC, April 25, 1904, FOM, TP, suggested building 
housing in the "Dunes area" for its European agents. 
Even as late as 1925, the DSL was buying housing in 
Dakar for its European agents. See Director DSL to 
DSL Administrators, Paris, July 16, 1925, DSL (Paris). 
In 1894, high company officials had felt no need to 
house DSL personnel. See report by Pouyer and A.
de Traz, FOM, TP, pp. 17-21.
35. Thi&s au Niger, pp. 73-74.
36. L. Petyt report on DSL for 1887, May 30, 1888, FOM,
Senegal XII,69, pp. 32-33. Petyt report, DSL expenses 
1890, Ibid., pp. 70-71. Boissel to Premier Briand, 
December 24, 1910, FOM, TP; Boissel to Deputy Blaise 
Diagne, December 1, 1920, Ibid.; DSL to MC, April 21, 
1921, Ibid.
37. See report by Roily on DSL functioning, January 29,
1911, ARS, 043, pp. 24-31. The Ligue Fran9aise pour la
Defense des Droits de 1*Homme et du Citoyen had made 
more general but unsubstantiated charges earlier. See 
Francois de Pressense to MC, October 23, 1906, ARS,
K32; GS to GG, March 9, 1907, Ibid.
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38. Telegram GG, Ponty, (at Kouroussa) to Cabinet (GG), 
December 21, 1910, RA: "me suis engage avec compagnie
Et ne pas nous faire guSrre d'employes et enlever agents 
Et la dite compagnie dont bonne exploitation nous 
interesse."
39. GS to GG, February 22, 1921, SARS, Confid, noted how a 
TK agent had worked African rail laborers for his own 
personal profit. See Inspector Merly to MC, July 8,
1926, FOM, TP; Demongin report, April 8, 1926 on service 
in stations, Ibid. A general, wide-spread practice of 
overcharging Africans for passenger tickets was noted
in Chief Exploitation Service TN to Lt. Silvani, 
Commandant Gendarmerie of TN, June 30, 1930, FOM, TP; 
Chief Exploitation Service of TN to Chief Commercial 
Section of TN, March 24, 1930, Ibid.
40. The Petyt report of 1891-1892, FOM, TP, pp. 8,9, listed 
16 chefs-cantonniers (undoubtedly Europeans) for 1889 
and only 6 for 1892. A report on DSL personnel with an 
attached tabular listing of September 15, 1892, FOM, 
Senegal XII,72, specifically listed 5 European chefs- 
cantonniers. The Fontaneilles report of July 17, 1898, 
FOM, TP, pp. 59,60 indicates that by 1897, at least, 
even these were gone. The job, it should be noted, 
involved skills at basic surveying measurements to align 
the track.
41. Copy GG to MC, January 18, 1928, K56-19; GS to GG, 
January 10, 1924. ARS, K82-26. In GS to GG, August 4, 
1928, ARS, K58-19, an estimate was made that 3,500 
workers were needed for public works projects in Senegal. 
Lt. Governor of Sudan to GG, August 12, 1927, ARS,
K57-19, estimated 8:^000 men would be recruited by the 
administration for public and private needs, not includ­
ing separate private hiring. See also acting GS to
GG, September 29, 1930, ARS, K60-19.
42. Administrator Dakar to GG, October 20, 1930, ARS,
K60-19. Most were Tukolor from the Senegal river and 
Sousous from Guinea.
43. General Bonnier to GG, June 29, 1918, ARS, K408-132; 
commentary on draft arret‘d by GG, n.d. (1918) on draft­
ing manpower for Dakar, ARS, K408-132; GG to Ravitaille- 
ment-Marine, September 28, 1918, Ibid.; copy acting 
President CC-Kaolack to Administrator Sine-Saloum, 
October 24, 1918, Ibid.; copy telegram Administrator 
Sine-Saloum to Delegate Senegal (Dakar), December 30, 
1918, ARS, K399-132; report by Syndic of manpower,
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February 26, 1919, Ibid.; Aumont to Chief Economic 
Affairs Service, February 19, 1919, Ibid.
44. E.g., Oldani to GS, December 6, 1918, ARS, K399-132; 
Economic Bulletin-December 1920, ARS, 2G20-1; Admini­
strator Dakar to GG, July 31, 1926, ARS, K81-26; P.V., 
CC-St. Louis, December 18, 1926, SARS, DCF.
45. GG to Lt. Governor of Upper Senegal-Niger, January 20, 
1919, ARS, K399-132, complained that permitting higher 
salaries in his colony would have repercussions on the 
cost of completion of the TK. On the shortages of 
laborers for shipping peanuts on the TN, see June 1925 
economic report, ARS, 2G25-2.
46. Thies au Niger, p. 46; earlier in 1911, work on the 
Kaolack-Gumguineo spur alone required 1200 recruited 
laborers, June report, ARS, 2G11-43.
47. TN report on 2&me portion, ARS, K47-19; report of acting 
Director TN to GG, October 4, 1932, Ibid.; annual report 
on workers of the 2§me portion, French Sudan 1938, ARS, 
K47-19. The actual contingents sent in a given year 
varied wildly from none to 1600 men, but most recruits 
were kept on the job for almost 2 years. See also Lt. 
Governor of Sudan to GG, August 12, 1927, ARS, K57-19; 
same, September 16, 1927, Ibid.; GS to GG, December 19, 
1927, ARS, K47-19; Demongin report, February 20, 1926, 
FOM, TP, on forced labor on the TKN; Demongin report, 
April 10, 1926, Ibid., on TKN personnel; Merly report, 
June 22, 1926, Ibid., on African manpower for the TKN; 
response of Lt. Governor of Sudan, May 28, 1926, ARS, 
4G87-105; response of GG, June 2, 1926, Ibid.
48. Director DSL to Chief Surveillance Engineer, May 15, 
1926, ARS, K81-26; Director DSL to GG, June 9,1926,
Ibid.; Commissaire Police, St. Louis to GS, December 6, 
1926, Ibid.
49. Petyt report 1891-1892, p. 85, FOM, TP.
50. See answer to question 9 of the questionnaire on forced 
labor in French West Africa /^circa 1928J7, ARS, K66-19; 
remarks in GG conference, January 8, 1921, ARS, K82-26. 
The Lt. Governor of Upper Senegal-Niger noted that the 
chiefs received 5 francs per worker recruited. For 
general background on rural labor, it is useful to 
consider African domestic slavery. See Denise Bouche, 
Les villages de liberty en Afrique noire, 1887-1910 
(Paris, 1968), p p . 58ff.; J.-L. Boutillier, "Les captifs
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51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
en AOF (1903-1905)," Bulletin de l'IFAN, serie B, 1968, 
pp. 513-535.
On labor recruiting of 500 men for the Louga-Lingudre, 
see Administrator Louga to GS, October 8, 1926, StL; 
Economic report, December 1926, ARS, 2G26-3; Political 
report 1929, ARS, 2G29-15.
Testimony of a retired African "cheminot." During the 
course of my sojourn in Senegal, I interviewed 26 
African ex-cheminots (all but one in the spring and 
summer of 1972) on a confidential basis. Henceforth, 
information provided by these men will be footnoted as 
"EX-RR." These interviews were very informative, not 
only for factual information, but in directing the 
study toward basic questions. Unfortunately a small 
sample of only 26 men, however informative, has to 
be preliminary in nature. See Appendix II for details.
A letter, DSL to MC, November 8, 1894, FOM, TP, refers 
to laborers working on the DSL track living nearby with 
their wives and children in straw huts; see also Petyt 
report on DSL expenses 1890, FOM, Senegal XII,69, p. 21.
EX-RR interviews. For a few years, the company even had 
its employees growing peanuts on DSL property for its 
own profit.
With exceptions. During World War I, heavy port traffic 
was handled at times only with recruited labor (see 
report by the Syndic of manpower, February 26, 1919, ARS, 
K399-132). Typical base salaries for unskilled urban 
laborers were 1.25 to 1.50 francs per day from 1881 to 
World War I (less 0.50 Fr/day if meals were provided).
In 1918-1919, with much manpower in the army, these 
salaries rose to 3 and even 6 francs per day (Oldani to 
GS, December 6, 1918, Ibid.).
See art. 31 of the draft decree on offices du travail, 
ARS, K55-19; P.V., Commission on regulation of work, 
August 9, 1924, Ibid. (referring to this article as #37).
Report by Friry, Janury 16, 1907, ARS, P37. In contrast 
see Mornet report on piece work in northern Nigeria,
1913 (for the Congo railroad project) in ANF, unclassi­
fied 89AQ-Brazzaville. See also Avant-projet Noirot, 
July 20, 1894, p. 64, FOM, Senegal XII,82 on road 
construction gangs.
Port workers in Dakar, at least, were paid in lump sums 
for an entire crew. See GG to Administrator Dakar,
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July 22, 1926, ARS, K81-26; Administrator Dakar to GG, 
July 31, 1926, Ibid. A draft report by Petyt (1898),
FOM, TP, indicates that a record was kept of the work 
of individual workers only in the central workshops, 
but not outside.
58. GS to S/Sec, April 12, 1886, ARS, 2B75; Petyt report on 
DSL expenses 1890, FOM, Senegal XII,69, p. 21. GS to 
GG, Political report 1908, ARS, 2G8-10. In a monograph 
on Thies in 1910, ARS, 1G337, p.35, an official noted: 
"Les manoeuvres se recrutent assez difficilement sur 
place; cette categorie de travailleurs est fournie par 
les bambaras, toucouleurs et sarakoles qui viennent 
pendant la traite travailler dans les escales, et 
ensuite regagnent leurs pays d ’origine ou ils livrent d 
la culture." See also Director DSL to Chief Surveillance 
Engineer, May 15, 1926, ARS, K81-26.
59. EX-RR interviews.
60. Decrees of June 17, 1895 and January 17, 1897. See GS 
to S/Sec, January 6, 1892, ARS, 2B67; same, January 5, 
1893, Ibid.; same, March 11, 1893, Ibid.; Delegate 
Interior (Dakar) to Director Interior, May 19, 1892,
ARS, K31; excerpt of notice in JOS, December 5, 1891,
ARS, K31; documents #47 and 106, Ibid.; draft GG to 
General,. Commandant en Chef, July 26, 1896, ARS,
K397-132; report Director Interior to GG, August 4,
1896, Ibid. See also the dossier FOM, Senegal XIV,26. 
Senegal reluctantly permitted, however, its workers
to be recruited for the French Congo and Madagascar.
See French Congo to GG, March 22, 1902, ARS, K398-132; 
GalliSni to GG, December 14, 1901, Ibid.; GG to Governor- 
General of French Equatorial Africa, April 30, 1913,
ARS, K397-132.
61. See report by Inspection Generale des Services 
Sanitaires et M^dicaux, October 12, 1931, ARS, K60-19; 
draft report by Maretti on agricultural manpower in the 
cercle of Kayes, July 17, 1923, ARS, K81-26; "Danger of 
Depopulation, French West Africa," November 21, 1931,
ARS, K162-26. The Societe des Mines de la Senegambie 
failed to extract gold with machinery on the Faleme in 
1912 when its dredge broke down (see Commercial Bulletin, 
May 1912, Upper Gambia, SARS, DCF). Its successor, the 
Compagnie des Mines de FalemS-Gambie, impressed local 
labor brutally (copy GS to Administrator Upper Gambia, 
January 30, 1930, StL). See also APA report of 
November 1939, ARS, 17G160-28.
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62. Note Balandier's penetrating comments on the reaction 
of Africans to "material inferiority," in The Sociology 
of Black Africa (New York, 1970), pp. 160-163, 282-284.
63. See GS to S/Sec, June 6, 1890, ARS, 2B67.
64. Senegalese craftsmen skilled in European trades, those 
of St. Louis in particular, were justly famed through­
out French West Africa and the Congo. See Crosson- 
Duplessis, Kayes au Niger, pp. 67-68; questionnaire on 
manpower-1897 (5 cercles of Sudan), ARS, K398-132; 
questionnaire on manpower-1897 (St. Louis, Dakar), SARS, 
DCF.
65. E. Mage, Voyage d'exploration, p. 221.
66. There are many works which describe the castes briefly. 
See Majhemout Diop, Histoire des classes sociales ... 
Senegal (Paris, 1972), pp. 49-52. Martin Klein, Islam 
and Imperialism, p. 10.
67. EX-RR interviews. See also A. Aumont, proofs of pamphlet 
for National Colonial Congress, 1889, ANF, 148AP2, p.3.
68. EX-RR interviews. Of the 26 retired railwaymen inter­
viewed, 11 claimed a notable ancestry (some even a royal 
ancestry), and 6 of these 11 had specialized in a 
technical metier. Metier can be used in a very general 
way to mean an specialized occupation, including watch­
men or clerks. In this work, I mean metier to refer 
narrowly to work of a technical nature. The large 
number of notables in the African "working class" 
suggests that more work needs to be done on the com­
position and evolution of this class. It is often 
pointed out that industrial workers in Africa have 
stood out from the mass of peasantry as a privileged 
group. One starting point for a study would be J. 
Lombard's analysis of the erosion of the traditional 
ruling class' power in Autorites traditionnelles,
pp. 68-88.
69. See footnote 23 above. In addition to a "supplement 
colonial," bonuses at the end of six years service and 
a housing allowance (when no housing was provided), DSL 
agents received from World War I, an "indemnity de 
deplacement de chert6 de vie" as well as an " indemnity
de d^placement." See salary scales for each DSL employee 
on the DSL list of January 1, 1890, FOM, Senegal XII,59. 
Colonial government officials also received a supplement
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coionial.
70. Sahib Diop of Dakar was a stationmaster from 1913 to 
1917, Amadou Gu&ye briefly from April 1919 to May 1921, 
and Guibril Bit of St. Louis from 1911 to 1932. See 
also list attached to DSL to MC, August 29, 1907, FOM,
TP; DSL to MC, November 23, 1900, SARS, DCF. Almost
all facteurs and facteurs-chefs on the DSL were European. 
Chardy suggested (Chardy to IGTP, July 28, 1934, RA) 
that these posts be held henceforth by Africans, as 
they were already on the TN. On African locomotive 
engineers, see e.g., Etienne report, March 21, 1887,
FOM, Senegal XII,69, p. 88; Couteau report, September 15, 
1892, FOM, Senegal XII,72.
71. See Petyt's 1887 report on the DSL, FOM, Senegal XII,69, 
pp. 88-90. Compare with Ibid., pp. 84-86. Petyt report, 
DSL expenses, 1888-1889, Ibid., p. 49; Petyt report,
DSL expenses 1890, Ibid., p. 20; Petyt report 1891-1892, 
FOM, TP, pp. 47-48. Petyt, who had been employed on a 
railroad in the U.S.A., was clearly motivated by racial 
prejudice. Other government officials felt differently. 
See Inspector Fournie to S/Sec, January 25, 1894, FOM, 
Senegal XII, 68. Jacquerez report, September 15, 1901, 
FOM, TP.
72. DSL pamphlet, "Notes relatives a la construction et a 
1'exploitation du chemin de fer DSL (decembre 1888)," 
(Paris, 1888), p. 45. On pages 34-36, the pamphlet 
complained that its European employees cost 3 times as 
much as in Europe, and worked half as hard because of 
the climate.
73. Crosson-Duplessis, Kayes au Niger, pp. 71-72 describes 
the Tukolor attack on the KN line in 1890.
74. DSL pamphlet of 1888, p. 52.
75. EX-RR interview. Report of DSL board of directors to 
stockholders, June 15, 1901, FOM, TP.
76. Notes by Launay on the functioning of the TK and DSL
railroads, April 10, 1920, FOM, TP. See also the 
diatribe against Senegalese workers in the note by 
police inspector, Vallet, n.d. /7l920_7, ARS, 17G239-
105.
77. The Legregram report, June 16, 1930, FOM, TP, pp. 25- 
26, noted that of the 62 stations, large and small, on 
the TN, only 12 were run by Europeans. Calmel, "Le
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 3 4 8 -
chemin de £er du Senegal au Niger...," Revue du Genie, 
October 1896, p. 323, remarked that Africans had already 
served as chefs de train, and even as stationmasters at 
remote stations on the unfinished KN.
78. Response GG to Legregram report, August 5, 1930, FOM,TP.
79. European colonial officers were generally convinced that 
Africans would only respect and willingly obey Euro­
peans clad in military uniforms. See Revin to Freycinet, 
July 19, 1879, ANF, F14/12438.
80. EX-RR interviews. Copy GG to GS, August 1927, ARS,
1P6-10, expressed surprise that the Lt. Governor would
favor shortening work hours for Africans on the TN to 
the same hours as European TN agents.
81. EX-RR interview; admission to this cadre was extremely
important, for it brought certain privileges, such as 
a right to railroad-supplied housing. DSL management 
resisted extending to African agents of the TN's Cadre 
Commun Superieur the courtesies they normally extended 
to European TN agents (copies of exchange of letters 
Director TK to Director DSL, June 4, 1923, ARS, 6P165-36;
Director DSL to Director TK, June 7, 1923, Ibid.;
Director TK to Director DSL, July 31, 1923, Ibid.;
joint letter of five TK agents to GG, November 30, 1923,
Ibid.; GG to GS, December 26, 1923, Ibid.
82. EX-RR interviews. A circular of October 31, 1910 by GG, 
Ponty, ARS, 17G160-28 enjoined the lt. governors of the 
federation to reserve administrative positions in their 
respective colonies for African school graduates. GS
to Lt. Governor of Dahomey, July 26, 1912, SARS, DCF, 
and GS to Lt. Governor of Ivory Coast, July 26, 1912, 
Ibid., urged that these governors accept African 
graduates of Senegal’s Ecole Pinet-Laprade on the 
railroads of their colonies.
83. F. Carr£re and P. Holle, De la Senegambie francaise 
(Paris, 1855), pp. 12-13: "Avant le decret de 1848, 
abolotif de l'esclavage, ils consentaient volontiers
a £tre masons, menuisiers, charpentiers, calfats, metiers 
consideres comme honorables; mais depuis 1 ’emancipation 
les marabouts ... se sont empares des enfants, les 
d&tournent ... des metiers qui les mettaient en contact 
avec des EuropSens .... Un homme ne au Senegal regarde 
aujourd’hui comme vil le metier de laptot ... et les 
navires de l ’Etat sont obliges de recruter leur 
personnel parmi les etrangers ou les gens nouvellement 
€tablis (bambaras, saracolets)." See also Ricard,
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Le Senegal, pp. 237-247; GS to MC, September 22, 1876, 
FOM, Senegal 1,61.
84. Young Senegalese were sent to France for a technical 
education as far back as 1837 (see G. Hardy,
L 'enseignement au Senegal de 1817 d 1854 (_ Paris, 1920_V> 
p. 83). At least a few returned to serve with distinc­
tion in the colony's technical services at an early 
date. (See Boilat, Esquisses senegalaises, pp. 258, 
274-275; Ricard, Le S§n6gal, pp. 17-18) . Of the 
originaires of St. Louis, the most successful in a 
technical career was Frederic Michas, who rose to the 
rank of Chief of Senegal's Public Works service in 
1924 after a long period of service outside the colony 
(Personal dossier, SARS, A628).
85. See e.g., Conseil General du Senegal, 1906, pp. 135-144.
86. See DSL, "Notes relatives ... DSL," December 1888, FOM, 
TP, p. 52; Petyt report 1887, FOM, Senegal XII,69,
pp. 88-89; Etienne report, March 31, 1887, FOM,
Senegal XII,59, p.36.
87. The number of skilled workers in St. Louis was too small 
for the needs of the 1880's (see GS to MMC, April 23, 
1882, FOM, Senegal 1,66). DSL Company records (DSL- 
Paris) show that, at least up to 1895, only 5 St. 
Louisians were registered as permanent or semi-permanent 
(auxiliary) employees. Three of these were train engi­
neers; only two were hired as clerks, and only for a 
short time. Only five St. Louisians were hired as 
facteurs from 1897 to 1900, only one of which became
a stationmaster (Guibril B&) . Six other St. Louisians 
commissioned by the DSL from 1902 to 1909 were only 
work crew foremen. In contrast, there were eight 
Gor£ens hired by the DSL for its auxiliary staff up to 
1893, and three others for the permanent staff up 1897.
An ex-railwayman claimed in an interview, however, that 
there had been a number of St. Louisians in the main 
DSL workshops.
88. A movement of prime significance for the political 
history of Senegal during this period of "proto-national- 
ism" among educated francophone Africans, it is recounted 
vividly by Lamine Gu&ye in his autobiographical Itineraire 
africaine (Paris, 1966), pp. 8-10, 85-101.
89. EX-RR interviews. See also Launay to Director TN,
July 24, 1924, RA, which noted the difficulty of getting 
African graduates of professional schools to come to the
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railroad. He suggested that the railroad form its own 
school.
90. EX-RR interviews; personnel records, DSL (Paris). As 
early as 1891, L. Petyt spoke highly of African person­
nel employed on a long-term basis at the DSL repair 
shops of Dakar, (see Petyt report on DSL expenses 1890, 
FOM, Senegal XII,69, pp. 21-23). There were 65 skilled 
workers in the DSL Dakar workshops in 1897, with some 
24 apprentices and laborers; in 1900 there were 47 
workers, with 46 apprentices and laborers (Jacquerez 
report of September 15, 1901, FOM, TP).
91. EX-RR interviews.
92. Of a group of 156 Senegalese workers observed leaving 
Bathurst for the Belgian Congo in March 1897, 107 were 
Sarakole, mostly unskilled laborers from Bakel. See 
list in Administrator Gambia to GG, March 18, 1897,
ARS, K397-132.
93. See C. Quinn, Mandingo Kingdoms, pp. 27, 42, 49.
94. A detailed 1938 analysis of the "general character" 
of Sarakoles sailing on French vessels and another on 
Wolof sailors can be found in ARS, 17G160-28. See also 
GS report for Direction des Colonies, January 22, 1880, 
FOM, Senegal 1,63; GS to S/Sec, June 6, 1890, ARS, 2B67; 
acting GS to S/Sec, November 7, 1892, Ibid.
95. Francine N'Diaye, "La colonie du Senegal au temps de 
BriSre de l'Isle, 1876-1881," Bulletin de l'IFAN, s£rie 
B, 1968, pp. 470-471, mentions the formation in 1879 of 
an "ecole des arts et metiers" in Senegal, and the 
training of tradesmen at the Catholic mission of St. 
Joseph at N ’Gazobil. The school run by the Fr£res de 
Ploermel also trained apprentices in some metiers at 
both St. Louis and Goree from an early date (Franjoise 
Flis-Zonabend, Lyceens de Dakar (Paris, 1968), pp. 167- 
169). A training school was also attached to the naval 
arsenal at S. Louis in 1886 (see GS to S/Sec, Decem­
ber 10, 1890, ARS, 2B67). Later on, an Ecole de 
Pupilles Mecaniciens de la Marine was created at Dakar 
(JOS, September 12, 1907, pp. 469-470). The Ecole 
Pinet Laprade was run by the Government General at 
Goree and the Ecole Blanchot at St. Louis by the colony 
of Senegal. See Flis-Zonabend, Lyclens pp. 169-172; 
response of acting GG to Merly's report of July 7, 1926, 
ARS, 4G87-105; copy GG to MC, January 18, 1928, ARS, 
K56-19; inquest manpower, Senegal-1927, ARS, K92-26.
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96. At the railroad workshops, the skills would include-- 
in addition to the familiar crafts of bricklayer, 
ironsmith and carpenter--the industrial skills of 
fitter, latheworker, brass-founder, tinsmith, and 
electrician, as well as locomotive engineer. The writer 
is particularly indebted to the comments of ex-cheminot 
El Hadj Ibrahima Di&ne.
97. EX-RR interviews.
98. Guy Pfefferman, Industrial Labor in the Republic of 
Senegal (New York, 1968), pp. 28-29, 34-38, 218-219.
99. Ibid., pp. 28-29, 36-38, 250.
100. See acting GS to Chief Public Works service of Senegal,
September 25, 1926, StL.
101. EX-RR interviews, See Bouche, Villages de liberte, 
pp. 156-158.
102. EX-RR interviews. A report of Director Interior to GS, 
June 19, 1886, SARS, DCF, noted that African workers 
and laborers insisted on being paid every 2 or 3 days.
103. Telegram DSL to GG, July 22, 1896, ARS, K397-132; tele­
gram Superville to GG, July 28, 1896, Ibid.; Delegate 
Interior to Director Interior, August 2, 1896, Ibid.; 
Superville to GG, August 4, 1896, Ibid.; DSL to MC,
July 25, 1896, FOM, Senegal XIV,27. Petyt noted the 
loss of some DSL workers already to the Congo in his 
report on DSL receipts 1890, FOM, Senegal XII,69, p.18.
104. EX-RR interviews. Some of those interviewed noted that 
many refused to be commissioned in the railroad, because 
they hadn’t understood the advantage of a long-term 
pension.
105. Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (London, 1962), 
pp. 362-363. For a contrary view see Peter Stearns, 
Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor (New Bruns­
wick, 1971), pp. 13-14. A law of December 27, 1890 
stipulated pensions for workers hired under contract.
See Doukas, French Railroads, pp. 68-71, 198-204.
106. A draft report by Petyt for 1898, FOM, TP, lists 180 
workers in 1894 receiving 1554 hours of treatment in 
the company hospital, 248 agents in 1895 for 2473 hours, 
165 agents in 1896 for 1417 hours and 254 agents in 1897 
for 1969 hours.
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107. Fontaneilles report, July 17, 1898, FOM, TP, p. 81; 
draft of report by Petyt, 1898, FOM, TP. A completed 
regulation was only submitted by the DSL to the Ministry 
of Colonies in November 1901 (report DSL board of 
directors to stockholders, June 18, 1902, FOM, TP).
108. See DSL personnel regulation-1908, copy in FOM, TP.
109. See DSL "ordre de service," no. 211, December 31, 1919, 
ARS, K35, DSL ordre de service, n. 261, August 5,
1925, FOM, TP.
110. P.V., CC-Rufisque, April 30, 1912, SARS, DCF; draft 
report GG to MC, November 18, 1910, ARS, K399-132; GG 
to MC, November 30, 1910, ARS, K33; GS to GG, April 14, 
1910, Ibid.; GG to GS, December 30, 1918, ARS, K398-132; 
acting GG to MC, June 4, 1923, ARS, K76-26. See also 
the dossier ARS, K34, on a proposal of 1919 for an 8 
hour workday in West Africa, especially documents #10 
and 11, which summarize the responses of government 
agencies and chambers of commerce.
111. Excerpt opinion CC-Rufisque, attached to GS to GG,
January 8, 1912, ARS, K399-132.
112. DSL to MC, August 29, 1907, FOM, TP, makes it clear
that the pension plan, applicable at that time to only
45 African exployees, was being put into effect be­
cause of the express request of these African employees. 
A copy of the 1927 version of the pension plan for 
Africans is in FOM, TP.
113. For TN agent benefits, see the Legregram report on TN 
personnel, July 12, 1930, FOM, TP.
114. See circular of October 14, 1937, ARS, 21G53-17; acting 
GG to MC, September 8, 1936, ARS, K70-19. Labor unions 
were made legal again in France by a law of March 21, 
1884. Not surprisingly, the merchants of that day in 
Senegal came out roundly against its promulgation in 
Senegal. See P.V., CC-St. Louis session of December 18, 
1884.
115. For the railroad strike of 1938, see Iba der Thiam, "La 
gr£ve des cheminots du S£n6gal de Septembre 1938," 2 
vols., Memoire de Mattrise (University of Dakar, 1972).
116. MC to GG, April 3, 1908, ARS, K106-26; copy GG to M C , 
June 24, 1908, Ibid.; deliberations of the Cour d ’Appel 
de l'AOF, June 1, 1908, Ibid. An attempt had already
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been made in 1906 to form a "Syndicat des Ouvriers 
R§unis" at Dakar (Procureur de la Republique to GS,
June 19, 1906, SARS, DCF, and unsigned copy to MC, n.d., 
ARS, K399-132).
117. ArretS of April 22, 1920 by Merlin, copy in ARS, K106- 
26; draft GG(Merlin) to MC, February 10, 1921, Ibid.; 
acting GG to GG(Carde), April 14, 1923, Ibid; GG to 
acting GG, May 15, 1923, Ibid.; GS to GG, October 4, 
1924, Ibid.; acting GG to GS, October 11, 1924, Ibid.; 
draft of acting GG to MC, February 1930, Ibid.; note 
on craft unions by Director APA, Ibid.
118. Telegram Friry to Director Public Works, May 10, 1909, 
SARS, DCF; Director Public Works to GS, May 10, 1909, 
Ibid. The strike was confined to DSL personnel run­
ning the trains on the new Thids-Diourbel branch. In 
1910 there was a dockers' strike at Dakar (agent of 
Phillippe, Delmas § Co. to GG, May 27, 1910, ARS, 
K399-132). In 1916 there was a strike of African 
butchers at Lyndiane (Brocard to GG, November 2, 1916, 
SARS, DCF) and in 1918 one of masons in Rufisque (ARS, 
2G18-1). A dockers' strike at Rufisque is described in 
a note of January 4, 1919, ARS, K399-132.
119. Letter from cheminots to GG, April 8, 1919, ARS, K35; 
note by Mouneyres, April 12, 1919, Ibid.
120. The arr£te of April 12, 1919, ARS, K35, mobilized rail­
road personnel; see police report (Commissaire Central 
de Dakar) to GG, April 15, 1919, Ibid.; report of 
General Bonnier, April 30, 1919, Ibid.; report of GG
to MC, May 1, 1919, Ibid..; note also the telegrams from 
commercial interests in Senegal (e.g., President 
CC-Rufisque to GG, April 14, 1919, Ibid.).
121. EX-RR interview, confirmed in part by police report, 
April 25, 1919, ARS, K35; see also "Les agents indigenes 
du DSL" to Chief of DSL Rolling Stock, December 30,
1919, Ibid.; telegram MC to GG, June 3, 1920, Ibid.; 
arbitration decision of June 9, 1920, Ibid.; GG to MC, 
June 12, 1920, ARS, 17G239-105; DSL to MC, September 30, 
1921, FOM, TP. A glimpse at European worker attitudes 
on the TKN is provided in "Personnel TKN" to President, 
CC-Rufisque, June 4, 19 24, SARS, DCF, as these agents 
deny responsibility for failures adding: "le personnel 
indigene, auxilliaire naturel du personnel europeen,
ne lui apporte aucun aide, tout au contraire! ...le 
chemin de fer marche mal c'est entendu, mais il marche 
cependant mieux qu'il peut marcher et cela gr&ce au 
personnel europeen." There were fights between African
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workers and Europeans at the TKN depot of Thies in 
August 1924 (Senegal political report 1924, ARS,
2G24-14).
122. An arr&tS of January 10, 1920 approved a constitution 
for the Association Amicale et Professional des Agents 
du chemin de fer du TK. An arr§te of July 15, 1924 
permitted the amalgation of this association with a 
similar association for the KN. A separate African 
association was created in 1929 (JO-AOF, January 1929, 
p. 79). A number of other associations were formed
in Senegal before the war; but a letter to MC,
January 31, 1907, ARS, K399-132, indicates that there 
were none before 1907.
123. Existing police reports cover various meetings of the 
associations or their members; e.g., a report of
May 17, 1926 on a banquet of African DSL cheminots,
ARS, 6P434-132; that of November 14, 1925, Ibid.; or 
that of December 19, 1926, Ibid. Those in ARS, 21G133- 
108 include reports on the European DSL association, 
as those dated September 3, 4 and 8, 1928 and 
January 18, 30 and 31, 1929, and one on the African DSL 
association dated January 21, 1929. A police report 
of September 12, 1931 (ARS, 21G41-17) covers a meeting 
of only 20 Africans of the DSL association, and another 
of October 4, 1931 (Ibid.) a meeting of only 15 members. 
See also report of police inspector Wilt to Director 
TN, December 3, 1927, ARS, 1P6-10; same December 4,
1927, Ibid.; confidential report, September 12, 1931, 
ARS, 1P8-10.
124. See Lamine Gu£ye, "Gr^ve du DSL," L'AOF, January 29,
1925, copy in FOM, TP; d'Oxoby, "En grbve," Journal de 
l'Ouest Africain, Ibid.; GG to MC, January 30, 1925, 
Ibid.; DSL to MC, February 11, 1925, FOM, TP; copy note 
for MC, February 12, 1925, Ibid.; Chief of Police,
Thi&s to Administrator Thi&s, February 10, 1925, SARS, 
Confid; GG to MC, February 19, 1925, FOM, TP: President 
of Syndicat Defense Inferets Senegalais to Blaise Diagne, 
March 17, 1925, Ibid.; the dossier ARS, 0234 has several 
documents of early 1925 discussing drafting workers on 
the TK and DSL. Contrast worker action on the TN with 
that shown in acting Director TK to GS, October 28,
1920, ARS, K409-132.
125. GS to GG, March 2, 1925, ARS, K106-26; draft GG to MC, 
May 11, 1925, Ibid.
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126. Government General, AOF, Sur les difficultes rencon- 
tr€es au r£seau Thi^s-Niger depuis sa creation...,
n .d ., /1927_j p p . 2-3, 7-8; see IGTP to Secretary 
General of the Government General, November 29,
1927, ARS, 1P6-10.
127. Director TN to GG, September 23, 1926, ARS, K53-19; 
Director TN to IGTP, February 27, 1928, Ibid.;
Legregram report on TN personnel, July 12, 1930,
FOM, TP.
128. See police report of January 30, 1929, ARS, 21G133-108, 
report of April 19, 1929, Ibid.; report of May 8, 1929, 
Ibid. The police report of January 21, 1929, ARS, 
21G133-108 saw little cohesion left in the DSL African 
association; but a report of February 1, 1929, Ibid., 
shows them negotiating actively for raises, and another 
report of September 14, 1931, ARS, 21G41-17, indicated 
more agitation for raises.
129. See GG to MC, December 1, 1933, FOM, TP, on reduction 
of DSL effectives; GG to MC, February 4, 1933, ARS, 
K66-19; note for GG by Direction APA, April 18, 1934, 
Ibid.
130. The police report of February 1, 1929, ARS, 21G133-108 
noted that the African TN association was reluctant to 
cooperate with their DSL colleagues. "Par leur genre 
different de recrutement," it explained, "ils se 
consid^rent comme au-dessus de leurs collegues du 
DSL..
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A P P E N D I X  I I
Of the 26 ex-cheminots, one began work on the Dakar- 
Niger only in 1934, but deserves to be included. Of the 
25 others, 10 began with the DSL, 5 with the KN, '4 with the 
TK, and 6 with the consolidated TN. Four began railroad 
work before 1911, 7 more before 1921, 3 more before 1926, 
and the rest afterward. Fourteen of these men received a 
formal French education, while the other 12 did not.
Fifteen did all or most of their work in the Rolling Stock 
division or associated rail workshops, four were in the 
Movement division, four in the Track (and Buildings) divi­
sion, and two in the central offices (one moved around too 
much to be classified). Ethnicity cannot be easily pin­
pointed in many cases because of mixed parentage. Roughly 
speaking, these men can be grouped as 8 Wolof, 5 Khassonke,
3 Lebu, 3 Sarakole, 2 Bambara, 1 Tukolor, 1 Serer, 1 Peul, 
and 2 not classified.
The interviews were generally conducted in the infor­
mant's home, usually privately in French, sometimes with 
friends present; but five men were interviewed in the 
street usually with friends sitting by, and one was inter­
viewed in an office. Six were interviewed at Dakar, one at 
Rufisque, one at St. Louis, and the rest at Thi&s. The 
interviews were not tape recorded (except in one case), but 
the following questionnaire was used as a general guide dur-
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in g the interviews:
TRANSLATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE FROM THE FRENCH:
Details on the general functioning of railroads (as
dates organization, directors' names, etc.) can be found in
books or archives. But the personal observations of rail­
road workers are particularly useful for undocumented items.
Some questions are:
1. When did you begin to work for the railroad and what posts 
did you come to occupy? Did your father or grandfather 
work for the railroad?
2. Where had you come from, and what attracted you to work 
on the railroad? Where did your father and grandfather 
come from, and, if they worked for the railroad, what 
attracted them to work for it?
3. What sorts of men were drawn by railroad work? From 
which lands, which origins, which former occupations?
4. Where and how did they live when they were single?
When they were married, where and how did their families 
live?
5. Were there voluntary associations or cooperatives for 
these workers? (societes d'entreaide for eating, for 
habitation, for purchasing goods, for sickness, for holi­
days, for social affairs, for receiving new workers, for 
loans, for burials, etc.) How did they function?
6. What leisure days were there? What did one do on those
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days or on religious festivals?
7. Were the mosque, the church, or the quarters of the city 
centers of communal life for the rail workers? How?
8. Do you recall any traditions, songs or well-known 
stories about important incidents or eminent railwaymen 
which illustrate aspects of the life of railwaymen?
9. Do you recall any stories of your father or grandfather 
about the development and functioning of the railroads, 
or on the development of trading posts and villages along 
the lines?
10. Do you think that there were any changes in the lives and 
perspectives of railwaymen as compared to other Senegalese, 
because of their work for the railroad?
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CHAPTER VI
RAILROADS AND AFRICAN LAND
/"In France_7 one meets at each step cities, villages, 
homes, chateaux, parks, with which one must reckon so 
as not to augment the enterprise's expenses unreasona­
bly . . . in a new country like the Sudan, one only 
worries about the general contours of nature. _/~Even_7 
the populations to be served are a secondary considera­
tion. They don't summon the railroad. The railroads 
summon them. ]_
-Ch. Freycinet, 1881
The impact of railroad lines on property values, 
especially on urban land located near rail stations and 
yards or near right of way approaches into towns, is a 
familiar theme of 19th century urban social history in 
Western countries. Even in the early days of railroading 
it was soon generally recognized that this means of locomo­
tion would raise the values of commercial properties well- 
sited to take advantage of the shipping and traveling 
facilities that an adjacent rail station would offer. Some 
land speculators would aim at cheap, early purchases of 
land located astride a projected railroad's right of way in 
rural areas, or better yet on the approaches into towns,
-359-
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in order to sell later to the railroad at inflated prices. 
Alternatively a speculator might gain even more by invest­
ing in the anticipated commercial appreciation of proper­
ties located near a projected railroad line. This could 
be a risky gamble, however, since a railroad trace often 
also reduced the value of some properties, especially
those residential areas masked or isolated by the contours
2
of a railroad's tracks and yards.
The impact of railroad construction in the 19th
century on property values of land in the clusters of
settled communities in Europe and the eastern United States,
with their pre-existing patchworks of property holdings,
rural and urban, and its impact on the social fabric of
these areas involved the complex interplay of many inter-
3
related elements. In comparison, a pioneering railroad 
lanced into unsettled territories, as in the American 
West, clearly was a simpler case. Here, a railroad was 
one of a set of conditioning factors newly-imported into 
the territory by the railroad itself--factors which were, 
in fact, creating new land values where none or virtually 
none had existed before.
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The case of railroads in Senegal stands out in 
contrast to the experiences in both the pioneering and 
settled situations. For while the lands in question 
had indeed been occupied by settled communities before 
the coming of the railroad, the promoters and organizers 
of the rail projects, thinking largely in terms of 
pioneering railroads, considered that they were indeed 
creating new property values where none had existed 
before. The nub of the problem really lay, however, in 
the fact that two radically different notions of land 
value, European and African, were involved.
African land tenure In contrast to European society, 
traditional Senegalese society, in a land-rich and labor­
scarce region, placed a relatively higher value on human 
resources and relationships than on material resources. 
The similarities in Western and African attitudes toward 
land and labor should not blind us to the significance 
of the different emphasis accorded these factors within 
African and Western societies. These similarities some­
times misled earlier observers into considering African
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
institutions as primitive versions of the Western. In 
fact, despite some obvious congruities, the differing 
perceptions within African and Western perspectives of 
the relation between land and labor indicates fundamental, 
underlying differences in the balances within the two 
cultures
Within Western society, there seems to be a impli­
cit assumption that society is purposeful in itself-'- 
that it exists to bring to fruition a given potential of 
development. Within this general assumption, land and 
labor are viewed as instrumental--as factors useful in 
accomplishing the tasks of development. Land is there­
fore valuable even in potential alone; and while land is 
exploitable only with appropriate applications of labor, 
labor itself is only given the status of another factor 
of production.
Traditional African societies in Senegal, with 
their long agricultural background, also valued produc­
tive land, and property rights had long been carefully 
defined throughout the region. But in a setting where 
land was abundant, with the predominance of a slash-
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and-bum system of agriculture, which encouraged mobility, 
and a relative scarcity of labor, the powerful, respected, 
and rich were in general not those who could make exten­
sive land claims per se, but those who could attract or 
compel military manpower and agricultural labor. The 
greater the manual support, the greater the fruits of 
production, and the greater the security. This was 
especially true during the unsettled era of the Atlantic 
slave trade.
Interpersonal relations and mutual obligations 
were, therefore, a more central concern than in Western 
society. Fertile land and water resources were also 
esteemed, but if depleted or too meager locally, they 
might be easily found in relative abundance elsewhere.'*
In fact, productive land, abundant water, and flocks were 
prized in large part for their usefulness in attracting 
new supporters to a group or leader, as well as in satis­
fying and retaining the more capable with rewards.
Perhaps the differences in Western and African atti­
tudes toward land and labor were the result, in origin, 
only of differing agricultural techniques under different
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climatic conditions. It is interesting to note, never­
theless, that servitude in Europe was characterized by 
tying the serf to the land, in contrast to African servi­
tude where the tie to a master was of a personal nature 
and where the personal qualities of the slave could enable 
him to rise to high positions of power.
Senegalese land tenure was complex, and its rules
varied with the ethnic group and region. It can be said
that, in general, property rights were conferred by the
6
act of clearing out forest land for cultivation. For 
example, Wolof custom, drawing upon ancient Serer prac­
tice, recognized the overlapping rights of an original 
claimant, the "lamane", who had earned rights over wide 
tracts of land by being the first to clear them with fire, 
and those of an occupying tenant, the "borom n'gadio", 
who had cleared a family plot for cultivation on a portion 
of this land with tools later on. The lamane was entitled 
to collect a fee from the latter. But this fee origin­
ally had the nature of a symbolic gift rather than rent 
and arose from a religious relationship between the lamane 
and the land, rather than an exclusive property claim.
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More importantly, the borom n'gadio could not in general 
be dispossessed and property being held on a familial 
or even a communal basis was, in general, not alienable, 
although its management might be confided to a family 
head.
After the 16th century, powerful monarchs usurped 
the rights of many a lamane, granting these land rights 
in turn as fiefs to members of their entourages, to 
warriors, or to religious leaders. In these cases, the 
fees exacted from the borom n'gadio might become onerous; 
but the very nature of these fees only emphasizes the 
importance of the personal bond in land tenure.
Set fees for land use were only levied at the 
inception of occupancy and for renewals at the death of 
either of the contracting parties. Regular annual taxes 
of various kinds were generally exacted on the basis of 
a set percentage of the crop harvested--a levy correspond­
ing more directly to the amount of labor invested in 
cultivation rather than to the intrinsic value of the 
land itself.^ There was never any question of an active 
market for land, nor of the peasant's basic right to
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continue occupying the land. After all, he, not the 
land was the source of wealth.
European land values on African turf Despite a prolonged 
European presence in ports or trading posts along the 
African coast and along some rivers, little headway was 
made at first in creating an extensive network of proper­
ty holdings according to European standards. There is 
no reason to doubt that French officials and merchants 
imported European notions of property at an early date
as a useful tool in organizing and administering inter-
9
nally their African trading stations. But the signifi­
cance of these measures, even at these trading points, 
was vitiated by the fact that, aside from the military 
advantages of a given position, there were generally 
many other alternative sites in the environs that could 
be just as suitable for trading, and indeed were often 
used for the p u r p o s e . D u r i n g  the period of the Atlan­
tic slave trade, the very nature of the trade prompted 
the competing European powers to scatter their trade 
operations widely in far-flung networks of small posts 
and anchorages along the coast, interspersed untidily
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among those of other rival nations, rather than concen­
trating operations at a few points or occupying long,
11contiguous stretches of coastline. Even after the
demise of the slave trade, the rising trade in staple
commodities did not necessarily transform the situation.
Terrains within the French-run escales trading in gum
along the Senegal river were indeed neatly subdivided
into parcels bought by merchants. But these property
holdings retained little real value when free trade
allowed commerce to take place at many other points
12
along the river's banks.
It was the growing profitability of larger and 
larger, coal-burning iron ships during the course of 
the 19th century that, as it gradually changed the char­
acter of seaborne transport, also drastically altered
13the relative importance of various coastal sites.
Unlike the smaller wooden sailing vessels, these more 
efficient maritime carriers could be accommodated only 
at a limited number of points along the African coast. 
Everywhere, anchorages and ports became less and less 
adequate as ships became larger, requiring extensive
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alterations and expansion even at the few natural harbors 
on the coast. Driven by a growing competition for com­
merce with Africa and for the maritime carrying trade, the
various powers strove to improve docking, coaling, and
. 1 4provisioning capacities at their colonial ports. Never­
theless, given the budgetary stringencies on colonial 
projects, governments could only undertake large-scale 
construction and dredging operations at a few ports. The 
heavy cost of construction at a port, such as Dakar with 
its excellent natural harbor, would prompt the colonial 
government to encourage a greater flow of traffic into 
Dakar simply in order to generate a better return on its 
earlier construction investment. This was, moreover, a 
cumulative process, since traffic could be attracted to 
Dakar by making even more improvements on its harbor and 
port. Thus the earlier investments were inviting even 
heavier investments in the port, and these made the diver­
sion of traffic to Dakar even more essential. Inevitably, 
the government also would deliberately neglect the construc­
tion needs of competitive ports, such as St. Louis and 
Rufisque, in order to funnel even more shipping into Dakar^ 
It was this increasing concentration of commercial
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activity at a few points (including at first St. Louis 
and Rufisque) that was the primary determinant in creating 
or in magnifying enormously property values in and around 
favored ports— by endowing well-located parcels of land 
with an undeniable intrinsic value based on their poten­
tial for facilitating business transactions and increasing 
trade volume, while reducing the costs of operation. In 
Senegalese ports, land at a site would be valued according 
to its proximity to the harbor, business district, and 
government administration offices, and to the site's ade­
quacy for commerce, storage, or habitation. Other nearby 
parcels might now also become objects for speculation, 
since they could also acquire value simply in anticipation 
of future increased shipping activity in the port.
As railroad lines were being built into the African 
hinterland, it was obvious that they were also reinforcing 
and extending the European system of land valuation on 
the African continent in two ways. The railroads were, 
on the one hand, attracting and concentrating even more 
of the hinterland's trade within certain ports, so that 
the overall value of real estate in a favored port would 
rise, even while the sitings of the railroad station and
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rail approaches in or near the port also reshuffled local 
property values to some degree. At the same time, the 
railroad was also embedding a system of European property 
holdings deep within the interior, by creating a string 
of focal points for local concentrations of the export 
trade within the peripheries immediately around the sta­
tions along the rail trace. Before the railroad, African
caravans could choose among a multitude of alternate
16routes leading to a number of different ports. The rail­
road line, cheaper and faster than a caravan, would now 
funnel freight and passenger traffic along a fixed trajec­
tory. But as noted earlier, the railroad, unlike a trail, 
highway, or river, was only open at a restricted number 
of points, its services available only at limited times, 
according to the directives of a railroad administration 
that formed part of the colonizing power. The concentra­
tion of shipping at the railroad stations would tend, there­
fore, to produce a gradation of land values in rural land
17
based on their proximity to the rail station. In this 
sense, the railroad was thus playing a primordial role in 
the creation of monetary land values in Africa, both by 
rendering areas in the interior accessible to ports engaged
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in the export trade and by helping to concentrate this 
trade within narrow geographic channels.
In contrast, the bits of terrain set aside for .the 
needs of the railroad--rectangles of 400 meters by 100 for 
DSL stations, 800 meters by 200 for TK stations, and from 
30 meters width for the DSL right of way to a variable 
span of 30 to 100 meters for the TK--had limited, though 
not inconsequential direct impacts in themselves on the 
growth of urban areas or the development of private prop­
erty systems. These railroad properties were only enclosed 
at a comparatively late date, and many unused portions of 
the properties were, in fact, occupied informally by Afri­
can huts or plantings, even into the 1930's.^ The two 
partial exceptions to this rule were Dakar and Thi^s; but 
this was due largely to the installation of railroad head­
quarters in both towns, and to the unique conditions at 
19these sites. The growth of urban areas, their morphol­
ogy, and the evolution of land tenure rights in and about 
these areas were governed to a much larger extent by other, 
more fundamental factors, peculiar to the nature of the 
colonial enterprise or intrinsic to the African scene, 
rather than to any direct, specific role of railroad opera-
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tions or to the layouts of rail traces and terminals.
Law, land and labor Land, whether in remote rural dis­
tricts or in the new urban areas coveted by the colonial 
regime, was regulated originally according to local Afri­
can law and custom, in which rights over the same piece 
of land might be held, perhaps consecutively, by a commu­
nity, by an extended family, or by an individual. After 
the conquest, the contact of these traditional land 
tenure systems with a system of European law based on indi­
vidual property rights and assigning a cash value to ter­
rain could only be corrosive for the former. This became 
evident wherever French law became preeminent, and espec­
ially when a need to pay taxes in cash arose. Sale of 
land, which might occur inadvertently out of ignorance of 
French law or because of a need for money, might now 
permanently alienate to Europeans as private property a 
community's formerly exclusive and theoretically non-ali- 
enable right or negate the legitimate traditional claims 
of others.
The French administration was interested, of course, 
in expropriating large tracts of land for its own needs, 
as well as seeing to it that French merchants and colonists
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could also obtain land under easy terms for trade opera­
tions and for agricultural development. The administra­
tion could claim wide stretches of terrain on the basis 
of treaties obtained by consent or force, and in fact had
little trouble in taking the land it needed for fortifi-
20cations or for the railroad lines. In other cases, 
however, Africans proved much more intractable about yield­
ing parcels of terrain that they were cultivating or inhab­
iting. The obstinancy of Africans in these cases was bad 
enough in the eyes of those colonial officials who could 
imagine more vital or productive uses for the land. But 
insistent African claims to apparently deserted tracts of 
territory indeed often infuriated top colonial officials.
It is likely that these officials were aware of the local 
practice of leaving fields in fallow for extended periods 
of time. However, they generally considered these prac­
tices backward and wasteful. As a consequence, the colon­
ial government was generally well disposed to awarding 
large tracts of rural terrain to French citizens or com­
panies, under condition that they be developed economi­
cally, and it did so often enough with little compensation
21for African occupiers or claimants of the terrain.
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Nevertheless. a sytem of rural concessions or plan­
tations never became widespread in Senegal, as it did in 
other French colonies in Africa. The political hostility 
in the 19th century between members of the colony’s General
Council and the colonial government originally may have
22played an important role in this development. Even more 
significant in the long run was the disappointing produc­
tivity of the rural concessions, in contrast to the profit­
ability of an export trade based on peanut cultivation by 
peasant families, who would abandon a terrain if it was
OO
awarded to a concessionaire. The government had little 
interest, therefore, in the dispossession en masse of Afri­
can peasants, who were the mainstay of production. Instead, 
the colonial administration tended, in practice, to moder­
ate the adverse impact of concession grants by limiting 
their size and avoiding settled productive areas. But
24
it continued, nevertheless, to award these concessions.
The colonial administration also had to be wary of 
French merchants and colonists. All too often, a petitioner 
seeking a rural concession in the name of agricultural 
development was only out to obtain cheaply plots of well- 
sited land that might be used advantageously for commercial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 3 7 5 -
25
purposes or sold at a profit later. Nor was the admini­
stration pleased, on the other hand, to be forced to pay 
high prices for needed urban land to French citizens who 
had already bought the rights to the land earlier, at a 
pittance, from Africans needing cash.^
To minimize other conflicts arising from fundamental 
differences between French laws and African custom, espec­
ially in the case of slavery, the colonial administration 
had divided Senegal in 1890 into two areas: the directly
administered territories, covering the urban coastal towns, 
the major trading posts, and, later on, a one kilometer 
ribbon of territory on either side of the DSL railroad, 
where French law would prevail; and the "Pays du Protec-
torat", covering the remaining territory, where local cus-
27tom was to prevail under French supervision. This divi­
sion could not resolve, however, the question of land 
tenure, since the majority of terrains in direct rule areas 
were rural in fact and still held according to African 
custom, while the administration also wished to grant con­
cessions in the Protectorate area. Neither could the prob­
lem be resolved easily by associating rights acquired under 
the customary law with those acquired under the Civil Code
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because of the complexity of overlapping rights involved 
in familial and collective land tenure. Even worse, under 
the technicalities of French law, most African land rights, 
being of a nature akin to that of usufruct in European
p Q
terms, would have been voided. The very act of regis­
tering African land into a French system of property hold­
ings, it should be added, presented a formidable problem 
to the administration, since in the absence of a land cad­
astre the physical effort of surveying and marking property
boundaries for even a limited number of terrains was a
29burdensome material task.
The abrupt imposition of French property laws within 
consolidated urban zones might also have had some grave 
consequences. The success of the colonial occupation did 
not depend so much on the acquisition of parcels of terrain 
as on attracting or compelling African labor to contribute 
to the export trade. Large numbers of Africans had to be 
drawn to reside within or near the urban areas for more 
or less extended periods of time, not only to perform the 
myriad skilled, semi-skilled, and menial tasks that ran 
the trade, but also for the associated tertiary activities 
that fed and sustained the populations of these towns.
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Fashioned by Europeans, the towns quickly became, as has
o n
been remarked, largely populated by Africans. u Trade 
goods and the need to earn cash for the head tax--the same 
devices which drew Africans into cultivation for the export 
trade--also enticed many into the towns, at least for short 
periods. The towns of course had other allures. They 
offered bright lights and refuge from rural labor recruit­
ment, from chiefly and parental authority, and for a time
31from the head tax itself. But the towns chronically 
suffered from labor shortages, and it would not do to com­
pound the shortage by making it difficult for African 
laborers to find housing or by repelling long-term resi­
dents from the vicinity by troubling unnecessarily their 
tenures on land.
The colonial administration's answer to these dilem­
mas was to proclaim a general right of eminent domain over 
land in Senegal (and later for all French West Africa) in 
the name of the French state. Enunciated as far back as
1862, this claim was based at first on treaties with Afri-
32can sovereigns granting land to the French. After the 
conquest, even more sweeping claims were put forth on the 
grounds that the rights of the African sovereigns had
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passed to the French state by right of conquest. Under 
this questionable theory, African sovereigns were consid­
ered to have been the sole proprietors not simply of 
abandoned and empty terrains, but also of all landed prop­
erty in the realm, with the actual cultivators entitled 
only to precarious rights of occupation. In case of land 
expropriation, a parcel's African occupants were therefore 
to be entitled only to a meager compensation for the loss 
of use of the land and for displacement costs, in contrast 
to holders of titles legally registered under French law,
who had recourse to a highly favorable expropriation pro- 
33cedure. Naturally, this principle could also be used
to assert, though with mixed effectiveness, that any direct
sales of land by Africans to Europeans were invalid.
This legal principle of land tenure, which was to be
a cornerstone of colonial social law, was dominant in
Senegal particularly after 1907, until rejected by the
34courts in 1933. One should not be too concerned with the 
formal legalisms of most government documents on this ques­
tion, although many an important court case turned on the 
logic of a theoretical argument. Essentially, the admini­
stration was pragmatically staking out as wide a claim as
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possible--retaining wide powers of expropriation and a 
veto over land registration--in order to be able to exer­
cise a firm control over a changing colonial situation 
that could evolve along contradictory lines. The long term 
interest of the colonial power, of course, was to extend 
the sway of Civil Code provisions over its entire colonial 
domain, and to do it in such a way as to reward those who 
were helping the colonial administration consolidate and 
develop the territory economically. At the same time, 
care had to be taken not to create social and economic tur­
moil nor to impair the administration's freedom of action 
by a too hasty extension of French metropolitan property 
laws. This might not only alienate and repel needed Afri­
can labor, but also allow greedy or unsympathetic elements, 
both European and African, to profit at the government's 
expense by exploiting the technical restrictions in these 
laws. The zone of private property holdings would be ex­
panded steadily, but only at a rate and in ways conforming 
to the government's immediate policies and interests. Under 
the circumstances, it was convenient for officials to view 
this unregistered land as valuable mainly in potential-- as 
a patrimonial treasure that would generate governmental
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revenue through lucrative land sales, as well as a resource
35held in trust for supposedly unsophisticated Africans.
Escales, ports, and trade Urban land had been claimed by 
the 19th century colonial administration in the name of the 
French state, the colony, and its municipalities. But 
within a few days of the decree transforming the Government 
General into a powerful, consolidated political authority 
in October 1904, a new decree was also issued advancing 
an exclusive claim of eminent domain over practically all
0/1
land in French West Africa in the name of the French stated 
Confirmed after legal tests in the courts, it was this claim 
which was to be the legal basis of property rights for the
07
lion's share of urban property. Under French colonial 
regulations, urban property could be granted in a number of 
ways. In the early days, French citizens could buy land 
from the African occupants and formally register them with 
the colonial government, or they could buy directly from 
the colonial government itself. Seasonally inundated urban 
lands were granted freely by the government with the pro­
viso that they be filled in above water level within a set 
period. Concessions for the temporary occupancy of plots 
of land were also granted on the basis of annual rents to
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the government, and could be converted to a permanent 
title if the land was sufficiently developed during occu­
pancy. The administration preferred to sell plots of land, 
however, in order to profit from the sales, and to simplify 
its own responsibilities. After 1887, surveyed urban land,
in principle, had to be offered at least initially for
38
sale at public auction. Sale and registration of a plot 
of land would be made after a surveyor reconnoitered and 
marked out the terrain, and after a formal inquest into 
outstanding claims on it. Prior to auctions, the govern­
ment would itself formally survey and formally register the 
land to be auctioned.
The colonial administration mapped out lots in each 
important trading center or each port at various times 
depending on the growth of the agglomeration. In general, 
and in contrast to the typical African village with its 
serpentine lanes winding about compounds of diverse, but 
generally rounded contours, the administration would try 
to lay out the lots, as had been prescribed by the metro­
politan ministry, in rectilinear checkerboard fashion, 
generally in the form of square islets of four equal square 
lots separated from other islets by streets or wide boule­
vards .
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River or seaboard escales were generally aligned 
about streets giving access to the shoreline and its quais. 
Inland trading centers would form along the junctions of 
roads, with a central market square often located at the 
crossroads. At a railroad junction, the checkerboard pat­
tern mapped out for the trading center, also generally 
called an escale, would be aligned along one long side of 
the rectangle forming the rail station property, with the 
main street of the center leading directly into the station 
at a right angle (See Figure 10a). In these railroad es­
cales, an open square, set aside as a market, often pro­
vided a focal center within the rectilinear layout, and a 
number of DSL escales were laid out on both sides of the
station property, though commercial operations almost al-
39
ways concentrated on one side only. In more important 
centers, a local administrator's residence would form an 
alternate focus, generally on the outskirts of the agglom­
eration. Unofficial or informally aligned settlements that 
had been in place before the formal administrative division 
of their terrains sometimes prompted deviations from the 
rectilinear patterns in order to preserve pre-existing 
alignments, especially along diagonally oriented trade 
routes. Sometimes, on the other hand, an over ambitious
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administrative plan for a given escale would map out a 
much greater area for allotment than was used by the ag­
glomeration, and in fact much of the mapped land would be
under cultivation as though the pattern of the allotment 
40
did not exist.
The railroad station would exert a powerful attrac­
tion tending to centralize trade within the adjacent escale. 
But this was offset to a large extent by the commercial 
advantages of waylaying road traffic while it was still 
enroute to the escale. Competing maStres des langues would 
often be found on the roads to the escale, attempting to
guide produce-hauling cultivators or whole caravans toward
41
particular patrons within the escale itself. Smaller 
traders, unable to afford the expense of a private plot or 
of permanent installations within the escale, would also 
open their operations on the access roads beyond its peri­
meter- -a ploy that would often lead the larger merchants 
to set up competing subsidiary operations near them on the 
roads. It was precisely just such a competition of traders 
and merchants attempting to outflank each other on the 
road leading out of Dakar, that resulted, after a series of
leapfrog jumps along the road, in the formation of Rufisque 
42
in the 1860's. It was this kind of process which also
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created many satellite trading centers on the roads and 
riverways near larger escales. Merchants based in the es­
cales would naturally resent having to invest in subsidi­
ary operations while smaller competitors were escaping 
the higher costs of escale installation, particularly after
1904 when tax-collecting municipal governments were set
43
up in a number of escales. Indeed from 1912, the larger
merchants were demanding that commerce be banned for a
radius of 5 kilometers or more about each escale and that
44ambulant traders be barred from operating within them.
Although sympathetic, the administration balked neverthe-
45
less at fettering free trade outright. Instead, it would 
rely, into the 1920's, on extending the system of formally- 
surveyed escales into the roads and waterways of the inter­
ior in pursuit of an expanding commercial geographic dis- 
46
tribution.
The main district within a rail escale could become 
so congested that there was insufficient space for storing 
the peanuts awaiting shipment by rail. Often stocks were 
heaped up at auxiliary sites at the outskirts of the escale, 
or beyond its perimeter. Peanut freight would be trun­
dled from these storage heaps to the railroad station on
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wheeled carts rolled along by hand over light, metal tram­
ways ("voies Decauville") running through the streets.
At first, the metal tracks for these lines were installed
at the initiative of individual commercial firms for their 
47
own needs. But later on, the commercial tram systems in 
the various escales were consolidated into municipal sys­
tems, either by a private entrepreneur or by the munici­
pal government itself.^
As for the ports, railroad lines could have contra­
dictory effects on their growth, depending on the port's 
commercial situation and the efficiency of port facilities. 
In so far as the structural layouts of the ports were con­
cerned these depended much more on the peculiar features 
of the port sites and on the orientation of docking and 
storage facilities than on the position of the railroad 
terminals themselves. Nevertheless, the terminal location 
clearly did have some effect (see Figures 10b through lOe 
for various ports). The rail terminal's location was of 
greatest importance at Rufisque, where the railroad, in 
redoubling the port's natural advantage of proximity to 
centers of agricultural production, more than compensated, 
along with the site's abundant water and storage space,
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for the grave inadequacies of Rufisque's unsheltered 
anchorage and meager docking facilities. The railroad sta­
tion was not placed within the limits of the commercial 
town, but at some distance to the north, about a half-kil- 
ometer from the wharfs. The gridiron pattern of the com­
mercial town's streets was, therefore, naturally aligned 
along the connecting passages that married the railroad 
station to the seafront docks. The streets running in from 
the seafront and the branching lateral streets were criss­
crossed with a dense network, of metal tram lines running 
up to the railroad station--a binding webwork of metal 
arteries carrying a rich flow of produce from rail to ship,
while showering the municipal coffers with revenue from 
49
its tolls.
The limited impact of the rail stations at St. Louis 
arose obviously from their remoteness, in a sparsely- 
settled, marshy, continental suburb far from the main com­
mercial hub of the island port. A private entrepreneur 
provided an irregular carriage service from the island to 
the stations; but it was plainly inadequate.^ Unfortu­
nately, by the time a new passenger terminal was built in 
a convenient location at the foot of the pont Faidherbe,
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51the town's commercial situation had radically worsened.
Even as the river trade, long and short haul, was shrink­
ing in volume, a capricious river mouth entry was blocking 
the larger ocean shipping from the port. Under these con­
ditions, the relocated rail facilities, far from acting 
as an armature for new commercial activity and urban growth, 
as they might have in an earlier period, operated instead 
as just one more siphon on a rapidly decaying port.
Similarly cramped by a partially-strangled river 
access to the sea, the port of Kaolack was buoyed, in con­
trast, by a rapidly improving commercial situation. Al­
ready well-placed to receive the produce of a rich agri­
cultural region only beginning to expand its production, 
Kaolack received an added filip by being selected as a 
major port outlet for the new TK railroad line. The sensi­
ble fashion in which the TK freight terminal was wedded 
directly to the port contrasted favorably with the dismal 
conditions at St. Louis, or even those at Rufisque. The 
roadbed here was traced around the western edge of the
already existent commercial escale down to a newly construc-
52
ted rail pier on the western edge of the port's riverfront. 
This happy arrangement, wisely drawn to leave space for
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new commercial installations near the station, nicely facil 
itated an easy transfer of freight (often carted by tram­
ways) between rail and port or commercial establishment 
and added significantly to the site's inherent advantages 
of plentiful natural quais, water, and storage space. The 
major drawback to the orientation of this trace was that 
as Kaolack expanded in prosperity, the rail line came to 
form a barrier to communication between newly-forming 
(African) residential suburbs and the commercial quarter 
of the town."*^
Dakar was one case where the rail terminal actually 
hampered the initial growth of the port. As recounted ear­
lier, the ill-conceived 1883 design for the rail line's 
approach into Dakar restricted commercial activity by mask­
ing stretches of shore line, while the passenger terminal,
deeply embedded in the port area, further congested a
54
cramped commercial quarter. Dakar s fine natural harbor 
led to its early use as an important port of call for coal­
ing and provisioning shipping on the major Atlantic routes;
55
but commercial traffic with the interior languished. A 
glance at early street maps of Dakar clearly reveals one 
reason in the occupation of many of the better sites by a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 3 9 1 -
steamship company and by edifices housing administrative
56
services or military and naval units. The railroad com­
pensated to some degree for the town's eccentric position 
with respect to the interior; but commerce was still ham­
pered by a lack of storage yards for peanuts in Dakar, 
and by the narrowness of shoreline available to commerce. ^  
The commercial success of Dakar came, of course, with 
the major construction efforts from 1908 to 1932 to create 
a suitable port adjacent to the military port. The widen­
ing, deepening, and improved sheltering of the harbor it­
self was coupled to the creation of vast new quais by shore­
line fill and the opening of wide new areas for stocking 
produce and coal.
The new quais and piers were served directly by a 
network of rails linked to the DSL system. But removal of 
the railroad terminal from the commercial center--a long­
standing grievance of local commerce--was also an integral
58
part of the port overhaul program. DSL freight opera­
tions were transferred back into the dunes region on the 
north edge of the town, while DSL administrative offices 
and housing were expanded in that zone. The new siting 
of the passenger terminal was less easy to settle, delayed
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as it was by a tug of war between merchants who wanted the 
station just at the edge of the commercial center, and 
naval authorities, who wished to push it out even farther 
for an easier access to the new naval arsenal. Interest­
ingly, it was the navy's insistence on giving its naval 
commander's new headquarters an unobstructed view of the 
harbor that was decisive, as a new, grander passenger rail 
terminal tucked in behind the arsenal was opened finally
59
in 1914, on an emplacement 1000 meters from the old site.
African land rights The growing importance of the es­
cales and ports played a paramount role in shaping the 
colonial administration's attitude toward African claims of 
traditional land tenure. The government's record in recog­
nizing these traditional claims had never been wholly con­
sistent in the 19th century, with colonial officials taking 
care at times to purchase rights to land at times, and
deliberately undermining or disregarding strong claims at 
60
other times. Even as the DSL was being completed, offi­
cials were purchasing the rights to land on the future sites 
of the escales of Thids and M'Pal, in French territory, 
from their African possessors before proceeding to survey
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plots for auction at these sites. In Cayor, the French 
state held title to wide perimeters around each of the 
DSL rail stations by treaty. But as long as a darnel ruled, 
the ministry in Paris only allowed the government of Senegal 
to rent plots within these perimeters to French merchants 
and traders on a temporary, annual basis. It was only 
after the elimination of the darnels in 1886, that the mini­
stry finally permitted the colonial administration to form
62
permanent escales and sell plots at these sites. Even
as late as 1896, the colonial government felt obliged,
before expanding the perimeter of the growing escales into
the Protectorate, to obtain a prior formal cession of the
land in question in treaties with the paramount chiefs of
63
Cayor and N'Diambour. In that era, even the colonial 
government held that French citizens had to obtain chiefly 
permission before occupying terrain in the interior, 
though in practice the chiefs would obey administration
^ 64 orders.
These distinctions and scruples were swept away by 
the ministerial decrees on land in 1900 and 1904, and by 
the dominance from 1907 of the administration's doctrine 
of being the sole proprietor of all unregistered lands in
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65Senegal. Henceforth, as other railroads were built—
the Thi&s-Kayes, the Louga-Linguere--colonial officials had
few qualms about seizing land unregistered under French
law for rail installations or for the new rail escales.
Whole villages might even be removed from their old sites
under this doctrine, with the occupants reimbursed only
for the costs of displacement and for any crops ruined in 
fifi
the process.
African property rights based on traditional claims 
had received some statutory recognition in article 2 of 
the decree of July 20, 1900 and were even guaranteed speci­
fically in article 58 of the ministerial decree of July 24, 
1906. These short passages seemed to promise that land 
held under traditional custom could no longer be sold or 
conceded to third parties by the government, without at 
least alerting the traditional claimants. The 1906 act 
also seemed to provide a means (though in practice a limi­
ted means) by which these claimants could obtain full title 
to the land under French law on the basis of their tradi­
tional rights.^
Nevertheless, the guarantees that might be read into 
these decrees for traditional rights were seriously undercut
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 3 9 5 -
in most urban areas by the administration1s court victories 
in 1907 upholding the contention that the French state as 
successor to the darnel held title under traditional law to 
all lands in Cayor or formerly in Cayor. The administra­
tion was bent, moreover, on narrowing the scope of the 
1906 decree as much as possible, so as to retain for itself
a decisive power of discretion in matters of land expro-
68
priation and registration. Article 58 of the decree of 
1906 was not intended, in any case, to maintain the social 
relations embodied in customary land law--for that matter, 
the colonial government only became familiar with the 
particulars of local African customary law later on. y 
Instead, officials had hoped vaguely that the decree of 
1906 would indeed gradually reduce peasant mobility by lead­
ing eventually to the formation of a private property system 
of small peasant holdings based on the Civil Code.
Thus, the colonial administration specifically barred
African collectivities from acquiring legal title to land
70
in their own right. Theoretically, the property might 
be registered in the name of the chiefs. But since the 
administration was also dead set against the formation of 
extensive latifundia, the chiefs were generally permitted 
to acquire only small parcels.^ Nevertheless, given the
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inconveniences of land registration and the general adher­
ence to cultivation based on the traditional methods scorned 
by French officials, it was hardly surprising that there
was in fact little formation of private property holdings
72m  rural areas.
It was, of course, the situation in urban areas that 
made the colonial government so sensitive to African land 
claims. On the one hand there were the public works pro­
grams undertaken by the Government General in the larger 
ports, such as Dakar--projects particularly dear to the 
Government General's overall policies. On the other hand, 
there was also the remarkable upsurge in the volume of 
peanut trade after 1S00. As a result, new escales were 
being formed in the interior as trade moved deeper inland, 
while the older escales also expanded notably. Of the 
DSL escales, lots had been surveyed and auctioned earlier 
only at M'Pal (1883), at Thi£s (1885) and at Tivaouane (1888). 
Merchants trading near the other stations along the line 
had been content in the meantime to rent lots in the govern­
ment owned perimeters on a temporary basis. Formal auctions 
of lots first took place at Louga only in 1894, and at 
five other escales in the center of the line (Pire, Mekhe,
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Kelle, Kebemer, and Goumbo Gueoul) only in 1896; auctions 
were held in the other DSL escales only after 1899. The 
growth of the DSL escales, first marked by an ample en­
largement of the government owned perimeters in 1896, was 
again exhibited in 1902 as the existing escale perimeters 
were doubled. Urban land auctions also began occuring more 
frequently at about this time. Only a short time later, 
lots were being sold at the new escales forming on the TK 
even as that line was under construction. Already before 
World War I, new trading centers were being formed and sur­
veyed on the roads of the interior, and this development
73resumed on a much larger scale in the 1920's. Most sig­
nificantly, the growth of these urban areas was provoking 
an increasing awareness among Africans of the advantages 
of property titles, or at least of the disadvantages of 
their absence.
In 1883 and 1884, the darnels had casually granted a 
St. Louisian merchant huge concessions of good terrain 
around the French-controlled perimeters at the new rail 
stations in Cayor— for a pittance.^ By 1896, the chiefs 
of Cayor had hesitated, at least, before conceding to the 
French state wide zones of land (some already producing 
rent) on the outskirts of rail escales--and had received
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75in exchange the political command of a canton of Baol.
Still, at the same time, the hour N'Diambour was unhesi­
tatingly ceding similar terrains around Louga, without any 
76compensation.
It was only belatedly in the first decade of the 20th
century that chiefs were advancing claims to parcels of
terrain within the main escales. Not surprisingly, it was
the chiefs educated in French schools, or having frequent
77
contact with Frenchmen, who made these claims earliest. 
African traders of St. Louis had, of course, been among 
the first to purchase lots in the new rail escales, al­
though some of these African purchasers may have been 
"fronting" for European firms. It is also clear that some
St. Louisian creoles, at least, were actively speculating
78in escale property at an early date. Perhaps one of the 
most interesting cases in regard to African land claims 
was that of Rawane Boye--a notable, former member of Sene­
gal's General Council, and sometime trader. Boye had been 
already paid in 1887 for lands taken by the colony for a 
growing trade center at Leybar on the DSL line. In 1894, 
he undertook to sue the DSL for land occupied by its tracks 
on a great portion of its line between Leybar and St. Louis,
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and for damages supposedly resulting from its installation 
in the 1880's. Boye was armed with solid traditional rights, 
confirmed by an arret§ of none other than Governor Faidherbe. 
Though the claim was clearly speculative in design, it 
tested some fundamental points in colonial jurisprudence, 
establishing for the first time, in the landmark's deci­
sion of the Court jf Bordeaux in 1903 that rejected Boye's
claim, that the state held rights of eminent domain over
79all land in Cayor.
But speculation had little appeal for most Africans,
few of whom possessed the means to indulge in it. There
are indeed many recorded cases of Africans selling their
land rights for cash, especially in urban areas, and there
were at least some early instances of Africans who began
80
to charge other Africans for use of land. There were
instances, later on, of African speculators taking land from 
81others. Nevertheless, in general there was not that much
interest among Africans in procuring land in full title,
even within the escales and ports, where it usually had
been possible to occupy land with little regard for the
82official divisions of terrain into lots. The procedures 
of land registration were difficult, in any case, and could
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be distasteful if it involved the abrogation of someone
else's traditional rights. For instance, despite a long
history of steady usurpation of their land by the colonial
regime, most Lebu in Dakar, although defending themselves
rigorously against new encroachments, consistently abstained
from securing their land as private property registered
, 83under French law until the mid-1920 s. It was a growing 
appreciation for the dangers of a precarious claim to land 
occupied in the urban areas, ports and escales, or in their 
immediate vicinities, that prodded many Africans into seek­
ing more secure formal arrangements--for the administration 
was becoming more intolerant of both customary and infor­
mal occupation of urban land, which seemed to threaten 
not only its commercial and municipal plans, but European 
health itself.
Sanitation and segregation There had always been some 
tendency for separation of European and African housing in 
both the ports and escales in the late 19th century because 
of differing life styles. The formation of an African 
quarter at Guet N'Dar in St. Louis comes to mind as one 
example.^ The very growth of the urban areas obliged the
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authorities to relieve the effects of congestion with 
zoning ordinances prescribing health and safety measures, 
building codes, and street alignments, and to limit rowdy 
and clamorous activities. Local ordinances of this type 
were obviously drawn from metropolitan models, but also 
included bans on activities that seem to have annoyed 
Europeans such as nocturnal singing, drumming, and millet 
pounding by Africans.®-* A concern for fire safety was 
also evident in the reservation of empty zones around forts 
and explosive stores and along the railroad line, as well 
as in the separation of urban housing by wide rectilinear 
streets.86 The questions of fire hazards, especially from 
the clusters of straw huts that sometimes caught fire near 
more permanent European structures, had occasioned spor­
adic expulsions of Africans from the centers of towns.®^ 
There were even some abortive efforts at laying out model 
villages near urban areas for occupation by African resi­
dents of the congested towns.®® Yet in the 19th century, 
there had never been any serious effort to segregate Euro­
peans and Africans in these areas on the basis of race; 
and European settled areas were, in fact, generally med­
leys of habitations of various types, styles and occupants.
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The situation took a more serious turn after 1900 as 
the colonial government’s program of port expansion ran 
into the unsavory sanitary conditions of ports with well- 
earned reputations as pestholes. Dakar’s plight in 1900 
tragically demonstrated the problem: there, a severe out­
break of yellow fever totally halted construction work 
underway on its harbor. Europeans had to be hastily eva­
cuated, while the colonial government was obliged to shoul-
90der the losses of the construction contractor.
At first, the Government General set out to find a
solution for these sanitation problems with ambitious plans
for sewage and drainage ditches, refuse disposal, and
street grading construction at St. Louis and Rufisque, as
91
well as at Dakar. Execution of these plans would have 
led inevitably to some additional separation of African and 
European housing, as at Rufisque, where the clearance of 
the commercial quarter and the construction of major drain­
age ditches was carried out with mass expulsions of Africans
92from the central parts of the town. After 1900, how­
ever, even before this program could be fully implemented, 
new discoveries in tropical pathology led to an even strong­
er emphasis on segregation.
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Nineteenth century germ theory, it must be remem­
bered, considered that disease germs could pass easily from 
one material object to another. Deadly germs were assumed 
to be lurking within "unhealthy" soils in Africa, within
the mists arising from streams, or borne through the air 
93in wind gusts. It was, for instance, a fear of disinter­
ring germs supposedly infesting the earth of an abandoned 
cemetery at the foot of pont Faidherbe, that had prevented 
the DSL for so long from transferring its badly-located
passenger station at St. Louis to the only site where it
94
could effectively serve the town's commercial center.
Yellow fever, the deadliest killer of Europeans, 
and malaria, it was now found, were only communicable from 
the bloodstreams of previous victims by mosquito bite.
These findings, accepted in the area with reluctance even 
as late as 1910, naturally revamped public works construc­
tion projects and urban sanitation ordinances toward an 
emphasis on eliminating mosquito breeding grounds by drain­
ing and filling depressions where water pools could form
95and on enforcing stricter building codes. The new know­
ledge happily saved many potential victims. Unfortunately, 
it also directed fresh attention to Africans as breeders
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and carriers of these diseases, particularly since Afri­
cans, because they were less gravely afflicted by the 
disease, could also be unwitting intermediaries in trans­
mitting these diseases to Europeans through mosquito bites. 
In the absence of a medical prophylaxis for yellow fever, 
it was obvious that a measure of safety would be gained
for Europeans by segregating their living quarters from 
96
Africans.
At an outbreak of yellow fever in 1911-1912, Afri­
cans were expelled by force from the escale of Thi£s and
installed in newly created villages on the periphery, and
97similar expulsions took place at Dakar. Even before 
this, the administration had already taken steps to create 
segregated African villages in the north of Kaolack and 
in the south of Foundiougne in 1910. These villages were 
set up to house Africans dislodged from the commercial cen­
ters of these towns; and these towns were being cleared 
not only to make way for takeovers of occupied land in the
centers, but also evidently with sanitary segregation in 
98
mind. Chronologically, the maturation of the notion of 
segregated quarters in 1910 can be confirmed approximately 
by the coincidental construction of the TK railroad.
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The first four escales surveyed for the new line--Khombole,
Bambey, Diourbel, and Gossas— were laid out with solitary
commercial centers next to the new rail stations, much as
in the old DSL escales, with the plan for Gossas approved
in November 1909. A map for the projected layout of Guin-
guineo, the fifth escale, dated April 8, 1911, announced
plans, however, for a segregated African village to be set
99up in the vicinity of the escale. Henceforth, at each 
new TK escale, two checker-board apportionments were made.
A commercial escale slated for European residence, on lots 
auctioned by the government, was placed conveniently oppo­
site the rail station. Africans could reside in this quar­
ter, but only in housing meeting stringent construction 
regulations. A second quarter, located not far from the 
commercial escale and mapped out in a similar pattern, was 
reserved for African residence (see Figure lOf). These 
quarters set aside near previously unoccupied escales were 
not needed to accomodate any displaced Africans as in the 
older escales. They were plainly intended only to facili­
tate the immigration of a labor force and to stabilize its 
presence by facilitating worker access to sites for inex­
pensive lodging.
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The new centers would differ fundamentally in two 
respects from the African villages heretofore nestling next 
to urban commercial areas in Senegal. They were, though 
this was rarely admitted publicly, to be deliberately sep­
arated from designated "European" areas in order to decrease 
the medical danger to Europeans from infection-bearing mos­
quitos (a separation zone of 800 meters was considered safe). 
At the same time, they were intended, in line with a much 
earlier concept endorsed in 1905 for Dakar by Governor 
General Roume, to provide urban living space for Africans 
on land reserved and mapped out by the administration.
The predetermined rectilinear alignments would presumably 
not only create more hygienic conditions in these new-style 
African agglomerations and lead to an easier surveillance
of them, but would also hopefully guide Africans toward a
100
greater acceptance of European forms of urban living.
Occupancy of a lot by a family head was free but 
precarious, and a permit of occupancy was revocable with­
out compensation in case the quarter was to be displaced. 
Purchase of a full title to a lot was possible, but the
initial purchase terms were too high in any case for most
101
Africans even into the 1930's.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-4 0 7 -
Plans were soon made to extend the system to older 
urban centers. In 1912, a segregated African quarter was 
set up within the perimeter of Ziguinchor. The establish­
ment of separate commercial and African quarters was dis­
cussed for Louga in 1912 and for Tivaouane as early as 
March 1914, though these were only implemented after World 
War I.102
The most dramatic move took place in Dakar, where
earlier expulsions of Africans from central areas to make
room for municipal reconstruction had exempted the Lebu,
the original inhabitants of the town and claimants to a
103great proportion of its terrain. Plans made earlier for
a European sanitary quarter at Goree in case of epidemic
104
had been abandoned meanwhile as impractical. An out­
break of bubonic plague in 1914 gave colonial officials an
opportunity to oust the Lebu from the vicinity of the port
105
and to divide the city into segregated quarters. Sub­
standard housing was torn down and burned and its occupants 
expelled to the Medina, a newly-created village reserved 
for Africans on the outskirts of the city, while strict 
construction regulations were instituted in the city. As 
many as 5,000 of the 20,000 African residents were removed
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to Medina before the operation was halted for political
106
reasons under wartime conditions. Colonial officials
continued to urge renewed displacements of Africans to the
Medina throughout the war, but failed to obtain ministerial 
107
approval. Eviction henceforth had to proceed in Dakar
not on the basis of official segregation, but more slowly
and subtly on the basis of stringent urban building codes;
and Africans could avoid expulsion by arranging for con-
108struction in line with the codes.
African urban living In the absence of any serious, con­
temporary studies of African urban life in Senegal before 
the 1930's, it is difficult to be precise to any great
extent about the conditions of African urban life during
109
the period considered. Whatever attention was given to
African urban and suburban dwellers was most likely to be 
directed toward the ancient occupants of the vicinity, such 
as the Lebu in Dakar, rather than to more recent immigrants 
and transients, who nonetheless formed an important element, 
if not the majority of both the labor force and population 
within the urban areas. Occasionally a rare, illuminating 
notation can be found on immigrant living conditions, as 
Canard's remarks in 1882 on an appalling shortage of sleep-
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ing quarters for escaped slaves flocking into St. Louis at 
110that time. But generally, little was known of these,
more volatile portions of the urban populace, whose comings
and goings marred badly indeed the accuracy of colonial 
111
censuses.
Dresch observed in 1950, that the white man in Africa
could expect to be lodged by his employer, while the African
112was still expected to fend for himself. Retired African
railwaymen recall that in their day young men migrating in­
to an urban or semi-urban area usually encountered little 
trouble in finding lodging and food. Even if there were 
no relatives, fellow countrymen, or recommended friends to 
be found locally, a newcomer.could generally rely on tra­
ditional African hospitality for temporary accommodations.
It was also easy as a rule, affirm the ex-railwaymen, to
rent room and board from local, settled families on a reg-
113
ular monthly basis. Canard's brief notation of 1882
reveals, interestingly enough, that such monthly rentals
to migrants were a common practice in St. Louis at that 
114
time. Reputedly, immigrant Tukolor or Sarakole men of 
the same region would tend to room together in large groups 
to save and share money. Other groups, notably the Wolof, 
were known, on the other hand, to prefer renting single-
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occupancy lodging, whether in rooms or huts.
The specific conditions of African occupancy in ur­
ban and suburban areas before the 1930's were usually
established on an informal basis within and without commer- 
%
cial areas, often escaping official attention unless the 
area was to be cleared for new construction or sanitary 
segregation. An official alignment would often be disre­
garded in reality, as at Guinguineo, where a large African 
quarter took form just to the east of the commercial escale
in spite of official plans designating a segregated African
T 1 fi
village on the other (south) side of the rail station.
The shortcomings and dangers of informal occupancy 
first became apparent to Africans in the ports, as the ad­
ministration moved from 1900 to implement massive construc­
tion programs. This was evident in Rufisque about 1902 as 
many Africans began to buy plots of land within the commune. 
It was also evident at St. Louis as large numbers of Afri­
cans also began to apply for property titles from about 
1909, when it became evident that the colonial government 
might wrest control over municipal land from the commune
*  0«- T  • 1 1 7of St. Louis.
In the 1920's, informal occupancy, although still
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widespread, was nevertheless becoming clearly less satis­
factory and less tenable. One sign was the colonial admini­
stration's increased concern about housing for African 
workers in the mushrooming port of Dakar, with the creation
of an Office of Economic Habitations in 1926 to deal with 
118
the problem. Even more significant in this period was
l
the creation of a large number of segregated African quar­
ters both at older trade centers--as in Tivaouane in 1919,
Louga in 1925, M'Bour in 1923--or at the host of newer
119
trading centers being created in the interior.
Segregated African quarters, of course, were the 
means by which the administration could reconcile its as­
pirations for both sanitation and an urban labor supply.
But curiously, the system was being extended in the hinter­
land precisely when official efforts for racial separation 
%
were flagging in Dakar. There, in the mid-19201s, the
administration was eradicating an 800 meter wide isolation
zone erected between the Medina and the town in 1915 and
1918, while steps were being taken simultaneously to create
120
a long-promised Lebu center in the Tound area of Dakar.
A good deal of the impetus for creation of segrega­
ted quarters in the escales, however, was coming from the
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1 2 1Africans themselves. This clearly came about not from
a passion for segregation, but from a better appreciation
by Africans of the hazards of informal occupation. The
segregated quarters, however precarious in theory, were
infinitely safer than occupation without official sanction.
Full ownership of the occupied lot might even be obtained,
since the terms of purchase, though onerous for Africans,
enabled some who could not afford to buy and build within
the escale, and who were unable to make a claim for land
based on traditional rights, to enjoy the guarantees of 
122
ownership.
The hazards of displacement from informally occupied 
lots were becoming all the more painful, since many Afri­
cans were also turning increasingly at the end of the war 
toward more solidly constructed housing, which could not
be as easily transported or discarded as the old straw 
123
huts. The tragic possibilities of dispossession were
graphically displayed at Thies in the early postwar period 
as an unfortunate court decision validated a questionable 
claim to 2 square kilometers of terrain in Thies, over the 
administration's opposition. The unfortunate African occu­
pants of this thickly populated area were now forced,
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whatever the duration of their residence had been, to
choose between paying the new owners or moving out without 
*10 /
compensation.
The interest of Africans in the formation of segre­
gated quarters did not mean reconciliation with the object­
ives of the colonial power. European merchants for example, 
cast a baleful eye on the formation of African quarters, 
which constituted a potential commercial danger to its 
nearby trading centers. At first, commercial activity 
within the quarters had been strictly forbidden, and the 
ban on non-African residence or ownership within them also
acted as an additional surety against clandestine European
125and Lebanese operations. Yet in practice, the ban on 
petty trade proved ineffective, and tended in many cases 
to benefit Lebanese commerce more than European. An ar- 
rete of 1924 had finally to recognize the fact by legali­
zing petty trade in these quarters, to the dismay of some
merchants who suspected, with good reason, that this trade
126
could stray into forbidden activities.
The administration was also displeased by the devel­
opment of these quarters into lively agglomerations with a 
life of their own, rather than mere sleeping quarters for
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
laborers and local cultivators. Marabouts, "griots", public 
writers, traders, sharpsters--elements of Senegalese society 
regarded as parasitic by French officials--were also attrac­
ted to these centers, which tended to free themselves from 
chiefly authority. "The inhabitant of the / “African^ 
escale," lamented an official in 1934,
doesn't worry about the precariousness of his 
title . . . The habitation permit, although un- 
negotiable, is still the object of profitable 
speculation . . . little by little the inhabitants 
of the native escale escape all tax payments.
Knowing how to avoid the law, lazy . . . detached 
from the authority of the canton chief, they es­
cape prosecution . . .  It can be said that the 
native escale exists in full independence, just 
within the bounds of regulations.
Conclusion If a structural portrayal of the impact of 
the colonial situation on African society ever becomes pos­
sible, it would probably have to be mapped out largely in 
terms of opposing forces of attraction and repulsion acting 
on Africans in the aftermath of the conquest. The rail­
roads were only one factor among others introduced or 
amplified by the colonial conquest. In facilitating the 
entry and circulation of the other factors, the railroad’s 
primary role lay in molding the geographic stage (and to 
some degree the tempo) in which the interaction of these 
forces would be played out. In concentrating economic
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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activity in urban centers, the railroads were concentra­
ting many of the contradictions and conflicts generated 
by the colonial situation, as well as its benefits, with­
in narrow spatial confines.
At the same time, this compression was creating the 
material conditions which allowed the spread of a system 
of property values in the Western sense. African land 
was being transformed into a commodity to be gradually 
assimilated into a Westernized sector, just as was the 
African's laboring contribution. But the African's con­
cepts of land, its value, and its relation to other facets 
of society were also being transformed subtly as well.
The opportunities and predicaments posed by a spreading 
legal system of private property evoked, of course, a wide 
range of reactions among Africans, from a worldly-wise 
Rawane Boye, versed in the possibilities of speculation 
through court action, down to incomprehending peasants 
chased from their ancestral homes by new, alien landowners, 
backed by the forces of law. The critical ingredients in 
determining an individual's reactions were the degree of 
material (mainly financial) opportunity, the amount of 
material investment already sunk in the property, and the
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degree of mastery of French legal procedures (indeed,
familiarity with French culture)--each of which evolved
progressively during the course of the colonial occupation.
The African's stake in land could be a factor encouraging
his acculturation, if he were not alienated meanwhile by
dispossession. Not surprisingly, the distinctive feature
of the emerging new attitudes toward land in this situdion
would be the decisive mediating role of the colonial
J 129
apparatus between the African and his land.
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the late 19th century, products hauled from West Afri­
ca were of low value for large bulk. Lighter cargo 
shipping in the Saloum up to Kaolack, however, was a 
partial exception to the general trend.
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Administrator Baol, November 11, 1919, SARS, DCF, indic­
ates that this applied to the extent of denying worship­
pers the right to buy land in common for a mosque.
71. Acting GG to MC, June 9, 1901, FOM, TP; GG circular of 
March 5, 1913 on agrarian policy, copy in SARS, DCF.
The administration followed the same principle in deny­
ing, or at least in trying to deny, rural concessions
in full property to Mouride collectivities (GS to Admin­
istrator Baol, December 30, 1913, SARS, Confid; GS to 
Blaise Diagne, September 2, 1918, SARS, DCF; Administra­
tor Baol to GS, August 1, 1922, Ibid.
72. Circular GG to Lt. Governors, December 17, 1921, SARS, 
DCF; note on "regime foncier," July 30, 1932, Ibid.
73. Arret& by GG, June 7, 1902 expanded the perimeters of
the territorial reserves around most DSL stations to 
squares of 2000 meters by 2000 meters. The extension 
of many DSL escales in 1896 expanded most of their 
perimeters from oblong shapes of a 300m radius around 
the rail station to squares of 1000m x 1000m. New 
escales were rapidly surveyed along the TK even as that 
line was being built (see GS circular to Administrators, 
March 23, 1909, SARS, DCF).
74. See the maps showing the grants to Lodois Neubourg in 
August 1883 and the larger concessions to Gaston Neu­
bourg in August 1884 at Tivaouane, Pire, N'Dande, and 
Kebemer in FOM, AP3024. See also GG to MC, May 26,
1905, Ibid.; Mme Neubourg, March 8, 1906, Ibid.; GS to 
MMC, June 23, 1884, FOM, 2B 54.
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75. Treaty of March 23, 1896, SARS, DCF; Director Native 
Affairs to Administrator St. Louis-Cayor, March 15,
1896, SARS, DCF; Administrator St. Louis-Cayor to Dir­
ector Native Affairs, April 3, 1896, Ibid., noted that 
Demba War made 5,000 francs per year on these rents
at Tivaouane.
76. Administrator St. Louis-Cayor to Director Native Af­
fairs, April 3, 1896, SARS, DCF. Later the "bour," 
jealous of Demba War's receipt of a province for his 
land, put in a claim for three terrains in the escale 
of Louga (GG to MC, January 10, 1899, Senegal XII,111).
77. Meissa M'Baye, son of Demba War, only got around to 
asking for a lot in Tivaouane in 1912 (GS to Adminis­
trator Cayor, March 8, 1912, SARS, DCF) and for a rural 
concession at his father's old headquarters at Sakh in 
1910 (Administrator Tivaouane to GS, May 10, 1910, SARS, 
DCF). Examples of chiefs interested in property owner­
ship at an early date are Bouna N'Diaye and Fara Biram 
LS, both well acquainted with French practices. Often 
a chief would try to obtain a parcel next to the French 
administrator's residence (e.g., the bour Sine at 
Fatick and the chiefs Samba Khary Cisse and Soce Sow
at Louga.
78. Notably the d'Emevilles--Justin, Germain, Georges.
79. The case remained in the courts at least until 1910. 
Rawane Boye had asked for over a half million francs in 
1894. Interestingly enough, the claim originated rem­
otely with Boye's ancestor, the 'iJean Barre" who first 
allowed French settlement on the island of St. Louis. 
The key decision was made in the arr&t of June 24, 1903 
of the Court of Bordeaux, copy of excerpt in FOM, TP, 
on the narrow and doubtful grounds that the canton of 
Toube had formed part of Cayor. See also acting GG to 
MC, June 9, 1901, FOM, TP; GG to MC, January 19, 1906, 
Ibid.
80. Particularly for lands bought in Dakar and Rufisque 
going back as early as the 1860's. A questionnaire on 
land tenure in Thies, n.d. ]_ circa 1902_/, SARS, DCF, 
noted that the original Serer occupants normally let
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strangers cultivate land on a temporary basis for a cow 
or the equivalent, but also remarked that some communi­
ties were now renting their surplus land at 5 francs per 
year for a one-man field. It also mentioned one case 
of a Bambara who had bought a hectare for 100 francs, 
and then sold it to a Frenchman for 4000 francs. See 
also Administrator Thi£s to GS, March 6, 1910, SARS,
DCF, on rental of land near M'Bao.
81. E.g., note on terrain of Diokouly N'Diayene (Rufisque), 
March 20, 1924, SARS, DCF. This is not to deny that 
there were disputes over possession of rural land in 
traditional societies; but these arose and were settled 
in a different manner than those now regulated by 
French law.
82. A note of acting GS, August 20, 1930, ARS, L63-132, 
stated that in Senegal, excluding Dakar, as of Decem­
ber 31, 1928 the government held 5,650 hectares of 
registered land in its own name, that Frenchmen held 
6,163 ha. morejbut that Africans had a total of only 
1,150 ha. Vadier to Director Agence Economique,
March 29, 1930, Ibid., listed some 4,276 ha. in the 
hands of 1,807 proprietors in Dakar without distinguish­
ing between African and European proprietors.
83. Armand-Pierre Angrand, Les L^bous de la presqu'^tle du 
Cap Vert(Dakar, 1946), pp. 102-132; Delegate Senegal 
(Dakar) to GS, September 19, 1907, SARS, DCF. Many 
were content with a certificate signed by a government 
official attesting to the accuracy of their traditional 
claim. This, however, did little good if the adminis­
tration decided later on to take the land (draft GS 
circular, January 13, 1925, SARS, DCF). The Tound area 
was set aside in 1905 as a quarter held communally by 
the Lebu community, but registered for that purpose in 
the name of the state. See Delegate Senegal (Dakar) to 
GS, September 1, 1913, SARS, DCF.
84. Camille Camara, Saint-Louis du Sinegal (Dakar, 1968), 
pp. 231-239.
85. E.g., local arr£t£ of Administrator-Mayor of Louga, Dec­
ember 8, 1905, SARS, DCF; same, December 1, 1912, Ibid.
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86. As noted in Moniteur du Senegal, January 12, 1888, 
no. 1673, p. 11. Areas were also cleared around 
forts for military reasons.
87. As in St. Louis in the 1850's (Camara, St. Louis, 
pp. 56-57 and again in 1889 (Moniteur du Senegal, 
January 31, 1889, no. 1728, pp. 50-51). Or in
Dakar (Moniteur du Senegal, April 11, 1889, no. 1738, 
pp. 138-139). See also Roger Pasquier, "Les villes 
du Senegal au XIXe siecle, Revue franqaise d'histoire 
d'Outre-Mer, 1960, p. 419.
88. As at Goukhombaye at St. Louis under Faidherbe and 
in the 1880's (Camara, St. Louis, p. 56; arr£te of 
March 31, 1884 creating the village, SARS, DCF).
89. As in d'Anfreville de la Salle, Notre vieux Senegal, 
(Paris, 1909), pp. 23-24, 73, 181-182; Partial 
report_on urban hygiene (Senegal) by Marchoux,
n.d. / 1901_/, FOM, TP.
90. Note of Director of Construction of the Arsenal,
November 29, 1905, ANF, DD^/2431.
91. Report, Director Public Works, Ficatier, December 16, 
1902, FOM, TP.
92. The report of a sanitary mission to Senegal ^Partial 
report on urban hygiene, by Marchoux, n.d. ]_ 1901_/, 
FOM, TP) recommended explusion of all straw huts 
and wood shacks from the major centers, because of
a belief that these structures, if infected, could 
not be sanitized. A local arrete of June 8, 1903
by the assistant mayor of Rufisque, SARS, DCF,
ordered the ejection of all straw huts beyond the 
new drainage canals erected around the commercial 
quarter.
93. A theory still advocated by Dr. A Kermorgant in 
"Epidemie de fi&vre jaune du Senegal, 16 avril 
1900 au fevrier 1901," Annales d1Hygiene et de 
Midecine Coloniales, no. 3, July-Aug. Sept., 1901, 
copy published by Ministry of Colonies in FOM,
AP3236. The Government General seemed on the way to
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accepting the mosquito theory in 1904 (See copy of 
of ComiteSup&rieur d'Hygiene..., session of June 21,
1904, in Ibid., pp. 46-47), but the theory was still 
not fully proven in 1905 (See Frederic Haskin, The 
Panama Canal / Garden City, 1914_/, pp. 105-112).
See alo Claude Pulvenis, "The !pidemie de fievre 
jaune si St. Louis du Senegal (1881), "Bulletin de
l1IFAN. XXX, series B, 1968, pp. 1352-1373.
94. Draft Petyt report, n.d. / 1898_/, FOM, TP; DSL to MC, 
November 23, 1900, FOM, TP. The papers of a con­
sulting engineer working on Rufisque's sewage system 
were burned for fear of contamination after he died 
of yellow fever (P.V. Municipal Council, May 22,
1905, SARS, DCF).
95. The Government General had to override objections 
of local authorities in Grand-Bassam against using 
old cemetery terrains in P.V., Comit! Superieur 
d'Hygiene..., March 5, 1910, FOM, AP3239; GG to MC, 
January 9, 1911, Ibid.
96. The stegomya mosquito is a noctural creature, pre­
ferring obscure corners during the day, and coming 
out in large numbers at night. Reference is rarely 
made to this motive. See P.V. Comite Superieur 
d'Hygiene et Salubrite Publiques, Session June 17 to 
21, 1904, FOM, AP3236, esp. p. 22; Note on "Terrains 
de Tound," by P. Denard, July 26, 1921, ARS, 4P660-132.
97. On the Thies explusions, see report of 4th trimester 
1911, ARS, 2G11-7; report of second trimester 1912,
ARS, 2G12-9; copy acting GG to GS, April 20, 1912^
ARS, H54. A health emergency was declared at Thies 
in an arret! of January 20, 1912. On expulsions in 
Dakar, see telegram GG to MC, September 28, 1911,
FOM, AP3239; political report, 3rd trimester, 1911,
ARS, 2G11-7.
98. Administrator Sine-Saloum to GS, June 27, 1910, SARS, 
DCF; same, September 5, 1910, SARS, DCF; same,
April 7, 1913, Ibid.; Two arr£tis of October 29,
1910, in JOS, November 10, 1910, no. 515, pp. 832-833.
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A plan for the new African village was drawn up in 
November 1910 (map of November 24, 1910, SARS, DCF). 
Similar plans for Fatick were approved in 1911 (re­
port to GS, August 21, 1911, Ibid.; Administrator 
Sine Saloum to GS, March 21, 1911, Ibid.).
99. The plan for Gossas was approved on November 25,
1909 (draft GS to Administrator Sine Saloum, SARS,
DCF) . The map for Guinguineo was drawn up
April 11, 1911; but a revised version was drawn up 
October 20, 1911 (SARS, DCF). A plan showing an 
extension of Bambey, without mention of segregated 
areas, was drawn up on April 12, 1910 and approved 
on June 15, 1910. Perhaps the arrival in 1910 
of a new administrator charged with command of 
the cercle of Sine Saloum played some role in the 
development.
100. See the excellent expose in the note on "Terrains
de Tound" by P. Denard; July 26, 1921, ARS, 4P660-132. 
Roume aimed at the erection of African villages on 
land owned by the state, with lots available free 
for residents, but with street alignments determined 
rigorously by the state.
101. Report of Inspector of Administrative Affairs to 
GS, August 30, 1934, SARS, DCF. A note of the 
ler Bureau (Senegal), n.d. j_ after 1924_/, SARS,
DCF, noted only a dozen properties owned in the 
African quarter of Kaolack (erected 1910), Some 
marabouts were active in acquiring both urban and 
rural terrains after the turn of the century. 
Speculation may have been an aim; but it is more 
likely that the purchases were motivated by 
defensive attitudes— of marabouts acquiring prestige 
by creating zones of land not subject to administra­
tive confiscation.
102. P.V., Municipal Commission of Louga, February 2,
1912, SARS, DCF. Bize to GS, March 10, 1914,
SARS, DCF. P.V. of Municipal Commission of 
Tivaouane, May 28, 1914, SARS, DCF. Plans were 
afoot in 1912 to add a segregated village at
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 4 3 3 -
Diourbel (Chief Topographic Service to GS, Feb­
ruary 9, 1912, SARS, DCF). GS to GG, April 18,
1912, ARS, P246, indicates that a segregated system 
was being considered for St. Louis at that time.
See also Administrator Dagana to GS, March 30,
1912, SARS, DCF.
103. Report by Boulland de l'Escale, 1909, doc. no. 85, 
ARS, 1G267, p. 27; D’Anfreville, Notre vieux 
Senegal, p. 73.
104. Grail report to MC, February 10, 1913, ARS, H54.
105. This story is told by Raymond Betts, "The establish­
ment of the Medina in Dakar, Senegal, 1914, "Africa, 
XLI (1971), pp. 143-152. A plan to install an 
African village at the site of the future Medina had 
been underfoot as early as 1909. (Boulland de l'Es­
cale report-1909, ARS, 1G267). An outbreak of 
bubonic plague in St. Louis also led to turmoil in 
1918 because of quarantining; but the consequences 
were less drastic. (GS to GG, March 25, 1918,
SARS, Confid).
106. The expulsions were clearly motivated in part be­
cause of an antagonism toward Africans, by some high 
officials. See acting GS to GG, July 11, 1914,
SARS, Conf id. Care was taken, however, to admit 
laborers into the city for work in the port area 
(P.V., Local committee of Hygiene, May 18, 1914,
ARS, H55.).
107. GG to MC, September 16, 1916, FOM, AP3238; Kair 
report, November 6, 1916 (Picanon mission), Ibid.; 
acting GG to MC, July 18, 1916, Ibid.; report of GG 
to MC, February 15, 1919, FOM, AP3237. Large 
scale resettlement in the Medina would have required 
a projected trolley line to carry workers to the 
port, some 3 to 4 kms. away.
108. See acting GS speech to General Council, session of 
Oetober 1915, pp. 16-19.
109. As in the inquiry of 1938 on the habitation and
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alimentation of Africans in French West Africa 
(Report on food, June 27, 1938, SARS, DCF).
110. Canard to MMC, April 23, 1882, FOM, Senegal I,
62; same, May 23, 1882, ARS, 2B54.
111. A letter of Senegal's Record Office to Director 
Interior, March 1, 1888, SARS, DCF concluded that 
although many of the huts and shacks in urban areas 
were being rented (by verbal agreement), so little 
was known of the floating population, that it was 
impossible to collect the legal tax on rents.
112. Dresch, p. 206. "le Blanc est loge dans sa ville, 
par son employeur, entreprise ou etat; le Noir se 
d^brouille." There was a growing tendency for 
employers to house their European employers after 
1900; but even as late as 1921, the housing crisis 
was so severe in Dakar that many couldn't find 
lodging, even in the port's hotels. (Note presented 
to GG, by the Commission of January 17, 1921, ARS, 
L40-39), Europeans commonly rented lodging in St. 
Louis; but this was apparently more difficult from 
about 1928 (GS to GG, September 19, 1928, SARS,
Confid.).
113. Ex-RR interviews. One informant, starting to work for 
the TK at a good wage in 1917 of 4 francs per day
(6% day week), paid a landlady for a room in ThiSs 
(Diakhao quarter) some 12.50 francs per month rent 
and 15 francs per month board.
114. Canard to MMC, April 23, 1882, FOM, Senegal I,
62: "A St. Louis la plupart des maisons sont des 
asiles qui abritent un nombre incroyable d'individues; 
les cours, les rez-dechaus£es, les dessous des 
escaliers memes sont habites, les chambres sont 
occupees chacune par une vingtaine d'individus.
Ces maisons appartiennent des families indigenes; 
generalement c'est une signare qui loue; elle occupe 
IS un petit logement tout le monde l'appelle 'Tauta' 
elle pourvoit d la nourriture de tous moyennant une 
quinzaine de francs par mois et par t£te."
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115. Ex-RR interviews. Confirmed in the Affaires Politiques 
report on Wolof seamen, July 1938, ARS, 17G-160-28.
116. Report Deseille, Decembre 23, 1932, SARS, DCF;
Chief Topographic Section to GS, January 27, 1933, 
Ibid.; note of February 9,' 1933 by Chief Public 
Works Service, Ibid.; avrkte of October 3, 1933,
Ibid. The same was true for other TK escales, _ 
save Kaolack. See note for GS, n.d. ]_ July 1926_/, 
SARS, DCF.
117. On Rufisque, see e.g., P.V., Municipal council of 
Rufisque December 9, 1902, SARS, DCF; same, May 6,
1903, Ibid. This was occuring when a new sewage 
system was being built in Rufisque and when many 
Africans were being expelled from the town center.
On St. Louis, see Mayor of St. Louis to GS, December 
18, 1909, SARS, DCF; Receveur Domaines to GS,
January 12, 1910, Ibid.; GS to GG, February 15, 1910, 
Ibid. acting Chief Topographic service to Chief 
Public Works, October 24, 1912, Ibid.; P.V., St.
Louis Municipal Council, February 16, 1912, Ibid.
Mayor of St. Louis to GS, July 16, 1913, Ibid.; 
acting GS to Mayor of St. Louis, June 20, 1914,
Ibid.
118. Created by a decree of June 14, 1926, the Office of 
Economic Habitation had to be reorganized in an 
arrete of August 4, 1934 in order to be effective.
119. See Administrator Baol to GS, March 30, 1924, SARS,
DCF. A list of April 10, 1928, SARS, DCF, suggested 
extending segregation to Pire, Mekh£, Kelle, N'Dande, 
Kebemer, and Goumbo Gueoul.
120. P.V., Sanitary Council, Circonscription Dakar,
October 9, 1925, excerpt in FOM, AP3238; MC to GG,
April 20, 1926, Ibid. Serious official interest in a 
Lebu village in the Tound is evident as early as in 
copy Delegate Senegal (Dakar) to Mayor of Dakar,
April 23, 1921, SARS, DCF.
121. Telegram Administrator Sine Saloum to GS, May 13,
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1919, SARS, DCF; Administrator Baol to GS, Jan­
uary 15, 1924, SARS, DCF; same, August 17, 1923,
Ibid.; petition of Thi&s residents to Administrator 
Thi&s, November 12, 1926, 1926, SARS, DCF; 
notables Thi^s to GS, March 20, 1925, SARS, DCF; 
Administrator Louga to GS, June 26, 1927, SARS,
DCF; notables M'Bour to President, Colonial 
Council, March 19, 1929, SARS, DCF; notables of 
Keur El Hadjie Malic at Gossas to Administrator 
commune-mixte of Gossas, February 17, 1933, SARS,
DCF; inhabitants of Guinguineo to Administrator 
Sine Saloum, September 16, 1931, SARS, DCF.
122. From about 1923 there was a marked increase in the 
number of application by Africans for certificats 
administratifs--a first step to obtaining property 
rights; perhaps this was an indication of new atti­
tudes among returning African veterans.
123. Report of Chief Customs Service Senegal-1923, SARS, 
DCF.
124. Administrator Thies to GS, December 1, 1921, SARS, 
DCF; same, December 22, 1923, SARS, DCF. This was 
the Laude affair. Laude, a feared colonial officer, 
apparently forced or forged an irregular sale of 
land at Thi&s while using a servant as a front. The 
claim was upheld in court in May 1918 on the narrow 
issue that the administration could not claim eminent 
domain because Thi^s had never been part of Cayor.
The local residents tried to stop the takeover with 
their own legal suit, which was rejected. See GG
to MC, May 29, 1920, FOM, AP524(9).
125. GS to Administrator Sine-Saloum, December 26, 1912, 
SARS, DCF; Arr^te of October 30, 1912, JOS, Nov­
ember 7, 1912, no. 619, p. 860; Arrete of August 16, 
1913, JOS, August 21,.. 1913, no. 660, p. 848; 
Significantly the first segregated quarter in 
Foundiougne was deliberately laid out at a time 
when the escale's merchants were away and could not 
protest (Director Public Works to GS, July 23, 1910, 
SARS, DCF). See also acting GS to GG, July 18,
1915, SARS, Confid.
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126. Lebanese traders previously had simply set up 
boutiques for petty trade on open terrain just out­
side the African quarters. Administrator Baol to 
GS, January 23, 1924, SARS, DCF; same, October 27, 
1924, SARS, DCF; Administrator Thies to GS,
February 9, 1926, SARS, DCF.
127. Inspector of Administrative Affairs to GS, Aug­
ust 30, 1934, SARS, DCF.
128. Ibid.
129. Jacques Lombard comes close to saying this in his 
excellent work: Autorites traditionnelles et 
pouvoirs europiens en Afrique Noire (Paris, 1967), 
pp. 93-94. However, Lombard, whose interest was in 
the chiefs, seems to exaggerate to some extent their 
interest in terrains and their traditional role in 
this respect.
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CHAPTER VII
RETREAT INTO A NARROWER PATTERN
Each economic region corresponds to . . .  an axis, 
branched on the exterior by a port. . . . Each region 
resembles a sort of lung, with its parallel arterial 
and venous systems, receiving its oxygen from agri­
cultural production. But ]_ the system's^ heart is 
located externally, far overseas.
After an unsettling period of post-World War price 
and monetary instability, economic activity in Senegal 
seemed finally to be easing into a period of new prosperity 
from about 1924.  ^ By 1928, however, the Senegalese economy 
began to weaken with a worldwide downturn in commodity 
prices, and a year later it entered upon a new, major 
period of prolonged, severe deflation and contraction as 
a general international economic crisis sharply intensi­
fied the local crisis. As in all such major crises, power­
ful economic tides cruelly tested existing economic struc­
tures, reshaping the economic landscape of Senegal drasti­
cally as the weaker and less fortunate firms and individ­
uals were toppled by the receding economic waters into
-438-
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a quagmire of defaulted credit. It was a financial cat­
aclysm in which less hardy economic alternatives and 
institutions were ruthlessly eliminated.^
Commerce in Senegal had always been based on a gener­
ous, even imprudent, extension of credit, which trickled 
down in a pyramidal chain from the large merchants (gener­
ally of Bordeaux) through small traders and even down to 
the cultivator, who might borrow his seed on credit— while 
the large merchant himself raised cash by borrowing from 
metropolitan banks. Now, as the price of peanuts fell 
sharply on European markets, intermediate merchants and 
traders were bankrupted by their debts as their own debtors 
defaulted. The two largest investment banks specializing 
in French West Africa were soon in difficulties, and major 
French commercial houses sharply reduced their operations 
in the interior.^ Various optimistic schemes for increased 
private investment in Senegal--such as the projects for 
new, light, narrow-gauge railways in Senegal--simply 
evaporated. And the economic crisis continued to deepen. 
After experiencing successive disappointing trading seasons, 
many discouraged farmers turned back to the more reliable 
subsistence crops while cutting down sharply on peanut 
cultivation for export. If the peanut trade were not to
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collapse completely, taking with it the entire weakened 
economic structure of the colony, the colonial government 
had to take action to give cultivators higher prices for 
their peanuts.
A variety of organizational and fiscal measures were 
proposed and executed at different times by the government. 
Some were designed to secure a better market for peanuts 
in the metropole by raising tariff barriers against foreign 
competitors and by upgrading the overall quality of peanut 
exports through field inspections. Other measures aimed 
at slashing intermediate handling and marketing costs by 
eliminating superfluous middlemen (such as the ubiquitous 
small African trader) from the chain of exchange and 
credit, and by reducing freight hauling rates. This was 
the era in which the SIP's ("Societes indigenes de pr£v- 
oyance") began to be transformed from "cooperative11 seed 
reserves for cultivators into marketing agents for them.^
It was also the moment that transportation networks in 
Senegal were going to be reshaped into a new and rigid 
mold.
Purchase of the DSL It was evident that railroad freight 
rates ought to be reduced as part of the effort to main­
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tain peanut exports at reasonable prices and volumes. But 
it was also plain that this could come about equitably only 
if the unwieldy division of the rail net between two dif­
ferent railroad managements--the DSL and TN--were ended, 
and if rail service were consolidated and streamlined.
Coordination of common operations on the two separate 
lines of the Senegalese rail network had been an issue ever 
since the DSL had been ousted from participation in the 
fledgling Thies-Kayes line in 1910.  ^ Operations of the TN 
line had been especially penalized by its termination at 
Thi^s on the DSL line some 40 and 70 kms away from the 
major ports of Rufisque and Dakar. The TN’s alternative 
outlet to the sea at Kaolack relieved it, to be sure, from 
a complete dependence on the DSL; but both the colonial gov 
ernment and a large fraction of local merchants were al­
ways unhappy with the consequent diversion of traffic from 
Dakar and Rufisque, entailing as it did substantial extra 
capital investment in port and commercial facilities at
Kaolack.^
Government purchase of the entire DSL line under the 
terms of the 1880 convention was one solution; but the 
metropolitan government shrank from the costly price tag 
for such an action, which would moreover only have ben-
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efited some colonial interests at the metropole's expense.® 
The Government General would have been willing to purchase 
the key Thies-Dakar section of the DSL alone; but the 
company had no intention of parting with the most valuable 
section of its line. Construction by the government of 
its own Thi^s-Dakar spur parallel to the DSL was also 
impossible politically and legally, since it would have 
struck a major blow at the company's viability by drawing 
off a good part of its traffic. It might be expected 
that a simple consolidation of rates and fares on the 
two lines would serve as a practical alternative, enabling 
rail users to use either line as an extension of the other. 
Some merchants, for instance, wished that cheap long-dis­
tance degressive rates for peanut freight on the TN simply 
apply for the remaining 70 kms of DSL line to Dakar.
Rail passengers wished for better timing of connecting 
passenger runs and more through service across the lines.
In reality, however, there were serious obstacles to 
simple solutions for cross-line traffic problems, not the 
least of which was the division of common traffic re­
ceipts . 1-0
It must be remembered that operations along the two 
lines were of a fundamentally different nature. The
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Thies-Niger, saddled with extensive operations over 1100 
kms of track, much of it through barren, unpopulated 
areas, effectively cast the burden for its long-haul oper­
ations onto users of the more prosperous portions of the 
line by means of a degressive freight rate structure, 
while the railroad line's receipts barely covered its oper­
ating expenses. Passing through the populous littoral, 
the DSL carried a denser traffic over a shorter line, 
while its receipts, produced from rates and fares directly 
proportional to the distance hauled, were generally almost 
double the line's operating expenses after 1900. Whereas, 
the TN, in its role as a major instrument of governmental 
economic and strategic policy, might be operated at fin­
ancially unprofitable levels, the DSL was expected, in 
contrast, to produce a substantial profit for the private 
corporation that owned it, as well as to repay the met­
ropolitan treasury for the huge sums advanced to the 
company earlier.^ If, for instance, one tried to attract 
more of Diourbel's peanuts to Dakar by applying the TN's 
degressive rates for the additional 70 kms of DSL line, 
the DSL would stand to lose from the resulting expense 
arising out of a heavier consequent traffic and a drop 
in receipts on an already assured through traffic from
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Bambey and Khombole. These losses would therefore have 
to be made up to the company, either by giving the DSL 
a disproportionate share of receipts from the common TN- 
DSL run (at the expense of a financially feeble TN) or by 
raising fares and rates for other parts of the DSL line 
(anathema to local merchants) .^
The dislocations of the World War and its aftermath 
only complicated an already murky picture. The DSL's costs 
of operation shot up sharply from 1917, as the prices of 
fuel and replacement parts skyrocketed and as personnel 
salaries jumped by large percentages in several steps 
beginning with the labor unrest of 1919.^ Orders in the 
United States for new rolling stock in 1919, for instance, 
doubled in cost almost overnight simply because of the 
franc's immediate post-war decline.^ The economy bonus, 
which had formed an important part of the company's 
profits during the pre-war period, shrank to nil as rap­
idly rising real expenses dwarfed the nominal expense 
figures calculated from the formulas of the convention of 
1900.■*--* At the same time, the company's reserve funds 
became totally inadequate not only because of inflation, 
but because the company had invested these funds in 
securities that had dropped in value in the meantime.1^
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To top it off, customer claims for losses due to missing, 
stolen, and damaged freight grew to alarming proportions-- 
almost 1,300,00 francs in 1920, 570,000 francs in 1922-- 
and the French government refused to cover any of these 
losses.
In order to survive as a viable operation, the DSL 
obviously needed new revenues from higher freight rates 
and passenger fares, ds well as from a reworked version of 
the old convention formulas, which might award the company 
new economy bonuses under inflationary conditions. These 
changes were reasonable enough given the inflationary situ­
ation. Unfortunately, bound as it was by the terms of the 
original 1880 convention to maintain its rates and fares 
at stipulated levels, the DSL had to obtain parliamentary 
approval for any changes. For their part, contemporary 
government officials were reluctant to let the basic 
working agreements be altered for what were viewed as 
temporary perturbations in the economy. Finally by 1920, 
the National Assembly allowed the DSL to raise its rates 
and fares, but only on a basis worked out jointly between 
the company and the Ministries of Finance and Colonies for 
application over a fixed, limited period, with the expect­
ation that the economic situation would settle down mean-
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while.
The upshot, given the continuing economic instability, 
was a succession of protracted negotiations leading to 
temporary agreements in 1920, 1921, 1925, and 1929 on the 
financial formulas for DSL operations, while rates, and 
fares were also allowed to rise by joint agreement at 
several junctures. The additional revenues raised from 
the higher rates and fares were fed into a special fund, 
whose assets were distributed according to a complicated 
set of formulas to the profit of the company, the French 
treasury, and new, larger reserve funds for the railroad.
It is not surprising, given the unforeseen manner in which 
the economy evolved, that the clumsy, inflexible formulas 
did not work very well, leading to all sorts of acrim­
onious quarrels as the terms were repeatedly renegotiated 
between the principals.-*-^
It might be thought that the DSL's delicate financial 
and legal position would have made the company comply 
readily with the Government General's policies on rates 
and fares. Sentiment in the ministry, as in the Govern­
ment General, it must be noted, was still strongly in 
favor of reducing DSL profits in the interest of the 
colony's commerce as a whole. The war emergency may have
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in due ed the Ministry of Colonies, indeed, to drop its 
earlier efforts to suspend application of the overgenerous 
convention of 1900, for it allowed this convention's con­
tinued application from 1915, with the benefits to the DSL 
only moderately trimmed.20 Nevertheless, the ministry 
never actually retracted its earlier denunciation of the 
convention of 1900, and the DSL's pleas for financial 
relief were received coldly at first.21
Surprisingly though, the colony's leverage over the 
DSL was less effective than might have been expected. The 
indifference, real or pretended, of the Ministry of Colo­
nies to the DSL's financial plight was, in reality, 
sharply limited by the countervailing interest of the 
French treasury--the watchdogs at the Ministry of Finance 
in particular--in seeing to it that the DSL generate 
large enough receipts in order to pay off some of its 
huge debt to the state, or at least enough to service the 
large annual interest on the debt.22 a canny DSL manage­
ment was even able several times in the course of the 
1920's to turn the colony's argument for a common DSL-TN 
rate and fare structure around into a means of obtaining 
rate and fare increases in tandem with increases on the 
financially beleagured TN, even when the DSL really did
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no t need the increase.^3 Senegalese merchants were quick 
enough; to object that raising DSL rates to equal the high­
est level on the TN's degressive scales was hardly justi­
fied at times when the DSL was turning a good profit. But 
the DSL generally received its requested hikes.24
The controversy over uniform DSL-TN rates (at the time 
technically DSL-TK rates) came to a head in 1921-1922, 
when the colonial government, which had permitted large 
rate increases for both the TK and DSL earlier in 1921, 
proposed that both the DSL and the soon-to-be fused TKN 
now lower freight rates significantly, especially for 
long-haul traffic, in order to stimulate commerce in the 
interior. The efforts of the Government General, ener­
getically supported by the Ministry of Colonies, to force 
compliance from an uncooperative DSL company were frustra­
ted, however, by the adverse ruling of a consultative 
interministerial committee.^ Lower rates on the DSL 
might have spurred business activity for Senegalese 
merchants as the Government General claimed, but a major­
ity on the committee objected that this acknowledged 
benefit to the colony's commerce (it would also increase 
the federation's tax revenues indirectly) would take 
place at the expense of the metropole's treasury, which
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stood to lose thereby a share of the DSL's potential pro­
fits due in repayment of earlier subsidies to the company. 
Maintenance of high DSL rates, on the other hand, might 
change the company's account with the state from a long­
standing accumulating liability into something of an asset.
The Government General continued to argue for lower 
DSL rates into 1924.^6 But by then, the DSL's obstinacy 
was resoundingly vindicated as a flood of traffic over­
whelmed an underequipped, undermanned, and barely viable 
TKN. The management of this government-owned railroad 
was severely upbraided for poor service by the very mer­
chants it had acted to please with lower rates. TKN rates 
subsequently had to be hiked back up in order to meet the 
operating costs of needed new material and personnel. In 
contrast, operating conditions on the DSL line and the 
financial health of the company, with its stable high 
rate structure, improved remarkably during the same period. 
The metropolitan government was certainly pleased as the 
DSL management repayed a very good portion of the com­
pany's old debt in the period of relative economic pros­
perity from 1924 to 1930.^7
Perhaps this denouement accounts in large part for 
the noticeably improved relations during the following
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period between the DSL and the Ministry of Colonies, and 
even the Government General (despite continued wrangling 
over some rate issues). It was in 1927 that the DSL was 
awarded a 25 year lease by the colony of Senegal for oper­
ation of the Louga-Lingu^re spur line under very attractive 
financial conditions.3® During this period also, the 
complicated regime of short-term financial arrangements 
were finally scrapped, as the DSL obtained from the French 
legislature in 1931 a new convention much like that of 
1900, with most of the original formulary constants simply 
multiplied by a factor accounting for the post-war infla­
tion of the franc.
This relatively amiable atmosphere did not persist, 
however, as the economic crisis of the Great Depression 
hit with full force in Senegal. As receipts fell, the 
DSL reacted initially by raising its rates; but in the 
face of a rapidly dwindling traffic, the DSL's total 
operating receipts still plunged. Peanut freight fell 
from 178,736 tons in 1929 to 125,408 tons in 1931, and 
then to 47,870 tons in 1932. In the same period, overall 
DSL freight traffic dropped by 68% to 99,755 tons in 
1932, while the number of DSL passengers shrank from 
545,771 in 1929 down to 99,443 in 1932.30 The financial
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arrangements of the recently concluded convention, devised 
as they were for more prosperous conditions, failed to 
yield any economy bonuses for the company, whose manage­
ment was soon asking for a new convention.31 The company's 
curtailments of operating expenses could not come close 
to matching the drastic decline in receipts, so that the 
carefully accumulated reserve funds were soon exhausted 
in covering the large deficits.32
Raising more revenue through increased rates was self- 
defeating and later out of the question given the fragile 
state of the economy. Lowering rates was also unpalatable 
since it would only increase the deficit. Oddly enough, 
operation of the unsuccessful Louga-Linguere line was a 
bright spot in the DSL's finances, because of an operating 
contract that obliged the unfortunate colony of Senegal 
to pay the company a large minimum bonus, whatever the 
volume of traffic carried on the l i n e .
Basically the DSL was kept afloat financially by the 
metropolitan government's guarantee of its stock dividends 
under the terms of the convention, which effectively com­
pelled government coverage of DSL budget deficits as 
before 1900. Metropolitan officials were appalled, how­
ever, at the size of the mounting company deficits--well
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over 9 million francs for fiscal year 1932 alone. ^  DSL 
management seems to have been inclined toward sitting out 
the economic storm, buoyed as they were by the guarantee, 
in the hopes of an early recovery in Senegal's economy.
But government officials were interested in a less expensive 
remedy. The question was, what was to be done.
Purchase of the DSL by the government offered one 
clear-cut solution. The terms of purchase of the DSL by 
the metropole had been set down in the original 1880 
convention, and there was a solid precedent for this kind 
of action in the government's purchase in 1909 of the 
metropolitan Western railroad.35 Yet, the government was 
visibly reluctant to assume the burden of purchase, which 
according to the terms of the convention would have saddled 
the French treasury with the obligation to pay the DSL 
company an annuity of 1,300,000francs for the next 51 
years.^6 It was the Government General instead which 
stepped forward to propose direct purchase of the line by 
the colonial government itself--an act that relieved the 
metropolitan budget of any future expenditures for the DSL.
The Government General had been absorbed since the 
onset of the crisis with reinvigorating the sagging Senegal­
ese economy by a coordinated policy of lower freight rates
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on both the DSL and TN railroads. Negotiations aimed at 
unifying and harmonizing rates and fares on the DSL and TN 
were indeed undertaken in 1930 between the DSL, the Govern­
ment. General and the ministries in Paris. But the old 
three-sided controversies among the principals soon flared 
up, despite some progress on rate unification, as the com­
pany acted to limit potential receipt losses, first by 
raising rates in 1930; then by balancing the rate decreases 
obtained by government negotiators with rate hikes in other 
sections of the DSL’s rate schedules.^
The colonial federation's purchase of the DSL seemed 
to offer a way out of these problems, since it would 
simplify the political and financial arrangements for run­
ning the line. It was not that the Government General and 
the Ministry of Colonies were particularly bent on elimin­
ating private enterprise from the operation of the Senegal­
ese railroads. Colonial officials were, on the contrary, 
also seriously considering at the same time a project for 
turning over the management of operations on all the rail 
lines in French West Africa— government-controlled as well 
as the DSL--to a consortium of metropolitan railroad 
companies and banks.^ The point was that an outright 
purchase of the DSL would finally enable the Government
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General to impose its own economic policies on a consoli­
dated network of Senegalese rail lines without the unwel­
come opposition of a private company pursuing its own 
narrow interests over a portion of the network. The com­
bined administration of a purchased DSL and TN would also 
allow substantial savings on joint operation expenses, 
which would be passed on to commercial users of the rail 
lines in the form of reductions on a consolidated DSL-TN 
rate and fare structure.
Negotiations between the DSL and the Government 
General for a direct retrocession of the rail line to the 
colonial federation proceeded apace in mid-1932, ending 
with the conclusion of a convention in September 1932.39 
Final approval of the agreement and its implementation 
were held up, however, because of the dilatory tactics of 
DSL stockholders and the delays inherent in parliamentary 
approval until April of the following year. Meanwhile, 
the DSL company continued to run the line, technically 
as the agent of the Government General, from January 1, 
1933, the nominal date of transfer of the line, until the 
actual transfer or. May 1st. Under the terms of the final 
agreement, the DSL company yielded the DSL and Louga- 
Lingu^re rail lines, their equipment, their budgetary
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assets and liabilities--less some real estate properties 
not used directly for rail operations--and received in 
exchange an assured schedule, up through 1983, of sub­
stantial annuity payments by the Government G e n e r a l . ^0
A new era dawned with the fusion of Senegalese rail­
roads under the colonial government's control in May 1933, 
and the rejection of the private metropolitan consortium's 
bid for operation of the unified network in 1934. Officials 
of the TN administration, charged with management of the 
new Dakar-Niger railroad, ruthlessly purged the staff and 
work force of the old DSL, diminishing their ranks in order 
to reduce rail expenses. The center of gravity of economic 
activity in colonial Senegal, heretofore radiating from two 
roughly perpendicular railroad spines, was slowly but 
perceptibly shifted southward and eastward, following in 
large measure the newly-consolidated main Dakar-Niger 
artery, which passed through Thi^s and Diourbel on the way 
tp Tambacounda, while the Thies-St. Louis portion of the 
old DSL was reduced to a mere branch of the main trunk.^
In the meantime, however, the colonial government had been 
obliged to take other important steps to assure economic 
development in this direction.
Automobile versus rail If the railroad had been a useful,
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but imperfect instrument for solving transportation prob­
lems in West Africa, the advent of the automobile, with its 
solid advantages of flexibility and low fixed capital 
investment, seems in retrospect to have offered a particu­
larly favorable opportunity for further growth in Senegal, 
not only of the export sector of the economy, but also of 
domestic interchanges of goods.^
Demonstrating again a vivacious predisposition for 
solving the problems handicapping their operations in 
tropical Africa with the latest technical devices, French 
colonial officers had tried to introduce the automobile 
into the region as early as 1899 in an abortive experiment 
in transportation service for the Sudan.^ Virtually no 
automobiles were operating in Senegal as late as 1914.^
But in 1916, French colonial officials already were strong­
ly interested in linking North and West Africa by auto­
mobile, and were acting to cover the railroad gap on the 
unfinished TK line with a connecting regular automobile 
service for mail and a limited passenger and freight 
t r a f f i c . ^  By 1921 some adventurous souls even succeeded 
in reaching St. Louis from Dakar in 6 hours by driving 
their autos along the sandy beaches connecting the two 
ports.^
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More serious was the abiding, growing concern of the 
colonial administration, from the early 1920's at least, 
to improve and extend the colony's rudimentary network of 
dirt trails so that they might carry auto traffic.^ The 
length of the network utilisable by auto was estimated 
optimistically by 1926 to stretch over 10,000 kms within 
Senegal: but in reality, except for the short, paved 
stretch from Dakar to Rufisque, the roads and trails were 
of uneven quality, often without usable bridges and barely 
passable even in the dry season.^
Nevertheless, as cheaper, American-built autos and 
trucks became generally more available from the mid-1920's, 
there was a remarkable upsurge in the number of such 
vehicles imported into Senegal. An estimated 945 vehicles 
were imported in 1925, 1598 in 1926, 602 in 1927, and then 
844 in 1928. Despite increasing government restrictions 
and taxation, an estimated 3,087 additional vehicles, and 
some 46,700,000 liters of gasoline were imported into 
Senegal in the period 1929 to 1932.^9 And most of these 
vehicles were utilized commercially as common carriers, 
not pleasure vehicles.
It was obvious that these vehicles would be used to 
serve areas hitherto disadvantaged by their remoteness
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from the railroad. It was expected at first, therefore, 
that the motor vehicle would play a useful complementary 
role to the locomotive, feeding traffic to the railroad 
station as a more efficient version of the pack animal 
carriers that had been hauling produce along roads and 
trails running perpendicular to the rail line for some 
time. It soon became evident, however, that trucks hauling 
produce could simply bypass a railroad station, and indeed 
the nearby escale, to head directly for a port. By mid- 
1928, a number of French commercial houses with operations 
based on the railroad escales were already noting, with 
some alarm, that competitors driving trucks were buying 
up peanuts directly from farmers at the sites of product­
ion, bypassing entirely the escales, which were consequent­
ly suffering from a sharp decline in business activity.^ 
Many of the truck owners were, moreover, small African or 
Lebanese entrepreneurs, who were being spared the expense 
of heavy investment in a fixed escale installation, with 
Frenchmen, only recently driven back to the escales by the 
yellow fever epidemic of 1927, put at a clear disadvant- 
51age.-,i
This motor vehicle traffic was growing rapidly. No 
precise figures are available to gauge the volume of this
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traffic; but one survey of vehicles circulating daily on
the Dakar-Rufisque road alone yielded an average daily
count of 114 freight haulers and 75 passenger carriers in
March 1928, which grew to 237 freight haulers and 288
52passenger carriers daily by March 1929.
The evident danger to French-based commerce and to the 
system of escales soon produced a reversal in the colonial 
administration's attitude toward the motor car. Serious 
consideration was once more given to limiting the number 
of points at which the trade in peanuts could take place, 
ostensibly to assure the quality of the exported product 
by facilitating government i n s p e c t i o n . ^3 In response to 
the concerns of the large French commercial houses, stiff 
new tariff duties were imposed on imported motor vehicles 
and gasoline. ^  The railroad already under construction 
from Louga to Lingu^re, the line projected from Diourbel 
to Touba, and the various projects for narrow-gauge rail 
lines branching from the main railroads were almost 
certainly designed, in part, to replace an already exten­
sive truck traffic in the interior."*"* But road traffic 
continued to grow.
The consequent diversion of freight traffic from the 
railroads to trucks was disturbing. The tonnage of slow
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freight carried by the DSL fell from a high of 423,909 tons 
in 1926 down to 314,039 tons by 1929, while total freight 
tonnage on the TN went from 297,705 tons to 262,523 in 
the same period (though admittedly total peanut exports 
from Senegal fell from 494,000 tons to 407,000 tons at 
the same time).^ Even more serious as a threat to the 
viability of the railroads, however, was the growing 
diversion of its passenger traffic to common carrier motor 
vehicles. Passengers carried annually by the DSL fell from 
a high of 1,042,217 in 1925 down to 545,771 in 1929, even 
before the onset of the economic crisis, which brought 
passenger service down to a low of 99,443 by 1932. The 
TN also experienced a similar drop in passenger traffic, 
which went from 1,090,088 in 1925 to 591,093 in 1929 
(though the TN's subsequent low was 346,629 passengers in 
1931).^ Measured in terms of the product of passengers 
times the distance travelled, the DSL had gone from 51 
million kms-travelled in 1925 to 27 million in 1929, while 
the TN had gone from 98 million kilometers-travelled to 
52 million during the same period. An estimate of auto 
traffic on three roads--Louga-Diourbel, St. Louis-Louga, 
and Dakar-Rufisque— concluded that the railroads were 
losing 10% million kilometers-travelled in traffic to the
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highways annually for those three runs a l o n e . ^8 The 
losses in third and fourth class passengers were parti­
cularly serious, since this service had previously been 
one of the most profitable elements of traffic on the DSL 
and TN railroads. It had indeed been an essential element, 
whose margin of profits had permitted the rail lines to set 
lower freight rates for selected products, such as the 
low-priced, bulky peanuts, and even comparatively low fares 
for other passenger classes, thereby stimulating business 
activity along the rail line.^^
The DSL made several, largely unsuccessful attempts 
to lure passengersback to the railroad, mainly with reduced- 
fare, light express trains. ° However, it was simply much 
more convenient for passengers to take to the highways 
rather than the railroad. The trains were more comfortable 
and less subject to breakdowns than autos. But voyagers 
travelling to a center located a dozen kilometers or more 
from a railroad station could make the journey with less 
effort and in less time in a motor vehicle. The voyager 
would generally be spared a long march to and from the 
railroad stations (as in Dakar where the passenger station 
was far from the African Medina). The auto ride itself 
would often be shorter, especially for trips requiring
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train connections. A trip from Louga to Diourbel took 4 
to 6 hours by auto, compared to 8 hours by train; while 
it took only 6 hours to get from Kaolack to Dakar by 
several routes, as compared to 11 hours by train during 
weekdays.
Moreover, unlike a railroad, where vehicles could 
roll on the tracks only according to tight schedules at the 
direction of a central railroad management, the roads 
were available at all times to any user equipped with a 
vehicle. Autos with seven passengers, or trucks carrying 
twenty, would start off as soon as a full complement of 
passengers were on board. Departures would occur often 
on the popular, crowded runs in contrast to the railroads 
with their limited, fixed schedules, with most trains 
subject to long unscheduled delays while freight was loaded 
and unloaded at stations enroute.^2
It might have been expected that a common carrier 
road service would not have been profitable in a territory 
where poor roads and a hot climate wore out the vehicles 
twice as fast as in France. In fact, even with stiff 
import taxes on autos and gasoline, skillful local 
entrepreneurs could gain a reasonable return from an 
automobile passenger service at fares, which for rel-
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atively short runs and for the more populous centers were
63
roughly equivalent to those on the railroad. The con­
tinuing ability of trucks to compete with trains for haul-
(\lxing freight was also evident.
One early measure that the colonial administration did 
take against the increasing road traffic was simply to 
allow roads running parallel with the railroad lines to 
fall into disrepair.^ This was particularly easy to do 
at a time when a strong local political effort was being 
made to relieve rural Africans of the prestation obligation 
to labor a set number of days annually on local bridge and 
road repairs. ^  The railroad administrations were indeed 
hopeful that the competition by parallel roads might be 
greatly reduced by this means, even as roads perpendicular 
to the rail lines were maintained as feeders for railroad 
traffic. But this policy of selective road neglect was 
patently unrealistic when so many major centers lay along 
the rail lines. It had little immediate impact on road 
traffic in any case, especially along the heavily trav­
elled Dakar-Rufisque highway, which had to be maintained 
for political reasons.^7
The onset of the economic crisis gravely magnified 
the problem posed by the automobile as early as 1928.
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Merchants were calling on the railroads to reduce their 
freight rates, even as the railroad was forced to compete 
with the more flexible motor vehicle for a share of an 
ever-shrinking passenger and freight traffic. The French 
merchants, forced as they were to retrench by closing 
down branch operations in the smaller escales in the 
interior, were upset that free-lance truckers could bypass 
their remaining fixed operations in the larger escales by 
purchasing the peanut crops directly on site from the 
growers.
In metropolitan France, the confrontation between rail 
and route during the depression led the government to 
ease competition by imposing a coordinated division of 
traffic between the two vehicular m o d e s . I n  Senegal, the 
colonial administration acted simply to eliminate the 
motor vehicle from the competition with a succession of 
severely discriminatory measures. This began with a local 
arrete in Senegal in January 1931, which made the roads 
running parallel to the railroad lines off limits to 
motor vehicles above a certain weight class (1000 kg in 
the dry season, 600 kg for the hive rna ge)Vehicle 
registrations and driver permits were then made renewable 
in a time-consuming procedure on a quarterly instead of
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an annual basis, while the fees were raised to punitive 
levels.70 The tax on gasoline was raised.71 Several 
communes and coxranunes-mixtes in Senegal also decided a 
little later that exorbitant daily parking fees for common 
carrier vehicles would be useful fiscal m o n e y - r a i s e r s .72
Appeals by French auto dealers against the discrimina­
tory measures, particularly against that of January 1931, 
led to some apparent relief in the form of a new local 
arrete in December 1931; but the freer circulation allowed 
under this measure was set to end in June 1933. Moreover, 
it would apply only to vehicles registered at a particular 
government agency before May 1931, and this right was not 
transferable to any new owner of the vehicle.73
As if this were not enough, an arrete of June 1932 
suddenly restricted peanut commerce in the interior to a 
fixed number of selected escales (143 in 1932, selected 
supposedly to limit the journey from the fields to a 25 
km m a x i m u m ) . 7^ - Finally, an arr£t£ of 1934 flatly banned 
the use of trucks for hauling peanuts to the trading 
centers, limiting the carrying trade to slow, costly pack 
animals--camels, mules, o x e n . 75
Of course, the colonial government could muster some 
plausible reasons for each of these measures. Heavy
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truck traffic, it was alleged, wore out the roads rapidly, 
burdening the colony with extra expenditures for repairs.
A growing vehicular traffic was obviously in need of 
careful government regulation. The practice of Lebanese 
truckers in buying up crops might lead to a drastically 
shortened buying season (and monopoly of the trade by the 
Lebanese ). Eve n the resort to animal carriers was 
justified by the argument that it would provide a nec­
essary stimulus to the local development of animal husbandry, 
ultimately benefiting African farmers as a growing supply 
of draught animals became available for p l o w i n g . 7^
In the final analysis, nevertheless, these argu­
ments- -save perhaps the underlying, real fear of Lebanese 
competition— should not be taken too seriously. Heavy 
road traffic required more road maintenance--and the col­
onial administration could win local African support for 
a campaign against the auto by raising the specter of 
increased rural road prestations. But license fees and 
import tariffs on gasoline and vehicles were producing 
enough revenues to finance road repairs with professional 
road crews.^ In reality, the colonial administration 
was deliberately hampering the use of commercial vehicles 
simply in order to protect the railroads from a dangerous
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competitor.
In rebuttal to the qualified sympathy given by another 
government official to the plaints of French automobile 
dealers facing ruin in Senegal, a high official of the 
Ministry of Colonies insisted that automobile traffic 
ought indeed to be penalized in the interest of the colon­
ial railroads, whose:
administration could survive only as long as ]_ its_/ 
monopoly was maintained, excluding all competition 
which might permit the passengers and high-valued 
merchandise to escape it. That is the price to pay 
for low f_ rail_/ rates on low-valued freight.
Rate structures on the railroads were designed to support 
the export of low-value freight from the interior by dis­
criminating against more lucrative elements of traffic. To 
remove these elements from the railroad's traffic was 
to wreck the railroad's entire financial structure, and 
to change its operation and purpose. But the railroad was 
indeed being well protected. Even by 1931, the importation 
of vehicles was already down to 221 for the year.®® The 
earlier brisk business in automobile imports was reduced 
to nil in short order. A growing transportation network 
of great flexibility and promise had been arrested, and 
then ruthlessly eliminated from the scene.®1
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Aftermath Government actions taken in the wake of the 
economic crisis cast the economic substructure of Senegal 
into the narrow mold it was to assume for the next several 
decades. Various measures of protection and subsidies 
were used to rescue the peanut trade for the small farmers 
and for the large Bordeaux commercial houses, albeit with 
the intermediate small African trader— considered incon­
venient and superfluous— finally squeezed out of the 
trade. The railroads had also been rescued from their 
financial plight, and then used in turn by the government 
as instruments in saving the trade.
The net of railroads in Senegal was a legacy of 
great value. It was a major factor in endowing post­
independent Senegal with one of the most dense, well- 
served, convenient transportation networks of tropical 
Africa (no mean advantage in the gasoline and water 
droughts of the 1970's); but a network which even today 
can effectively serve only a portion of the national 
t e r r i t o r y . X n  place of a multicentric geographic 
diversity, which had briefly begun to flourish spontan­
eously along a widespread grid of roads--promising a 
wider spatial dispersal of trade and an attendant growth 
in domestic commerce--Senegalese economic development
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was confined by the colonial government's policy within 
a thin, narrower pattern, whose lifeblood radiated from 
the long arteries of the railroad. Even the formerly 
principal rail highway from Thies to St. Louis was largely 
bypassed in favor of a seemingly monomaniacal commitment 
to the port of Dakar and the strategic Dakar-Niger trace. 
The opening of the Sudan, the economic isolation of the 
Gambia, and the centralization of administrative and 
economic activities at the eccentrically-placed port of 
Dakar--the same objectives which the colonial government 
and the ministry in Paris had been pursuing in 1880--were 
still being applied, with a vengeance, in 1933.^^
It would be easy, from the available evidence, to con­
clude uncharitably that the colonial government had been 
acting simply to rescue the narrow material interests of 
French expatriates in Senegal-- those of the larger 
commercial firms and the bureaucrats employed in admin­
istering a publicly-owned railroad--from the economic 
crisis. To do so, however, would be to miss an opportun­
ity to expose the nature of the system which the French 
had succeeded in implanting in Senegal. By acting as it 
did against the automobile in the 1930's, the government 
was, after all, also injuring the material interests of
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certain French firms, including the powerful Banque de 
l'Afrique Occidentale to the tune of 3 million francs of
investment.85
The deepening economic crisis made the colonial gov­
ernment face hard choices of what was to be sustained 
and what eliminated. Under the existing conditions of 
competition and without consolidation, it was questionable 
whether the railroads could bear up without mass infusions 
of government aid from the metropole. Large scale finan­
cial aid from the metropole was unlikely under the circum­
stances, and stringent cutbacks in rail services or hikes 
in freight rates were intolerable, since they would only 
have made commercial recovery difficult, if not impossible, 
for some areas in the interior (as in the Sudan). The 
motor vehicle would have been a viable alternative to 
the railroad in areas near the coast; but it was unclear 
what geographic pattern would emerge from a reliance on 
this means of locomotion (aside from a possible collapse 
of Sudanese commerce).
Since the 1880's the French colonial system had 
been based increasingly along the railroads. A good deal 
of commerce also flowed along the rivers and through some 
of the smaller seaports. But the railroads had come to
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stand as one of the major hallmarks of the French presence
and, to the official colonial mind, as one of France’s
proudest contributions to the "opening" of the African
interior. It was not likely that top government officials
would willingly allow the legacy of over 50 years of effort
to go under ignominiously by tolerating an uncertain
experiment in highway transportation. It seemed more
natural instead to reserve the profitable traffic to
"that which fructified, that which acted in the general
interest, and to penalize at the same time that which
would render sterile the enormous capital invested by the
86colony to assure transportation.
The automobile was striking not only at the vitals of 
a railroad in which the colonial government had a large 
stake invested, but also at an entire interlocking complex 
of commerce, property, and administration based on the 
railroad. The auto was a threat to the web of escales 
nourished by the railroad, since it allowed commercial 
operations established within them to be bypassed. More­
over, evasion by auto was not just simply a matter of 
geography, because highway traffic— free as it was from 
the railroad's need to follow a set route according to 
the rigid timetables of a central authority— was also
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therefore less susceptible to surveillance and control. 
Government documents of the period manifest indeed an 
underlying fear of the auto as a sort of harbinger of a 
more "anarchic" social order, indicating that the issue 
was not simply a question of commercial and real estate 
i n v e s t m e n t . * ^  i t  was also a question of control--central- 
ized control over what French officials had always per­
ceived to be the unrooted African, whose body and mind, 
like quicksilver, seemed ever to be eluding them. With 
the elimination of the auto, African producers would be 
largely obliged once more to come to and deal directly 
with European dominated institutions and facilities.
Some losses would have to be accepted, as in the 
decay of some of the older escales cf the defunct DSL, 
in the virtual abandonment of the Louga-Linguere venture, 
and in the continued, temporary expansion of Kaolack with 
its share of exports at Dakar's expense. But the focus 
along which economic recovery would be oriented--the geo­
graphic and administrative core which would channel the 
energies of the region— would be the newly-fused axis of 
the Dakar-Niger railroad. The steel trace of the railroad 
had been introduced into West Africa by the French in 
order to liberate human society in that region from the
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physical restraints of an overgenerous space and hard 
climate. However, the play of economic systems and budgets 
as well as the weight of history, converted the rails 
into a constrictive straitjacket of control, which even as 
it nourished growth also firmly encased it within certain 
bounds.
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2. Despite continued monetary instability into 1926, the 
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170-172; Suret-Canale, L'ere coloniale, pp. 214-221.
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5. For the SIP's in particular, see Guiraud, L*arachide, 
pp. 133-144; Suret-Canale, L'ere coloniale, pp. 299- 
310.
6. See above, Chapter IV, p. 242.
7. See Chief of Public Works Service to GS, January 15, 
1924, SARS, DCF; President, CC-Dakar to GS, November 27, 
1923, Ibid.; Launay note of April 28, 1924, ARS, 
6P172-36; Note of Director of Economic Affairs,
April 22, 1924, Ibid.; the division of peanut exports 
can be difficult to discern, because ships calling 
at Kaolack generally loaded only to 2/3rds capacity 
to avoid navigation problems on the Saloum river--the 
rest of the cargo would be taken on at Dakar or 
Rufisque.
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8. Since 1900, the colonies had become directly respon­
sible in principle for covering their budgetary 
expenses. The DSL, as a colonial enterprise sub­
sidized directly by the state, had therefore become
an historical anomaly, as well as a bone of contention 
between the colonial and metropolitan governments.
See above, Chapter IV, p. 222.
9. Launay note, February 15, 1924, ARS, 6P172-36.
10. Setting rates for long-haul traffic and dividing 
receipts between two lines sharing traffic caused 
problems for railroads in other lands. See the 
excellent account by Stephen Salsbury, The State, the 
Investor and the Railroad (Cambridge, Mass., 1967,), 
pp. 206-222, on the problems of the B & W and Western 
railroads in Massachusetts.
11. The ratio of real expenses to receipts ("coefficient 
d'exploitation") generally hovered for the DSL around 
a comfortable 0.6. The TN generally got by with a 
ratio of 0.9 to 1.0; and then sometimes only by not 
counting some governmental subvention funds. For 
specifics see a minute of December 27, 1919 on the 
new DSL convention, FOM, TP, which listed annual
DSL expenses and receipts from 1910 to 1916 correspond­
ing to ratios of 0.5 to 0.69; P.V., CTPC, November 3, 
1925, FOM, TP, shows the ratio back at 0.63 in 1924; 
the Legregram report of June 24, 1930, FOM, TP, p. 13, 
shows the ratio hovering between 0.5 to 0.73 from 
1925 to 1929.
12. See Legregram report, June 24, 1930 on unification of 
rates, FOM, TP; Inspector Sol to MC, July 25, 1930, 
Ibid.; Launay note, April 28, 1924, ARS, 6P 172-36; 
P.V., Conseil Consultatif du Chemin de Fer du TN, 
November 30, 1925, Ibid.; Report of Chief Surveillance 
Engineer, December 31, 1929, FOM, TP; GG to MC,
January 25, 1930, Ibid.
13. See DSL to MC, October 4, 1917, FOM, TP; Ormesson to 
MC, October 10, 1917, Ibid.; DSL to MC, September 10, 
1919, Ibid. A letter, DSL to MC, November 10, 1919, 
FOM, TP, noted that real DSL expenses had increased
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from 2,586,000 francs in 1914 and 2,300,00 in 1916, 
to 4,258,000 francs in 1918, while traffic had 
languished. See also DSL to MC, December 4, 1919,
FOM, TP.
14. The letter, DSL to MC, November 10, 1919, no. 2029 
M/7, FOM, TP, estimated that the revaluation of the 
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to MC, December 18, 1919, Ibid.
15. Copy MC to DSL, June 21, 1919, FOM, TP; Mouneyres 
note, November 25, 1919, Ibid. See P.V., DSL Verifi­
cation Commission, March 23, 1914, FOM, TP, on the 
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des Comptes, March 24, 1924, FOM, TP. Much of the 
increase came from the inflationary increase of 
peanut prices; but contemporary documents indicate 
that thieves had also become much bolder and more 
successful.
18. On the basis of a law of January 7, 1920, authorizing 
temporary conventions for three colonial railroads 
(the DSL, an Indochinese railroad, and the Franco- 
Ethiopian) upon agreement between the Ministers of 
Finance and Colonies and after a favorable review
by the Comite des Travaux Publics des Colonies. This 
regime was extended by a law of October 17, 1924 until 
December 31, 1929 and was again extended by a law 
promulgated on February 17, 1930 for an additional 
year.
19. The DSL note on law #4371, December 1930, FOM, TP, 
summarizes these temporary arrangements. Some DSL 
special rates and accessory charges were allowed to 
rise on February 1, 1918 (DSL to MC, November 10, 1919, 
# 782 CM/5, FOM, TP). Broad increases in rates and 
fares were only allowed, however, on January 1, 1920 
(decree of February 22, 1920, copy in FOM, TP), on 
March 1, 1921 (Boutteville memo, September 17, 1921,
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FOM, TP), on November 15, 1926 (DSL to Gubiand,
January 21, 1929, FOM, TP), and on April 1, 1930 
(Legregram report, June 24, 1930, FOM, TP). As for 
other financial arrangements, the "temporary" con­
vention promulgated on February 3, 1920 (effective 
January 1, 1920) was modified by riders attached Feb­
ruary 17, 1921, October 15, 1924, and December 17, 1925. 
Useful documents are the report by de la Serre, Jan­
uary 25, 1920, FOM, TP; Report to the Comite des 
Travaux Publics des Colonies (henceforth CTPC) by 
Drogue, February 11, 1921, FOM, TP; Rousseau report 
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20. In letters exchanged between the ministry and the 
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administrator, June 21, 1919, Ibid.; two letters DSL
to MC, dated November 10, 1919, FOM, TP; Mouneyres note 
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Ibid.
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peanuts; acting MC to Preside it of CPTC, February 14,
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risk run by the French treasury due to the DSL's 
involvement in the Louga-Linguere rather than any
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operation of the line (draft of MC to GG, February 27,
1929, FOM, TP).
37. Copy of GG TO GS, May 19, 1930, FOM, TP; report by 
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existence already of a heavy truck traffic from 
Djolof to Louga. The growth of M'Backe as a center of 
auto traffic, especially for the Sagata-M'Backe run, 
was noted.in Administrator Baol to GS, April 16, 1928, 
SARS, DCF. The project for the Sine railroad by 
Surleau, June 28, 1930, FOM, TP, noted that trucks 
hauled 10,000 tons of peanuts from M'Backe to Diourbel 
at 150 francs per ton.
56. Pruvost report, June 1, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 5; Legregram 
report, June 16, 1930, FOM, TP, p. 36; table of 
peanut exports in Guiraud, L 'arachide, p. 37.
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57. Pruvost report, June 1, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 5; Pruvost 
report, June 25, 1935, Ibid., p. 6; Legregram report, 
June 16, 1930, FOM, TP, p. 33.
58. Report of DSL Surveillance Engineer, August 20, 1930, 
FOM, TP. The auto may, however, have generated some of 
this new traffic as well (see Wilson et aL., Highway 
Investment, pp. 177-179).
59. The Pruvost report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 70, 
calculated the profitability of various classes of 
passengers on the TN for the period 1930 to 1933 and 
for the DN in 1934. During this depressed period,
only fourth class passenger service remained profitable. 
First and second class service were, as always, highly 
unprofitable during this period.
60. DSL to MC, October 25, 1928, FOM, TP; MC to GG,
November 30, 1928, Ibid.; P.V., CPTC, May 23, 1929,
FOM, TP; DSL to MC, February 14, 1930, FOM, TP, gave 
a report on the small number of passengers taking the 
special trains; GG to MC, February 25, 1930, Ibid.;
GG to MC, September 11, 1930, Ibid.; draft MC to GG, 
October 17, 1930, Ibid.; draft MC to DSL, February 11, 
1931, FOM, TP; DSL to MC, February 17, 1931, Ibid.
61. Railroads in Senegal faced the same automobile competi­
tion for passenger traffic in the 1960!s and 1970's.
The best description of this traffic in the 1920's is 
in the detailed report of the Chief Surveillance 
Engineer, August 20, 1930, FOM, TP. The TN did try
to change its timetable to carry more of the Dakar- 
Kaolack traffic (GS to Director TN, October 30, 1930, 
SARS, DCF); but autos continued to dominate this run 
(acting Director TN, September 26, 1931, Ibid.) Most 
documents on this question simply attribute the shift 
to an "infatuation" (engouement) of the African for 
the automobile.(See Surveillance Engineer report, 
December 28, 1928, FOM, TP). The colonial administra­
tion was upset that proposed increases in DSL fares 
would only make auto competition worse (Surveillance 
Engineer report, December 31, 1929, FOM, TP; GG to 
MC, January 25, 1930, Ibid.)
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62. Surveillance Engineer report, August 20, 1930, FOM, TP.
63. Ibid.
64. Surveillance Engineer report, December 31, 1929, FOM, 
TP; GS to Director TN, March 4, 1931, SARS, DCF, 
considered a reduction in the TN's special rate for 
peanuts on the Guinguineo-Kaolack run in order to 
compete with autos; despite high truck rates and
the competition of the new Louga-Lingu^re railroad, 
trucks were still preferred for freight hauling from 
Djolof, according to Administrator Djolof to GS, 
November 12, 1931, SARS, DCF. Despite discriminatory 
administration measures, automobile freight haulers 
were still competitive up to 1933 (acting GG to MC, 
October 27, 1933, FOM, TP).
65. See the GG1s recommendation on deliberately neglecting 
the maintenance of roads running parallel to a pro­
posed narrow-gauge rail line into Baol, in GG to GS, 
January 21, 1928, ARS, 6P46-36. See also Geoffrey 
Gorer, Africa Dances (New York, 1962), p. 69.
66. Political report, 1928, ARS, 2G28-8; note for IGTP,
May 31, 1933, ARS, K143-46.
67. For instance, Fatick, a major center, was connected 
by roads to both Thi&s and Kaolack. Plainly Thi£s- 
Kaolack traffic could run along these roads. At a 
later era, the printed report by the RSgie des Chemins 
de Fer du S£n£gal, Consequences de la rupture de la 
Federation du Mali sur 11 exploitation du chemin de fer, 
October 19, 1960, copy in RA, still recommended the 
restriction of auto traffic along roads paralleling 
the railroad. The contrary view was expressed clearly 
in the Pruvost report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, pp. 
90-94. See also P.V., CC-Dakar, August 9, 1933.
68. Doukas, French railroads, pp. 214-219, 223-229.
69. The arrete of January 12, 1931 can be found in JOS, 
April 8, 1931, pp. 248-249. See also Georges 
Barthelemy, "la circulation des camions au S£n6gal,” 
Gazette Coloniale, March 17, 1932.
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70. GS to GG, December 5, 1931, FOM, AP545(5); acting 
president of CC-Dakar to Administrator Dakar, Jan­
uary 5, 1932, Ibid.; Gaston Joseph to President of 
F6d£ration Nationale de l1Auto ..., July 13, 1932,
Ibid.
71. GG to MC, April 28, 1932, FOM, AP545(5).
72. GG to MC, February 24, 1933, FOM, AP545(5); MC to 
Union des Vehicles Industriels, March 30, 1933, Ibid.
73. Copy of Potton to Director General of the Banque 
d'Afrique Occidentale (Henceforth BAO), December 12, 
1931, FOM, AP545(5); copy of BAO (Dakar) to BAO(Paris), 
December 17, 1931, Ibid.; GS to Director BAO(Dakar), 
February 26, 1932, Ibid.
74. Guiraud, L 1arachide, pp. 121-133. In contrast, the 
writer of the December 1917 report for Tivaouane,
ARS, 2G17-33 clearly saw that the limitation of trade 
points only worked against the interests of the cul­
tivators by increasing his expenses. Some Lebanese 
competition was also undermined deliberately by the 
elimination of some formerly busy trade centers, such 
as that at Gaoune, within a concession held by Cheik 
Anta M'Backi (Telegram of Administrator Baol to GS, 
October 29, 1932, SARS, DCF).
75. Economic report, 1934, ARS, 2G34-33 (the SIP's were 
allowed to use trucks, however, for seed transporta­
tion) ; the LIGUS mission, Rapport de l'^tude sur la 
coordination des transports du Senegal(1954), ARS-L, 
pp. 36-37, noted sadly that growers were still forced 
to depend on costly, slow pack animal transport be­
cause of the policy of excluding trucks from trade
in the interior. See also J. Fouquet, La traite des 
arachides dans le pays de Kaolack, et ses conse­
quences ... (St.Louis, Senegal, 1958), pp. 91-100.
76. Guiraud, L 1arachide, p. 120, complains of the result­
ing rapidity of a season's transactions. Admitedly 
this rapidity did eliminate the traditional social 
event involved in the seasonal, prolonged dickering 
between buyer and seller over the price of peanuts
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in the escale. But Guiraud was obviously more worried 
about the threat of competition to fixed French 
interests. An economic report of 1933, ARS, 2G33-4, 
suggested, on the contrary, that competition from 
Nigeria and Gambia could best be met with rapid 
purchases of available peanuts in Senegal.
77. Guiraud, L'arachide, pp. 119-120; economic report,
1934, ARS, 2G34-33.
78. P.V., CC-Dakar, August 9, 1933, copy in FOM, AP545(5).
79. Note by MaTtre Devallon for the Direction of Political 
Affairs, December 13, 1933, FOM, AP545(5), in answer 
to a note by Gaston Joseph of November 30, 1933,
Ibid.; see also the note by Gaston Joseph, December 26, 
1933, Ibid.
80. Customs Service report, 1931, ARS, 2G31-3. By this 
time, the onset of the depression was taking its toll 
as well.
81. The alternative was for the government to subsidize 
the railroad. See the thorough analysis of modem 
road-rail competition and coordination in Arthur 
Hazlewood, Rail and Road in East Africa (Oxford, 1964), 
especially pp. 43-81.
82. The published report by the Direction des Transports 
du MinistSre des Travaux Publics de la Republique du 
Senegal, Les transports terrestres au S&n€gal (Thies, 
1964), pp. 2-4, termed the consequences of this div­
ision of the country "tragic.” See also Corinne 
Beneviste, Les relations Dakar-St.Louis. Le rail et 
la route, DES (Dakar, 1967), ARS-L.
83. The administration chose the headquarters for the new 
DN at Thies, already the headquarters of the TN, 
largely because of the difficulty of finding new 
lodging at Dakar for railroad personnel (GG to MC, 
September 8, 1932, FOM, TP).
84. Suret-Canale ( in L'ere coloniale, p. 254) selected 
1936 as the year in which Dakar's supremacy was
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final ly assured. The annual political report for 
Senegal, 1936, ARS, 2G36-5, noted a strong seasonal 
migration from the Senegal river basin, Djolof, and 
Louga toward the southern lands, which were richer, 
better-watered, and "ou les frais de transport sont 
moindres pour 1*Evacuation des produits vers les 
centres d1 achat." For general remarks on rate and 
fare structures on the DN and on other railroads of 
French West Africa, see the Coste report, March 10, 
1938, FOM, TP. The growth of a transportation network 
based on roads would also have channeled more trade 
into the Gambia, which the railroad had deliberately 
bypassed (see Administrator Sine-Saloum to GS, Jan­
uary 21, 1924, SARS, DCF, in which this official 
strongly advised against such a development).
85. Involving 172 unsold vehicles as well as auto replace­
ment parts in one enterprise alone. See copy BAO 
(Dakar) to BAO(Paris), December 17, 1931, FOM,
AP545(5); BAO(Paris) to MC, February 23, 1932, Ibid.
86. Note by Maltre Devallon for the Direction of Political
Affairs, December 13, 1933, FOM, AP545(5).
87. Guiraud, L 1arachide, p. 120, for one, flatly described
the situation brought on by the auto in Senegal, before 
discriminatory restrictions were imposed, as a state
of "virtual anarchy.” Mattre Devallon referred to it 
as a "state of indiscipline" (note for Direction of 
Political Affairs, December 13, 1933, FOM, AP545(5).
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TABLE 1
DSL RAILROAD IN THE PEANUT TRADE
YEAR PEANUTS1 PEANUTS2 % OF TOTAL PEANUTS 2 $DSL PEANUT TOTAL 2
EXPORTED CARRIED PEANUTS SENT FROM FREIGHT FROM FREIGHT,
FROM SENEGAL BY DSL CARRIED BY THIES & THIES & OTHER THAN
(METRIC TONS) (METRIC TONS) DSL TIVAUUANE TIVAOUANE PEANUTS ON
(METRIC TONS) (PERCENTAGE) DSL (METRIC
TONS}
1878 34 , 524
-
4
8
9
1
1879 34,529
1880 52,134
1882 48,015
1883 42,858
1884 38,250 -
1885 41,248 -
1886 22,565 10,002 44.3
1887 19,714 10,714 54.4
1888 40,3423 28,867 71.6
1889 32,080 22,818 71.5
1890 27,386 18,892 69.0
1891 26,394 22,818 86.6
1892 46,790 37,305 79.7 19,830 53.2
1893 59,302 43,729 73.7 24,001 54.9 14,637
TABLE 1— CONTINUED
YEAR PEANUTS1 
EXPORTED 
FROM SENEGAL 
(METRIC TONS)
PEANUTS° 
CARRIED
BY DSL
(METRIC TONS)
% OF TOTAL 
PEANUTS 
CARRIED BY 
DSL
PEANUTS^
SENT FROM 
THIES & 
TIVAOUANE 
(METRIC TONS)
$DSL PEANUT 
FREIGHT FROM 
THIES & 
TIVAOUANE 
(PERCENTAGE')1
TOTAL 
FREIGHT, 
OTHER 
THAN PEA­
NUTS ON 
DSL (MET­
RIC TONS)
1894 65,289 46,718 71.6 22,723 48.6 19,919
1895 51,537 34,837 67.6 18.195 52.2 11,954
1896 63,556 42,863 67.4 25,095 58.5
1897 48,1233 38,474 80.0 20,330 52.8 21,505
1898 95,987 53,089 55.3 27,216 51.3 27,098
1899 85,547 57,642 67.4 27,414 47.6 35,311
1900 140,921 90,386 64.1 41,667 46.1 21,899
1901 123,482 97,660 78.9 45,992 47.2 57,354
1902 110,225 51,318 46.6 24,921 48.6 51,657
1903 148,843 78,296 52.6 41,558 53.1 40,882
1904 137,784 66,209 48.1 32,309 48.8 34,512
1905 96,175 53,817 56.0 27,201 50.5
1906 100,476 51,741 51.5 25,032 48.4 26,419
1907 154,447 101,833 65.9 40,049 39.3 44,982
1908 144,140 76,969 53.1 30,225 39.3 90,927
1909 224,326 146,130 65.1 83,475 57.1 103.343
1910 227,299 160,170 70.4 84,162 52.5
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T A B L E  1 - - C O N T IN U E D
Several sources:
1 Figures for 1878-80 from Ministry marine, Tableaux de Population, de culture et 
de commerce des colonies. Figures for 1882-87 from Ministry Marine, Statistiques 
Coloniales. For 1892-1910 from S/SEC Colonies Statistiques c-oloniales; Petyt Report—  
receipts DSL-1890,FOM, Senegal Xll,69;
2 Figures 1886 to 1891, in Fontaneilles Report, July 17, 1898, FOM, TP; Figures 1892- 
1910 in annual reports of DSL board of directors to stockholders (1896 missing) same 
as figures 1892-1905 in Government General. Les Chemins de fer en AQF, I, 1906.
3. X. Guiraud, L 1arachide ginegalaise. (Paris, 1937), p. 37.
a A % calculation on the basis of the trade season, or from November through the 
following October, would be much more meaningML, but figures for total exports from 
Senegal on this basis are not available--Presumably shipments of peanuts within the 
country, as seed for example, would be negligible, this is confirmed by a glance at 
Table V.
b Includes freight shipped in from TK railroad.
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TABLE 2
PEANUTS ARRIVING BY RAIL AT PORTS3
(Freight Volume in Metric Tons—  
Percentage of the Total Peanut 
Rail Freight is in Parentheses)
TRADE SEASON AT RUFISQUE AT ST. LOUIS AT ALL ' 
OTHER RAIL 
STATIONS
TOTAL
1884-85 7,321 (60.8#) 4,475 37. 2#) 238 12,034
1885-86 6,761 (72.5 ) 1,955 21.0 ) 610 9,326
1886-87 6,512 (68.2 ) 2,984 31.3 ) 47 9,543
1887-88 17,604 (66.7 ) 8,496 32.2 ) 290 26,390
1888-89 17,745 (80.8 ) 4,007 18.2 ) 216 21,968
1889-90 15,782 (83.1 ) 2,922 15.4 ) 279 18,983
1890-91 16,595 (90.5 ) 1,479 8.1 ) 263 18,377
1891-92 36,334 (88.2 ) 4,347 10.6 ) 505 41,186
1892-93 41,661 (89.3 ) 4,820 10.3 ) 156 46,637
1893-94 38,792 (85.9 ) 6,106 13.5 ) 279 45,177
1894-95 31,917 (92.7 ) 2,467 7.2 ) 63 34,447
1895-96 38,320 (92.8 ) 2,885 7.0 ) 67 41,27 2
1896-97 33,996 (89.6 ) 3,908 10.3 ) 33 37,937
1897-98 44,642 (86.8 ) 6,379 12.4 ) 401 51,422
1898-99 43,667 (85.6 ) 7,239 14.2 ) 118 51,024
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TABLE 2--Continued
TRADE SEASON AT RUFISQUE AT ST. LOUIS AT ALL TOTAL
OTHER RAIL
STATIONS
1899-1900 84,854 (86.2 ) 13,309 (13.5 ) 257 98,420
1900-1901 69,066 (87.6 ) 9,256 (11.7 ) 515 78,837
aSource: Chief of DSL operations to GG, May 27, 1901, SARS, 
DCF.
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TABLE 3
ANNUAL PEANUT FREIGHT PER STATION ON DSLa-(METRIC TONS)
INCOMING OUTGOING
YEAR DAKAR RUFISQUE ST. LOUIS SEBIKOTANE POUT THIES
1892 578 32,163 4,484 150 7 27 6,393 ...
1893 566 38,748 4,369 130 640 7,926
1894 185 40,051 6,393 155 920 9,534
1895 30 32,047 2,691 111 466 8,111
1896 58 39,618 3,133 163 628 11,675
1897 48 34,554 3,819 144 485 10,019
1898 47 6 45,556 7,007 229 649 13,273
1899 68 49,004 8,504 209 1,201 11,360
1900 245 77,823 12,261 511 865 20,238
1901 294 85,968 10,987 993 1,498 21,496
1902 70 45,343 5,762 836 1,071 12,459
1903 205 72,037 5,948 1,214 1,604 23,119
1904 201 58,994 6,928 440 663 15,031
1905 128 48,937 4,139 357 507 13,015
1906 4,971 43,882 5,852 333 671 9,691
1907 2,317 81,732 17,726 712 1,886 18,244
1908 5,351 64,312 6,564 421 1,649 14,270
1909 1,970 131,212 12,688 696 1,616 71,139
1910 3,910 135,902 19,876 838 1,960 73,585
1911 2,874 76,529 7,339 332 1,178 46,760 . . .
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TABLE 3— CONTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR TIVAOUANE PIRE
GOUREYE
N 'GAYE 
MEKHE
KELLE N'DANDE KEHEMER
1892 13,437 2,919 5,398 3,215 1,209 7 28
1893 16,075 3,660 5,563 3,589 1,683 980
1894 13,189 2,703 6,145 4,252 1,967 1,075
1895 10,084 2,962 5,116 2 922 1,666 524
1896 13,420 3,101 6,109 2^013 2,009 608
1897 10,311 2,254 6,063 1,926 2,515 828
1898 13,943 3,046 7,767 1,802 2,605 1,725
1899 16,054 3,199 6,977 1,674 3,204 1,928
1900 21,429 6,009 15,493 2,916 3,417 3,610
1901 24,371 8,556 13,935 3,774 3,905 3,608
1902 12,462 4,083 7,364 1,664 1,500 2,261
1903 18,439 6,373 13,193 2,312 2,393 2,816
1904 17,278 5,159 11,210 1,835 3,211 3,412
1905 14,186 2,815 7,180 1,697 2,803 3,204
1906 15,341 2,781 5,344 4,510 2,683 2,711
1907 21,805 7,459 15,634 2,946 6,177 5,999
1908 15,965 6,461 14,187 3,251 4,832 5,020
1909 12,336 7,104 16,816 4,957 8,000 7,547
1910 10,577 9,132 16,075 5,353 7,345 10,153
1911 5,940 4,302 8,123 2,482 3,624 4,012
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TABLE 3— CONTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR GOUMBO LOUGA 
GUEOUL
SAKAL M ’PAL BAO TOTALS
1892 87 2 1,376 145 573 62 37,305
1893 1,352 1,536 51 101 22 43,729
1894 1,426 3,669 511 354- 212 46,718
1895 7 57 1,774 147 204 62 34,837
1896 753 1,673 239 267 141 42,863
1897 943 1,771 228 505 427 38,474
1898 2,130 4,249 564 713 361 53,089
1899 2,710 6,946 913 840 232 57,642
1900 5,145 7,303 1,735 1,449 686 90,386
1901 4,584 7,505 1,662 941 509 97,660
1902 1,874 3,299 1,020 370 894 51,318
1903 2,006 2,800 829 264 674 78,296
1904 3,350 2,757 952 325 530 66,209
1905 2,818 2,890 937 304 351 53,817
1906 2,657 3,372 1,278 588 76 51,741
1907 5,940 8,159 2,141 1,697 1,465 101,833
1908 3,444 3,224 461 313 455 76,969
1909 5,363 7,795 969 224 785 146,130
1910 7,621 12,525 1,720 907 1,191 160,170
1911 2,408 5,644 1,009 579 631 87,363
a Source: Figures from annual reports of DSL Board of
Directors to stockholders (1896 missing); same as figures 
1892-1905 with very slight differences in Government 
General, AOF, Les chemins de fer en AOF, I; Le Senegal(Paris 
1906. Figures showing tonnages per trading season (November 
to May) would be preferable, but only scattered figures 
are available for some stations.
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TABLE 4
POPULATION STATISTICS 
-COMMUNES
YEAR ST. LOUIS GOREE RUFISQUE DAKAR
1835
1876
1884
1885 
1888
1890
1891 (June) 
1891 '
1904
1908
1909
1910
1913
1914 
1916
11,636
15,980
18,924
16,682
18,620
25,000 
16,119 
20,17 3, 
24,070 
24,679 
22,219 
22,093 
23,326 
23,481
.1 - - -
\Za
1
3,2432b 1,2932c l,5562d
[3
i5
|6
.1
1,928?
1,744
1,700?
2,068°
6,783^ 
5,127
5,000?
8,091°
1.946I 
4,829
6,300?
8,737°
1,5607 12,446? 18,447?
'8I
- 12,469 24,910
i
a
TO
11
8
1,195®
923 
7 598
12,4579 
11,112® 
12,SOS11 
11,658®
24,914®
24,609
21,624?1
24,577
1 Rousseau's notes on St. Louis, ARS, 3G^/1
2 SARS, 22G40
3 SARS, 22G39
4 Annuaire du Senegal, 1888
5, SARS, 22G41
6 SARS, 22G42
7 Government General, AOF, Recencement de la population du 
Senegal en 1904 (St. Louis, Senegal, 1904), pp. 6-7.
8 SARS, DCF
9 Government General, AOF, L 1AOF. 1911
10 ARS, H57
11 SARS, 22G51
a Includes 1182 of floating population
b Includes 27 6 of floating population
c Includes 113 of floating population; the rural suburbs
held 6,601 people also 
d Includes 360 of floating population
e Includes 2,500 of floating population
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TABLE 5 
POPULATION STATISTICS - 
ESCALES
YEAR THIES TIVAOUANE PIRE
GOUREYE
N'GAYE
MEKHE
KELLE N'DANDE LOUGA M'PAL
1876 l , ^ 1
187 8 9 260 650 2,000 250 600 400 1,000 2,500
1885 1,003 1,178 - - -
1888 2,094 - - - - r
1891 - - - - - 901
1894 443 384 - 143 200 - -
1895 301 167 - 191 - £
1897 657 6 - - - - - 1,199°
1898 - 3,135® 1,137 814 395 661 1,353, 232
1904 2,784
2,707
4,318 
4,2528
1,503 1,460 516 736 1,395 130
1905 - - - - - -
19079 1,750 - - - - - 1,726 -
19089 2,404 3,403,q 
1,8481912 -
19ll° 3,044 2,110 1,172 379 758 353 1,478
19169 2,969 1,978 - - - - 1,433
1 SARS, 22G40
2 Walter map, November 14, 1978
3 SARS, 22G39
-498-
R
eproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright 
ow
ner. 
Further 
reproduction 
prohibited 
w
ithout 
perm
ission.
TABLE 5— CONTINUED
4 Annuaire du Senegal, 1888
5 SARS, 22G45
6 SARS, 22G49
7 Government General, AOF, Recensement de la population, pp. 6-7.
8 Report of GS to GG; in JOS, January 1905, p.l
9 SARS, DCF
10 SARS, 22G51
a The perimeter of Tivaouane was expanded from 4 to 16 square kilometers in 1897.
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TABLE 6
ANNUAL MILLET FREIGHT PER STATION ON DSL3
(METRIC TONS)
INCOMING
YEAR DAKAR RUFISQUE THIES TIVAOUANE ST. LOUIS TOTAL
1892 294 419 65 92 851 1,793
1893 153 169 7 28 349 1,465
1894 69 50 6 35 194 855
1895 282 126 12 4 999 1,646
1896 218 127 4 49 256 1,035
1897 199 82 34 73 1,327 1,818
1898 123 64 50 143 422 1,115
1899 256 141 9 29 516 1,182
1900 73 12 19 66 147 449
1901 138 65 2 18 353 786
1902 318 155 10 31 669 1,744
1903 444 108 6 4-2 2,939 4,131
1904 686 277 33 67 1,899 3,355
1905 403 373 109 180 162 2,112
1906 579 477 133 82 268 1,954
1907 326 413 460 822 185 4,143
1908 562 224 170 73 1,562 2,920
1909 719 322 1,040 277 614 3,574
1910 527 377 1,182 232 95 4,186
1911 554 355 265 166 727 2,564
a Sources: Figures from annual reports of DSL board of
Director to stockholders (1896 missing); 1896 figures 
in table in Government General, AOF, Les chemins de 
fer en AOF. I. Le Senegal (Paris, 1906), p. 35. That 
table is virtually the same as the above for 1892-1905.
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TABLE 7 — CONTINUED
1 Figures 1892 to 1911 ih annual reports of DSL Board of Directors to stockholders (1896 missing)
2 1886 figures in Etienne "Report, FOM, Senegal XII, 69.
a Sources: For 1892 to 1911 - Annual Reports of DSL Board of Directors to stockholders.
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TABLE 8 
PASSENGER TRAPPIC-DSLa
NUMBER OP PASSENGERS
YEAR 1ST CLASS 2ND CLASS 3rd CLASS TOTAL
1885 1681 6083 93,113 100,877
1886 1845 7148 103,525 112,518
1887 2043 8422 144,267 154,732
1883 2192 9828 17 5,134 187,154
1889 2110 8702 148,814 159,626
1890 2264 9036 136,707 148,007
1891 2263 9200 144,417 155,880
1892 2694 10,828 187,865 201,387
1893 3275 12,955 207,656 223,886
1894 3987 12,264 190,536 206,787
1895 3144 10,941 159,506 173,591
NUMBER OP PASSENGER-KILOMETERS
YEAR 1ST CLASS 2ND CLASS 3RD CLASS TOTAL
1885 139,108 365,356 4,691,092 5,195,556
1886 105,650 461,790 6,354,911 6,922,351
1887 222,942 574,464 7,589,786 8,387,192
1888 238,430 698,999 8,920,889 9,858,318
1889 236,554 603,543 7,879,014 8,719,111
1890 244,654 615,409 7,585,330 8,445,393
1891 260,27 6 662,325 8,061,518 8,930,119
1892 290,223 720,665 10,384,187 11,375,075
1893 344,133 830,793 11,273,686 12,448,612
1894 388,380 779,916 10,276,736 11,445,032
1895 345,310 718,429 8,442,229 9>505,965
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TABLE 8--CONTINUED
PASSENGER RECEIPTS (FRANCS)
YEAR 1ST CLASS 2ND CLASS 3RD CLASS TOTAL
1885 12,218.15 26,696.50 254,637.01 293,551.66
1886 12,158.50 26,279.25 336,019.47 384,462.22
1887 20,424.76 47,823.84 403,980.16 472,228.76
1888 20,451.88 53,618.56 481,008.82 555,079.26
1889 21,667.49 47,947.27 413,909.12 483,521.93
1890 21,703.62 46,900.98 387,715.86 456,320.46
1891 22,551.79 45,485.09 408,846.57 476,883.15
1892 25,880 52,946 538,711.83 617,536.45
1893 25,207 62,909.40 592,418.65 682,542.
1894 36,316.81 58,281.21 531,626.90 626,225.93
1895 31,542 50,610 441,303.20 523,528.17
YEAR
$3RD
CLASS
PASSEN­
GERS
% 3RD 
CLASS 
RECEIPTS
AVERAGE TRIP ONE-WAY (KMS)
1ST CLASS 2ND CLASS 3RD CLASS
1885 92.3 86.7 82.8 60.1 50.4
1886 92.0 87.4 57.3 64.6 61.4
1887 93.2 85.5 109.1 68.2 52.6
1888 93.6 86.7 108.8 71.1 50.9
1889 93.2 85.6 112.1 69.4 52.9
1890 92.3 85.0 108.1 68.1 55.5
1891 92.6 85.7 115.0 72.0 55.8
1892 93.3 87 .2 107.7 66.6 55.2
1893 92.8 86.8 105.1 64.1 54.3
1894 92.1 84.9 97.4 63.6 53.9
1895 91.9 84.3 109.8 65.7 52.9
a Source: Prom tables of traffic by DSL, in POM,
Senegal XII, T4.
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TABLE 10
BREAKDOWN OF TK RECEIPTS, 1910-1922a 
COMMERCIAL RECEIPTS (franos)
YEAR SECTION PASSENGERS EXPRESS SLOW TOTAL COM* TOTAL
AND BAGGAGE FREIGHT FREIGHT MERCIAL RECEIPTS
RECEIPTS INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT 
TRAFFIC
1910 1
2
TOTAL
1911 1
2
3
TOTAL
1912 1 
2 
3
TOTAL
1913 1 
2
3
TOTAL
1914 1 
2
3
TOTAL
1915 1 
2 
3
TOTAL
329,023
7,286
336,309
388,997
60,496
"5,064
463,557
322,000
121,180
57,796
500,976
598,370
142,442
112,660
553,473
462,833
179,342
75,637
717,813
294,556
156,829
75,355
456,740
30,988
608
31,596
26,840
8,665
 '83
34,502
27,146
16,637
6,705
50,488
32,477
26,537
11,754
70,768
31,763
37,505
5,690
74,958
29,182
44,253
8,162
81,501
607,001
3,715
610,715
455,061
34,134
1,108
490,305
381,406
81,717
38,400
501,582
332,160
399,324
89,580
821,063
625,087
157,082
43,161
825,310
593,929
204,000
188,682
986,010
967,012
11,609
978,621
869,998 
112,893 
5^255 
988,452
730,662
210,533
102,961
1,053,047
763,008
568,302
213,994
1,545,303
1,119,665
375,929
134,488
1,518,080
847,666
405,062
272,205
1,524,951
974,575
11,698
988,272
890,165
113,595
6,440
1,010,199
754,823
234,7011
111,067
1,090,591
793,052
578,468
238,652
1,610,172
1,150,708
392,258
159,089
1,682,056
873,531
424,425
314,989
1,612,925
(1) Thies-Diourbel section (79 Km)
(2) Diourbel- Kaolack section (77Kin)--not including Diourb&l
(3) Guinguineo to Terminus of line
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TABLE 10— CONTINUED
COMMERCIAL RECEIPTS (francs)
YEAR SECTION PASSENGERS 
AND BAGGAGE
EXPRESS
FREIGHT
SLOW
FREIGHT
TOTAL COM­
MERCIAL 
RECEIPTS
TOTAL
RECEIPTS
INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT
TRAFFIC
1916 1 343,541 30,010 324,248 702,709 737,715
2 190,727 41,924 150,861 375,261 385,904
3 77.756 7.391 150.584 235.631 359.432
TOTAL 607,023 79,255 625,413 1,311,601 1,484,049
1917 1 417,110 32,665 395,405 845,181 892,810
2 214,887 44,740 230,617 560,144 565,455
3 115.610 7.006 202.803 395.510 344.358
TOTAL 807,608 84,411 828,315 1,790,834 1,802,623
1918 1 542,074 59,458 631,161 1,252 , 694 1,389,176
2 237,777 60,185 233,980 531,942 558,336
3 199.148 14.119 234.952 498.214 787.188
TOTAL 978,997 135,763 1,150,092 2,262 , 653 2,734,700
1919 1 501,305 157,019 680,167 1,318,408 1,332,023
2 464,917 100,819 253,229 812,767 933,669
3 200.902 10.708 154.177 356.766 450.022
TOTAL 1,167,124 248,344 1,087,574 2,503,041 2,935,776*
1920 1 1,134,279 402,123 1,402,697 3,029,100 3,432,622
2 1,012,936 280,068 669,536 1,962,540 2,060,376
3 435.790 51.739 347.386 854.914 946.336
TOTAL 2,583,005 733,930 2,509,620 3,826,555 6,444,514*
1921 1 1,094,824 ■\92,781 2,155,695 3,443,230 3,858,051
2 982,115 140,522 841,731 1,964,367 2,110,811
3 J.8,679 627.536 1.062.431 1.432.358
TOTAL 2,403,158 351,979 3,624,891 6,470,028 7,943,182*
1922 1 1,185,760 168,730 2,531,814 3,686,305 4,070,201
2 1,075,830 125,463 1,054,622 2,255,916 2,303,450
3 557.941 18.259 657.208 1.213.407 1.401.664
TOTAL 2,819,532 312,453 4,223,643 7,355,628 8,334,897*
x - includes transportation of construction material
(a) Souroe* Notioe on the TK by Direotor Tl^Ballabey, July 20, 1923, 
ARS, 6P 160-36
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TABLE 11
GROSS RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES AFTER THE TKN FUSION 3
RECEIPTS (FRANCS) EXPENSES (FRANCS)
YEAR THIES-KAYES KAYES-NIGER THIES KAYES KAYES-NIGER PROFITS 
(Receipts Less 
Expenses)
1924 16,858,979 7,056,298 13,510,392 8,039,559 2,385,328
1925 24,610,424 9,927,277 20,808,861 16,135,212
i
2,406,313 g
vO
1926
1927
36,095,665
THIES-h
58,632,
17,204,964
riGER
237
25,167,340
THIES-J 
36,035,
20,093,507 ' 
JIGER 
906
8,939,722
3,596,331
1928 64,635, 073 61,393;,177 2,741,896
1929 62,554, 838 60,839; 513 1,715,325
1930 55,525, 412 65,743, 580 -10,418,169
1931 42,505, 586 52,564, 917 -10,059,330
1932 36,336, 382 43,558, 353 - 7,322,075
a Source: Pruvost report, June 25, 1935, Page 35 (Bagot Mission)- FOM,TP Niger
These figures are not exactly the same as those presented in Qhemln de fer de ffirTgg‘~au
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TABLE 12
PEANUT FREIGHT SHIPPED3 (METRIC TONS)
FROM
RAILROAD 
SECTION OR 
STATION
1928-29 SEASON 1929-30 SEASON 1930-31 SEASON
TO KAOLACK
TO DAKAR & 
RUFISQUE TO KAOLACK
TO DAKAR & 
RUFISQUE TO KAOLACK
TO DAKAR 
RUFISQUE
KOULIKORO (KN) 6,805 4,235 8,064 3,265 4,561 3,037
BAMAKO-TOUKOTO 5,241 3,479 6,653 2,433 5.462 2,177
TOUKOTO-KAYES 1,237 773 1,261 237 671 337
TOTAL KN 13,283 8,487 15,978 5,935 10,694 5,551
KAYES-VILLE 1,926 1,904 1,458 1,047 408 1,139
KAYES-AMEIDEDI 248 994 185 984 303 662
AMBIDEDI-COTIAR3 2,389 159 2,179 151 1,188 103
TAMBACOUNDA- 4,268 - 5,933 23 5,246 8
KOUNGHEUL
KOUNGHEUL- 6,813 - 11,770 - 13,091 -
MALEME HODAR
KAFFRINE- 6,745 - 11,060 - 12,968 -
BIRKELANE
GOSSAS &
GUINGUINEO 16,072 - 24,299 - 19,650 -
SINE RAILROAD - - - - 1,131 -
DIOURBEL 37,106 3,713 38,522 7,485 23,906 20,127
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TABLE 12--CONTINUED
PROM 
RAILROAD 
SECTION OR 
STATION
1928-29 SEASON
TO KAOLACK
TO DAKAR & 
RUFISQUE
1929-30 SEASON
TO KAOLACK
TO DAKAR & 
RUFISQUE
1930-31 SEASON
TO KAOLACK
TO DAKAR & 
RUFISQUE
BAMBEY
KHOMBOLE
TOTAL TK 
TOTAL TN
1,516
77,083
90,366
23,103
26,421
56,297
64,784
$ on Thies- 
Kaolack Section 69. 6$
1,039
96,445
112,423
23,796
23,893
57,379
63,313
67 .7$
77,891
88,585
18,212
12,245
52,496
58,047
65.0$
a Source: Copy report acting director TN to IGTP, September 26, 1931, SARS, DCF.
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TABLE 13 
EFFECTS OF FUSION - 
VOLUME AND INTENSITY OF TRAFFIC3
(TK + KN ADDED)
TONNAGE EXPRESS EXPRESS AND..,^. „ »
AND SLOT-/ FREIGHT TONNAGE X  DISTANCE-SLOW FREIGHT * TK + KN ADDED 
YEAR (TONS) TK ONLY TK 4- KN ADDED PASSENGERS X DISTANCE
(UNIT KM)
1920 192,541 9,899,424 25,503,657
1921 168,035 8,282,438 20,655,682
1922 194,622 13,156,351 26,548,063
1923 202,246 11,119,801 27,123,335
1924 Fusion 234,668 54,951,696
1925 267,823 66,643,859 94,937,266
1926 297,705 85,453,844 98,470,084
1927 256,106 67,760,959 64,453,246
1928 258,658 83,034,380 57,736,503
1929 262,523 86,343,774 52,282,572
a Source: From legregram report (mission Sol) , June 16, 1930, F0M,TP, p. 33.
figures are close to, but not exactly the same as those given in Ohemin de fer de 
Thids au Niger, p. 84, for the years 1924 to 1928.
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TABLE 14— CONTINUED
Several Souroest
1* Rrom tables in annual customs service reports on Senegal, especially for 1932, SABS, DCF.
2 . Annual reports of DSL Board of Directors to Stockholders•
3. Annual reports to DSL stockholders- See Table 15*
4. Legregram report (Sol Uission), June 16, 1930, FQH, TP.
5. Derived from tables of monthly peanut freight in A ®,  6P438-36.
a - Probably reflects a heavy traffic due to "Havitaillament" operations within Senegal.
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TABLE 15
ANNUAL PEANUT FREIGHT PER STATION ON DSLa (METRIC TONS)
INCOMING OUTGOING
YEAR DAKAR RUFISQUE ST. LOUIS SEBIKOTANE POUT THIES
1908 5,351 64,312 6,564 421 1,649 14 , 270 ...
1909 1,970 131,212 12,688 696 1,616 71,139
1910 3,901 135,902 19,876 838 1,960 73,585
1911 2,874 76,529 7,339 332 1,178 46,760
1912 8,028 82,930 5,715 667 2,020 40,029
1913 8,000 114,091 3,380 1,045 2,709 49,906
1914 4,160 107,865 3,252 824 2,630 57 , 507
1915 5,812 136,786 3,598 1,024 2,675 95,529
1916 7,700 62,849 878 562 1,454 31,369
1917 16,294 74,561 1,123 994 2,244 46,220
1918 24,183 85,171 4,039 486 1,927 58,401
1919 18,846 87.401 1,496 1,038 2,980 63,680
1920 13,060 141,653 1,500 483 2,816 80,533
1921 22,437 117,079 1,405 744 3,383 64,564
1922 31,823 102,009 6,102 680 3,564 65,889
1923 26,787 92,569 10,359 860 3,442 48,745
1924 43,356 76,504 8,750 7 20 3,811 55,509
1925 83,393 132,812 18,145 1,324 5,541 93,128
1926 89,646 123,349 15,986 1,316 5,102 99,435
1927 57,766 89,215 9,329 7 26 3,062 66,800
1928 67,999 103,563 8,999 889 3,742 77,329
1929 80,503 88,788 8,839 780 4,977 79,060
1930 81,888 66,420 7,610 215 2,604 61,185
1931 86,257 36,489 1,366 13 1,693 54,687
1932 25,419 15,030 1,394 301 1,333 16,921 . . .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 15— CONTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR THIES LESS 
TK FREIGHT 
TRANSIT
TIVAOUANE PIRE N'GAYE KELLE 
BOUREYE MEKHE
N'DANDE
1908 13,814 15,965 6,461 14,197 3,251 4,832
1909 18,053 12,336 7,104 16,816 4,957 8,000
1910 24,819 10,577 9,132 16,07 5 5,353 7,345
1911 7,593 5,940 4,302 8,123 2,482 3,624
1912 7,489 6,284 5,243 9,053 2,603 5,811
1913 13,086 9,033 7,790 13,300 4,883 5,263
1914 11,245 6,047 5,328 13,548 §,932 5,109
1915 18,579 10,032 9,415 12,966 4,320 3,105
1916 3,771 5,257 4,177 7,416 2,169 2,729
1917 8,401 6,403 3,917 8,291 3,415 3,046
1918 6,341 3,912 6,044 12,061 6,621 3,325
1919 7,474 4,257 4,754 7,772 5,330 2,719
1920 11,835 8,434 6,636 15,593 5,994 5,916
1921 5,919 11,430 7,07 2 14,052 5,345 5,147
1922 9,291 10,040 5,218 16,031 4,396 4,390
1923 8,052 11,024 5,854 14,822 4,612 4,972
1924 7,229 9,802 5,176 13,099 5,101 5,650
1925 18,597 15,671 9,245 23,846 8,356 11,168
1926 17,996 16,702 9,772 25,319 7,981 9,886
1927 11,952 11,010 7,605 17,937 5,316 6,943
1928 13,938 12,758 6,989 17,548 5,189 7,491
1929 16,887 13,902 8,217 18,801 7,778 7,008
1930 5,193 8,637 6,270 16,088 4,980 7,169
1931 6,437 5,448 6,138 17,520 4,152 4,819
1932 3,677 3,252 2,491 6,902 1,565 1,699
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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T A B L E  1 5 — CO NTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR KEBEMER GOUMBO 
GUEOUL
LOUGA SAKAL M ’PAL RAO
1908 5,020 ’3,444 3,224 461 313 455
1909 7,547 5,363 7,795 96w 224 785
1910 10,153 7,621 12,525 1,720 907 1,191
1911 4,012 2,408 5,644 1,009 579 631
1912 3,402 6,467 6 , 686 1,712 762 742
1913 9,259 7,738 10,443 2,297 558 515
1914 8,480 5,847 5,030 530 40 301
1915 4,303 1,795 1,144 143 13 42
1916 3,552 3,317 2,414 419 72 92
1917 5,189 3,078 3,222 793 93 422
1918 9,459 4,528 3,198 208 34 263
1919 6,144 4,104 4,149 616 68 272
1920 10,556 7,342 8,980 1,012 227 619
1921 10,650 6,741 8,115 885 230 385
1922 9,347 7,177 8,449 1,528 435 677
1923 11,211 8, 329 10,454 2,149 670 681
1924 11,097 5,571 9,984 1,639 346 496
1925 19,353 13,365 26,171 3,698 809 1,196
1926 17,260 9,653 21,092 3,066 693 1.,040
1927 13,330 6,333 14,543 1,654 421 591
1928 11,608 9,472 17,274' 2,671 658 862
1929 12,009 5, 994 15,831 2,116 540 616
1930 12,519 7,097 18,359 3,141 829 726
1931 10,838 5,463 12,611 1,021 349 279
1932 3,679 1,972 3,001 473 86 87 ...
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 15--CONTINUED
OUTGOING
YEAR TK TRANSIT TOTAL
1908 456 76,969
1909 53,084 146,130
1910 48,900 160,170
1911 39,167 87,363
1912 32,540 97,190
1913 36,820 129,820
1914 46,262 115,675
1915 76,950 146,947
1916 27.598 .7 2,138
1917 37,819 93,105
1918 52,060 113,887
1919 56,206 108,450
1920 68,698 159,364
1921 58,645 140,915
1922 56,598 140,012
1923 40,693 129,000
1924 48,280 128,740
1925 74,531 234,402
1926 81,439 229,041
1927 54,848 156,507
1928 63,391 181,666
1929 62,173 178,736
1930 55,916 156,007
1931 48,250 125,400
1932 13,244 47,870
a Source: Annual reports of DSL Board of Directors to
stockholders (1909 to 1933).
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TABLE 16— CONTINUED
Sources:
1 Annual reports to DSL stockholders.
2 Table of peanut freight from5'TK stations, 1911-1926, in FOM, TP.
a Column 6 minus column 7.
b After fusion of the TK with the KN, Dakar received about 1/3 of the KN's peanuts,
so that the more complicated pattern of traffic makes this term meaningless.
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TABLE 17
RECORDED POPULATIONS OP COMMUNES AND ESCALES IN SENEGAL
Commune 
or Escale 19141 19162 19214 19255 19302 19346
Saint Louis 23,481 22,169 20,358 19,006 19,373 30,800
Dakar 21,624 24,577 37,145 — 54,000\ 
(In 19318)
76,100
Goree 923 7 59 998 - - -
Rufisque 12,873 11,658 11,307 17,082 20,029a 17,600
Louga 1,476 1,433 3,108 3,772 6,316 3,600
Mekhe 379 - 1,300 1,918 2,074 1,860
Tlvaouane 2,110 1,978 2,584 3,615 3,230 2,900
Thles 3,044 2,967 6,427 6,612 12,620 15,500
Khombole 1,075' - - 1,202 1,929 1,900
Bambey 4587 - - - - 4,200
Diourbel 2,192 2,283 2,538 5,852 11,348 15,400
Gossas - - - - 2,765 5,900
Kaolack 1,454 1,442 1,532 5,652 13,348 44,200
Fatlck 1,3197 - - 2,185 3,035 3,400
Foundiougne 994' - - 1,625 1,784 2,700
Zigulnchor 1,477 1,479 2,629 1,669 8,225 6,100
Dagana 1,689 1,462 - - 1,516 -
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TABLE 17— CONTINUED
Commune 
or Escale 1914 4 19162 19214 19255 19302 19346
Podor 2,17 2 2,227 1,329
Bakel 3,081 3,134 - - 2,840 -
Tambacounda - - - - 1,626 -
M'Bour - - - 5,351 3,182 -
Several Sources:
i
Ul
1 Extracted from tables In SARS, 22G50
2 Extracted from tables in SARS, DCF 1
4 ARS, 17G 239-108
5 Table dated September 25, 1925, SARS,DCF
6 Table III, Annuaire statlstique de l'AOF, 1933-34, p. 20
7 From tables in SARS, 22G52
8 Lombard, ideographie humaine, p. 153 
a Including Bargny
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TABLE 18
EUROPEAN POPULATION OF COMMUNES AND ESCALES IN SENEGAL3
COMMUNE OR 
ESCALE 19081 1914 2 19162 19214 19242 19302 1934k5
Saint Louis 1,010 417 + 633 Metisl 346 + 540 Metis 627 - 440 990
Dakar 2,434 2,201 [2,157 + 762 M&tis 2,534 - - 10,250
Goree - 48 + 110 Metis' 31 81
Rufisque 186 250 + 118 Mgtis 181 + 115 M§tis 201 307 37 6 264
Louga 100 67 34 + 10 M§tis 59 72 231 180
Mekhe - 343 - 36 74 38 60 ,
Tivaouane - 77 + 10 Metis 8 6 + 1 0  Metis 43 73 53 100 01
ThiSs 140 222 + 29 M§tis 185 + 10 Metis 296 415 628 810 w
Khombole 50 493 - - - 56 160 '
Bambey 26 213 - - - - 110
Diourbel 28 53 8 6 + 6  Metis 90 - 248 240
Gossas - - - - - 80 100
Kaolack 27 5 3 + 7  Metis 143 + 12 Metis 68 - 813 620
Fatick 40 30 + 10 Mgtis3 24 - 179 160
Foundiougne 33 2 0 + 5  Metis - 22 - 42 50
Ziguinchor - 67 + 20 Metis 52 + 10 Metis 45 — 160 190
Dagana - 22 13 - - 15 —
Podor - 3 1 + 5  Mgtis 2 0 + 4  Metis - — 44 _
Bakel - 2 + 2  MStis 2 + 1  Metis - — 9 _
Tambacounda - - - - — 179 160
M'Bour - 333 - - - - 180
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TABLE 18--CONTINUED
a. Metis were sometimes tabulated into the figures for "Franjais." Sometimes not— which 
may account for some fluctuations in the size of populations, especially for St.
Louis, Dakar, and Ruflsque.
Several Sources:
1 From tables in SARS, DCF
2 From tables in Sa RS, 22G50
3 From tables in SARS, 22G52
4 ARS, 17G239-108
5 Table III, Annuaire statistique de-<l*AOF, 1933-34, p.20.
-524-
-525-
TABLE 19
POPULATION OF CERCLES DIRECTLY AFFECTED 
BY RAILROADS
CERCLE 19081 19142 19253 19301
Tivaouane
Thids
Louga
131,082
74,656
O Q  C Z A
131,848
96,947
92,660
131,337
107,327
98,213
a
227,396° 
176, 124
Total: 
Thies+Tiva 
Tivaouane+ 
Louga
305,372 321,455 336,877 403,520
Baol
Sine-Saloum 
Niani-Ouli 
(later Tam- 
bacounda)
17 6,839 
171,203 
25,256
197,858
199,305
34,491
166,953
223,590
33,467
179,750°
291,471
41,224
Total: Baol+ 
Sine-Saloum+ 
Niani-Ouli
373,298 431,654 424,010 512,445°
Upper Gambia 22,564 25,833 42,067 20,680
Total Senegal 
(Includes 
other cercles 
and communes
4
1,173,000 1,280,933 1,354,000 1,638,000
(in 1910) (in 1926) (in 1931)
1 From SARS,DCF
2 From ARS,22G50
3 Table dated September 25, 1925 In SARS, DCF
4 From Lombard, Geographie Humaine, p.21
a Cercle of Tivaouane disbanded in 1928 and divided be­
tween neighboring cercles
b Figure includes population of new cercle of Djolof,
previously part of Louga cercle.
c Cantons of FandSne and Diack transferred from cercle of 
Baol to cercle of Thies in 1928.
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TABLE 20— CONTINUED
Sources:
1 From tables in Note sur difficultes creation TN.
2 Legregram report (Mission SOL) June 16, 1930, p. 33, 
FOM, TP.
3 Annual reports DSL Board of Directors to stockholders.
4 From Pruvost report (Mission Bagot), June 1, 1935,
FOM, TP.
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TABLE 21— CONTINUED 
(A) EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN EMPLOYEES
YEAR CENTRAL TOTAL "PERMANENT" TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
SERVICE EUROPEANS AFRICANS AFRICANS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES
PARIS -SENEGAL -SENEGAL SENEGAL
19202 36 103 590 693 7 29
19212 37 121 644 765 802
19222 37 137 682 819 856
19232 37 142 666 808 845
19 24 2 37 146 607 753 790
19252 39 158 642 800 839
19262 40 17 2 768 940 980
1927 2 41 176 812 988 1029
19282 43 149 804 953 996
19292 43 167 841 1008 1051
19317 146 165
ex-DSL7 90 126
1935 on'
TN
Sources :
1 From annual organization tables in FOM, Senegal XII, 74, 1885-1897./ 2 From list
remaining files DSL (Paris), 1913-1929./ 3 Petyt Report, DSL expenses 1888-1889, FOM, 
Senegal Xll, 69, p. 108./ 4 Petyt Report, DSL expenses 1890, FOM, Senegal XII, 69, 
p. 14./ 5 Figure from Launay note on DSL, April 10, 1920, FOM, TP./ 6 Fontaneilles 
Report, July 17, 1898, FOM, TP./ 7 Pruvost Report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 104 
a Including the 7 member board of directors.
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TABLE 21 
DSL EMPLOYEES
(B) TOTAL PER COMPANY DIVISION 
*(PARENTHESES, ( ), INDICATE NUMBER OF 
AFRICANS IN THE DIVISION
......... 7" - -  ' / _  7
YEAR CENTRAL CENTRAL MOVEMENT/ ROLLING/ TRACK MEDICAL/ GRAND
SERVICE SERVICE ( STOCK / / TOTAL
IN PARIS IN DAKAR
Dec. 1885* 25 24 85 132 46a 312
Dec. 1886-, 26 54 73 158 632 - 943
Dec. 18871" 23 16 88 117 582 11 837
Dec. 1888 26 17 96 133 522 9 803
Dec. 1889 25 13 95 130 493 9 765
Dec. 18901 25 16 93 129 499 8 770
1891 Sentence
Arbitral
operations
a forfait
Dec. 18911 24 13(3)* 94(39)* 125(53)* 474(463)* 6(4)* 736(562)*
Dec. 1892 24 17(3)* 105(58)* 148(139')* 548(530)* 7(5)* 849(735)*
18942 - 18 ? 154 571
Dec. 18951 27 18b 115(64)* 159(153)* 718(700)* 7(5)* 1044(922)*
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TABLE 21— CONTINUED
(B) TOTAL PER COMPANY DIVISION
YEAR CENTRAL CENTRAL MOVEMENT ROLLING TRACK MEDICAL GRAND
SERVICE SERVICE STOCK TOTAL
IN PARIS IN DAKAR
18962 19 ? 134 548 ?
1897 2 - 14 106 130 316 10 57 6
19003 32 19 112 138 ? 4 ?
SOURCES:
1 Prom DSL annual tables of organization in FOM, Senegal XII, 74.
2 Fontaneilles Report, July 17, 1898, FOM, TP.
3 Jacquerez Report, September 15, 1901, FOM, TP.
a Not Including locally recruited laborers.
b Africans in Central Service in 1895 lumped in with those of M ovement division.
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TABLE 22  
T K  AND TN EMPLOYEES 
( A )  EUROPEAN AND A FR IC A N  EMPLOYEES
YEAR EUROPEANS PERMANENT
A FR IC A N
CADRE
A FR ICANS  
ON CONTRACT
DAY
LABORERS
U N S K ILLE D
MANPOWER
TOTAL
A FR IC A N S
TK-19131 109 - - - - 7 27
TK-19172 70 30 - - - 658
TK-19192 97(73)a 45 - - - 804(816)a
TK-1920 70 55 - - - 832
TK-1921 92 72 - - - 1166
TK-1922 106 73 - - - 1316
TK-1924 360 315 - - - 5500
TN-1926^ 314 333 275 u
TN-1930 443a 225 290 823 6,152° (7,490)
TN-1931® 403 388 248
TN-1933^ 334 403 142 - - 3,699
TN-1935 268 373 106
only
DN1938 ° 349 802 - - - 7,648
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TABLE 22— CONTINUED
(A) EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN EMPLOYEES
Sources:
1 Launay note on TK, April 10, 1920, FOM, TP.
2 Lists in TK annual reports, FOM, TP.
3 Tables in ARS, 6P30-36.
4 From 1926 list of TN personnel, RA - Budget annex only.
5 Legregram Report, July 12, 1930, FOM, TP. (As of June 1930)-Budget Annex only.
6 Pruvost Report, June 25, 1935, FOM, TP, p. 104 - Budget Annex only.
7 Fiche dated February 22, 1933, ARS, IP 212-32.
8 From Compte Rendu de gestion-Direction chemins de fer-AOF, 1946, RA, p. 12 (tables
4 and 5).
a There were 298 of Cadre, 124 under contract and 21 temporary; of the total, 96 
were on vacation.
b 316 were in Movement, 1510 were in Rolling Stock, 4254 on Track and Buildings.
And 967 were in the 2eme Portion.
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TABLE 22
TK EMPLOYEES
(B) NUMBER WORKERS OP DIFFERENT 
STATUTES IN EACH DIVISION
Year CENTRAL &
GENERAL
SERVICES
MOVEMENT ROLLING
STOCK
TRACK & 
BUILDINGS
1917 : 
Euros 18 30 14 8
Afric Cadre - 25 -
Afric Day 5 138 268 222
Labor
1919:
Euros 21 47 16 8
Afric Cadre - 13 27 -
Afric Day 5b 217 293 249
Labor
1920:
Euros 22 29 16 5
Afric Cadre 14 31 5
Afric Day 5 294 297 236
Labor
1921:
Euros 27 30 27 7
Afric Cadre — 16 37 6
Afric Day 12b 294 354 384
Labor
1922:
Euros 27 41 33 5
Afric Cadre “■u 17 59 5
Afric Day 12 379 443 421
Labor 
Source:
a From lists in TK annual reports FOM, TP. 
b Not possible to tell whether they were in the Cadre or 
not.
c Total in Table 22 (A) includes workers on automobile 
service at Cotiari.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
GLOSSARY
TERMS
bour - royal title of the rulers of several states in the 
Senegambia.
bourba - the ruler of Djolof.
borom n'gadio - Wolof term for the family head entitled to 
occupy a plot of terrain for cultivation after 
having cleared it with tools.
cheminot - French term for railwayman.
communes-mixtes - mixed municipal and colonial system for 
governing a municipality, with the local French 
administrator serving as the mayor and an appointed 
municipal council.
creole - in Senegal, someone of mixed African and Euro­
pean ancestry.
crown bondsmen - from the French term "captifs de la 
couronne" indicating the slaves of the royal 
household, the chiefs of whom had in time risen to 
important political positions in Cayor by the 
mid-19th century as servitors of the darnel.
darnel - the ruler of Cayor.
degressive rates - French term for schedules of sliding- 
scale charges on a kilometric basis for freight 
hauling by rail; called "tapering" in England.
dioula - ambulant African traders, particularly those 
operating along trade routes in the interior.
-535-
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Direction - French term for a bureaucratic department 
within the French government (as within a 
ministry).
escales - French term originally signifying trading posts 
along the Senegal river; later applied generally 
to trading centers in Senegal, whether on the 
coast or inland, and especially used to designate 
the centers growing next to the rail stations.
facteur - grade of rail employee, inferior to station- 
master, serving at rail stations.
griot - in the Senegambia, member of an important strata 
of society of musicians, oral historians, and 
praise-singers.
hivernage - the season in Senegal of rain and humidity, 
lasting roughly from about June to November.
lamane - original occupier of a tract of land, laying 
claim to it by being the first to clear it with 
fire.
ma'itre des langues - French term for Africans interposing 
themselves as intermediaries in trade by intercep­
ting produce-bearing carriers on the routes 
leading into trading centers.
marabout - French term for Muslim religious leader.
marigot - in West Africa, French term for stream beds that 
fill with water during the hivernage, but dry out 
during the dry season.
metier - in Senegal, a professional skill introduced by
Europeans; in this work, specifically referring to 
the craft and industrial skills.
Mouride - member of a largely Wolof Muslim brotherhood
founded in Senegal in the 19th century by Ahmadou 
Bamba.
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navetane - French term for seasonal migrant worker coming 
from the interior to grow peanuts in coastal and 
rail areas of Senegal.
n'diatigui - intermediary in specialized market trans­
actions .
niayes - string of humid, fertile depressions along the 
west coast of Senegal.
prestations - labor obligation of a set number of days of 
work imposed on African residents of rural areas 
by the French colonial administration for 
maintenance and repair of roads, bridges, and 
other works supposedly of a local nature.
sofas - slaves used as warriors in African armies.
spahi - cavalryman in French African colonial military 
units.
talibe - student or follower of a marabout.
trader - the French term of "traitant" in Senegal gene­
rally meant African or creole intermediary traders.
tyeddo - a warrior, member of the warrior strata in the
Senegambia, generally used only to designate those 
adhering to fetishist custom.
ABBREVIATIONS
AMMP - Archives of the Ministry of Marine, Paris.
ANF - National Archives of France, Paris, rue Francs- 
Bourgeois.
AOF - Afrique Occidentale Francaise.
AP - "Affaires Politiques"- series in French National 
Archives, Section d'Outre-Mer.
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APA - "Affaires Politiques et Administratives."
ARS - National Archives of Senegal, Dakar.
ARS-L - library of the National Archives of Senegal.
BAO - Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale.
B.C.E.H.S.A.O.F. - Bulletin du Comite d*Etudes Historique 
et Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale 
Franyaise.
Bull Admin du Senegal - Bulletin Administratif du Senegal.
Bull. SGCB - Bulletin, Societe de Geographie Commerciale 
de Bordeaux.
Bull. SGC de Paris - Bulletin, Societe de G^ographie 
Commerciale de Paris.
CC - chamber of commerce.
Confid - series of unclassified registers in National 
Archives of Senegal.
DCF - unclassified dossiers of documents dealing with 
railroads and related subjects in the National 
Archives of Senegal, Dakar (literally stands for 
"dossiers des chemins de fer").
DN - Dakar-Niger railroad.
DSL - Dakar-Saint Louis railroad.
DSL(Paris) - archives of the DSL Company in Paris.
EX-RR - reference to African ex-railwaymen interviewed.
FOM- National Archives of France, Section d'Outre-Mer, 
rue Oudinot, Paris.
GG - Governor General of French West Africa.
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GS - Governor (or later Lt. Governor) of Senegal.
IGTP - Inspector General of Public Works of French West 
Africa.
JO-AOF - Journal Officiel de l'Afrique Occidentale 
Fran^aise.
JORF - Journal Officiel de la R&publique Frangaise
-Debgts Pari.-Chambre - Debats Parlementaires-Chambre 
-Ddbats Pari.-Sdnat - D6bats et Documents Parlemen- 
taires-S§nat.
JOS - Journal Officiel du Senegal.
KN - Kayes-Niger railroad.
MC - French Minister of Colonies.
MMC - French Minister of Marine and Colonies.
Moniteur du Senegal - Moniteur du Senegal et Dependances.
MTP - French Minister of Public Works.
P.V. - "prbces-verbal" (in English: minutes)
RA - archives of the R£gie des Chemins de Fer du 
Senegal.
Reg. - a set of three registers, minutes of the Commission 
de Verification des Comptes du chemin de fer de DSL.
S/Com(s) - Sub-commission(s).
SARS - unclassified "fonds du Senegal" at National Archives 
of Senegal.
SECCOA - Syndicat d'Etudes des Chemins de Fer de la Cote 
Occidentale d'Afrique.
StL - archives of the colonial government of Senegal 
still remaining at St. Louis (unclassified).
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TK - Thi^s-Kayes railroad.
TKN - Thi^s-Kayes-Niger railroad.
TN - Thi^s-Niger railroad.
TP - unclassified dossiers on railroads and public
works at the National Archives of France, 
Section d'Outre-Mer.
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